Sino–American rapprochement in the early 1970s had a dramatic effect on the Korean Peninsula. Recently declassified US government documents shed new light on the importance of the ‘Korean question’ during secret talks held between the United States and China. This article contends that Sino–American rapprochement constituted a kind of ‘intermediate settlement’ of the Korean War and ultimately influenced the transformation of the ‘divided Korea system’.
Two primary factors in the Korean question confronted the United States and China in their talks for rapprochement.
(1) The role of the US Army in South Korea
Mutual understanding regarding the role of the US armed forces in Korea (USFK) was a precondition for US–China reconciliation. The USFK acted as a ‘deterrent’ against an attack from Chinese/North Korean armed forces during and after the Korean War, whereas China regarded the US military presence as a‘ threat’ to its own security. Consequently, it was necessary for the United States to convince China that the USFK was not intended for action against China. The newly agreed role of the USFK was a ‘stabilizer’, which was expected to keep the balance of power in Northeastern Asia, in particular by checking the potential expansionism of the Soviet Union and Japan. With China’s understanding of the USFK’s role and its continued deployment, the Nixon administration abandoned the plan of extending the Nixon Doctrine to South Korea.
(2) The presence of the United Nations in the Korean Peninsula
The United States and the United Nations designated China and North Korea as‘ belligerent parties’ in the Korean War. Sino–American rapprochement and the admission of China to the UN (China–UN rapprochement), however, fundamentally changed this structure of confrontation. China demanded in particular the dissolution of the UN Commission for Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea (UNCURK). Having been founded during the Korean War, UNCURK symbolized a claim that South Korea was the only legitimate government on the Korean Peninsula. Washington and Beijing agreed to abolish the UNCURK ‘quietly’ in the UN General Assembly in 1973. This suggested that the international community, including the United States and China, recognized ‘two antagonistic legitimate governments’ on the Korean Peninsula.
The driving force behind Sino–American co-operation for reframing the Korean question was the common interest in the stabilization of the divided Korea system. In retrospect, we can say that a new crisis management system emerged out of Sino–American rapprochement, which could be called the ‘Sino–American Concert of the Korean Peninsula’. From the point of view of the two Koreas, however, Sino–American joint engagement in the Korean question meant in effect the suspension of unification.

抄録全体を表示

This paper examines changes in the Thai perception of China during the Thanom administration (1963–73), when Thailand turned from “hostilities” to “rapprochement” toward China. The paper attempts to clarify the changing perceptions, their causes, and the logic used by the government in attempting the policy shift.

The decade under study is categorized into three periods: (1) confrontation (1963–68), (2) adjustment (1968–71), and (3) rapprochement (1971–73). During the confrontation period, the demonization of China, the deification of the United States, domino theory, and forward defense doctrine were adopted to justify Thailand’s participation in the Vietnam War. During the adjustment period, opinion toward China was divided into two groups: Foreign Minister Thanat Khoman, students, and some intellectuals encouraged rapprochement with China, while other military-related officials opposed it. During the rapprochement period, under international pressure, Thanom’s military administration felt the urge to approach China. China was then dichotomized from the image of Communism and recreated into a “converted criminal.” The image changes during each period were not only the result of domestic and international conditions but also helped facilitate the government’s policy shifts.

抄録全体を表示