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  • 李 秉哲
    アジア研究
    2022年 68 巻 3 号 1-19
    発行日: 2022/07/31
    公開日: 2022/08/10
    [早期公開] 公開日: 2022/06/20
    ジャーナル フリー

    This article aims to add a new perspective on how the Japanese government conducted Japan-South Korea negotiations on security-economic cooperation during the early 1980s.

    The Zenko Suzuki administration judged that Japan could not meet the U.S. government’s expectations of strengthening its own defense capabilities. For this reason, the administration expressed willingness to cooperate with the U.S. for the economic and social development of strategically important countries. This was intended to work as a means to achieve the ‘comprehensive security’ policy adopted by the Masayoshi Ohira administration and burden-sharing in the U.S.-Japan Alliance. In other words, Japan had an economic cooperation policy that aimed to support developing countries, while recognizing the political impact of foreign aid. Japan had this policy in place before South Korea’s request in 1981 for 10 billion dollars in economic assistance.

    The Suzuki administration had already acknowledged the need to support South Korea to ensure Japan’s cooperative relationship with the U.S. Nevertheless, there was a marked contrast in position between Japan and South Korea during the early stages of the negotiations on the official purpose and contents of economic cooperation. Steady negotiation efforts were necessary to create a situation where the Japanese Prime Minister could make bold political judgments and take action on this issue.

    The Japanese government later decided to negotiate with South Korea based upon its main principles of economic cooperation, such as ‘improving people’s livelihood’ and ‘maintaining a balance among beneficiary countries’, while recognizing the political nature of such cooperation and its indirect contribution to Korea’s security. In other words, the Japanese government intended to maintain its own initiative on economic cooperation while responding flexibly to South Korea’s request for aid.

    During the negotiations, the Japanese side had explicitly stated that it could not agree with Korea’s view that Japan should promote economic cooperation with Korea in order to ease Korea’s military burden. However, Japan did express some understanding of South Korea’s situation and Korea accepted Japan’s assertion that it would contribute to Korea’s economic and social stability. Negotiations then made progress and the two sides agreed on the official purpose for economic cooperation and the amount of assistance from Japan to Korea. Under these circumstances, Prime Minister Suzuki played an important role in deciding the proportion of Japan’s ODA to the total amount of assistance to South Korea. He also explained Japan’s position during the summit talks and dispatched his special envoys to Korea. Consequently, the differences in stance between the two countries on the content of the assistance was narrowed to a considerable extent before the inauguration of the Yasuhiro Nakasone administration.

    However, negotiations between Japan and South Korea were suspended during the Japanese history textbook controversy that surfaced at the end of June 1982. When the textbook issue was settled, Suzuki announced that he would not run in the Liberal Democratic Party leadership election. Therefore, the Nakasone administration assumed responsibility for resolving the remaining issues.

    There is thus room for further consideration of whether the Suzuki administration’s pacifist stance should be regarded as the reason behind the failure of negotiations with South Korea. It is important to bear in mind the necessity of examining various aspects of Japan’s domestic and international situations. Furthermore, Japan-South Korea negotiations on security-economic cooperation revealed a high degree of policy continuity among the Ohira, Suzuki and Nakasone administrations.

  • ―要員の安全確保をめぐって―
    庄司 貴由
    国際安全保障
    2012年 39 巻 4 号 101-118
    発行日: 2012/03/31
    公開日: 2022/04/14
    ジャーナル フリー
  • ―ビジョンに終わらせないステップを考える―
    河野 道夫
    21世紀東アジア社会学
    2021年 2021 巻 11 号 178-190
    発行日: 2021/09/30
    公開日: 2021/12/17
    ジャーナル フリー

     東南アジア諸国連合(ASEAN10ヵ国)に日中韓を加えた13ヵ国(ASEAN Plus Three=APT)が、2001年に「東アジア共同体」を提起してから今年で20年になる。このAPTにオーストラリア(豪)とニュージーランド(NZ)を加えた15 ヵ国は2020年、地域包括的経済連携(RCEP)協定を締結するなど進展もあったが、南沙諸島・尖閣諸島など領土問題や、徴用工・従軍慰安婦など戦争責任と戦後処理の問題があり、いまだに「東アジア人」としての一体感や連帯感の育つ環境ではない。しかし、それは主として政府間のことで、日常生活の中では人々の国境を超えた接触・交流の機会が増大し、次第に視野は東アジアに拡大している。 本稿は、その状況の中で東アジア共同体「構想」を推進するための基礎的で現実的なステップを追求する。

  • ―冷戦後日本外交の新局面―
    白鳥 潤一郎
    国際安全保障
    2018年 45 巻 4 号 68-85
    発行日: 2018/03/31
    公開日: 2022/04/01
    ジャーナル フリー
  • 外務省内における議論を中心に
    木村 隆和
    国際政治
    2011年 2011 巻 164 号 164_129-142
    発行日: 2011/02/20
    公開日: 2013/05/22
    ジャーナル フリー
    The purpose of this article is to revisit a very controversial issue-the evaluation of the Sato Eisaku Cabinet's China policy from 1970 to 1972-through the clarifications regarding the situation in Japan's Ministry of Foreign Affairs during the period. Since, in the wake of World War II, the Allied Powers had dismantled the Japanese Imperial Army and Navy, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs has been the central bureaucracy, being responsible for the planning and drafting of the diplomatic and security policies of the Japanese government. However, preceding studies have not focused adequate attention on the very important issue of how the high officials of the ministry had discussed the Japanese government's China policy in the era. This article analyzes the issue empirically on the basis of primary sources, which mainly comprise the recently declassified diplomatic documents of the Japanese government.
    Because the Japanese government has disclosed a very limited number of diplomatic documents thus far, the quality of information through these Japanese sources tends to be extremely fragmentary. I have invested considerable effort to organize the pieces of fragmented information and painstakingly compared them not only with preceding works but also with the documents declassified by the White House and the U.S. Department of State. During the course of those lengthy and difficult procedures, I discovered certain historical facts that are very important for studying the Japanese government's postwar foreign policy.
    These facts prove that the ministry failed to formulate a strategic response to the drastic transformation of the international situation in the early 1970s. These facts also reveal that the ministry decided to normalize its relations with China and severe diplomatic relations with Taiwan, as early as immediately after the Taiwanese government was expelled from the U.N. on October 25, 1971. In addition, before the formation of Tanaka Kakuei's Cabinet on July 7, 1972, the ministry succeeded in mending U.S.-Japan relations, which had been seriously damaged by President Nixon's unilateral initiative for the U.S.-China reconciliation.
    Lastly, I would like to draw your attention to another very important point regarding the manner in which Hashimoto Hiroshi, who served as the chief of the “China Section” for the ministry during the period, evaluated the far eastern policy of the Nixon administration. He is conventionally recognized as a “pro-China” Japanese diplomat or as having a “sense of independence from Washington,” because he consistently asserted the prompt normalization of relations with China. However, his assertions regarding the China policy was based on his expectation that Washington's commitment to the defense of Taiwan was very stable and reliable, and it meant that the conventional views of him could be oversimplifications.
  • 七〇年安保前後の東京と沖縄
    村井 良太
    年報政治学
    2017年 68 巻 2 号 2_122-2_148
    発行日: 2017年
    公開日: 2020/12/26
    ジャーナル フリー

    1960年代から1970年代の日本では保守長期政権下にもかかわらず 「革新自治体」 が全国に広がった。ここでは事例研究の一方法である政治史を用いて, 佐藤栄作政権 (1964 ~ 1972) が革新自治体の隆盛にどう向き合ったのかを, 特に重視された東京都と琉球政府/沖縄県に注目して分析した。明らかになったのは, 第一に, 保守中央政府・陣営も革新地方政府・陣営もともに日米安保条約が再検討期を迎える1970年を重視していた。第二に, 同じく双方とも, 政治・行政の科学化と社会開発を共通目標としていた。第三に, 佐藤政権は予想される70年安保や沖縄返還という困難な課題と向き合う中で革新地方政府を地域住民の代表として彼らと協働した。そして第四に, 革新自治体は複合的性格を持っており, 1970年以降, ローカル・オポジションの拠点から市民参加や自治体改善運動の場へと変化していった。

  • ――北朝鮮の国際海事機関(IMO)加盟問題を中心に――
    李 秉哲
    国際政治
    2023年 2023 巻 209 号 209_130-209_145
    発行日: 2023/03/15
    公開日: 2023/06/29
    ジャーナル 認証あり

    This article examines why the Japanese government supported South Korea’s efforts to postpone deliberations on North Korea’s application for the IMO membership in 1984.

    The Nakasone administration valued Japan-South Korea relations and it appears likely that Japan would have been willing to cooperate with South Korea on foreign policy. However, since the 1970s, the Japanese government had consistently supported North Korea’s participation in international organizations and had been seeking to improve relations with North Korea, to stabilize the Korean Peninsula. Soon after the Rangoon bombing incident of 1983, Japan and the U.S. agreed not to push North Korea too hard, for fear of triggering dangerous military action, but to induce inter-Korean dialogue to ease tensions on the Korean Peninsula. Taking these facts into account, Japan’s decision to support Korea cannot be said to be self-evident. In addition, relatively few studies have been devoted to an analytic, detailed examination of how the Japanese government strived to achieve peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula during the Second Cold War.

    In connection with these issues, I propose that Japan’s diplomacy during the Second Cold War was multifaceted in that it sought to achieve the goal of cooperation with friends and partners as a member of the Western camp while promoting easing tensions on the Korean Peninsula as a leader in Asia.

    In consideration of major Western countries’ negative and skeptical attitudes toward North Korea, the Japanese government viewed that it was not desirable to immediately approve of North Korea’s membership in the IMO. However, the principle of universality in international organizations and the stability on the Korean Peninsula were pursued simultaneously by Japan. For instance, the Japanese government believed that Japan’s incitement of conflicts between the two Koreas would not only deteriorate Japan-North Korea relations but also hinder an environment conducive to the resumption of inter-Korean dialogue. Furthermore, the Japanese government remained unchanged in its position that North Korea’s participation in international cooperation could contribute to weakening North Korea’s belligerence in East Asia. Accordingly, the Japanese government agreed to support the postponement of deliberations on North Korea’s IMO membership. However, the Nakasone administration also considered it inappropriate for Japan to directly propose the postponement as requested by Korea.

    It is generally acknowledged that Japan was not competent enough to end the Cold War in East Asia or resolve the Korean problem. Nevertheless, this study argues that Japan contributed to stability on the Korean Peninsula and in East Asia through bilateral and multilateral diplomacy during the Second Cold War. It is thus important to bear in mind the necessity of examining various aspects of Japanese diplomacy during the Cold War, in addition to examining Japan’s reluctant response to the Cold War structure.

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