トレント号事件
出典: フリー百科事典『ウィキペディア（Wikipedia）』 (2021/04/17 11:05 UTC 版)
トレント号事件（トレントごうじけん、英: Trent Affairまたはメイソン・スライデル事件、英: Mason and Slidell Affair）は、アメリカ合衆国の南北戦争中に外交問題に発展した事件である。1861年11月8日、アメリカ海軍（北軍）のチャールズ・ウィルクス海軍中佐が指揮するUSSサンジャシントがイギリスの郵便船RMSトレントを拘束し、南軍の外交官、ジェイムズ・マレー・メイソンとジョン・スライデルの2人を戦時禁制として連行した。この2人はアメリカ連合国が独立国としてヨーロッパで外交認知されるために、イギリスとフランスに向かわせた使節だった。
- ^ Hubbard pg. 7. Hubbard further writes that Davis’ policy was “a rigid and inflexible policy based on economic coercion and force. The stubborn reliance of the Confederates on a King Cotton strategy resulted in a natural resistance to coercion from the Europeans. Davis’s policy was to hold back cotton until the Europeans “came to get it.” The opinions of Secretary of War Judah Benjamin and Secretary of the Treasury Christopher Memminger that cotton should be immediately exported in order to build up foreign credits was overridden by Davis. Hubbard pg. 21-25
- ^ Jones pp. 2–3. Hubbard p. 17. Mahin p. 12.
- ^ Berwanger p. 874. Hubbard p. 18. Baxter, The British Government and Neutral Rights, p. 9. Baxter wrote, “the British government, while defending the rights of British merchants and shipowners, kept one eye on the precedents and the other on the future interests of the mistress of the sea.”
- ^ Graebner p. 60–61.
- ^ Mahin p. 47. Taylor p. 177.
- ^ Mahin p. 7. Mahin notes that Seward had talked in the 1850s of annexing Canada and in February 1861 had spoken frequently of reuniting the North and South by a foreign war.
- ^ Dubrulle pg. 1234.
- ^ Donald, Baker, Holt pp. 311–312. Hubbard pp. 27–29
- ^ Jones pp. 3–4, 35.
- ^ Hubbard pp. 34–39. Walther p. 308. Russell had written to Lyons about the arrival of the three Confederates: “If it can possibly be helped, Mr. Seward must not be allowed to get us into a quarrel. I shall see the southerners when they come, but unofficially, and keep them at a proper distance.” Graebner p. 64.
- ^ Mahin p. 48. Graebner p. 63. Donald, Baker, Holt p. 312.
- ^ Mahin pp. 48–49. Hubbard p. 39. Jones p. 34
- ^ Donald, Baker pg. 314. Mahin pg. 48-49. Taylor pg. 175-179. Taylor notes that British officials already believed that Seward would provoke an international crisis as a diversion from the Union’s internal problems. For example, an article in the New York Times, believed to have been planted by Seward in order to transmit a warning to Britain, had said that any permanent dissolution of the Union would invariably lead to United States acquisition of Canada.
- ^ Mahin pg. 54-55. The negotiations between the United States and Britain failed when Lord Russell, aware that the treaty would obligate the British to treat Confederate privateers as pirates, informed Adams on August 19, 1861 that, “Her Majesty does not intend thereby to undertake any engagement which shall have any bearing, direct or indirect, on the internal differences now prevailing in the United States.”
- ^ Berwanger, pp 39-51
- ^ Mahin pg. 54-56. Hubbard pg 50-51.
- ^ Warren pg. 79-80.
- ^ Mahin pg. 98.
- ^ Mahin pg. 96-97.
- ^ Walther pg. 316-318. Hubbard pg. 43-44, 55. Monaghan pg. 174. Monaghan notes that as the news of the Trent Affair reached London, Russell made the following reply to written correspondence from the Confederate commissioners, “Lord Russell presents his compliments to Mr. Yancey, Mr. Rost, and Mr. Mann. He has had the honor to receive their letters of the 27th and 30th of November, but in the present state of affairs he must decline to enter into any official communication with them.”
- ^ Mahin pg. 58. Hubbard pg. 58
- ^ Weigley pg. 78. Weigley suggests an interesting alternative hypothesis to the traditional narrative of events when he writes, “The Confederate government may have intended the Mason-Slidell mission as a trap to bring the United States and Great Britain to war. The itinerary of the two emissaries was suspiciously well advertised. At Havana, they fraternized and dined with the officers of the San Jacinto, again publicizing their departure plans. On board the Trent, Slidell appeared unduly eager to become a captive.”
- ^ Hubbard pg. 60-61. Mahin pg. 58. Musicant pg. 110.
- ^ Musicant pg. 110-111
- ^ a b c d http://h42day.100megsfree5.com/histanex/11anxs/08trent.html
- ^ Musicant pg. 110-111. Mahin pg. 59
- ^ Musicant pg. 111. Monaghan pg. 173
- ^ Mahin pg. 59. Donald, Baker, Holt pg. 315. Ferris pg. 22. Wilkes later said that he had consulted “all the authorities on international law to which I had access, viz, Kent, Wheaton and Vattel, besides various decisions of Sir William Scott and other judges of the Admiralty Court of Great Britain.” Musicant pg. 111. Musicant notes that the availability of the law texts on San Jacinto were the result of the complex legal situations that were likely to have been encountered in its two year anti-slave-trade patrol of the African coast.
- ^ Donald, Baker, Holt pg. 314
- ^ Mahin pg. 59
- ^ Nevins pg. 387-388
- ^ Fairfax pg. 136-137
- ^ Fairfax pg. 137
- ^ Fairfax pg. 137-139. Ferris pg. 23-24
- ^ Mahin pg. 60. Ferris pg. 22. Monaghan pg. 167. Williams was the only British naval officer involved in the incident.
- ^ Mahin pg. 61. Ferris pg. 25-26. Fairfax pg. 140. Fairfax adds the following in his account of the proceedings, “I gave my real reasons some weeks afterward to Secretary Chase, whom I met by chance at the Treasury Department, he having asked me to explain why I had not literally obeyed Captain Wilkes's instructions. I told him that it was because I was impressed with England's sympathy for the South and felt that she would be glad to have so good a ground to declare war against the United States. Mr. Chase seemed surprised, and exclaimed, ‘You have certainly relieved the Government from great embarrassment, to say the least.’”
- ^ Mahin pg. 61
- ^ Ferris pg 32-33. Jones pg. 83. Jones wrote, “The seizure of these two Southerners in particular drew a triumphant response. Mason had been a principle (sic) advocate of the hated Fugitive Slave Law and the Kansas-Nebraska Act, and Slidell had earned a reputation as one of the most dedicated secessionists in Congress.” Charles Francis Adams Jr. pg. 541. Charles Francis Adams Jr., son of the U. S. Minister to Great Britain, wrote, “Probably no two men in the entire South were more thoroughly obnoxious to those of the Union side than Mason and Slidell.”
- ^ Ferris pg. 33-35
- ^ Charles Francis Adams Jr. pg 548-549
- ^ Charles Francis Adams Jr. pg. 547
- ^ Charles Francis Adams Jr.pg. 548
- ^ Charles Francis Adams Jr. pg. 548.
- ^ Ferris pg. 34.
- ^ Jones pg 83.
- ^ Jones pg. 89.
- ^ Ferris pg. 35-36
- ^ Donald, Holt, Baker pg. 315
- ^ Nevins pg. 392-393. Jones pg. 89
- ^ Mahin pg. 62. Nevins pg. 392-393.
- ^ Mahin pg. 64. Warren pg. 170-171
- ^ Warren pg. 173.
- ^ Niven pp. 270-273.
- ^ Jones pg. 88. Warren pg. 174-175.
- ^ Warren pg. 175-176.
- ^ Mahin pg. 64-65. Nevins pg. 389. The Nashville had captured and destroyed the Union merchant ship Harvey Birch on its trip. Adams tried to have the ship declared a pirate. British authorities held it briefly in port, but by November 28 Russell had determined that she was properly documented as a CSA warship, and its officers were properly credentialed by the CSA. Ferris pg. 37-41
- ^ Mahin pg. 65
- ^ Baxter, “Papers Relating to Belligerent and Neutral Rights, 1861-1865 pg. 84-86. Warren pg. 96-97. Warren writes that at a cabinet meeting on November 11 Lord Chancellor Richard Bethell, an Admiralty judge for twenty three years, and Dr. Stephen Lushington, a judge on the High Court of the Admiralty, both argued that simply removing the envoys would not have been a violation of international law.
- ^ Donald, Baker pg. 316. Mahin pg. 25.
- ^ Donald, Baker, and Holt pg. 315
- ^ Warren pg. 107
- ^ Warren pg. 105.
- ^ Mahin pg. 69
- ^ Warren pg. 106-107
- ^ Warren pg. 109
- ^ Ferris pg 44
- ^ Warren pg. 109.
- ^ Jones pg. 84-85. Ferris pg. 52. Mahin pg. 69. Lyons, in a private letter, reported to Palmerston that (although he could not “vouch for the truth” of his source) he had heard that unbeknownst to Lincoln, Seward had directly ordered the capture by Wilkes. Mahin pg. 70.
- ^ Mahin pg 68-69
- ^ Jones pg. 85.
- ^ Ferris pg. 52- 53.
- ^ Warren pg. 146-147
- ^ Ferris pg. 76. Clarendon in September, anticipating the U.S. would pick a fight with Britain wrote that he felt “N[apoleon] w[oul]d instantly leave us in the lurch and do something in Europe w[hic]h we can’t stand.”
- ^ Warren pg. 85.
- ^ Ferris pg. 79.
- ^ Ferris pg. 80-84.
- ^ Warren pg. 149-152.
- ^ Baxter, The British Government and Neutral Rights pg. 10-12.
- ^ Baxter, The British Government and Neutral Rights pg. 14
- ^ Bourne pg 601
- ^ Bourne pg. 601
- ^ Bourne pg. 602-605
- ^ Bourne pg 604-605
- ^ Bourne pg. 600
- ^ Ferris pg. 63
- ^ Donald, Holt,Baker pg. 316. Ferris pg 62
- ^ Ferris pg 64
- ^ Ferris pg. 64. Warren pg. 133. Bourne pg. 607.
- ^ Warren pg. 132-133. Mahin pg. 72. Ferris pg. 65. Ferris indicates in footnote no. 30 on page 219 that his account is based largely on Bourne who “is the only scholar, I believe, who has examined most of the pertinent archival sources.”
- ^ Warren pg. 134. Warren further wrote, “At Toronto and Kingston, he proposed earthworks with heavy ordnance, and allocated two hundred men for extending and strengthening them. A new ten-gun battery was to replace the rusty cannon overlooking the Grand Trunk Railway tracks, wharf, and channel, and a Royal Artillery officer arrived to instruct men in its use. Williams wanted to blow bridges over the St. Lawrence and, in the event of attack, close Toronto by sinking ships. Desperate moves were necessary.”
- ^ Bourne pg. 611
- ^ a b Warren pg. 133.
- ^ Warren pg. 134.
- ^ Warren pg. 135
- ^ Warren pg. 34-35
- ^ Bourne pg. 609. Bourne wrote, “The vast length of the exposed frontier made it virtually impossible for the British to defend it in its entirety – but, worse, the Americans were peculiarly well placed to attack it. They not only had superior local resources in men and material, they also had excellent communications for concentrating those resources upon the frontier and for reinforcing them from the heart of commercial and industrial America – in fact sufficiently good communications in Macdougall’s view to outweigh the difficulties of a winter campaign.”
- ^ Bourne pg. 610-613. On the lake situation Bourne wrote, “Quite clearly there could be no hope of securing the command of the lakes unless adequate preparations were made in advance of hostilities. But the time was peculiarly unfavorable for such measures; the whole question of colonial military expenditure had recently been investigated by a committee of the house of commons whose bias was plainly to encourage greater efforts on the part of the colonists themselves. On 17 October, therefore, Somerset had concluded that the defence of all the lakes would be ‘very difficult’ and that the main effort must be left to the Canadians themselves, though ‘perhaps with proper arrangements we might defend Lake Ontario and Kingston Dockyard.’ But even for this limited programme no preparation had been made by the time Lewis raised the matter at the Cabinet of 4 December. Nor was anything done later.”
- ^ Bourne pg 620-621. On December 26 de Gray had prepared a memorandum indicating 7,640 troops would be needed for the initial attack. Macdougall had prepared a memorandum on December 3 in which he suggested that 50,000 troops would be necessary to guarantee success.
- ^ Bourne pg. 625-626. Washington wrote, “Possibly a very strict blockade, without an attack, might induce the people of Maine to consider whether it would not be for their interest to declare themselves independent of the United States, and so profit by all the advantages that would be derived from railway communication with Canada and the Lakes.”
- ^ The Times, 6th January 1862, pg 9 and The Times, 8th January 1862, pg 19
- ^ 10th February 1862, pg10
- ^ The Times, 8th January 1862, pg 10
- ^ Campbell, pg. 64
- ^ Campbell, pg. 60-63
- ^ Moody et al, pg. 775-776
- ^ Baxter, The British Government and Neutral Rights pg 16. Bourne pg. 623-627.)
- ^ Baxter, The British Government and Neutral Rights pg. 17
- ^ Bourne pg. 627 fn 4
- ^ Bourne pg 625
- ^ Bourne pg. 623-624.
- ^ Warren pg. 154
- ^ Weigley pg. 80-81.
- ^ Bourne pg. 630. Bourne wrote (pg. 231), “By the destruction of American shipping, by a severe blockade, by the harassing of the Northern coastal cities and perhaps by the occupation of Maine the British might, while being unable to secure a decisive military victory, not only draw off the enemy from hard-pressed Canada and inspire the South morally and materially, but, above all, so sap the North’s moral and economic strength as to bring her Government to sue for peace on unfavourable terms.”
- ^ Mahin pg. 73.
- ^ Ferris pg. 131-135
- ^ Donald pg. 31-36
- ^ Donald pg. 36-38
- ^ Mahin pg. 70. Ferris pg. 180.
- ^ Ferris pg.80
- ^ Mahin pg. 98. Warren pg. 158. The words in quotes are Dayton’s.
- ^ Weigley pg. 79. Ferris pg. 181-182.
- ^ Ferris pg. 181-183. Taylor pg. 184.
- ^ Taylor pg. 184
- ^ Ferris pg. 184
- ^ Ferris pg. 188-191
- ^ Ferris pg. 192-196.
- ^ Hubbard pg. 64
- ^ Jones pg. 117-137
- ^ Jones pg. 138-180.
- ^ Jones pg. 223.
[続きの解説]
トレント号事件
出典: フリー百科事典『ウィキペディア（Wikipedia）』 (2020/12/23 08:31 UTC 版)
「チャールズ・ウィルクス」の記事における「トレント号事件」の解説
詳細は「トレント号事件」を参照 ウィルクスはその任務の一環としてイギリス領バミューダ諸島を訪れた。ウィルクスは命令に従って行動する中で、その旗艦USSワチュセットに乗船したまま1週間近くも港に停泊した。これはアメリカ海軍の艦船は1日のみ港内に留まることができるというイギリスの規則を破ったものだった。ウィルクスが港に留まっている間に、アメリカ連合国の封鎖破りの重要な基地であるセントジョージ港を、ウィルクス配下の砲艦USSタイオガとUSSソノマが封鎖した。これら砲艦はイギリスの郵便運搬蒸気船マーリンに発砲した。 アメリカ連合国がイギリスに送った特使ジェイムズ・マレー・メイソンとジョン・スライデルの2人が、イングランドに向かうイギリスの郵便船RMSトレントに乗船していることをウィルクスが知ったとき、その蒸気フリゲート艦USSサンジャシントを使って郵便船を停船させる命令を出した。1861年11月8日、サンジャシントはトレントに遭遇すると、船首を超えて2発の砲弾を放ち、トレントを停戦させた。サンジャシントの船長が率いた移乗部隊がトレントに乗り移り、メイソンとスライデルを逮捕した。この2人の使節はボストン港のウォーレン砦に連行された。 バミューダの新聞は「悪名高きウィルクス」と名付けた。そのウィルクスの行動によって、アメリカ合衆国とイギリスの全面戦争が避けられないと多くの者が考えた。 ウィルクスはアメリカ合衆国議会の決議で公式に感謝の意を表された。しかし、イギリス政府の外交圧力のためにリンカーン大統領がウィルクスの行動を否定することになった。メイソンとスライデルは釈放された。ウィルクスの次の任務はバージニア州ジェームズ川の船隊だった。1862年7月16日には海軍代将に昇進し、西インド諸島で封鎖破りに対抗する任務を割り当てられた。
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