情緒主義
出典: フリー百科事典『ウィキペディア（Wikipedia）』 (2024/02/18 09:17 UTC 版)
情緒主義（じょうちょしゅぎ、英: emotivism）は、倫理的な文は命題ではなく、情緒的な態度を表現すると主張するメタ倫理学の見解である[1][2][3]。そのため、口語的には万歳・くたばれ説として知られている[4]。各々の道徳判断は個々人の好みや感情の表明に過ぎないとする立場であるため、道徳は客観的な合理性を持つものではないとして、理性で把握するような道徳法則を想定していない。20世紀における分析哲学と論理実証主義の成長の影響を受け、この理論はアルフレッド・エイヤーによって1936年の彼の著書『言語・真理・論理』で鮮やかに表現されたが[5]、 その発展はチャールズ・スティーブンソンによるものが多い[6]。
- ^ Garner and Rosen, Moral Philosophy, chapter 13 ("Noncognitivist Theories") and Brandt, Ethical Theory, chapter 9 ("Noncognitivism") regard the ethical theories of Ayer, Stevenson and Hare as noncognitivist ones.
- '^ Ogden and Richards, Meaning, 125: "'Good' is alleged to stand for a unique, unanalyzable concept … [which] is the subject matter of ethics. This peculiar ethical use of 'good' is, we suggest, a purely emotive use. … Thus, when we so use it in the sentence, This is good,' we merely refer to this, and the addition of "is good" makes no difference whatever to our reference … it serves only as an emotive sign expressing our attitude to this, and perhaps evoking similar attitudes in other persons, or inciting them to actions of one kind or another." This quote appears in an extended form just before the preface of Stevenson's Ethics and Language.
- ^ “Emotivism | philosophy” (英語). Encyclopedia Britannica. 2020年5月28日閲覧。
- ^ Philosophy of Meaning, Knowledge and Value in the Twentieth Century: Routledge History of Philosophy. Routledge. (2012). ISBN 9781134935727
- ^ Pepper, Ethics, 277: "[Emotivism] was stated in its simplest and most striking form by A. J. Ayer."
- ^ Brandt, Ethical Theory, 239, calls Stevenson's Ethics and Language "the most important statement of the emotive theory", and Pepper, Ethics, 288, says it "was the first really systematic development of the value judgment theory and will probably go down in the history of ethics as the most representative for this school ."
- ^ “quasi-realism” (英語). Oxford Reference. 2020年5月28日閲覧。
- ^ Zangwill, Nick (1993). “Quasi-Realist Explanation”. Synthese 97 (3): 287–296. doi:10.1007/BF01064071. ISSN 0039-7857. JSTOR 20117846.
- ^ Brandt, Ethical Theory, 221: "A recent book [The Language of Morals] by R. M. Hare has proposed a view, otherwise very similar to the emotive theory, with modifications …"
- ^ Wilks, Emotion, 79: "… while Hare was, no doubt, a critic of the [emotive theory], he was, in the eyes of his own critics, a kind of emotivist himself. His theory, as a consequence, has sometimes been depicted as a reaction against emotivism and at other times as an extension of it."
- ^ Berkeley, Treatise, paragraph 20: "The communicating of Ideas marked by Words is not the chief and only end of Language, as is commonly supposed. There are other Ends, as the raising of some Passion, the exciting to, or deterring from an Action, the putting the Mind in some particular Disposition …"
- ^ Stevenson, Ethics, 273: "Of all traditional philosophers, Hume has most clearly asked the questions that here concern us, and has most nearly reached a conclusion that the present writer can accept."
- ^ Hume, Enquiry, "Appendix I. Concerning moral sentiment"
- ^ Moore, Ethics, x: "Although this critique [of ethical naturalism] had a powerful impact, the appeal of Moore's nonnaturalistic cognitivism was, by contrast, relatively weak. In the decades following Principia, many philosophers who were persuaded by the former ended up abandoning cognitivism altogether in favor of the position that distinctively ethical discourse is not cognitive at all, but rather an expression of attitude or emotion."
- ^ Wilks, Emotion, 1: "… I do not take Ayer's ethical theory to hinge in any necessarily dependent sense upon his verificationist thesis … I take his ethical theory to hinge upon his verificationist thesis only to the extent that it assumes logic and empirical verification (and combinations thereof) to be the only means of firmly establishing the truth or falsity of any claim to knowledge."
- ^ Wilks, Emotion, 1: "… I do not take Ayer's ethical theory to hinge in any necessarily dependent sense upon his verificationist thesis … I take his ethical theory to hinge upon his verificationist thesis only to the extent that it assumes logic and empirical verification (and combinations thereof) to be the only means of firmly establishing the truth or falsity of any claim to knowledge."
- ^ Satris, Ethical Emotivism, 23: "Utilitarian, rationalist and cognitivist positions are in fact maintained by the members of the Vienna Circle who wrote in the fields of ethics, social theory and value theory, namely, Moritz Schlick, Otto Neurath, Viktor Kraft and Karl Menger."
- ^ “Ethics - Existentialism” (英語). Encyclopedia Britannica. 2020年5月28日閲覧。
- ^ Hare, Language, 14–15: "The suggestion, that the function of moral judgments was to persuade, led to a difficulty in distinguishing their functions from that of propaganda. … It does not matter whether the means used to persuade are fair or foul, so long as they do persuade. And therefore the natural reaction to the realization that someone is trying to persuade us is 'He's trying to get at me; I must be on my guard …' Such a reaction to moral judgments should not be encouraged by philosophers." After Pepper, Ethics, 297.
- ^ Seanor et al., Hare and Critics, 210. After Wilks, Emotion, 79.
- ^ Urmson, Emotive Theory, 15: "The earliest statement of the emotive theory of value terms in the modern British-American tradition (as opposed to statements in such continental writers as Haegerstroem, which became known to English-speaking philosophers only comparatively late and had no early influence) was, so far as I know, that given by I. A. Richards in a general linguistic and epistemological work, The Meaning of Meaning …"; Urmson, Emotive Theory, 16–17; Brandt, Ethical Theory, 206: "The earliest suggestions of the theory in the [20th] century have been made by W. H. F. Barnes and A. Duncan-Jones."
- ^ Ayer, Language, 103
- ^ Ayer, Language, 106
- ^ Ayer, Language, 107
- ^ Ayer, Language, 111
- ^ Wilks, Emotion, 1: "Stevenson's version, which was intended to qualify the earlier views of Ayer (and others) … will then be treated as an elaboration of Ayer's."
- ^ Satris, Ethical Emotivism, 25: "It might be suggested that there are two broad types of ethical emotivism. The first, represented by Stevenson, is well grounded in philosophical and psychological theory relating to ethics … The second, represented by Ayer, is an unorthodox spin-off of logical positivism."
- ^ Stevenson, Facts, 15; Hudson, Modern Moral Philosophy, 114–15
- ^ Stevenson, Facts, 21: "Both imperative and ethical sentences are used more for encouraging, altering, or redirecting people's aims and conduct than for simply describing them."
- ^ Wilks, Emotion, 20
- ^ Stevenson, Ethics, 21
- ^ Stevenson, Ethics, 27
- ^ Stevenson, Ethics, 27–28
- ^ Stevenson, Ethics, 207
- ^ Wilks, Emotion, 15, gives a similar example
- ^ Hudson, Modern Moral Philosophy, 130–31; Wilks, Emotion, 25–26
- ^ Stevenson, Ethics, 115–18
- ^ Wilks, Emotion, 25: "These are methods in which we scrutinise the factual beliefs that mediate between our fundamental and our derivative moral attitudes; where we argue about the truth of the morally relevant facts that are called upon in support of our or other people's derivative moral attitudes, eg. as when we argue about whether or not there is a causal connection between pornography and sexual violence." The moral "beliefs" Stevenson spoke of are referred to as "derivative moral attitudes" by Wilks in an attempt to avoid confusion between moral beliefs and "factual beliefs".
- ^ Stevenson, Ethics, 118–29
- ^ Stevenson, Ethics, 139–40
- ^ Stevenson, Ethics, 141
- ^ Wilks, Emotion, 26
- ^ Brandt, Ethical Theory, 225
- ^ a b Brandt, Ethical Theory, 226
- ^ Urmson, Emotive Theory, 38
- ^ Ross, Foundations, 33–34
- ^ Urmson, Emotive Theory, 38–40, 64
- ^ a b Stevenson, Ethics, 83
- ^ a b Stevenson, Ethics, 84
- ^ Philippa Foot, "Moral Beliefs," Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, vol. 59 (1958), pp. 83-104.
- ^ ibid., p. 96.
- ^ ibid., p. 97.
- ^ Urmson, Emotive Theory, 64–71
- ^ Wilks, Emotion, 45–46
[続きの解説]
情緒主義
出典: フリー百科事典『ウィキペディア（Wikipedia）』 (2021/08/17 17:32 UTC 版)
アルフレッド・エイヤーらの情緒主義 において自然主義的誤謬は新たな解釈をうける。価値判断を間投詞などと類比的な単なる情緒の表現だと考える。つまり、経験的なものであれ形而上学的なものであれ、何かの事実を記述するという事実命題とは、本質的に異なるタイプの判断である。この立場からは、自然主義的誤謬とは記述と情緒の表現というまったくことなる性質の行為を同一視しようとする誤りだということになる。
※この「情緒主義」の解説は、「自然主義的誤謬」の解説の一部です。
「情緒主義」を含む「自然主義的誤謬」の記事については、「自然主義的誤謬」の概要を参照ください。
情緒主義
出典: フリー百科事典『ウィキペディア（Wikipedia）』 (2019/07/14 04:22 UTC 版)
情緒主義（emotivism、情動主義とも訳される）はA・J・エイヤーやC・L・スティーヴンソンらの立場で、道徳判断は信念ではなく一種の感情の表現であり、あるいはそうした表現を通して相手の感情に訴えかけるための道具であると考える立場である。
※この「情緒主義」の解説は、「メタ倫理学」の解説の一部です。
「情緒主義」を含む「メタ倫理学」の記事については、「メタ倫理学」の概要を参照ください。
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