by Seyoum
Hameso and Tilahun Ayano Nebo
The problem
The
notion of minority is sometimes misleading. It is used to refer to ethnic,
national, religious and social groups or other collective entities embraced
within a larger entity. Quite often the term ‘minority group’ refers to
numerical insignificance of population groups. But this has problems in some
contexts. Numerical majority can be a minority in terms of political
representation whereas numerical minority can be a political majority. This is
particularly true of Ethiopia. The author takes the case of ‘the largest
ethnic group in the country, the Oromo,’ as being ‘politically and
socially marginalized and thus might be regarded, politically speaking as a
‘minority’ group; while representatives from a numerical minority group
constituting c. 6 per cent of the population, the Tigreans, currently hold the
central power, and Tigreans are thus not classified as a ‘minority’ in
this context’. (p.5)
This
Minority Rights Group International (MRG) report by Kjetil Tronvoll introduces
Ethiopia as a country of ‘multiple of ethnic groups’ (p.6). Even after
consulting the 1994 Ethiopian census, he joins many others in saying ‘nobody
knows exactly how many ethnic groups and minorities there are in Ethiopia’
(p.7). Such a statement is not surprising since doubts about peoples, their
numbers and their cultures are all too common in situations as Ethiopia where
subsequent polities have a problem of promoting a single ethnie while
suppressing others. The result is an all too common misrepresentation and
misinformation about people. The author too fails into this trap when he
states that Sidama is characterised by a ‘caste system’ (p. 9) which is of
course far from truth. As a matter of fact Sidama prizes itself of its
egalitarian Luwa age-set system, very similar to the Gada system of the Oromo,
which had been undermined by the Abyssinian conquest which replaced it with
hierarchically ranked ethnic and power relations. The problem of
misrepresentation, however, is not confined to Sidama. There has never been
enough understanding of many other cultures and traditions. Even then this
report is different from many other works by western scholars about the
peoples and the polity in Ethiopia. Humanitarian concerns are visible
throughout the report.
The author is the director of the Horn of Africa
Programme at the Norwegian Institute of Human Rights, University of Oslo. In
this report, he provides a brief historical account of the Abyssinian conquest
(p.12) which had formed the basis of the modern Ethiopia. The report does not
hide the similarity between the Abyssinian conquest and European colonisation
of Africa and the problems associated with historical inequities. The author
makes reference to methods common to most Ethiopian regimes: the coercive
nature of the state, the promotion of the process of acculturation,
assimilation, and Amharanisation. Thus ‘the establishment of the Ethiopian
borders at the start of the twentieth century is at the core of the today’s
political controversy in the Horn of Africa.’ (p.13). This colonial polity
necessarily contains a multitude of centrifugal forces; the empire was
sustained largely by force of domineering centre controlled by Amharic and
which is now partly challenged by the ascendance of the TPLF to power.
The
transitional charter & the constitution
It
is true that the Abyssinian political system’s traditional governorship of centre-periphery remained of the key problems of the country. With the growing
awareness the issue came to public debate in the last four decades starting
with the issue of land, languages and ‘nations and nationalities’. Both
the Haile Selassie autocracy and the derg’s
military rule were not in a position to solve the key problems that have their
root in the colonial venture of the Ethiopian emperor, Menelik. It is with
this background that the Ethiopian Peoples Revolutionary Democratic Front
(EPRDF) led by the Tigrean People’s Liberation Front came to power in 1991.
A
chapter on the transition from unitary state to ethnic federation is
controversial. Here the author looks into the initial years of the transition
(1991-95), the transitional charter itself, Eritrean independence, the
constitution and the elections. Two aspects stand out: the constitution and
the federal dimension. In what looks like a ‘constitution for a Nation of
Nations’, the EPRDF placed on paper so many grand ideals to encompass
individual and collective rights. In idealism of all untold proportions, the TPLF/ERPRDF regime raised, through the constitutional formation which it
meticulously controlled, various issues which had remained taboos in Ethiopian
and Ethiopianist discourse.
The
open manifestation of prioritising collective national rights such as
linguistic, and associated political demarcations gave an image of a
government truly committed to reform the empire. Within this framework, the
adoption of ‘ethnic federalism’ seemed to give power to the hitherto
oppressed and suppressed political minorities. To many outside
observers, this remains the most intriguing part of the discussion of the
Ethiopia of EPRDF.
A
new start or a slow trek into the past?
The
author of the report contrasts the new constitution with the Ethiopian recent
past. Much of the appraisal of the constitution is grounded on this
fundamental comparison of the new experiment with Ethiopia’s political past.
It then restructured the state through ethnic federalism and drafted the 1994
Constitution. The constitution is regarded as radical in so far as ‘granting
every ethnic group … the right to self-determination up to and including
secession’. (p.5) Credit is offered to the government for these measures and
hence the title with a question mark: Ethiopia: A New Start? Arguably, the
very issues which the government is given credit are, as we see below,
problematic, controversial and mere window dressing.
As
to the constitution, it is correct to quote a scholar who told the author that
‘[it] is only meant for foreign consumption, and not for internal
implementation’. Thus the EPRDF venture has more to do with image building
than true reform in substance. While the image of the constitution appears to
be ‘minority friendly’, its implementation is skewed towards the ruling
minority which became a political majority.
The
report has other doubts about the constitution that it may legitimise ethnic
conflicts. We would argue that the constitution does not in itself legitimise
ethnic conflict, but the lack of its implementation necessarily breeds
conflict. An entrenched oppression by the ruling TPLF is likely to legitimise
and extend the seeds of more conflicts.
The
quest for self-determination of national groups was already there long before
the constitution. It will also be there whatever forms the oppressive empire
politics may take. Indeed, in a political culture of Ethiopia where
Abyssinians claim that they are the only ‘chosen people’ to rule,
ethno-national political and cultural demands are the only way to air the
grievances and the plight of ethnic or national groups. As long as the
politics of domination and control exists in the name of unity or democracy,
the struggle of oppressed ethnic groups there will be the possibility of
conflicts. It is only the end of oppression and domination that will create a
ground for peaceful co-existence of different groups. In this sense, TPLF’s
start is neither a good start nor new. All it is doing it to buy time in its
long trek into the past. Ethiopian politics under the TPLF is not new but a
false start.
Federation
The
other misused term in Ethiopia of today is what is termed as ‘ethnic
federalism’. It is often imposed from Ethiopianist discourse which is at
loggers with the presumed policies of collective empowerment for ethnic and
national groups.
For
the formerly advantaged groups, the transitional government’s policy of
demarcating the ‘regional’ and ‘state’ boundaries on the basis of what
they say ethnic ‘killils’, an Amharic term, on top of making several
languages the languages of office and education was unpalatable. Hence the
‘ethnic’ connotation to the arrangement which has its own drawbacks from
the perspective of the oppressed nations and peoples.
In a sense, the opposition of the former ruling circles is not only to
the TPLF/EPRDF and its policies per se, it is to the legitimising aspect of
the problems that haunted Ethiopia since the conquest. That is, its subsequent
regimes have been extensively centrist, oppressive and coercive. These groups
are posed to oppose any idea of federation that takes power from a unitary
state, be it ethnic, national or international.
Neither
is the TPLF/EPRDF sincere in its policy of federalism and federal states. This
can be seen in the manners the polity runs, how the federal states were formed
and run. While we don’t delve into the deep discussion of this aspect, it is
sufficient to indicate some and only some of the centrist aspects of the TPLF
despite its pronouncements. For example, at the beginning of the Transitional
Government, there were 14 regions. Sidama was one of them. In terms of
population numbers, economic or any criteria this nation is no position to be
prevented from having the status given to Harar, Benshangul, Tigray or even to
the Amhara ‘states’. But in a few years of experimentation, the EPRDF
government merged Sidama into what became the mouthful Southern Nations
Nationalities and People’s Regional State whose capital and president are
nonetheless Sidama.
This
forced unionisation is not unique to TPLF, it is common in the beleaguered
history of the empire state of Ethiopia. Even by taking the nominal federal
regions by the word, they are now composed of nine ‘states’: the Amhara
and Tigray ‘states’ in the northern highlands, Oromia ‘state’ in the
central and south, Afar and Somali ‘states’ in the eastern lowlands, a
mouthful of Southern NNPR ‘state’, in the south, Gambella and Benshangul
‘states’ in the west, and the city ‘state’ of Harar. Cities like Addis
Ababa which houses the ruling elite have an undeclared state status.
Recently
the seat of Oromia is transferred from Addis Ababa to a hundred kilometres
south, to Adama (Nazareth). These and other more significant geographical
gerrymandering are done by political decisions without involving the people
via referendum or similar democratic mechanisms. Such actions and many others
indicate that the ‘federal states’ do not have real powers commensurate
with true decentralisation. Ethiopia is still very much controlled by central
government, and that the constitutional devolution of power is inadequately
implemented. It should also be said that the ethnic federal system is designed
to perpetuate TPLF’s position in power by divide and rule tactics, and this
argument has a solid foundation.
Human
rights
The
report has problems with the implementations of the constitutional rights and
freedoms. It argues that the level of political, civil, and economic rights
the minorities allowed to exercise is limited. At the same time the report is
sympathetic to the current political rule by noting the daunting tasks the
government faces to introduce political liberalisation amid the traditional
violent political values and systems of the Ethiopian empire. It calls for
moderation from all sides to facilitate the process of unity and at the same
time enjoying diversity. It also warns that Ethiopia’s unity will be at
stake unless constructive and pluralistic political climate develops.
Under
a section ‘human rights under pressure’, the author argues that despite
the promises by the EPRDF and Ethiopia’s accession to international human
rights instruments, ‘human rights violations still occur throughout
Ethiopia. Detentions without trial, torture, ‘disappearances’ and
extra-judicial executions are regularly reported by international and national
organisations … Of particular interest for this report is the increasing
stigmatisation of certain ethnic groups which are labelled by the government
as secessionist factions’. Accordingly many Oromo and Somali [people] are
suspected of supporting [liberation] movements on the basis of their ethnic
identity alone’ (pp.24-25). The author further argues that if the
constitution that excels in providing human rights protection necessitates a
sound and transparent system of governance is not implemented and defended in
practice, its value is meagre. Thus the main criticism raised against the
TPLF/EPRDF government is that it does not respect and uphold its own
constitution.
Challenges
The
appalling human rights record of the government in power is underestimated by
comparison to the challenges it faces from different directions. The
report’s author is of the opinion that transforming a culture of violence in
a short time is a daunting task. While it is true that the development of a
political culture of human rights and democracy may take time, the TPLF/EPRDF
proved itself for being authoritarian tolerating no political dissent.
TPLF’s actions and inactions are the main contributors of the challenges it
faces. TPLF shows a clear lack of political will and responsibility for a
democratisation process and building political culture of human rights. It is
up to the international community to put pressure on and condemn the TPLF.
The
report indicates that international donor community relied on the regimes
spoken intentions and proclamations that it will develop a political culture
of human rights. The author acknowledges the presence of widespread human
rights abuses in Ethiopia. He argues that people are allowed to exercise very
limited political and civil rights. The regime is reluctant to admit
responsibilities for human rights abuses, and its senior cadres usually blame
the regional and local officials. This is a lame excuse since under the
present day Ethiopia, drawing such a line between the federal government and
states is wrong. TPLF has all the control to change things around in regions
through its surrogate parties.
Among
other key challenges are also the change of violent political culture and the
need for economic development. Both challenges remain challenges, as the
TPLF/EPRDF is inept to address them. There are several economic injustices
being committed by the regime. The cronies of the regime and its affiliated
companies control the key economic activities. The economic policies of the
government are based on clearly demarcated discrimination, favouritism,
cronyism, and unjust competition. The biased treatment of Tigray at the
expense of others is one example. Another example is the government’s
readiness to spend scarce resources on senseless and dubious wars while over 8
million people face starvation. Politically, the TPLF itself is an extension
of violent political culture. Its pretensions otherwise are just to prolong
its stay on power and they are not demonstrations of its commitment to stable
and peaceful political development. The imprisonment of tens of thousands of
civilian politicians and suspects and harassing many more are the cases in
point. The future is bleak to look forward with the TPLF/EPRDF. One would only
wonder if democratisation of the empire is possible at all?
The
author also indicates another recent challenge. This involves the change in
the nationalistic rhetoric of the regime due to the Ethiopian-Eritrean war.
The war helped the government to stigmatise and persecute ethnic groups as
anti-Ethiopian. Indeed the government is using the old slogan used by the derg
to discredit the TPLF. The report fails to mention the negative impacts of the
war on the economy as well as the loss of tens of thousands of human lives and
the displacement of many more. The TPLF should be held internationally
accountable for its actions in breach of its accession to international
covenants and human rights instruments.
The
author sums up the key challenges to include the development of the political
culture of human rights, the solution to Ethiopia-Eritrea war, land rights,
women’s rights, language and education, and economy. The report details the
unfulfilled promises: broad based democratisation, as well as adversarial and
defensive political positions rather than provision of constructive
alternatives.
Recommendations
The
recommendations of the report range from the dispensation of Eritrea-Ethiopia
conflict, to international community’s response, the need for democratisation, pluralism, human rights, independence of the judiciary, and
policies on education, health and housing to ‘ensure that the basic rights
of the most marginalized and disadvantaged minorities are upheld’. Yet these
are easier said than done.
It
recommends to the government, the oppositions, and the international community
to proceed on democratic path along the constitution. It mentions the presence
of unfulfilled promises and that an inclusive and broad-based democratisation
has failed to materialise. There is a political stalemate in Ethiopia due to
mutual distrust between the government and opposition groups. It is yet to be
seen if the TPLF government want to share power or give it to others. So far,
there is no will on the part of the TPLF to build an all-inclusive
democratisation process. The calls by different opposition parties for
peaceful dialogue and peaceful political settlement have fallen on deaf ears.
The issue is now changing the TPLF to tolerate opposition parties, respect
democratic processes and observe rights, including the right for
self-determination.
The
other problem is changing the opposition political parties that echo
old-fashioned Ethiopian polity in the name of unity to control and dominate
political minorities. So far, there is no sign of change to accommodate new
ways from these groups for a peaceful co-existence and mutual respect. The old
notion of the ruling class versus subject is very much unwelcome nowadays and
it will only prolong conflicts. The inclusion of the plights of oppressed
groups and addressing their genuine problems are absent from the politics of
the TPLF and old-style political groups. If this process of inclusion fails to materialise, peaceful co-existence and peaceful political development will not
be possible. The ‘anti-peace’, ‘anti-Ethiopia’, ‘anti-democracy’,
and ‘anti-unity’ Abyssinian political rhetoric to control and dominate
others is more destructive than constructive as are international groups that
support them.
So
far the TPLF proved itself to be neither democratic nor building democratic
process. The TPLF regime is not signalling a real and meaningful change; it is
heralding more of the same. The political process has not evidently undergone
fundamental changes. Even more so, TPLF is gradually creeping back to the
old-style than openness for free political competition. The rhetoric of
federation and a token of self-determination are more of pretence than a
reality.
The
report holds a ‘mediator’ perspective and therefore most of the
recommendations emanate from impartial positions. It recognises the difficulty
of such a stance where polarisation of polity and society is deep. While no
one side of the problem will be satisfied with the analysis nor with the
recommendations, the report will contribute to further international
community’s understanding of Ethiopia. It makes a timely and informative
reading. This
is a superb report by a western scholar about the brief historical accounts of
Ethiopian polity and the problems associated with democratising an empire
state. The report is definitely a contribution towards our knowledge of
the relations between people and the political rule in Ethiopia.
Seyoum
Hameso and Tilahun Ayanou Nebo
This review article appears in The
Sidama Concern Vol.5
No. 3, 2000 (pp.27-31)
Reference Style: The following is the suggested format for referencing this article:
Hameso, Seyoum and Tilahun Ayanou Nebo 2000. Ethiopia: A
New Start? The Sidama Concern,
5, 3 [online] URL: http://www.sidamaconcern.com/books/ethiopia_a_new_start.html
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