

Challenging the United States: French Foreign Policy 1944 – 1948

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ABSTRACT

Challenging the United States: French Foreign Policy from 1944 – 1948

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French foreign Policy between 1944 and 1948 is examined in terms of its successes in reasserting a French international identity reflecting a power capable of holding its own against the new superpowers of the world. Drawing upon the foreign policy documents of France and the United States, an image of French foreign policy as single-mindedly focused upon renewing identity by manipulating the negotiations over the future of Germany becomes clear. For the most part historians in the past have discussed this policy in terms of its shortcomings since France failed to gain many of its immediate goals. However, this thesis concludes that the immediate goals of French policy were simply a means to an end. The reassertion of French international interaction and the revival of French identity as free of foreign influence were the clear long term goals of foreign policy in the post-war period. As long as France maintained the balance between independence and foreign aid it viewed the policies of this period as a success

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Dedicated to the memory of my Babcha

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Introduction

The end of the Second World War created a shift in traditional diplomatic relations. The four strongest European powers, Britain, France, Germany and the Soviet Union, had suffered through half a century of military and economic strife. At the same time, political and diplomatic polarization were increasing as the United States and the Soviet Union both began to flex their ideological muscles. Of all nations, France felt this change most intensely. Set adrift from its traditional affection for power and glory by the war and economically devastated, the French began to search for a new role that would reassert French power and identity while providing sufficient flexibility to accept foreign aid in an effort to rebuild their fractured infrastructure. The manner in which France presented itself to the international community would become the dominant feature of this plan. French foreign policy was carefully crafted so as to never publicly acknowledge its reduced position in the international community and to play an active role in deciding the future of Germany and Europe. Granted an equal voice among the Allies in Germany, France used its influence as an occupying power to promote its own vision of postwar Europe based on France as a bridge between East and West. Between 1944 and 1948, France attempted to restructure Europe in its own image through a multifaceted foreign policy that always pointed back to its old enemy Germany. Thus was born the French Thesis.

French policy was founded on the belief that Germany was the ultimate cause of its fall from power and glory. The French Thesis assumed that to assure a permanent return to international power three events would have to occur: the German threat would have to be permanently removed through decentralization and separation, the French economy would have to once more become self-sufficient by accepting reparations from Germany in the form of coal and labour, and France would have to successfully balance itself between the influence of the great powers by remaining aloof and independent. This could only be achieved by exploiting its position on the Allied Control Council in Germany. Claiming not to be bound by agreements made in its absence, France set out to hinder to work of the Control Council while proposing an alternative position. By proposing a policy on Germany that was different from that of the United States, France created a lively rostrum for debate that kept it at the forefront of international diplomatic relations and created the illusion of power. To French policy makers active, independent participation in the negotiations over the ultimate shape of Europe was the only way to reassert France's proper place as a leader of nations.

Lacking the economic or military clout to directly challenge the desire of the United States to rebuild Europe based on a strong united peaceful Germany, the French launched a three-pronged diplomatic attack on their ally while happily accepting its aid to rebuild at home. In Germany, France used its vote on the Allied Control Council to defeat any American measure intended to centralize or revitalize Germany. On French soil the government used the popularity of the PCF (*Parti Communiste Français*) and the nation's economic weakness to create the impression that any strong-arm diplomacy on

the Americans part would throw the country into the waiting arms of the “red menace.” French foreign policy reinforced this fear by constantly highlighting its assertion that France was an independent entity that could chose to ally itself with the Soviet Union or to remain neutral if it so chose. This created a disproportionate shift in power in which a weakened France used American fears as a tool to control and stall the greater power’s European aims. Indeed, the French were very aware that one of the bulwarks of American policy was maintaining France as a capitalist-oriented nation. Under these conditions and threats, American policy makers took the possibility of a communist France very seriously.

The brilliance of French foreign policy during this period is evident in its success. For a four-year period between 1944 and 1948, French foreign policy essentially dictated the framework which shaped American diplomatic actions. The lack of any successful centralization of Germany, the massive “gifts” of foreign aid to France, and the acknowledgement that France frustratingly stood alone against American aims in Europe were all due to actions taken under the umbrella of the French Thesis. Only the increasing polarization of the Cold War and lack of cooperation from the Soviet Union led France to modify its plans for Europe. Even then the French were able to smoothly shift their allegiance toward the western camp, while maintaining the ever-important perception of independence and autonomy of action.

Chapter 1

Historiographical Overview

Many historians have incorrectly concluded that the beginnings of the Cold War forced France to give up its autonomy by falling in with the United States and the West. This conclusion is based on the belief that because France failed to achieve the role of mediator between East and West or to achieve all its goals in Germany its policy was a failure. In fact, Georges Bidault, Minister of Foreign Affairs for much of the period discussed, privately acknowledged France's weakened state, but adhered to the theory that France was a proud nation whose foreign policy should hearken a return to greatness. The question that many historians have failed to ask is whether France achieved its goal of finding a new autonomous role in post-war Europe while maintaining its independent-minded nature and rebuilding its economy.

An overview of the major works dealing with French foreign policy in the early post-war period shows a preoccupation with two themes: economic recovery and the future of Germany. That the focus is upon these two factors is not surprising for between 1944 and 1948 French foreign policy was focused on Germany and revitalizing the French economy was inseparably tied to it. What is surprising is the strong slant in the historiography toward writing off French diplomacy during this period as a failure. With the exception of a handful of historians, the vast majority believe, at best, that France was stalling the inevitable and, at worst, that its policies served only to frustrate the efforts of the United States to bring prosperity to Europe. However, it is erroneous to discount

French efforts simply because the international situation shifted drastically. While France may have lost some of its battles, it did not lose the war for self-renewal and respect. It was a remarkable feat for a nation so badly scarred by war and the stigma of defeat to regain some measure of its past power through diplomatic manoeuvring alone. This thesis clearly shows that despite a series of policy failures culminating in the expulsion of the Communists from the coalition government in 1948 the French policy of independence remained effective and very much alive.

Those historians and political scientists who have argued that the failure of France to remain neutral in the Cold War did not necessarily signal a failure of French post-war aims understand the importance identity and perceptions played in re-establishing an international presence for the nation. In particular Alfred Grosser, Edward L. Morse, Anton W. DePorte and Alexander Werth all discuss French diplomatic actions as part of a policy of grandeur. Grosser comes closest to portraying these years not in terms of total defeat or victory, but as a continuous shift between decline and renewal as France struggled to find its place in a changing world. He attributes the quest for identity to the policies and plans of Charles de Gaulle and concludes that the usually divisive French political landscape was so cohesive on foreign policy matters because all of France was concerned with re-establishing its international identity. Morse tends to take his cues from Grosser, relying heavily on him to back up his very similar thesis. Of the three historians who discuss French policy in terms of identity, DePorte is the most likely to editorialize and speak of French failures as complete successes. His work is also the most caught up in the myth and wonder of French grandeur.

In both *La Quatrième République et la politique extérieure* (1961) and *French Foreign Policy Under De Gaulle* (1965) Grosser forwards the thesis that the ultimate goal of French domestic policy in the Fourth Republic was “national unity” and that this unity, in the form of the state, was inevitably channeled toward “external ambition.”¹ Edward L. Morse argues a similar case in *Foreign Policy and Interdependence in Gaullist France*.² Morse bases his discussion of the tactics used by France to regain some measure of international status by focusing on Grosser’s statement that, “France is no longer one of the great powers. How can her will to be treated as an equal be reconciled with military and economic aid from others?”³ He believes French policy, with its tone of independence, gained increased freedom of movement and action through “tactics of surprise, the use of negative policies to deny other states the achievement of their goals, the manipulation of illusions that appeared to enhance French power, the articulation of ambitious policies, the fostering of nationalism, and the consummate use of ambiguity that permitted flexibility both at home and abroad.”⁴

The period between 1944 and 1948 is characterized by Grosser as representing a shift in French policy aims. In 1944 foreign policy was geared toward security vis-à-vis

¹ Alfred Grosser, *French Foreign Policy Under De Gaulle*, (Toronto: Little Brown and Company), 1965, p. 15.

² Edward L. Morse, *Foreign Policy and Interdependence in Gaullist France*, (New Jersey: Princeton University Press), 1973, p. 146.

³ Alfred Grosser, *La Quatrième République et la politique extérieure*, (Paris: Editions du Seuil), 1961, pp.397-98.

⁴ Morse, *Foreign Policy*, p. 18.

Germany while by 1948 policy was shifting toward restoring prosperity through foreign aid.⁵ Grosser sees a conflict between these two goals. On the one hand France wanted to establish its own guidelines for security against Germany, but encountered strong resistance from the United States, which was the only viable source of funds for French economic recovery. On the other hand, he notes that such conflicts are typical of declining powers, but adds that a nation may shift between decline and renewal many times during a given period. However, what Grosser fails to understand is that there really was no sudden shift toward economic concerns in 1948, but rather a constant desire to find a balance between foreign aid and international autonomy. A quick review of *The Foreign Relations of the United States* and *L'Année Politique* for the period encompassing 1944 to 1948 shows that French officials made economic recovery an important part of their foreign policy.⁶

It is interesting to note that Grosser chooses to discuss France's economic dilemma as a question of "whether it is necessary to renounce some sovereignty in order to acquire... wider possibilities of action than if one retained national sovereignty intact."⁷ His question virtually mirrors that asked by Georges Bidault and Jean Monnet in 1946 when they were discussing how increased economic aid from the United States would affect French autonomy. Looking at the policies of Bidault and Monnet, he comes

⁵ Grosser, *La Quatrième République*, p. 2.

⁶ United States Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States 1944-1948*, (Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office), 1983, and, *L'Année Politique, 1944-1948*, (Paris: Éditions du Grand Siècle).

⁷ Grosser, *French Foreign Policy*, pp. 4-5.

to the correct conclusion that “France chose to function under the belief that reality is, in part, what one makes it.”⁸ Morse agrees, noting this policy was intended to help reassert French independence in the face of decline. The continual assertion of French leaders that the nation had suffered only a temporary setback in status was simply a function of this policy.⁹ For Grosser and Morse the question clearly is whether a nation’s decline is measured in terms of military and economic clout or past glories, present beliefs and future aspirations.

Like Grosser and Morse, Anton W. DePorte understands that the goal of all French policy was the “maintenance of French security, which includes both the physical integrity of the territory and the maintenance of France’s international power – of her Great power status.”¹⁰ An obvious admirer of Charles de Gaulle, DePorte attributes the combative nature of French foreign policy to “his almost mystic patriotism and his conception of the unique role of France in the world.”¹¹ The importance of DePorte’s *De Gaulle’s Foreign Policy 1944-1946* is that it hearkens back to the manner in which France presented itself to the world during the height of the French Thesis. He notes that foreigners did not understand what the French were trying to accomplish. While French stubbornness was intended to reassert the perception of a great power, “the incessant

⁸ Ibid, p. 11.

⁹ Morse, *Foreign Policy*, p. 21.

¹⁰ Anton W. DePorte, *De Gaulle’s Foreign Policy 1944-1946*. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press), 1968, p. 3.

¹¹ Ibid., p. 17.

official talk of French equality of rights and greatness – the famous ‘policy of grandeur’ – was irritating to many outside France who saw only her material weakness.”¹² Like the diplomats who negotiated for France after the war, DePorte believes that its policy on Germany showed an inner strength and forward-looking character. He postulates that without French interference Germany might have fallen under Soviet domination. By preventing the creation of a central German government “the French unknowingly saved Europe and the Western world” from communism.¹³ Thus like de Gaulle, DePorte subscribes to the theory that France had a special role to play in the world that no other nation could fill.

Alexander Werth shares DePorte’s opinion, making clear his belief that French stalling tactics in Germany actually contributed to maintaining the peace during the Cold War. As G.D.H Cole asserts in the introduction to Werth’s *France 1940-1955*, the nation “did a great deal to prevent the cold war from turning into a hot war against Communism.”¹⁴ Werth asserts American policy often showed “a perfect disregard for France’s ambitions in the German field.”¹⁵ While Werth does argue that the French Thesis failed due to the engagement of the United States and the Soviet Union in the Cold War, he adds, “for a time, however, France still resisted, unwilling to bow to the *fait*

¹² Ibid., p. 281.

¹³ Ibid., p. 285.

¹⁴ G.D.H. Cole cited in Alexander Werth, *France 1940-1955*, (London: Robert Hale Ltd.), 1956, p xi.

¹⁵ Werth, *France 1940-1955*, p. 295.

accompli.”¹⁶ Indeed, what comes through clearest in Werth’s work is his belief that “the French knew from the first that France could not endure a third war, or hope to survive one without sheer eclipse; and, dispirited – or even ashamed – as they often seemed, their will to survive as world leaders remained exceedingly strong.”¹⁷ French policy was therefore clearly modified to fit the changing nature of the international power balance.

Despite sharing very similar theses on French policy, Grosser and Morse reach conclusions opposing those of DePorte and Werth. All four see some measure of success in the post-war period, however, Grosser tends to focus on French perceptions, arguing that since the French did not see themselves as a declining power in 1948, the ultimate failure of their subordinate goals was not important. Morse mirrors this conclusion, adding that French foreign policy was primarily intended to reinforce the image of a nation with a strong international presence at home as well as abroad.¹⁸ DePorte concludes that France attempted to reassert its grandeur with the force of its entire national being behind it. Such devotion to a national goal would inevitably succeed. Finally, Werth’s conclusion is the most balanced, arguing French policy achieved a fair share of success as well as failure. In essence, DePorte chooses to discuss French foreign policy during this period in terms of the mystical characteristics that make France unique while Werth stays grounded in the world of *Realpolitik*.

¹⁶ Ibid., p. 310.

¹⁷ Ibid., p. xi.

¹⁸ Morse, *Foreign Policy*, p. 21.

Not all the historians who have discussed French policy in this period as an experiment in reasserting identity conclude that it was successful. In fact, Simon Serfaty, Robert Gildea and Herbert Tint see France as a nation objectively in decline and point to its foreign policy as proof of this. In *France, De Gaulle, and Europe: The Policy of the Fourth and Fifth Republics Toward the Continent*, Serfaty sums up post-war policy by stating “the French have kept ‘their feet stuck in the mud’ and it is with regard to their persistent hope of regaining their past rank that they have lived with ‘their heads in the clouds’”¹⁹ Robert Gildea expresses the same opinion in *France Since 1945*, concluding foreign policy was dominated by an insecurity that only a great power which had come within an ace of extinction could experience.²⁰ Indeed, in *France Since 1918*, Herbert Tint argues, “parity of diplomatic status was not identical with equality.”²¹ France possessed real power in Germany, but he notes “France was very much the poor relation among the victors.”²² Therefore, despite its urge to remain independent the disastrous state of the French economy left it “extremely vulnerable” to outside pressures.²³

To Serfaty, the French Thesis is a prime example of decline for two reasons. First, France sought to compensate for its military inferiority by “reiterating demands for more respect for her dignity.” Accompanying this emphasis on short-term preoccupations,

¹⁹ Simon Serfaty, *France, De Gaulle, and Europe: The Policy of the Fourth and Fifth Republics Toward the Continent*, (Baltimore: The John Hopkins Press), 1968, p. 166.

²⁰ Robert Gildea, *France Since 1945*, (New York: Oxford University Press), 1996, p. 5.

²¹ Herbert Tint, *France Since 1918*, (London: B.T. Batsford), 1970, p.111.

²² *Ibid.*, p.111.

²³ *Ibid.*, p.112.

France chose to procrastinate, as “no motion at all was usually judged preferable to a declining one.”²⁴ Secondly, he sees decline in the French attempts “to convince a Great Power that its continued alliance, indispensable to France, was advantageous to the Great Power as well.”²⁵ However, the author notes that France continued to remain “sensitive” to any encroachment on her national independence, in particular when it came to improving economic conditions.²⁶ Robert Gildea expands upon the conflict between autonomy and economic revitalization believing, “the French government was caught between the anger of French public opinion and the need to retain the favor of the American government.”²⁷ He sees this as inevitably leading to a “seduction” of France through the granting by the United States of minor concessions in Germany and Marshall Plan aid. At this point French “dreams” of achieving the goals of the French Thesis “dissolved.”²⁸ Tint takes an even harder line, arguing the negotiations over the future of Germany actually highlighted France’s dimmed grandeur. In fact, he believes it was bitterness over France’s diminished status that caused its diplomats to “somewhat hysterically” form a policy based on the belief that “Germany was the most important problem of the universe.”²⁹

²⁴ Serfaty, *France, De Gaulle, and Europe*, p. 161.

²⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 161.

²⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 164-165.

²⁷ Gildea, *France Since 1945*, p. 10.

²⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 11.

²⁹ Tint, *France Since 1918*, p.111.

Serfaty, Gildea and Tint conclude that France's post-war economic reliance on the United States and its reduced position spelled failure for an independent foreign policy. By tying in economic necessity with national autonomy, and a policy of independent action with some sort of national inferiority complex, the three men automatically discount Grosser's assertion that France's temporary economic reliance on the United States would lead to renewed French autonomy in the long run. Like most French foreign policy during this period, economic revitalization was a means to an end, as was maintaining the illusions of power. However, Serfaty chooses to believe that post-war French policy was essentially based on ignoring France's "lack of power" and assumed "a *de facto* return to normalcy" that was doomed to failure.³⁰ France possessed real power in Germany, but Tint notes "France was very much the poor relation among the victors."³¹ Gildea takes the thought further, concluding the French government was caught between "the anger of French public opinion and the need to retain the favour of the American government."³² He believes that economic necessity forced France to side with the United States, which "held the purse-strings of European recovery, so that while France's security needs dictated one course, her economic needs imposed another."³³

It is too simple to discount French diplomacy during a half-decade period because all of its goals were not achieved. Serfaty, Gildea and Tint seem to conclude that because

³⁰ Serfaty, *France, De Gaulle, and Europe*, p. 28.

³¹ Tint, *France Since 1918*, p.111.

³² Gildea, *France Since 1945*, p. 10.

³³ *Ibid.*, p. 11.

France received large amounts of American aid, its international position was groundless. At the same time they would all agree with the statement that “the great achievement of France in the last fifty years has been to rise to the international challenges of the twentieth century while preserving a very specific French identity.”³⁴ However, their analysis clearly overlooks the fact that finding a middle-of-the-road solution between dependence on American economic aid and French international autonomy was a dominant dilemma of all French policy-makers during this period. Furthermore, maintaining a uniquely French identity was of utmost importance among policy goals and France did not fail in this effort. Rather than discussing French foreign policy as an attempt to revive a nation badly damaged by war, they tend to focus on failure and thus miss the sense of renewal and rebirth that the policy was designed to instil nationally and internationally.

Russell B. Capelle and Frank Giles take a different approach when it comes to discussing the policies of post-war France. In *The MRP and French Foreign Policy* Capelle looks at how the German threat was perceived domestically and among members of the party who dominated foreign affairs during the years the “French Thesis” was official policy. During this time MRP (*Mouvement Républicain Populaire*) leaders Bidault and Schuman alternated as Minister of Foreign Affairs. Capelle notes that the fear of Germany permeated many political groups in France, including the MRP. He comments, “MRP leaders developed elaborate arguments in party periodicals to demonstrate how much less dangerous Germany would be if incorporated in a European

³⁴ Gildea, *France Since 1945*, p.227.

community.” But these arguments did not reach enough people. Party leaders in parliament did not speak up clearly or frequently enough to overcome fears engendered by the frequent warnings against Germany of other political leaders.³⁵

Capelle points out that older MRP leaders like Schuman and Poher were aware of the dangerous parallel between the development in Franco-German relations after 1945 and that of the 1920's, when French opposition to Germany stimulated a revival of German militarism in the 1930's. He notes, “even within party circles they did not present this lesson of history frequently enough to the attention of younger members of the party.”³⁶ Fear caused uncertainty within the MRP over what kind of Europe should be constructed. Europe meant different things to different people. In his journals written soon after the war, François Mauriac, who was at one time a member of the MRP, reminded his readers that the Germans had distorted for the French the idea of Europe. “When a Frenchman said, ‘Before everything, I am a European,’ we knew that it meant, I have chosen to be a traitor.”³⁷ To Capelle, France was caught paradoxically between nostalgia for the past and a search for new solutions. During the debate on foreign policy at the MRP Congress of 1950, Bidault struck a typically French note when he said, “There is something against which one is never right... the nation.” Hourdin of the MRP

³⁵ Russell B. Capelle, *The MRP and French Foreign Policy*, (New York: Frederick A. Praeger), 1963, p. 62.

³⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 62.

³⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 62.

commented that, although a Frenchman refuses to accept the idea of “My country, right or wrong,” in internal affairs, the idea was doubtless well accepted as to “exteriors.”³⁸

Unfortunately, while the author professes to discuss the period from 1944 to 1954, he actually focuses on the period between 1950-1954. Furthermore, Capelle’s MRP seems to exist in a virtual vacuum. He mentions that, by heading the Ministry of Foreign Affairs for ten years, the party gave France a high degree of continuity in foreign policy. Indeed, from 1944 to 1954, one knew rather well what France stood for in foreign policy. Throughout the book, Capelle never gives a clear explanation of what the MRP’s stance on foreign policy was or the role played by Georges Bidault in formulating this policy. The fate of postwar Germany, a subject that dominated French foreign policy from 1945 to 1948, is hardly given any mention and the United States is not mentioned at all. What Capelle does make clear is that the notion of French grandeur ran strongly through the ranks of the MRP. The traditional grandeur upon which France had always based its identity had been greatly diminished by the German invasion and the changing nature of the post-war world. To Capelle, the MRP, like all Frenchmen, was searching for a new basis for French status.

Historians writing from an American perspective acknowledge that even in decline France held a geographically and economically strategic location which made it a difficult nation to negotiate with. However, for the most part, they also agree that French policy in Germany was doomed to failure from the beginning, not because of economic

³⁸ Ibid., p. 63.

dependence as suggested by Serfaty, Gildea, and Tint, but because of the increasingly ideologically polarized international scene. They also tend to speak of French policy as being solely motivated by an irrational fear of the German threat rather than as a composite of economic, identity and security issues. John W. Young, F. Roy Willis and John Gimbel essentially argue that the Cold War forced France to make a choice between the Soviet Union and the United States and once this choice was made its policy of international autonomy failed. Rather than discussing the effectiveness with which French diplomacy adapted when the international situation shifted, they conclude that change signalled defeat. Once again, like their counterparts writing from a French perspective, historians discussing the impact of French policy on American aims fail to take in the big picture, that even when clearly in the Western camp France maintained a policy of autonomy and self-determination. Of the three, Young and Willis acknowledge that despite failing, the French Thesis did allow France to gain concessions from the United States.

John W. Young believes that France's acceptance of US aid came at an economic and political price. He notes "Germany was reviving much faster than France wished, European economic integration had not progressed far, and France remained unable to afford substantial armed forces."³⁹ John Gimbel adds that France reacted "on security grounds and out of fear that Germany would be rehabilitated first."⁴⁰ To Young and

³⁹ John W. Young, *France, The Cold War and The Western Alliance 1944-49: French Foreign Policy and Post-War Europe*, (New York: St. Martin's Press), 1990, p. 226.

⁴⁰ John Gimbel, *The American Occupation of Germany: Politics and the Military, 1945-1949*. (California: Stanford University Press), 1968, p.217.

Gimbel, this irrational fear caused French officials to follow a policy which “blocked, delayed, or vetoed” any American proposal that might lead to an eventual resurgence of German power.⁴¹ In Gimbel’s opinion, during the period from 1944-1948, “France was the immediate barrier” to American plans for Germany.⁴²

Facing this situation, with “French independence restricted by Cold war developments and internal weakness”, Young believes France had no choice but to fall in line behind the United States.⁴³ Young then contradicts himself by stating, “even in decline, France had influence.” Economic and military weakness and political division did not reduce its strategic importance in Europe, Africa, and South-East Asia. Young concludes, “European economic recovery and Western defences depended on her and she had a major impact on the exact shape of post-war Europe, not least in laying the basis for European political and economic co-operation.”⁴⁴ Thus, rather than acknowledging the brilliance of French foreign policy as a determining factor in its continued autonomy in the post-war period, Young argues it was only France’s geographic position that saved it. He does not question how much of a voice France would have had if its foreign policy had not exploited this advantage to the fullest extent.

⁴¹ Gimbel, *The American Occupation of Germany*, p. 23.

⁴² *Ibid.*, p.217.

⁴³ Young, *France, The Cold War*, p. 230.

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 1.

On the other hand, F. Roy Willis acknowledges “the attitude of the French government toward the German problem, unlike that of the American government, did not change greatly in the period from the end of hostilities to the beginning of the Moscow conference of 1947.”⁴⁵ He notes that this was largely due to the non-partisan insistence by all political groups in the nation “that France use its position as an occupying power to pursue an independent policy in Germany.”⁴⁶ Despite maintaining an independent policy for several years, Willis argues that French independence in Germany came to an end on September 21, 1949 when the French zone of occupation “which for four years had been not only the symbol of France’s international status, but also the means of enforcing its will on Germany... was economically and politically merged with the Bizone.”⁴⁷

Willis concludes that the integration of the French zone into a larger Western German zone signals the failure of French policy. Indeed, most historians commenting on this period tend to agree with this theory. John S. Hill describes this as a process of “Dead Sea fruit... turned to ashes.”⁴⁸ He talks in terms of “exclusion” and “humiliation” which served as a reminder to the French that they lacked the real strength necessary to

⁴⁵ F. Roy Willis, *The French in German 1945-1949*, (Stanford University Press), 1962, p. 29.

⁴⁶ F. Roy Willis, *France, Germany and the New Europe 1945-1963*, (Stanford: Stanford University Press), 1965, p. 23.

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 31.

⁴⁸ John S. Hill, “Germany, the United States, and De Gaulle’s Strategy for Economic Reconstruction, 1944-1946,” In Robert O. Paxton, *De Gaulle and the United States: A Centennial Reappraisal*. (Oxford: Berg), 1994, p. 22.

be a great power.⁴⁹ Irwin M. Wall asserts that France had no choice but to give in to the wishes of the United States noting, “the French now understood that French foreign policy must draw close to that of the United States’ if France was to survive. France, like it or not, had to get along with the U.S and the German question... would not be allowed to interfere.”⁵⁰

Edgar S. Furniss, Jr. offers a typically American overview of France’s post-war role in *France: Troubled Ally; De Gaulle’s Heritage and Prospects*.⁵¹ The title itself offers the reader a good overview of the tone set by Furniss within. He acknowledges France’s attempt to re-establish grandeur but attributes it the belief that, “after World War II the United States expected too much of France.” Like a younger brother who can never keep up, Furniss believes “the United States marked out for France an international role which was beyond its capacity.”⁵² He is convinced that while France’s strategy “won some initial successes,” it was doomed to end in “failures caused by the inability of French leaders to marshal national strength.”⁵³ This is a particularly strange conclusion to reach. Rather than attributing French failures to economic, or international conditions Furniss seems to be suggesting that national weakness lead to failure. Granted, the

⁴⁹ Hill, “Germany, the United States, and De Gaulle’s Strategy for Economic Reconstruction, 1944-1946”, p. 25.

⁵⁰ Irwin M. Wall, “Harry S. Truman and Charles de Gaulle,” In Robert O. Paxton, *De Gaulle and the United States: A Centennial Reappraisal*, (Oxford: Berg), 1994, p. 45.

⁵¹ Edgar S. Furniss, *France: Troubled Ally; De Gaulle’s Heritage and Prospects*, (New York: Council on Foreign Relations), 1960.

⁵² *Ibid.*, p. ix.

⁵³ *Ibid.*, p. x.

French political landscape was always a fragmented one, but during the early post-war period, it was most cohesive in the realm of foreign policy. In fact, as Willis acknowledges, French foreign policy was actually more stable than the ever-shifting American policy.

Unlike Willis, who argues France's policy failed with the integration of the French Zone with those of Britain and the United States in 1949, Furniss argues for the economic theory of failure. He believes the formal entrance of France into the European Recovery Program of 1948 brought an end to the policy of grandeur and mediation. He concludes, "a country in a state of crisis cannot have a grandiose foreign policy."⁵⁴ What is striking is that Furniss reaches this conclusion on page 23 of a 492-page monograph and then contradicts himself in his final chapter when he claims, "a Western Europe in which France plays a leading role is indispensable to the strength and vitality of the free world."⁵⁵

The overriding belief found in American analyses of the situation seems to be bewilderment over the French refusal to accept their lot. From Gimbel to Wall, there is the assertion that the French only managed to frustrate the inevitable move into the American camp. American aggravation comes out most clearly in Frank Costigliola's discussion of the relationship between France and the United States in the post-war period. Costigliola argues the prevalent attitude taken by American diplomats dealing

⁵⁴ Furniss, *France: Troubled Ally*, p. 23.

⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 492.

with France was paternalistic. Washington's first objective in France "was "to isolat[e] and ostraci[ze]" the Communists while "shepherding" those French political elements that would be most sympathetic to American goals.⁵⁶ Indeed, Costigliola is one of the few historians writing from the American perspective to acknowledge the power French politicians held over their American counterparts, perhaps because he also had written a major study of Franco-American economic relations between the two world wars. Unlike those who argue French economic dependence equalled American dominance, Costigliola shows a healthy respect for the continual rearguard action French policy continually enforced against a loss of autonomy.⁵⁷ Unfortunately, while his work is filled with the colourful complaints and frustrations of American diplomats concerning French policy, it has very little analytical input from Costigliola. He tends to let the primary sources speak for themselves.

The historiographical record reveals that while most historians discussing French foreign policy in the post-war era have recognized the importance of independence, grandeur, or autonomy in diplomatic relations they have differed on how successful this policy was. In many ways, Germany became a testing ground for a new concept of French international identity. Would France assert itself as an independent player, or fall under the influence of the United States and become little more than a client state? Historians have argued over what the failure to achieve the French Thesis on Germany

⁵⁶ Frank Costigliola, *France and the United States: The Cold Alliance Since World War II*, (Toronto : Maxwell Macmillan), 1992, p. 65.

⁵⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 2-10.

and the need for American economic support really meant for French international aims. Certainly, France never became the compliant ally that many American diplomats hoped for. Nor did it achieve the international role as mediator between the Great Powers that De Gaulle hoped would enhance its traditional grandeur. Perhaps, rather than discussing these years in terms of failure, the discussion should turn towards transition and the need for France to find a new role in a world that could not economically or politically support traditional French concepts of security and international roles.

Chapter 2

The Psychological Impact of Defeat: The German Menace

France's national identity and international image had always been based upon the concept of *la grande nation*. Indeed, the traditional foreign policy of France looked back to the conviction that the French were the voice of reason and enlightenment for the world. After all, for centuries French had remained unchallenged as the language of diplomacy, and its military and economic support had helped the thirteen American colonies achieve victory over Great Britain in the eighteenth century. The link with its glorious and strong past as a world power led most French to overlook their nation's slow, but steady decline through the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. However, it would be the German invasion of 1940 and France's quick defeat in the face of the *Blitzkrieg* that would suddenly highlight its reduced status to its citizens and the world. To make matters worse, the Franco-German armistice of June 22, 1940 divided France between a northern German occupied zone and a nominally autonomous France to the south. In a few short weeks, the glory and grandeur of "France" had fallen shattered to the ground. Indeed, on November 11, 1942, Germany occupied the whole of France and disbanded the "armistice army" of Vichy. The Allies all but discounted France as a partner in their strategy for winning the war and its resistance movement was not taken seriously by many strategists in the United States well into 1944.

The liberation of France saw it lacking the respect of the very allies with whom it considered itself an equal. To make matters worse, four years of German occupation and

war had left France economically devastated and adrift from traditional sources of power and grandeur. French foreign policy became an exercise in renewal and prevention. Germany was highlighted as the cause of France's decline and would have to be dealt with. This enmity toward the Germans was not a new attitude at all. Indeed, it has deep roots in traditional French foreign policy. As early as 1680, the Secretary of State for War under Louis XIV, François-Michel Le Tellier Louvois, wrote, "henceforth the Germans must be considered to be the main enemy, indeed the only one from whom real harm can come to us."⁵⁸ Two hundred and sixty-four years after Louvois made this statement, every successive generation of French citizens could remember at least one instance in which France was at war with its German neighbour. Between 1870 and 1940, a 70-year period, France experienced three German invasions and it should not be at all surprising that post-war foreign policy was aimed at preventing a fourth.

France was now faced with a dilemma over how it would reconcile its traditional role as a great power with defeat. As Alfred Grosser notes, France had always defined a great power as "a state that is capable of defending itself against any other state; in other words, one that had a chance of succeeding in a bilateral conflict with any other state."⁵⁹ However, as the European war came to a close in 1944, France was not even close to filling this definition. Between June 6, 1944 (D-Day) and the end of the European war on May 8, 1945, the United States gave France \$2.3 billion in military equipment and

⁵⁸ Herbert Tint, *French Foreign Policy Since the Second World War*, (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson), 1972, p. 28.

⁵⁹ Alfred Grosser, *French Foreign Policy Under De Gaulle*, (Toronto: Little Brown and Company), 1965, p. 96.

supplies.⁶⁰ Indeed, while the United States relied on highly trained, heavily armed troops France had to make do with small groups of lightly armed irregular troops. Thus, the primary concern of French policy at the end of the war was to take actions to show France was an effective, autonomous participant in the Allied war effort. To achieve this France would have to take actions that clearly showed it in the spotlight.

In 1944, soon after liberation, France had very little power over how the post-war world would be shaped. The Americans, British, and Soviets viewed the French military forces as ineffective. In fact, many of the Allies believed the French forces importance as a psychological symbol of success to the people of France hardly balanced their nuisance value. It was easy to discount France as a has-been power, supported by a military consisting of a rag-tag group of poorly equipped, foreign funded irregulars. Indeed, even when France had a modern, fully equipped army behind it, defeat came quickly and completely. However, the French did not plan to slink off into the night without putting up a fight. If they no longer had the economic and military framework to be counted as an equal among the victorious powers, French diplomats would respond with the type of diplomatic strategy that only centuries as a world power could impart. France would exploit its strategic geographic location and Allied perceptions of its weakness to gain a strong handhold in Europe. Two such events occurred at Strasbourg and in the Italian Alps during the closing months of the war.

⁶⁰ Frank Costigliola, *France and the United States: The Cold War Alliance Since World War II*, (New York: Twayne Publishers), 1992, p. 34.

The French armies occupied Strasbourg on November 23, 1944 against the commands and wishes of the United States. The region was particularly significant for its symbolic and strategic importance to the French. In the Franco-Prussian War of 1870-1871, the French lost Alsace-Lorraine to the Germans, a major cause of anti-German feeling in France in the period from 1871 to 1918 when it was returned as part of the Armistice agreement to end World War I. In 1940 the region was lost to the Germans again as part of the Franco-German armistice of July 22. Taking Strasbourg, the capital of the much fought over territory, would be a "a dazzling sign of French grandeur reconquered."⁶¹ Indeed, General Charles de Gaulle considered holding Strasbourg to be an imperative part of restoring French self-worth and identity and something that would give France a much-needed boost against Allied claims of French ineffectiveness.

France refused to abandon its position and remained firm in its decision even when the United States threatened to "cut the French army's supply of fuel and ammunition" to force a withdrawal.⁶² De Gaulle felt that France had no choice but to hold its place; to pull out would only serve to highlight the nation's reduced status, power and reliance on America for military aid. At the same time, these humiliating factors could be turned into a tool to gain status and concessions. Within days, France responded to U.S. demands by warning that if Strasbourg were left without a fight "an outraged French population might overthrow the government, spreading chaos in the rear of the Allied armies." Furthermore, the French army would prevent the transport of Allied

⁶¹ A.W. DePorte, *De Gaulle's Foreign Policy, 1944-1946*, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press), 1968, p. 80.

⁶² Costigliola, *France and the United States*, p. 36.

supplies over any territory it held.⁶³ If such threats were actually carried out by France, the Allied armies would effectively be fighting a war cut off from its supply lines, a potentially disastrous scenario. It also shows the importance France placed upon reasserting its authority surpassed even the war effort.

American diplomats responded to the French ultimatum with rage. One was even heard to proclaim, "If he had been an American, I would have socked him on the jaw." President Roosevelt huffed, the French showed "considerable nerve" after all the United States had done for them.⁶⁴ As representatives of an ascending world power, American diplomats had trouble understanding the lengths France would go to in order to reverse its downward slide. Despite not understanding French aims, and being frustrated by their refusal to take orders, the United States cancelled its withdrawal order. Such successes would be typical of future French diplomatic action which Frank Costigliola notes, was to be "based on France's strategic location and America's dread of turmoil."⁶⁵

Another example of France's policy of turning the tables on apparently hopeless situations occurred on April 29, 1945 when General de Gaulle ordered General Paul Doyen to advance into strategically important parts of northern Italy. De Gaulle argued that since France had been excluded from the British and American armistice talks with Italy in 1943 it could set its own peace terms and was still technically at war. This was

⁶³ Ibid., p. 36

⁶⁴ Ibid., p. 36.

⁶⁵ Ibid., p. 36.

probably the first time France turned its exclusion from international negotiations into a technical advantage. The same tactic would be employed in later years when it came to using the agreements made at the Yalta and Potsdam conferences as tools toward gaining concessions for the French foreign policy position. Excluded from both conferences, France would use this as an advantage to argue for an independent French foreign policy.

When American troops attempted to intervene in the Italian situation General Doyen protested "this serious and unfriendly act." Backed by Paris, he warned that any U.S. attempt to challenge the French government in the area would be resisted "by all necessary means without exception."⁶⁶ As in the Strasbourg case, the United States threatened to cut off all supplies and munitions to the French army, scolding France for threatening that "French soldiers bearing American arms will combat American and Allied soldiers who... contributed to the liberation of France itself." France withdrew its troops across the border, but made it clear to the Italians that they were ready to once more occupy the region. It seems that the Italian government took the French example seriously, for in later negotiations the border adjustment was made in France's favor.⁶⁷ By remaining stubborn and refusing to stand down until their position was clearly presented to the international community, France gained what it wanted in Italy.

⁶⁶ "Letter from the Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in France (Caffery), June 6, 1945," in United States Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS) 1945*, Vol. IV: Europe, (Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office), 1983, p. 735

⁶⁷ "Memorandum from the French Ambassador (Bonnet) to the Acting Secretary of State, December 18, 1945," *FRUS 1945*, Vol. IV: Europe, 1968, pp. 754-55.

The Italians properly summed up the situation when they informed the American State Department that “the decidedly unfriendly propaganda activity and administrative actions which the French troops are carrying on in the occupied zone, may in fact lead us to believe that France might be induced, with the false strategic pretexts to claim ‘ex nove’ territorial vindications.”⁶⁸ France’s response to American and Italian protests was fairly typical. The French Ambassador informed President Truman, “In France this withdrawal would be all the more resented as it would be from terrain that we have conquered. Furthermore, as you know, the Italian army invaded France in June 1940 from this area.”⁶⁹ Honor, the perception of weakness, and the importance of preventing any future disgraces were the overriding concerns voiced by the French when it came to conflicts on the international level. Indeed, the French were quick to note, “France cannot consent that a modification against her will would be made in the existing state of affairs in the Alps Maritimes. This would be contrary to her honor and her security.”⁷⁰

⁶⁸ “Memorandum from the Italian Embassy to the Department of State 5 June 1945,” in *FRUS 1945*, Vol. IV: Europe, 1968, pp. 735-736.

⁶⁹ “Memorandum from the French Ambassador (Bonnet) to President Truman, 8 June 1945,” *FRUS 1945*, Vol. IV: Europe, 1968, pp. 736-737.

⁷⁰ “Memorandum from the Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in France (Caffery) 6, June 1945,” *FRUS 1945*, Vol. IV: Europe, 1968, p. 734.

Chapter 3

Yalta and Potsdam: France is Given an International Voice

In February 1945 at the Yalta Conference (February 4 – 11, 1945) of the Big Three (Great Britain, the United States, and the Soviet Union) France was granted a zone of occupation in Germany at the urging of the British – but “only out of kindness,” Roosevelt and Stalin emphasized. The uphill battle French diplomats would face in attempting to reassert their nation’s greatness was highlighted by the Soviet and American delegates who had very little positive to say about their absent ally. Indeed, both the Soviets and Americans refused to invite France to the conference feeling that it was more akin to a defeated power rather than an ally. De Gaulle was “unrealistic” in seeking great-power status when “France had not done very much fighting in this war,” Stalin commented to Roosevelt. FDR responded that de Gaulle fancied himself a combination of Joan of Arc, Napoleon, and Georges Clemenceau. He complained that the British had the idea of “artificially building up France into a strong power.”⁷¹ Indeed, the American president was correct in his assumption. Altruism had nothing to do with Britain seeking a strong role for France in the post-war world. To the Allies, France’s defeat seemed to signal the end of their respect. Winston Churchill believed that a strong France under British tutelage, would make an excellent buffer against any possible future Soviet aggression. Due to its strategic geographic location, France should play a limited

⁷¹ “Minutes of the Roosevelt-Stalin Meeting, 4 February 1945,” in *FRUS 1945*, Vol. II: The Conferences of Berlin (Potsdam), 1960, pp. 572-573.

role and do as it was told. Its defeat signaled a need for paternal guidance, a scenario the French were eager to avoid.

The lack of importance attached to French opinions became clear six months later. Though admitted to Germany as an occupying power, France was excluded from the next major meeting of the great powers at Potsdam. The limited international role intended for France proved embarrassing when the administrative framework for the future of Germany was set up without even one word from French diplomats. The Potsdam Conference's Declaration on Germany stated, "It is the intention of the Allies that the German people be given the opportunity to prepare for the eventual reconstruction of their life on a democratic and peaceful basis."⁷² The four occupation zones of Germany conceived at the Yalta Conference were set up, each to be administered by the commander-in-chief of the Soviet, British, U.S., or French army of occupation. Representatives of the four Allies were to make up an Allied Control Council to deal with matters affecting Germany and Austria as a whole.

In France, the press reaction was strong and loud. *Combat*, the favourite paper of the non-conformist left wing intellectuals and the resistance, published an angry editorial rant on July 24, 1945 that highlighted France's anger and frustration at being marginalized and overlooked once again. It threatened, "France isn't at Potsdam, but plenty of her rolling stock is still in Germany." Of course, the editorialist at *Combat*

⁷² "The Secretary of State to the President: Memorandum of Suggested Action Items for the President," FRUS 1945, Vol. II: The Conference of Berlin (Potsdam), 1960, p. 567.

expressed anger at the manner with which France was treated and accused the Allies of “taxing” French “friendship pretty heavily.” The editorial did make clear that France would have to take a firm stand against what it sarcastically called “the respected Potsdam trinity” to maintain autonomy and independence of thought.⁷³ This editorial clearly reveals the concerns that were so much a part of the argument for renewing French identity as strongly independent of foreign influence in the post-war period. France’s lack of power, hopes for reparations from Germany, and its frustration at being excluded from the circles of power that it had traditionally been a part of, all conspired to strengthen the will of the nation to show those who wished to dominate and exclude it that even a weakened France had what it took to form an independent and vocal foreign policy. Indeed, at Algiers in November 1944, Charles de Gaulle had outlined the essence of all French policy in the years to come when he passionately exclaimed to the provisional Consultative Assembly, “To rebuild our power: that is what is henceforth the great cause of France.”⁷⁴

It was an error in judgement for the Big Three to grant France a zone of occupation in Germany and then to expect its diplomats to simply follow their lead. France had been defeated militarily, but the foreign policy of France was specifically intended to show the international community that the French will to survive and to forge their own destiny could never be vanquished. The government intended to reinforce the belief that French national identity was so strongly intertwined with its status as a great

⁷³ *Combat*, Editorial, July 24, 1945, (Paris), p. 12 .

⁷⁴ Robert Gildea, *France Since 1945*, (New York: Oxford University Press), 1996, pp. 435-438.

power that nothing could destroy the will to persevere. The French zone of occupation in Germany might have been created to serve the interests of Britain and the United States, but France would use it to build a beacon for the world, to proclaim proudly that France remained capable of leading itself and Europe into the post-war world. The *Times* (London) declared the creation of a French zone as “the most striking success for France since the liberation in the field of foreign policy.”⁷⁵

To Charles de Gaulle’s interim government, the French zone raised the nation to equal status with the great powers. France could now show the world and the shaken French people just how effective the nation still was in the sphere of diplomacy. Just before General Pierre Koenig took possession of the French zone as Commander in Chief, de Gaulle declared that France would not be treated as the poor relation when it came to negotiations on the future of Europe. France had been overlooked at Potsdam, but this would not be allowed to occur again. No arrangements would be agreed to unless France was consulted, “at the same time and in the same manner as the other great powers.”⁷⁶ He then announced that in the near future France would make an announcement to the representatives of the other powers in Germany regarding its foreign policy position on the future of Europe.

⁷⁵ Edgar S. Furniss, Jr., *France, Troubled Ally: De Gaulle’s Heritage and Prospects*, (New York: Council on Foreign Relations), 1960, p. 7.

⁷⁶ “Déclaration du Général de Gaulle à l’Assemblée, 23 Novembre 1945,” *L’Année Politique: Revue chronologique des principaux faits politiques, économiques, et sociaux de la France de la Libération de Paris, 1944 – 1945*, (Paris: Éditions du Grand Siècle), pp. 358 – 359.

French policy would turn the future of Germany into a pedestal from which could be trumpeted the return of France as an international player. American diplomatic and political leaders, who had shown France so little respect at the end of the war, would be forced to take notice and listen to the independent and autonomous foreign policy stance taken by the French in regard to Germany. This independent policy would show the world and the people of France that their nation remained capable of acting on its own, and determining its own future. The ultimate goal of this policy would be to replace the image of defeat and devitalisation so many attributed to France with a picture of autonomy and independence.

Chapter 4

The French Thesis on Germany

On May 2, 1945 the European Advisory Council met to eliminate the last vestiges of national government in Germany and replaced it by the four Commanders-in-Chief of the occupying powers. The Commander-in-Chief was established as supreme authority in his zone. Indeed, only the four zone Commanders, acting with unanimous agreement, could effect changes in Germany as a whole. France was an equal in name and power when it came to any decisions in Germany and this power formed the basis of French foreign policy and international power in the post-war world.⁷⁷ Several months earlier, on February 2, 1945, de Gaulle let the nation know just how important its role in Germany would be. Harkening back to the traditional French fear of the German menace, the General proclaimed, “the cause of all our trials has always been Germany who was favoured by errors, illusions, or outside help.” France would play an active and important role in post-war Germany since “not only the future but also the very life of France depends on what will be done to the defeated Germans.”⁷⁸

Minister of Foreign Affairs Georges Bidault argued that French policy was intended to assert French identity abroad and was a “psychological necessity” to

⁷⁷ “Déclarations du Général de Gaulle à l’Assemblée, *L’Année Politique, 1944 – 1945*, p. 360.

⁷⁸ “General Charles de Gaulle: Broadcast on French Foreign Policy in War and Peace, 2 February 1945,” *FRUS 1945*, Vol. II: General, Political and Economic Matters, 1967, p. 1251.

strengthen the ties between the French people and their glorious past.⁷⁹ In an interview with the *New York Times* dated August 26, 1945 Bidault noted that Germany must not be allowed to threaten European security. French policy would ensure a decentralized Germany with the Rhineland separated and the Ruhr internationalized.⁸⁰ On September 11, 1945 France officially presented before the Council of Foreign Ministers its intentions to see the Ruhr and Rhineland severed from any new German state in order to deny Germany the military means and the geographic opportunity to wage aggressive war against France.⁸¹ The French military fully supported such actions and the *Etat-Major Général de la Défense Nationale* believed France's proposals would limit German war potential while providing the nation a supreme position of dominance over its old enemy.

Behind the scenes, Bidault informed the French representative on the Allied Control Council that he should block any measure prejudicing a positive outcome for French policy goals. Bidault and de Gaulle were convinced that if France wished to succeed in finding a new, independent role in the post-war world, its policy in Germany would have to be pressed forward at all cost. Within days of receiving this directive the French representatives were busy obstructing the work of the Control Council and blocking all agreement on central administrative agencies. By October 1945, France had successfully blocked American attempts to install a Central German Transport

⁷⁹ "Memorandum from the French Ambassador (Bonnet) to the Secretary of State, 6 October 1945," *FRUS 1945*, Vol. IV: Europe, 1968, p. 799.

⁸⁰ *New York Times*, August 26, 1945, New York, p.34.

⁸¹ "Memorandum by the French Delegation to the Council of Foreign Ministers, 11 September 1945," *FRUS 1945*, Vol. III: European Advisory Commission, 1968, pp. 869-71.

Department.⁸² In a private meeting with the ambassadors of Britain, the Soviet Union and the United States, Georges Bidault explained the actions of France in the Allied Control Council. Relying on the same strategy used by de Gaulle in Italy, Bidault regretfully informed the assembled ambassadors that France had not taken part in crafting the Potsdam Agreement and thus could not be held accountable for any decisions made therein.⁸³

France pushed for the creation of an independent buffer state east of the Rhine that would endow France with an extra measure of security against German aggression. This demand had strong historical precedents. In three previous periods, France had seized the Saar territory – 1681 – 1697, 1792 – 1815, and 1919 – 1935. The geography of the Saar region offered a good natural defence for France’s exposed Northeastern frontier while its abundance of coal was an essential complement to the iron ore mines of Lorraine.⁸⁴ Continuity in policy would also assure that France’s link to past successes and the dangers Germany posed to its interests would not be easily forgotten. “France is very clear on the problem of the Rhine”, Charles de Gaulle reminded the Allies, “the Rhine is French security.”⁸⁵ Indeed, the Rhine would serve to reinforce France’s

⁸² “Notes by the French Delegation of the Directorate of Transport,” *FRUS 1945* Vol. III: European Advisory Commission, 1968, p. 877.

⁸³ “Memorandum from the French Ambassador (Bonnet) to the Secretary of State, 11 August 1945,” *FRUS 1945* Vol. I: General; The United Nations, 1967, p. 567.

⁸⁴ Simon Serfaty, *France, De Gaulle, and Europe: The Policy of the Fourth and Fifth Republics Toward the Continent*, (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press), 1968, pp. 21-22.

⁸⁵ “Politique Exterieur: Le problème du Rhin, 25 Janvier, 1945,” *L'Année Politique 1945*, p. 101.

international identity, provide a strategic advantage, and offer a solution for the lagging French economy.

On October 1, 1945 General Koenig presented a formal statement on behalf of France to the Allied Control Council on Germany. In it was outlined the French Thesis on the future of Germany and Europe. The French government argued France could not agree to any decision that might prejudice the future of the Ruhr and the Rhineland. Noting that the two regions were economically and strategically important to French interests and that the force of all German invasions had been channelled through these territories, French diplomats expected the full cooperation of the Allies in channelling their support into France as reparations.⁸⁶ Koenig also insisted that Germany not be allowed to form any type of central government organizations that might allow the growth of its power. The French essentially proposed a post-war Germany that would be run with absolutely no input from the Germans.

Between November 13th and 20th, 1945 Maurice Couve de Murville, acting as a representative of the *Quai d'Orsay*, went to the United States to explain the French position to the Americans. At a press conference he argued in favour of the creation of a sovereign Rhineland state with Allied occupation of its strategic points and for the internationalization of the Ruhr. He reiterated his country's conviction that, "the security of Europe and of the world demands that Germany should lose the free use of war

⁸⁶ "La Conférence des Réparations à Paris, 9 Novembre 1945," *L'Année Politique, 1944 – 1945*, pp. 358 – 359.

potential represented by the industry and the resources of the Rhine-Westphalia area.”⁸⁷

The French plans struck the Americans as unworkable; de Murville found the Americans unresponsive to French military security concerns and determined to forge ahead with the creation of central administrative agencies.

Meanwhile, in France, Georges Bidault held a series of talks with American Secretary of State Byrnes between November 15th and 20th, 1945. Bidault proclaimed the “paramount importance” France attached to “preventing the Rhineland and Westphalia ever again becoming an arsenal, corridor or base for an attack by Germany on her western neighbours.” The only solution, Bidault felt, was the one France had been suggesting for months, “the final separation of this region, including the Ruhr.” To France, so badly battered by Germany and in need of security assurances, this was “an essential condition for the security of Europe and the world.”⁸⁸ Secretary of State Byrnes, taken off guard could only blandly respond that the United States was willing to go ahead without France. This was a bluff that the French were aware had little chance of succeeding. The Potsdam agreement had clearly outlined the need for unanimous consent and the British and Soviets had warned they would counter any unilateral

⁸⁷ “Report on the Franco-American Conversations held in Washington, 13-20 November 1945 Concerning the Future Status of the Rhineland and the Ruhr, *FRUS 1945*, Vol. III: European Advisory Commission, Austria-Germany, p. 896.

⁸⁸ John W. Young, *France, The Cold War, and the Western Alliance, 1944-49: French Foreign Policy and Post-War Europe*, (New York: St. Martin’s Press), 1990, p. 34.

American actions.⁸⁹ At best, the United States and France would become locked in a battle of wills, each waiting for the other to blink.

Stuck in a deadlock, relations between the two powers quickly soured any hope of co-operation in Germany. American diplomats and military personnel sharply criticised their French colleagues, frequently blaming them far more severely than the Soviets for failing to move forward with the work of the occupation.⁹⁰ Personnel of the United States Army desiring to visit the French zone were frequently treated in a manner they regarded as insulting and demeaning. For their part, French troops and officials were ordered to check all papers and follow all procedure by the book. The goal of these frustrating and time-consuming exercises was typically French: the United States had to learn that this was France's zone and it would not be manipulated or influenced unduly by a foreign power, even an ally. This led General Lucius Clay to repeatedly complain, "we did not have the same right with respect to the French zone, since its actions were taken by the separate [French] state administration."⁹¹

⁸⁹ "La Conférence des Réparations à Paris, 9 Novembre 1945," *L'Année Politique, 1944-1945*, p. 358.

⁹⁰ "The United States Representative on the Allied Commission on Reparations (Pauley) to the Secretary of State, 14 September 1945," *FRUS 1945*, Vol. III: European Advisory Commission, p. 1290.

⁹¹ Lucius D. Clay, *Decision In Germany*, (New York: Doubleday), 1950, p. 407.

The United States Reacts to the French Thesis

The goals of France in regards to Germany all ran directly opposite the aims of American foreign policy. The United States had briefly flirted with the idea of similar harsh actions to restrain German power under President Roosevelt. His Secretary of the Treasury, Henry Morgenthau Jr., had proposed a plan which would turn Germany “into a country primarily agricultural and pastoral” without “war making industries.” For a brief time it seemed as if French and American policy goals in Germany could easily be reconciled. This led Georges Bidault to remark, “our desire is to wipe the slate clean of the past, start afresh and work with the U.S as closely as we possibly can in the international field.”⁹² At the Quebec Conference in September 1944 the “Morgenthau Plan” was officially adopted for further study but it fell to the wayside under the new administration of President Harry Truman.

Truman believed French fears of a revived Germany were exaggerated. He had been to Germany at the end of the war and had seen the extent of the devastation. The United States would repeat the errors of the last war and finance German reparations. American policy now dictated that security in the world lay not in territorial acquisition but in a new system of international security based on a peaceful, restored Europe.⁹³ As the United States retreated from the extreme position of the Morgenthau Plan the

⁹² Robert O. Paxton & Nicholas Wahl, *De Gaulle and the United States*, (Providence: Berg), 1994, p. 124.

⁹³ Irwin M. Wall, “Harry S. Truman and Charles de Gaulle,” in *De Gaulle and the United States: A Centennial Reappraisal*, Robert O. Paxton, ed., (Providence: Berg), 1994, pp. 124-25.

disparity grew wider between the American and French positions. The United States now stood behind its position to establish a self-sustained Germany at the earliest possible date. This outcome was an essential part of the United States' strategy to create a sound European economy and to stop the continued need for financial support. A State Department memo from early 1945 pointed out American goals and the problems they faced. It noted U.S. desires to keep "this period of transition at a minimum are in direct conflict with French desires to retard German recovery." If the United States were to side with the French on this policy, it would mean, "adding to our own financial liability in Germany, perhaps so much that our investment to date would be lost in its effectiveness to develop a self-sustaining, responsible German government."⁹⁴

The constant complaint heard from American diplomats in Germany between 1945 and 1948 was that the French veto in the Allied Control Council for Germany was preventing the establishment of central, German administrative services. In effect, France alone was holding back the successful fulfillment of U.S. policy. This led to increasing frustration among American diplomats who saw all their aims being thwarted by a nation they had all but discounted. The increasing conflict between France and the United States in Germany led the State department and U.S. military to issue an analysis of the situation in August 1945. Brigadier-General G. Bryan Conrad missed the entire thrust of French policy aims and concluded, "the French are hurt, sensitive, suffering from a collective inferiority complex... '*La Grande Malade*' is flat on her back but

⁹⁴ "Memorandum of Conversation by the Acting Secretary of State, 18 May 1945," *FRUS 1945*, Vol IV: Europe, 1968, p. 689.

hypersensitive to remedies suggested by U.S. doctors and unable, so far, to cure herself... France today is sick, hungry, proud, and hard to handle."⁹⁵

Conrad's analysis was typical of how Americans dealing with French foreign policy saw the situation. Rather than discussing France as an autonomous nation protecting its interests, U.S. discussion tended to fall into paternalistic and derogatory language. For example, Ambassador Jefferson Caffery diagnosed French complaints as symptomatic of "post-liberation neurosis" and their "well-known inferiority complex."⁹⁶ Over the coming years, as France continued to frustrate the aims of the United States in Europe, to this evaluation would be added, "convalescent", "devitalized", "demoralized" and "exhausted."⁹⁷ Of course, the fact that France managed to get American diplomats so riled up reflects the success of its foreign policy means. It is difficult to equate France with weakness and loss when its diplomats continued to score points against the United States. Optimism ran high among French diplomats as report after report from French-occupied Germany highlighted France's success in grinding American policy to a halt. General Koenig dispatched reports featuring the latest disagreements between the Americans and Soviets on the Allied Control Council. He believed that the increasing division between the Big Three (Great Britain, Russia, and the United States) would

⁹⁵ G. Bryan Conrad, "Franco-American Relations," August 14, 1945, 092 France 1944-45, Secretary General Staff Classified General Correspondence 1944-45, Cited in Frank Costigliola, *France and the United States: The Cold War Alliance Since World War II*, (New York: Twayne Publishers), 1992, pp. 40 – 41.

⁹⁶ Costigliola, *France and the United States*, p. 40.

⁹⁷ "The Director of the Office of European Affairs (Hickerson) to the Coordinator of Foreign Aid and Assistance, 12 October 1948, *FRUS* 1948, Vol. III: Western Europe, 1974, p. 666.

allow France's strategy on Germany to triumph. At the absolute minimum, he expected agreement on French aims in the Saar.⁹⁸

General Lucius Clay, the American Military Governor believed the French came to Germany in an unhappy frame of mind: "suffering from their accumulated hatred of the Germans, their apprehension of the future, their unimpressive record of repelling the German invasion, the French also were resentful that they had not been included in the Potsdam conference."⁹⁹ He went on to note with frustration, "I do wish to point out that there is an increasing conflict between American and French policy which leads to almost daily disagreements in our operations in Germany."¹⁰⁰ After dealing with French stalling tactics for several months, General Clay contacted the State Department for further instructions, noting his fear that, "unless there is a definite improvement in our ability to obtain results in the next two or three meetings... it will be manifest in the press and to the public that military government has failed."¹⁰¹ The fact the United States' man on the spot would suggest that American policy could fail due to French efforts says a great deal about just how far France's leverage had increased in under a year. From having been granted a zone of occupation out of pity to becoming the primary concern of American foreign policy, France had begun to forge its new identity.

⁹⁸ John W. Young, *France, The Cold War and the Western Alliance, 1944-1949: French Foreign Policy and Post War Europe*, (New York: St. Martin's Press), 1990, p. 140.

⁹⁹ Lucius D. Clay, *Decision in Germany*, (New York: Doubleday), 1950, p. 116.

¹⁰⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 416.

¹⁰¹ "The Ambassador in France (Caffery) to the Secretary of State, 18 April 1945," *FRUS 1945*, Vol. III: European Advisory Commission, 1968, p. 655.

The power France wielded in the Allied Control Council forced the United States to tread lightly. The American policy of conciliation toward Germany was intended to speed European recovery and “to frustrate socialism, forestall Communism, to spare American taxpayers money, to counteract French plans to dismember Germany, and to contain the Soviet Union in Central Europe.”¹⁰² In the big picture of American policy, there was very little room to accommodate what France was attempting to achieve. On September 22, 1945 a bewildered Clay exclaimed, “I believe the problem right now is the fundamental principle of how we are going to govern Germany. If the Control Council isn’t going to establish German administrative machinery it might as well fold up as a governing agency and become a negotiating agency.”¹⁰³ Indeed, this is effectively what happened as France increasingly sought out conflict with the United States over its German policy.

For its part, France welcomed conflict with the United States over foreign policy issues. It showed that despite setbacks France remained as vocal and active in international politics as ever. The conflict was simply another part of de Gaulle’s plan for reasserting French greatness. Indeed, de Gaulle begins the second book of his memoirs with, “*Etre grand, c’est soutenir une grande querelle*” (To be great is to sustain

¹⁰² John Gimbel, *The American Occupation of Germany: Politics and the Military, 1945 – 1949*, (California: Stanford University Press), 1968, p. xi.

¹⁰³ “The United States Political Advisor for Germany (Murphy) to the Secretary of State,” *FRUS 1945*, Vol. III: European Advisory Commission, 1968, p. 964.

a great quarrel).¹⁰⁴ To de Gaulle and Bidault, French identity sprang from the past, from the history and culture of France. Post-war policy was intended to “develop the national personality” so it once more focused on the glory of France.¹⁰⁵ Conflict and argument reflected an active diplomatic role in international politics and deflected any possible image of France as a satellite state of the United States. A policy of grandeur meant more than salvaging French pride. Equality of status would allow France to participate in building a more secure world.

The nature of the conflict between France and the United States can be defined as encompassing two overlapping concepts: the future of Germany and maintaining independence from the great powers without falling into a dependence that would lead to further decline. French policy in Germany was backed by several domestic and international factors working in its favor. Of primary importance was the strategic location of France in the heart of Europe coupled with massive popular support for the *Parti Communiste Français*, revealed during the 1945 election. The increasing fear of the spread of Communism into Western Europe forced the United States to adopt a policy that avoided domineering attitudes for fear of tipping the balance in the Communists favor. The dilemma the United States was forced to face was reconciling its German policy and its attitude toward France within a single coherent European policy. Stuck in

¹⁰⁴ Charles de Gaulle, *War Memoirs Volume II: The Edge of the Sword*, (New York: Criterion Books), 1960, p. 3.

¹⁰⁵ Charles G. Cogan, *Oldest Allies. Guarded Friends: The United States and France Since 1940*, (Westport: Praeger), 1994, p. 6.

a Catch-22 dilemma, American foreign policy-makers treaded water, immobile and lacking direction for much of the period between 1945 and 1948.

The United States had emerged from the Second World War a full-fledged global player which sought to achieve peace and prosperity through the application of American values. American policy makers believed that order and peace depended upon prosperity and political democracy. To many in the State Department, France was lacking both these essential elements. On the one hand there were de Gaulle and his ultra-nationalistic supporters, and on the other, the looming menace of the PCF (*Parti Communiste Français*). The continuing economic crisis threatening France intensified political uncertainty there. The United States, challenged by France, faced the unappealing prospect of compromising its own philosophy of how to achieve world peace and prosperity.

The brilliance of French policy was that it exploited the weakest link in the United States' vision of reconstruction. In essence, American policy could only succeed if the nations it wished to mold cooperated fully. During the closing months of the war, in a briefing paper on France, the Department of State concluded that "American interests require that every effort be made by this government to assist France morally as well as physically, to regain her strength and her influence, not only with a view toward increasing the French contribution to the war effort, but also with a view toward enabling the French to assume larger responsibility in connection with maintaining the peace."¹⁰⁶

¹⁰⁶ "Briefing Book Paper – France," *FRUS 1945*, N.D. released between Jan. 21 – Feb. 2, 1945. Vol. I: General; United Nations, 1973, p. 300.

Indeed, with the exception of France, most of Europe was more than willing to follow the American model in exchange for economic aid and post-war support. While the government of France realized the inherent dangers of a severely weakened economy, its overriding concern lay with the manner in which the outside world perceived it. To simply accept American aid would be too much like charity, or even worse, it would mean France had taken on the role of a follower. France responded by separating its need for economic aid from its policy on Germany and the United States responded in kind. Continuing its policy of stubbornly marching toward a set goal despite heavy resistance from the outside, France maintained a strong, independent tone in all of its policy negotiations.

American Fear of Communism

The American fear and distrust of Communism proved to be France's most effective tool in preventing the United States from responding to French diplomatic efforts in Germany by exploiting the dismal state of France's economy to its advantage. The fact that the usually divisive French political landscape was unified by France's search for an autonomous role in Europe led many in the State Department to distrust all French political parties equally. This created a problem for them since Washington needed the cooperation of France if it was going to succeed in building a strong, non-communist France. If the French were to choose a Communist government, the United States could no longer "live safely," the Joint Chiefs of Staff warned in a 1947 report.¹⁰⁷ Indeed, because of France's importance to the national security of the United States, priority was given to establishing "the areas of primary strategic importance to the United States in the event of ideological warfare."¹⁰⁸

The likelihood of a Communist France seemed high between 1945 and 1948. The *Parti Communiste Français* gained 26.5 percent of the popular vote and won more seats than any other party (158) in the 1945 election.¹⁰⁹ Within days of the publication of the election results, Roosevelt approved a State Department plan to rebuild France as a major

¹⁰⁷ "Report by the Joint Strategic Survey Commission –National Security Policy," *FRUS* 1947, Vol. I: General; The United Nations, 1973, p. 740.

¹⁰⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 739.

¹⁰⁹ "Politique Interieure: La campagne électorale: Attitude des parties," *L'Année Politique, 1944 – 1945*, p. 358.

power. The United States would henceforth make allowances for France and treat it, "on the basis of her potential power... rather than... her present strength [in order to] bolster the non-communists." The French Communists were depicted as "dangerous extremists" who would eventually attempt to seize the government.¹¹⁰

In 1947 American Ambassador to France James Caffery, calling for increased aid to France, expressed his belief that "the long hand of the Kremlin found the PCF to be its most useful tool in Europe."¹¹¹ A British official returning from a trip to France added to the paranoia when he stated that Paris was the control center of a heavily armed "secret army" ready to act on orders from Moscow. It is clear that the United States took such rumors very seriously. To prevent the takeover of France by armed Communist insurrectionists, President Truman approved a plan to send in American troops. In the interim the United States would have to do its best to weaken the influence of the Communists by encouraging and supporting political factions open to U.S. influence.¹¹²

The powerful fear of communism led the United States to tread softly in situations that could only be resolved through firm action. General Clay openly wondered whether the State Department was doing anything at all to alter French behavior. Freeman "Doc" Matthews, from the Office of European Affairs, conceded the fact that the State

¹¹⁰ "The Ambassador in France (Caffery) to the Acting Secretary of State," *FRUS 1946* Vol. II: Council of Foreign Ministers, 1970, p. 1144.

¹¹¹ "United States Assistance to Countries from the Standpoint of National Security, 23 September 1947," *FRUS 1947*, Vol. I: General; The United Nations, 1973, p. 666.

¹¹² "Report by the Policy Planning Staff Resume of the World Situation, 6 November 1947" *FRUS 1947*, Vol. I: General; The United Nations, 1970, pp. 770-780.

Department had taken no action to remedy the situation and had no plans to change its approach. He stated that the State Department's immediate priorities lay with buttressing the internal stability of France and preventing an even greater move toward popular support of the PCF. Any actions that might affect the balance of power into the Communist camp had to be carefully weighed and evaluated.¹¹³

The United States saw itself as constructing a global defensive strategy to rebuild Europe and halt the progress of communism; this stance directly conflicted with the strong autonomous streak in French identity. France had suffered enormous losses as a result of the war and was inevitably worried that U.S. economic and foreign policies would endanger its future status. The French were not willing to simply sit back and allow the United States to map out their future. To allow such an event would mean that France would essentially cease to be France. If the French zone in Germany could be a useful French tool to influence America's European policy, then the domestic threat of Communism could be put to a similar use curbing the United States domestic influence in France. French identity and independence would remain secure as its diplomats put a particularly French spin on the communist menace to France.

As early as October 27, 1944, U.S. Ambassador Jefferson Caffery noted, "As France goes, the Continent of Europe will probably go and it is not in our interest to have

¹¹³ Irwin M. Wall, *Making of Postwar France*, pp. 44-47.

the continent... dominated by any single power – friend or enemy.”¹¹⁴ The triumph of “aggressive and militant” French Communism would mean, “the entire continent might fall into the Russian orbit.”¹¹⁵ The worry expressed by Caffery reveals just how much power France really had at its disposal. The United States could not simply treat the French as weak dependents. In fact, for the most part French diplomacy held its own against the dominant power in the West.

A *Quai d'Orsay* analysis of July 20, 1945 noted the “marked incomprehension” between France and the United States when it came to most foreign policy goals. However, it emphasized that the Soviets, unlike the Americans, stood “industrially incapable of furnishing [France] with the equipment necessary to rebuild our industry.”¹¹⁶ Indeed, the French economy was in a shambles in 1944 and recovery seemed highly unlikely without massive foreign aid, even if France managed to gain all the demands outlined in the Allied Control Council for reparations. Only the United States could provide the necessary funds. An important part of French policy would become striking a balance between accepting U.S. aid without losing autonomy and maintaining an independent foreign policy, counter to American goals. Indeed, American diplomats argued that the United States had no choice but to deal with the “sour puss” French on their own terms or face the consequences of a Communist dominated Europe. Several weeks after this interchange, Ambassador Caffery warned that U.S. economic supplies to

¹¹⁴ John W. Young, *France, the Cold War and the Western Alliance, 1944 – 1949: French Foreign Policy and Post-War Europe*, (London: Leicester University Press), 1990, p. 39.

¹¹⁵ Young, *France, the Cold War*, p. 40.

¹¹⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 64.

France must be maintained, partly to preserve the market for U.S. goods, but also to prevent France from falling under foreign domination.¹¹⁷

In February 1946, Paris based U.S diplomat Livingston T. Merchant (later appointed Ambassador to Canada, 1956-1958; 1961-1962 and Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs in the late 1960s) observed that France could move in one of two directions. It could, "gamble on a new world", that is the American model of private enterprise and modernization, or on the other hand, it could choose the path of "economic self-containment."¹¹⁸ Such a choice would be disastrous to American interests since the consensus in the State Department was that restrictive economic practices spawned not only dictators and wars, but also smacked of Communist practices. To keep France on the right path, the United States began to pump American funds into the devastated economy. From 1945 to 1954, the United States contributed nearly \$1 billion a year to the French economy.¹¹⁹

¹¹⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 40.

¹¹⁸ Costigliola, p. 45.

¹¹⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 45.

Chapter 5

International Diplomatic Ascent Reconciled with Economic Descent

The Second World War left France in a demoralized state. Its economy was shattered, the national administrative machinery was nonexistent, and industrial and commercial centres were devastated. General Charles de Gaulle recalls this period in his memoirs noting, "Paris was without the means regularly to communicate with the provinces... The railways were to all intents and purposes at a halt... As for the roads, 3000 bridges were down; hardly 300,000 vehicles were roadworthy out of the former total of three million."¹²⁰ In April 1945, eight months after the liberation of Paris, 35 percent of the French stated that food and transport were the most urgent internal problems, compared with 13 percent who put the elections and the organization of political parties first.¹²¹ At the beginning of 1946, 59 percent of the French population could heat only one room during the winter. Another poll showed that there was no optimism about the economic future; only 29 percent expressed hope.¹²²

The French economic situation was such that only massive foreign aid could bring about long-term recovery. In August 1945, General de Gaulle stated laconically, "the President and Mr. Byrnes, underlined the American wish to help France to as speedy as

¹²⁰ Charles de Gaulle, *Mémoires*, vol. 3, (Paris), 1959, pp. 5-6.

¹²¹ Institut Français d'opinion publique, Ministère des Affaires étrangères, 16 April 1945, ministère des Affaires étrangères, *Affaires diverses commerciales*, no. 4085.

¹²² Institut Français d'opinion publique, Ministère des Affaires étrangères, 1 February 1946.

possible a recovery, and even to increase her productive capacity: they stated that every request for equipment for the French mining industry would be given absolute priority by the United States."¹²³ The French government was able to reconcile its desire to remain independent of foreign influence with its need for economic support by referring to the aid as "gifts".¹²⁴ Indeed, as late as 1947 the United States granted emergency interim aid amounting to 317 million dollars. Over 66 percent of the official bread ration during the winter of 1948 was provided free of charge by the United States to the French government through gifts of flour, as well as 60 percent of the petrol ration and 20 percent of the coal used.¹²⁵

Despite French efforts to rebuild the economy and American aid, within a period of 5 years, the franc had lost six-sevenths of its nominal value. Nothing like this had ever happened in the history of France and it had an effect on the way the French people viewed the United States. As the need for American aid increased, distrust of the United States skyrocketed. Indeed, 50 percent of the French believed that American aid was primarily designed to provide the United States with foreign markets, and only 18 percent believed that it was the result of a sincere desire to aid Europe. In fact 15 percent of the French people believed that American aid represented the desire to interfere in European affairs.¹²⁶

¹²³ Charles de Gaulle, *Mémoires*, vol. 3, (Paris), 1959, p. 463.

¹²⁴ Tint, *French Foreign Policy*, p.15.

¹²⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 16.

¹²⁶ Institut Français d'opinion publique, *Ministère des Affaires étrangères*,

France's international prestige continued to suffer because of poor economic conditions. General de Gaulle recorded his realization that, before France could again count in the councils of the world, it had to rebuild its shattered political organization and its economy.¹²⁷ French policy held that the nation remained important because of the strategic and military benefits of its geographic location. However, as long as France remained in a temporary state of decline it was vulnerable to pressure and exploitation by others. Even if left weak and unsupported, France could still use its geographical position, its recognized place in major power circles, and its nuisance value to harm American interests.¹²⁸ In French diplomatic circles, it was fully accepted that France had to reach for greatness once more, not only for itself, but also for the benefit of the world. At the same time, French policy would reflect the desire, in a nation which had been for a very long time a great power, to revive the sense of being master of its own destiny as far as was still possible.¹²⁹

As late as 1950 United States aid was responsible for an average of 18 percent per annum (1944 to 1950) of all investments in France, most of which went into the nationalized industries. A public opinion poll dated 1 October 1947 showed that 78

1 September 1947.

¹²⁷ Charles de Gaulle, *War Memoirs: Salvation*, Translated by R. Howard, (New York: Simon and Shuster), 1960, pp. 5-6.

¹²⁸ William Reitzel, *United States Foreign Policy, 1945-1955*, (Washington), 1956, p. 191.

¹²⁹ Stanley Hoffmann, *Decline or Renewal? France Since the 1930s*, (New York: The Viking Press), 1974, p. 284.

percent of those asked believed that the economic situation was worse than the previous year. A further 35 percent believed that lack of food was France's single greatest problem and 87 percent believed that the situation would worsen.¹³⁰ It was in this atmosphere that the French Communist Party began to charge that French economic dependence was making it a colony of the United States.¹³¹ The United States was extremely careful never to give the impression that it was influencing the domestic policy of France, but this did not deter the Communist Party.

American policy in France was based upon the theory that the United States "should make it clear that it is not our purpose to impose upon the peoples of Europe any particular form of political or economic association. The future organization of Europe must be determined by the peoples of Europe."¹³² American officials wished to give the impression that "it was a basic feature of American policy... [that] the concept of 'friendly aid' ... remained predominant in American thinking."¹³³ At the same time, they often had difficulty reconciling a deep rooted belief that France should follow the lead of the United States with the strong-minded, independent streak of the French. Undersecretary of State Sumner Welles acknowledged that, "ever since the tenth century,

¹³⁰ Institut Français d'opinion publique, Ministère des Affaires étrangères, 1 October 1947.

¹³¹ Tint, *French Foreign Policy*, p.18.

¹³² *Ibid.*, p.18.

¹³³ *Ibid.*, p.19.

France has been one of the great nations of the world” but times had changed and it could no longer “ignore the twentieth century economic reality.”¹³⁴

No matter how careful the United States was to maintain the perception a “partnership” with France, distrust remained strong among French policy makers. Jean Monnet argued, “the sovereignty of the French people, the expression of which was suspended by the Occupation of France. must be completely safeguarded, and any organization outside of France should be prevented from arrogating to itself the slightest atom of a right to the leadership of the French people.”¹³⁵ This applied to both the German military threat and the overwhelming cultural and economic power of the United States. Indeed, as late as 1947 Jean Baptiste Duroselle, discussing American aid to France proclaimed, “there are a few occasions in history when a decision so purely technical on the surface has produced such tremendous consequences.”¹³⁶

¹³⁴ Sumner Welles, *An Intelligent American's Guide to the Peace*. (New York, Dryden Press), 1945, p. 48.

¹³⁵ Jean Monnet, *Memoirs*, (New York: Doubleday), 1978, p. 155.

¹³⁶ Jean-Baptiste Duroselle, *France and the United States: From the Beginnings to the Present*. Trans. Derek Coltman, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press), 1978, p. 181.

France Proposes a New Path for Economic Renewal

France soon responded to its economic crisis by proposing a plan for economic reconstruction that would, of course, involve Germany and would highlight France's potential for power in the future. Foreign Minister Georges Bidault argued France had to protect its "traditional industries," that were so much weaker than "the huge American industries."¹³⁷ Bidault believed economic security could be gained through dismantling existing industries in Germany, placing the Ruhr under international control and by joining the Saar with Lorraine.¹³⁸ The combined economic resources of these regions would be used to serve France and remedy its serious coal shortage.

Jean Monnet, who had been Chair of the Franco-British Economic Co-ordination Committee and spent much of World War II in Washington D.C., where he made many powerful friends, believed he had a solution to reconciling the need for aid with the desire for autonomy. Monnet hoped to use American dollars to help reconstruct an efficient, expanding economy necessary for French power and independence. As Monnet put it, France faced the choice between "modernization or decadence."¹³⁹ In March 1946, Monnet sent a memorandum to Bidault in which he outlined the basis for future economic policy. The aims of security and French economic reconstruction were seen as

¹³⁷ "Le charbon de la Ruhr et de la Pologne, *L'Année Politique 1946*, pp. 134, 428, and "Memorandum of Conversations at the White House on August 22, 1945 Between President Truman, General de Gaulle and Georges Bidault," *FRUS 1945*, pp. 707 – 711.

¹³⁸ "La suppression des comités d'organisation et la réparation," *L'Année Politique 1946*, p 101.

¹³⁹ Robert Frank, "The French Dilemma: Modernization with Dependence and Decline," in *Power in Europe? Great Britain, France, Italy, and Germany in a Postwar World, 1945-1950*, ed Josef Becker and Franz Knipping, (New York: Walter de Gruyter), 1986, p. 266.

inseparable. The plan fulfilled foreign policy requirements for security with domestic needs for coal and steel.¹⁴⁰

France's need for dollars led some to suggest an increase in dependence upon the United States. While the 1946 "Monnet Plan" did call for a general shift towards the United States, it also clearly defined French independence and power. The ideal situation was to never accept bonds that could not be removed and that might submit France to the decisions of others long after the ties were no longer in France's interest. Intense cooperation and exchanges were acceptable as long as entanglements could be avoided.¹⁴¹ Furthermore, Monnet believed it was worthwhile to accept some loss of autonomy in order to secure "the promise of future independence."¹⁴² German coal bound the Monnet plan to the French Thesis. The plan's ambitious targets would require large supplies of coke and coal. These could only come from western Germany; so French economic needs would support the primary concern with military security and thus reinforce independence.¹⁴³ The Monnet Plan could bolster French military security claims on the Ruhr and Rhineland by adding an economic justification. As John S. Hill notes, "Monnet's memorandum to de Gaulle of December 4, 1945 had linked a long-term

¹⁴⁰ "Politique Economique et Sociale: Les articles d'utilité sociale," *L'Année Politique 1946*, p 131.

¹⁴¹ Arnold Wolfers, *Discord and Collaboration*, (Baltimore: University of Baltimore Press), 1965, p. 67.

¹⁴² Robert Frank, "The French Dilemma: Modernization with Dependence and Decline," p. 271.

¹⁴³ Frances M. B. Lynch, "Resolving the Paradox of the Monnet Plan: National and International Planning in French Reconstruction," *Economic History Review*, v. 37, #2 (May 1984), p. 236.

reconstruction plan to foreign credits, foreign credits to rapid modernization, rapid modernization to increased production, and increased production to national economic independence.”¹⁴⁴

While domestically, French policy makers feared that France was drifting too close to the United States because of increased economic aid, American policy makers began to fear the opposite. In 1946, Merchant observed that the French mindset was geared toward self-sufficiency and enjoyed “greater popular and political appeal” for its “cut dependence” and “conformed to the desire for national accomplishment and strength.” This would be extremely disappointing for American hopes for “a liberalized, expanding world trade.” Merchant warned that the United States could head off any such catastrophe with an increase in dollar aid. When weighing the expense of loans to France and other nations, Congress should also “calculate how many hours a billion dollars lasts in fighting an all-out war.”¹⁴⁵

French foreign policy in Germany was closely linked with plans to rebuild the economy. While American aid was appreciated, the dangers to an autonomous identity that came along with it required France offer its own solution to recovery. On October 5, 1945, General de Gaulle spoke of integrating the French zone of occupation into the economy of France as a possible solution to speed economic recovery. The suggestion

¹⁴⁴ John S. Hill, “Germany, the United States, and De Gaulle’s Strategy for Economic Reconstruction, 1944-1946,” *De Gaulle and the United States*, Ed. Robert O. Paxton, (Oxford: Berg), 1994, pp. 114-115.

¹⁴⁵ Costigliola, *France and the United States*, p. 45.

was proposed once more in November and December of the same year. In addition, France continued to argue, removing the Ruhr, Rhineland and Saarland from the authority of the Allied Control Council and putting it under French authority would provide the economy with copious amounts of coal. When American diplomats reminded the French of what a devastating effect this would have on the German economy, France's response was to suggest the Germans would just have to "make [the] necessary adjustments" to deal with the inevitable foreign exchange deficit.¹⁴⁶

On March 24, 1946, Prime Minister Félix Gouin, in a speech at Strasbourg attempted to shift the French government's stance toward a less rigid line on Germany. The foreign policy of Bidault was seemingly disavowed when Gouin stated, "annexation, whether open or disguised is no solution." He then proceeded to request an increased supply of coal from the Allies.¹⁴⁷ This reversal of French policy would not be allowed to go unchecked. Within two weeks French policy returned to presenting a unified foreign policy to the world. A communiqué published after the Cabinet meeting of April 5, 1946 reaffirmed, "the continuity of France's policy with regard to the Ruhr, the Rhineland and the Saar."¹⁴⁸ In fact, what forced the return to the French Thesis on Germany were threats from Bidault, his MRP and the PCF. If existing policies were not followed to their natural conclusions, Gouin's coalition government would fall.

¹⁴⁶ "Memorandum of Conversation Between the Secretary of State and Couve de Murville, November 11, 1945," *FRUS 1945*, Vol. IV: Europe, 1968, p. 908.

¹⁴⁷ Alexander Werth, *France 1940 – 1955*, (London: Robert Hale Ltd.), 1956, p. 306.

¹⁴⁸ *Ibid*, p. 306.

Bidault felt certain that any sign of retreat in French foreign policy would bring the successes of the last few years crashing down and France would once more be perceived as a weakened nation whose only source of economic support was the United States. The PCF stated similar motives behind backing Bidault against Gouin. Duclos noted such a change would be disastrous since it would be an agreement reached “at the price of French security, of which the internationalization of the Ruhr was an essential condition.”¹⁴⁹ For France, integration of the Saar represented guarantees of material reparations from Germany as compensation for wartime damage. The French coal crisis remained a crutch to economic recovery and policy planners believed control of the Saar region, with its vast stores of coalmines, would bolster its economy while dampening the image of France as reliant on American aid.¹⁵⁰ Indeed, Henri G. Rathenau, Councilor for the Foreign Commerce of France, noted as late as 1950 that between 60 and 70 percent of the Saar’s exports were to France, and 84 to 87 percent of its imports came from French industries.¹⁵¹ Indeed, in August 1949, at the first session of the Council of Europe, France was still arguing that the best way to prevent the Saar’s reattachment to Germany and to maintain France’s special economic and strategic role, was by making it autonomous politically. The recognition of the Saar’s autonomy by the nations of the world, including Germany, would establish a stable situation against the day when a peace treaty would be negotiated with Germany.

¹⁴⁹ Werth, *France 1940 – 1955*, p. 306.

¹⁵⁰ F. Roy Willis, *The French in Germany*, (Stanford: Stanford University Press), 1962, p. 33.

¹⁵¹ Henri G. Rathenau, “L’Union Économique Franco-Sarroise,” *Politique Étrangère*, August-September 1955, pp. 439 – 443.

France offers its Own Vision of Europe: International Balancing Act

France's foreign policy in Germany highlighted French autonomy and its ability to challenge the United States on international issues. At the same time, French diplomats tied their goals in Germany to reconciling increasing economic dependence upon the United States with maintaining independence. However, for French policy to truly achieve a solution to the dilemma of autonomy, it would need to propose an alternative to the world order suggested by American diplomats. As Charles G. Cogan posited, "France was well placed in its geography: it is hard for the 'country of the center' to fall into isolation. It is difficult to create a defense structure for Europe without France."¹⁵² Effectively, the economic and social reliability of a stable post-war Europe established through conciliation and the unity sought by the United States, conflicted with the full independence for which the French were striving. French policy was based on a belief that if the influence of the United States grew too great France would not only lose its international prestige, but that mystical quality that made up its national character.

At Brest, on July 22, 1945, de Gaulle proclaimed France had a great role to play in the world. This consisted of being "a link between the two worlds." It was essential that France should be "neither a pawn in the game of others, nor their battlefield."¹⁵³ France would pursue a policy that would place it between the United States and the

¹⁵² Charles G. Cogan, *Oldest Allies, Guarded Friends: The United States and France Since 1940*, (Praeger: Westport), 1994, p. 7.

¹⁵³ Werth., p.255.

Soviet Union as “the arbitrator between the two camps.”¹⁵⁴ The implementation of this very broad policy was intended to be “equidistant from the ‘two camps.’”¹⁵⁵ French policy would maintain a precarious balance between accepting foreign aid from the United States and pursuing an independent role for France in the post-war world. The growing intensity of the Cold War would inevitably alter the nature of France’s German policy, but French diplomatic aims remained essentially unchanged. Even today, French policy remains dominated by a desire to promote its special place in the world and to avoid too close an association with the power of the United States.

France’s “middle of the road” approach to foreign policy was very much rooted in philosophical reasoning. It seemed to suggest that superpowers based on ideologies would come and go, but France transcended all of this. Existentialist philosopher Jean-Paul Sartre defined the role of France in October of 1945. He noted that even though France “has lost much of its power,” it was very important to remember, “France is our concrete situation... our only chance... and if we decide to take our chance on life... we have to take our chance on France, and commit ourselves to finding a place for France in this tough world, this humanity in danger of death.”¹⁵⁶ To de Gaulle and Bidault,

¹⁵⁴ Jean Laloy, *Yalta: Yesterday, Today, Tomorrow*, Translated by William R. Tyler, (New York: Harper and Row), 1988, pp. 61 – 62.

¹⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 62. In later decades French nuclear policy and its independent strike forces would provide a similar boost to the level of middle power by guaranteeing a place at the table among the great powers and giving “sanctuary” to French territorial integrity. Thirty years after the death of de Gaulle and a decade after German reunification French foreign policy continues to be dominated by a need to assert individuality at all costs and to avoid the label of “satellite state” to any power.

¹⁵⁶ Costigliola, *France and the United States*, p. 46.

France's place was squarely between the power of the United States and the Soviet Union.

"We are interested in affairs which go beyond the West. France will never permit itself to be limited to the Western part of the world," Georges Bidault declared in 1945.¹⁵⁷ As André Siegfried declared at the time, France "felt its mission to be that of serving as a moderating element, indispensable to the equilibrium between the great blocs that are trying to divide up the world between them."¹⁵⁸ Perhaps the best example of this philosophy expressed as policy came from Salomon Grumbach, member of the French Socialist Party and President of the Foreign Affairs Commission of the Council of the Republic. He felt it was for the government of the Republic,

"for French diplomacy to do all that our international position, all that the influence we have been able to keep in spite of the weakening of our material forces, allows us in order to promote the reconciliation of the Anglo-Saxon countries and Soviet Russia, without which there will be no certain and stable world peace, no viable solution to the German problem."¹⁵⁹

Charles de Gaulle wanted to keep Germany contained while striking a balance between the two superpowers. He saw the growing fear of communism as a lever to boost French independence and pry aid from the United States. An increasingly fearful Ambassador Caffrey was told, "I would much rather work with the USA," but if I cannot

¹⁵⁷ "Déclarations de M. Bidault et du Général de Gaulle à la consultative, 21 Novembre 1945" *L'Année Politique, 1944 – 1945*, p. 66.

¹⁵⁸ "Le Général de Gaulle en Allemagne occupée," *L'Année Politique, 1944 – 1945*, p. 315.

¹⁵⁹ Salomon Grumbach, "Après Moscou: Quelques Réflexions sur l'Échec d'une Conférence à Quatre," *Revue Politique et Parlementaire*, May 1947, p. 108.

work with you I must work with the Soviets... even if in the long run they gobble us up."¹⁶⁰ Of course de Gaulle, was so obsessed with restoring French grandeur and glory, that he would never allow France to be placed in such a position. The threat of moving into the Soviet sphere was sufficient to silence American complaints about France's German policy while allowing it to remain in the center.

Policy held that small states, threatened by the domination of the superpowers, could turn to French leadership in keeping Europe as independent as possible of superpower rivalries. *Le Monde* urged that the European bloc should try to maintain an equal independence from Moscow and Washington or face the fate of pawns between the two superpowers. France would act as the "wedding ring" or "hyphen" between East and West. What becomes clear is that the ideological differences between the two superpowers did not play a large role in shaping the French middle ground policy. All members of the governing coalition of the MRP, the Socialists and the Communists supported it. Once more the desire to reassert the power of France superseded international or party politics. For this reason, French diplomats desired the creation of a regular system of intervention in the domestic affairs of a decentralized Germany. This would guarantee against indirect aggression, since it would prevent the resurgence of a hostile German state. Essentially, Bidault and de Gaulle believed that the assertion of French leadership on the European continent would leave Germany isolated and once more establish France as a great power.

¹⁶⁰ "The Ambassador in France (Caffery) to the Acting Secretary of State, May 5, 1945, *FRUS 1945*, Vol. IV: Europe, 1968, p. 686.

De Gaulle noted, “of course, we do not have the temerity to believe that we can alone assure the security of Europe. We need alliances.”¹⁶¹ France, as self-appointed mediator in the East-West conflict, wished to renew the unity of the former Allies on the basis of a general agreement on the German problem, thus giving France the *sécurité totale* that had escaped it in 1919.¹⁶² Ideally, France wished to establish a *triple entente* based on London, Paris and Moscow. The French believed “a community of interests” existed with Russia in regard to German revival. According to a 1945 opinion poll, four-fifths of the French public found the Americans too easy on the Germans. Twenty percent of the public gave first priority to the relations with the United States, 23 percent put priority on ties with the Soviet Union.¹⁶³

French efforts to strengthen ties with the Soviet Union in order to counter the domestic and international influence of the United States often proved frustratingly ineffective. For the most part, the Soviet Union ignored French calls for closer ties and remained vague on the question of mutual defence treaties. From 1944, when de Gaulle first brought the issue to Moscow, onward, the Soviet Union refused to ally itself with France. In November 1945, Monsieur Alphand, an official of the *Quai d'Orsay*, went to Moscow to argue the French case in Germany. A memorandum was submitted on the Ruhr and Rhineland implying French support against any German attempts to recover the

¹⁶¹ Roy C. Macridis, *De Gaulle, Implacable Ally*. (New York), 1966, p. 125.

¹⁶² Serfaty, *France, De Gaulle, and Europe*, p. 6.

¹⁶³ Institut Français d'opinion publique, Ministère des Affaires étrangères, September 1, 1945.

Eastern territories.¹⁶⁴ Unfortunately for French aims, the Soviets showed very little enthusiasm toward any of the French proposals. Stalin had belittled the power of France and Krushchev stated, “France is a charming country; only the French can never make up their minds about anything. We like people to be our friends or our enemies. We don’t like wobblers.”¹⁶⁵ Indeed, the lack of enthusiasm from the Soviet Union forced France to eventually shift its policies toward a Western European policy rather than a pan-European one.

¹⁶⁴ Werth, *France 1940 – 1955*, p. 279.

¹⁶⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 1.

The Cold War Forces French Policy to Change

By late 1946, the Cold War was slowly warming up and French attempts to develop closer ties to the Soviet Union vis-à-vis Germany were going nowhere quickly. At the same time, the problem of preventing the resurrection of a strong, united Germany seemed to be solving itself. However, the solution to France's German problem was one that threatened the careful balancing act between East and West that de Gaulle, Bidault, and Sartre had so eloquently argued for. The spring of 1946 saw increasing rumors of a split between the Western Allies and the Soviet Union. This division was accentuated by the virtual embargo on food exports from eastern Germany, and by the American embargo on industrial exports from the west.

Georges Bidault rejoiced at the chance of dealing with the German threat once and for all; however, he despaired at what the end of cordial East – West relations would mean for France. It was slowly becoming evident that the world and Europe were being divided into two hostile blocs and that France would have to side with one or the other. Still, Bidault was loyal to his vision of France as a mediator of the middle ground and on May 28, 1946 he declared “the division of Germany, as suggested by the Anglo-American press” could not be considered a solution. It could only be considered the final breakdown of all attempts between the Allies to settle the German problem.¹⁶⁶

¹⁶⁶ “United States Delegations Records, Council of Foreign Ministers, Second Session, Thirty-ninth Meeting, July 10, 1946, *FRUS 1946*, Vol. II: Council of Foreign Ministers, 1970, p. 860.

On September 5, 1946 the United States made clear its intentions to counter France's Thesis on Germany with a new thesis of its own. Secretary of State Byrnes made a speech at Stuttgart in which he stated the United States wanted to see Germany become a federal state with a democratic and national central government that was economically united. There would be no need for any special control in the Ruhr or Rhineland, which would only, "place them under the political domination of foreign powers." In short, the United States was not in favor of any "economic internationalization of the Ruhr." French policy seemed to have been defeated in the hour it took the Secretary of State to complete the speech. The only positive outcome for France was Byrne's view that it could have economic control of the Saar.¹⁶⁷

In February 1947, during a moment of despair, a distraught Bidault quietly confided to Jefferson Caffery, "I am only too well aware that France is a defeated country and our dream of restoring her power and glory at this juncture seems far from reality."¹⁶⁸ To all intents and purposes, France seemed as if it had no choice but to give up its policy. However, Caffery had spent years in Paris dealing with French diplomats and politicians and was certain that France would not give up quietly. He was convinced that Bidault was too committed to his aims in the Ruhr-Rhineland to abandon them easily. The Ambassador suspected the French would be willing to strike a deal with the Soviet Union on Germany and warned the new Secretary of State, George Marshall that, "while

¹⁶⁷ Ibid., pp. 860-877.

¹⁶⁸ "The United States Deputy for Germany at the Council of Foreign Ministers (Murphy) to the Secretary of State, February 12, 1947," *FRUS 1947*, Vol. II: Council of Foreign Ministers, 1970, pp. 26-28.

Bidault's principles are basically anti-Communist, at the Moscow Conference [you] will by no means be able to count on him."¹⁶⁹

Bidault, though discouraged by the Stuttgart speech, still believed France could achieve all its goals in Germany if things went well at the Moscow Conference. On February 28, 1947 in a debate of the French Assembly, there were hopes for a lasting settlement of the German problem and for guarantees of French security. Former Premier Paul Reynaud went so far as to advocate co-operation with America and Britain in order to guarantee Ruhr coal exports. Florimond Bonte, of the PCF, wanted the Soviets to share in the control of the Ruhr and criticized the idea of a decentralized Germany. Bidault had already assured Deputies in the Foreign Affairs Commission that he would continue to demand the territorial detachment of the Ruhr from Germany. He emphasized the consistency of current French policy with that of Clemenceau and Poincaré after the Great War and promised a firm defense of this policy while co-operating with both East and West.¹⁷⁰ Sitting on the razor's edge remained the prerequisite of any French foreign policy.

The Moscow Conference proved to be a failure for French aims not because of some internal French weakness, but due to the continued Russian refusal to work closely with France. As Young notes, "despite the confidence of his speech, despite all the arguments in favour of maintaining France's German policy, and despite the need to

¹⁶⁹ "The Ambassador in France (Caffery) to the Secretary of State, February 7, 1947," *FRUS 1947*, Vol. II: Council of Foreign Ministers, 1970, pp.154-155.

¹⁷⁰ *Journal Officiel, Débats*, February 27, 1947, pp. 499 – 504.

preserve East – West unity as the way to safeguard France’s security and political unity, there were clear and abundant signs that Bidault’s policy would not win through at Moscow.”¹⁷¹ Indeed, at Moscow the fragmentation of the Cold War was apparent for all to see. East Bloc states lined up behind the Soviet policy of a centralized German government and high reparations. On the other hand, Western states feared that high reparations would ruin the European economy. Once again, France stood alone with no support for its call for a separate Ruhr State. Only the Benelux countries expressed a slight interest in seeing special controls on the Ruhr and a confederated German state.¹⁷²

On March 10, 1947, the opening day of the conference, Bidault met George Marshall only to be told that if France wanted coal supplies and a share in the Ruhr, it would have to join the Anglo-American Bizone.¹⁷³ Then on March 12, President Truman, in an address to Congress, depicted a world in which everyone had to choose between the political ideals of communism and liberal democracy. Immediate economic and military aid would be sent to Greece and Turkey to battle the growth of Communism. In response to Truman’s declaration, the Congress of the United States promptly appropriated \$400,000,000 for this purpose. There was very little enthusiasm for the “Truman Doctrine” in France. Bidault believed it threatened any hope of France steering

¹⁷¹ John W. Young, *France, The Cold War and The Western Alliance, 1944 – 1949: French Foreign Policy and Post War Europe*, (New York: St. Martin’s Press), 1990, p. 141.

¹⁷² “The Secretary of State to the President and the Acting Secretary of State, March 17, 1947,” *FRUS 1947*, Vol. II: Council of Foreign Ministers, 1970, p. 255.

¹⁷³ “The Secretary of State to the Acting Secretary of State, For Acheson from Marschall, March 11, 1947,” *FRUS 1947*, Vol. II: Council of Foreign Ministers, 1970, pp. 237-242.

a middle course between East and West. Georges Catroux, France's Ambassador to the Soviet Union between 1945 and 1948, felt that, yet again, the United States had made a psychological error that was more likely to enrage Russia than pacify it. Vincent Auriol, first President of the Fourth Republic (1947 – 1954) expressed surprise at the tone of the speech and wondered about its likely effect on the PCF.¹⁷⁴ Maurice Thorez, leader of the PCF, attacked Truman's speech in the Cabinet on March 18 as showing a desire to divide the world and to use "dollar diplomacy" to influence European government policies.¹⁷⁵

Bidault met Stalin on March 17 for the first time since de Gaulle's December 1944 meeting. Stalin received him before both the American and British delegates remarking, "it is better to be two against two than three against one." If France would help Russia get an agreement on reparations, the Soviet Union would not stand in France's way with regard to the Ruhr. This offer rang hollow since the French did not need Soviet approval to keep the Saar and increase coal exports. To the French, it was becoming increasingly evident that a choice would have to be made between "a deal with Washington behind Stalin's back," versus "a deal with Moscow behind the back of the Anglo-Saxons."¹⁷⁶ This of course would mark an end to France's claims of neutrality between the two great powers. The best Bidault could say of the outcome of the conference was: "We did our best and we worked hard. We retain our hope and our

¹⁷⁴ Young, *France, The Cold War and The Western Alliance*, p. 142.

¹⁷⁵ *Journal Officiel, Débats*, March 18, 1947, pp. 143 – 144.

¹⁷⁶ Young, *France, The Cold War and The Western Alliance*, pp. 143-144.

determination to succeed. But no time must be lost. The interests of France, which are also those of justice, have been respected.”¹⁷⁷

A 1947 *Quai d'Orsay* report noted that the lack of results at the Moscow Conference had only set back the resolution of the German problem and that the Germans could only profit from the disagreement among the Allies. It came to the conclusion that the division of Germany between East and West was a likely event and France would need to work with the Anglo-Americans to resolve the future of Western Germany and to seek concessions on the Ruhr and Saar in return for trizonal cooperation.¹⁷⁸

Raymond Aron wrote in *Combat* that although, on the face of it, France had not yet chosen “between East and West,” the choice could not be delayed much longer. He noted, “it is not fair to say that we depend equally on both the giants. For reconstruction we are largely dependent on the USA. Without American credits even the present mediocre standard of living of the French people would not be possible.”¹⁷⁹ He went on to say that France could afford to remain neutral in issues that did not involve it, but in the German issue, where France’s interests were directly involved, it would have to take sides. The only possibility therefore was for France to support Anglo-American policy: “for if Germany is not reconstructed with us, it may well be reconstructed against us.”¹⁸⁰

¹⁷⁷ Georges Bidault, *Resistance: A Political Autobiography*, p. 148 – 149.

¹⁷⁸ *Quai d'Orsay*, 1947.

¹⁷⁹ *Combat*, January 25 and February 7, 1947, p. 4.

¹⁸⁰ *Ibid.*

Only a few months later an internal crisis in Paris would highlight France's response to the changes of the last few months.

On April 30, 1947 a wildcat strike spread through the Renault auto plant near Paris. Over 20,000 workers went on strike as a protest against low cost of living increases. The *Confédération Générale du Travail* came out in favor of the striking workers and this forced the PCF to choose between backing the workers' pay demands or supporting their government's wage policies. MRP and Socialist members of the coalition government refused to grant Thorez's pleas for wage hikes and the government ground to a halt. On May 7, 1947, Premier Ramadier was forced to ask the National Assembly for a vote of confidence on the issue and the PCF was dismissed from the government.¹³¹

Headlines across the United States declared: "Ramadier Fires Reds." This outcome pleased the Americans no end and France was promised an immediate increase in aid. On May 9, 1947 the U.S. dominated World Bank made its first loan ever, a \$250 million grant to France. Despite the absence of the French Communists in government, their continued presence in the political landscape allowed French policy to continue exploiting American fears. Jefferson Caffery warned that France needed still more aid or the Ramadier government would fall and divide France between the Communists and the ultra-nationalistic followers of de Gaulle. A Communist victory in France threatened

¹³¹ *Journal Officiel, Débats*, May 7, 1947, pp. 243 – 244.

“Soviet penetration of Western Europe, Africa, the Mediterranean and Middle East... our position... in Germany rendered precarious if not untenable.”¹⁸²

The manner in which the May 1947 crisis was dealt with was typically French and still very much concerned with perceptions and identity. Some historians have hinted that the dismissal of the PCF from coalition government was proof of France’s acquiescence to American demands. However, the French made it very clear that the dismissal was an internal matter that had nothing to do with American demands or foreign policy concerns. At the time, political commentator François Goguel argued the continued economic crisis in France was what brought the issue to a head. He noted that 5.5 million French citizens had voted for the PCF and a surge of American influenced anti-communism would surely have led to bloodshed.¹⁸³ The Renault strike was actually a microcosm of typical French policy actions carefully crafted and shaped to give the desired impression to various groups. Internally, the French people were reassured that American influence had nothing to do with the expulsion, while internationally the United States was pleased with the outcome regardless of the reasons.

The summer of 1947 saw France’s hopes for economic recovery given a new lease on life. On June 5, Secretary of State Marshall made an address at Harvard that reconciled French economic concerns with the changing nature of its German policy. Marshall described the economic ills of Europe and prescribed a remedy to restore “the

¹⁸² “The Ambassador in France (Caffery) to the Secretary of State, May 12, 1947,” *FRUS* 1947, Vol III: The British Commonwealth and Europe, pp. 711-712.

¹⁸³ *Esprit*, May 1947, p. 848.

confidence of the European people in the economic future of their own countries and of Europe as a whole." The United States would contribute funds and "friendly aid in the drafting of a European program."¹⁸⁴ In France, the reaction of the press revealed the strong sense of involvement over deciding the future of Europe. In *L'Humanité*, Pierre Courtade wrote: "is this supposed to be that friendly aid which, as Marshall suggested, was not lined up with any ideology?... To subscribe to the Marshall Plan without any guarantee is to accept that 'world leadership', that Truman talked about. The *Quai d'Orsay* is not asking for even the most elementary guarantees."¹⁸⁵

The declaration of Marshall Plan aid did not force France to give up its claims to neutrality or of forging its own destiny. Bidault declared that France did not want to see Europe "shrink" and announced that he had invited Molotov to take part in three power talks to discuss Soviet participation in the Marshall Plan. After five meetings with Bidault, Molotov proclaimed that the Marshall Plan was incompatible with Soviet conceptions of national sovereignty.¹⁸⁶ Despite France's best efforts, the Cold War was moving into full gear.

The French press responded by severely criticizing Molotov and the Soviet Union for wrecking European cooperation and international solidarity. Claude Bourdet wrote an

¹⁸⁴ "Press Release Issued by the Department of State, June 4, 1947. *FRUS* 1947, Vol. III: The British Commonwealth - Europe, 1972, pp. 237 - 239.

¹⁸⁵ *L'Humanité*, June 18, 1947.

¹⁸⁶ Werth, *France 1940 - 1955*, p. 279.

editorial in the July 6, 1947 edition of *Combat* that declared, “we are told that we must choose – choose between the USSR and the USA, between East and West, between the Right and Left, between de Gaulle and the Communists. Must we give up our desperate desire to represent a civilization on the narrow margin between the two worlds?”¹⁸⁷ Even at this late date, France seemed determined to see its way through to maintaining its hard fought for independence and autonomy.

Indeed, the events of June 1948 reveal that the French remained determined to maintain a strong independent streak. While some historians have argued the union of the French, British and American zones into the Federal Republic of Germany and its integration into the Western European economy with a reformed economy signaled the end of French distancing tactics from the West, nothing is further from the truth. The Soviets quickly countered the unification moves of the western powers by cutting off access to the jointly occupied city of Berlin. However, during this entire period France continued to maintain a policy of abstaining from active participation based upon the national goals of the French Thesis. This obviously upset many within the American government who wished to present a unified western stance against any Soviet action. A pleading telegram to Paris read, "Mr. Marshall has asked me to express his earnest hope that French govt. can see its way clear to approve program for Western Germany... U.S. Govt. will be motivated by desire to achieve objective stated above and will give careful consideration to views of French."¹⁸⁸

¹⁸⁷ *Combat*, Editorial, July 6, 1947, p. 15.

¹⁸⁸ "The Ambassador of France (Caffery) to the Secretary of State, May 24, 1948," *FRUS 1948*, Vol II: Germany and Austria, 1973, p. 277.

The United States continued to face opposition from France on the issue of Germany. Caffery wrote to the *Quai d'Orsay* noting, "if the French government, casting aside the progress made in recent months, should now insist on retreating to so limited a program as the mere announcement of reform, pooling of foreign trade, and revision of internal frontiers. not merely would European belief in the force and unity of the Western powers suffer a blow. but the confidence of the American people in Western Europe would sustain an even greater shock."¹⁸⁹ An internal analysis led the American to believe, "Bidault now fears that he has gone too far to meet us at London and is trying to find a way to crawl out."¹⁹⁰ Indeed, in later correspondence Bidault highlighted just how strong support for the French Thesis remained in France when he pointed out, "I'll have to face the Assembly and given the attitude of the Communists, the Gaullists, and the Socialists, I don't know how we will come out. Everyone will ask me if the Russians take aggressive action at Berlin. What will the Americans do?"¹⁹¹ Bidault expected violent opposition from every sector of political life in the face of a weakening of the French position on Germany.

¹⁸⁹ "The Ambassador in France (Caffery) to the Secretary General of the French Ministry for Foreign Affairs (Chauvel), May 25, 1948," *FRUS 1948*, Vol II: Germany and Austria, 1973, p. 279.

¹⁹⁰ "The Ambassador in France (Caffery) to the Secretary of State, May 24, 1948," *FRUS 1948*, Vol II: Germany and Austria, 1973, p. 274.

¹⁹¹ "The Ambassador in France (Caffery) to the Secretary of State, May 26, 1948," *FRUS 1948*, Vol II: Germany and Austria, 1973, p. 281.

Even when France fell in line to support the United States, it maintained conditions that had to be met. For example, the French refused to cooperate unless "the effective participation of France in the control of the German industrial potential shall be assumed with a view to bring about, in particular, an international management of the Ruhr."¹⁹² The overriding theme of the dispatch was that "French demands for security, indispensable to the maintenance of peace, shall be satisfied."¹⁹³ Once again, internal U.S. correspondence showed the level of concern over French actions in Germany. A dispatch from the Secretary of State to the Embassy in France reads, "we are most concerned about para. 5 of Foreign Affairs Committee motion... according to which French government is to veto anything which might run counter to French reservations."¹⁹⁴

It is quite clear that by the winter of 1948 French foreign policy continued to rely on the same tactics first used in 1944 with the declaration of the French thesis. The formation of a Western German state simply brought the foreign policy debate to a new level. As late as November 1948 France voiced concerns emphasizing the tenets of the French Thesis, mainly control of the Ruhr and French Security. This is clearly seen in a dispatch from the Ambassador in the United Kingdom to the State Department wherein he notes the French government expressed fears that "the control and distribution of coal,

¹⁹² "The Ambassador in France (Caffery) to the Secretary of State, June 10, 1948," *FRUS 1948*, Vol II: Germany and Austria, 1973, p. 326.

¹⁹³ *Ibid.*, p. 326.

¹⁹⁴ "The Secretary of State to the Embassy in France, June 11, 1948," *FRUS 1948*, Vol II: Germany and Austria, 1973, p. 330.

coke and steel of the Ruhr cannot be properly effective if the international authority does not retain a certain number of the powers of control over the management of plants now exercised by the allied authorities."¹⁹⁵ Once more, security concerns and the need to assert identity remained at the forefront of all French policy goals.

¹⁹⁵ "The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Douglas) to the Acting Secretary of State, 11 November 1948," *FRUS 1948*, Vol II: Germany and Austria, 1973, p. 478.

Chapter 6

Conclusions

As 1948 dawned it seemed easy to discount French foreign policy aims over the past four years as a failure. After all, France failed in its attempts to gain the Ruhr and Saar for itself, its economy remained at wartime lows, and the Cold War seemed to indicate that France would have to side with the West or stand alone in the dark. However, the primary goal of French policy was a success. The nation went from being all but discounted by the Allies in 1944 to being a primary concern of American foreign policy makers in 1948. More importantly, French policy showed that even with a badly damaged economy, France could stand up against the influences of the politically and economically dominant United States. The fact that so many of documents in *The Foreign Relations of the United States* series in the second half of the twentieth century are devoted to discussing French blocking measures, stubborn attitudes, and France's annoying habit of replying to every U.S initiative with one of its own, shows that France had a serious impact on how the United States would approach Europe. The people of France were shown that, though hurt, their nation still maintained powerful links to its proud past. For proof, one need only look to the fact that France managed to stall and challenge American policy in Europe for the four years from 1944 to 1948, and offered a coherent and feasible alternative to U.S. domination.

The fact that France failed to prevent the start of the Cold War does not necessarily reflect a failure of its policy of remaining in the middle. Even as Europe was

divided between Eastern and Western blocs, France continued in a policy of independent thought and autonomous action. The French character was not suited to pandering to the superpowers and the desire to be an arbitrator remains strong and active today. France at the start of the 21st century fills exactly the new world role it was searching for throughout the 1940s as a strong, vocal middle power, with a strong presence in the United Nations and a strong link to its past as *la grande nation*. If France's post-war policy had truly failed, it would not be what it is today: uniquely French.

Finally, it is easy to equate change with failure. The Cold War and the shifting balance of European power meant that France had to adapt its policies and actions to fit the situation. Rather than speaking in terms of its failure, French policy should be praised for the deft manner in which it bounced back from shocks that would have sent American foreign policy into a tailspin. If the fact that France failed to accomplish many of the secondary goals set out in 1944 – 1945 meant its entire foreign policy was a failure, then would not the same be true of American policy? Many of the goals the United States set out to achieve at the end of the war were not accomplished in the manner originally conceived. Therefore, the brilliance of French foreign policy in the period between 1944 – 1948 was just how much was accomplished in the framework of a war-ravaged nation struggling to regain a position of independence and respect.

Appendix I

The Yalta Conference¹⁹⁶

Protocol of Proceedings of Crimea Conference

The Crimea Conference of the heads of the Governments of the United States of America, the United Kingdom, and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, which took place from Feb. 4 to 11, came to the following conclusions:

I. WORLD ORGANIZATION

It was decided:

1. That a United Nations conference on the proposed world organization should be summoned for Wednesday, 25 April, 1945, and should be held in the United States of America.

2. The nations to be invited to this conference should be:

(a) the United Nations as they existed on 8 Feb., 1945; and

(b) Such of the Associated Nations as have declared war on the common enemy by 1 March, 1945. (For this purpose, by the term "Associated Nations" was meant the eight Associated Nations and Turkey.) When the conference on world organization is held, the delegates of the United Kingdom and United State of America will support a proposal to admit to original membership two Soviet Socialist Republics, i.e., the Ukraine and White Russia.

3. That the United States Government, on behalf of the three powers, should consult the Government of China and the French Provisional Government in regard to decisions taken at the present conference concerning the proposed world organization.

4. That the text of the invitation to be issued to all the nations which would take part in the United Nations conference should be as follows:

"The Government of the United States of America, on behalf of itself and of the Governments of the United Kingdom, the Union of Soviet Socialistic Republics and the Republic of China and of the Provisional Government of the French Republic invite the Government of ----- to send representatives to a conference to be held on 25 April, 1945, or soon thereafter, at San Francisco, in the United States of America, to prepare a

¹⁹⁶ *A Decade of American Foreign Policy : Basic Documents, 1941-49* Prepared at the request of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations By the Staff of the Committee and the Department of State, (Washington, DC : Government Printing Office), 1950.

charter for a general international organization for the maintenance of international peace and security.

"The above-named Governments suggest that the conference consider as affording a basis for such a Charter the proposals for the establishment of a general international organization which were made public last October as a result of the Dumbarton Oaks conference and which have now been supplemented by the following provisions for Section C of Chapter VI:

C. Voting

"1. Each member of the Security Council should have one vote.

"2. Decisions of the Security Council on procedural matters should be made by an affirmative vote of seven members.

"3. Decisions of the Security Council on all matters should be made by an affirmative vote of seven members, including the concurring votes of the permanent members; provided that, in decisions under Chapter VIII, Section A and under the second sentence of Paragraph 1 of Chapter VIII, Section C, a party to a dispute should abstain from voting."

"Further information as to arrangements will be transmitted subsequently.

"In the event that the Government of ----- desires in advance of the conference to present views or comments concerning the proposals, the Government of the United States of America will be pleased to transmit such views and comments to the other participating Governments."

Territorial trusteeship:

It was agreed that the five nations which will have permanent seats on the Security Council should consult each other prior to the United Nations conference on the question of territorial trusteeship.

The acceptance of this recommendation is subject to its being made clear that territorial trusteeship will only apply to

(a) existing mandates of the League of Nations; (b) territories detached from the enemy as a result of the present war; (c) any other territory which might voluntarily be placed under trusteeship; and (d) no discussion of actual territories is contemplated at the forthcoming United Nations conference or in the preliminary consultations, and it will be a matter for subsequent agreement which territories within the above categories will be placed under trusteeship.

[Begin first section published Feb., 13, 1945.]

II. DECLARATION OF LIBERATED EUROPE

The following declaration has been approved:

The Premier of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom and the President of the United States of America have consulted with each other in the common interests of the people of their countries and those of liberated Europe. They jointly declare their mutual agreement to concert during the temporary period of instability in liberated Europe the policies of their three Governments in assisting the peoples liberated from the domination of Nazi Germany and the peoples of the former Axis satellite states of Europe to solve by democratic means their pressing political and economic problems.

The establishment of order in Europe and the rebuilding of national economic life must be achieved by processes which will enable the liberated peoples to destroy the last vestiges of nazism and fascism and to create democratic institutions of their own choice. This is a principle of the Atlantic Charter - the right of all people to choose the form of government under which they will live - the restoration of sovereign rights and self-government to those peoples who have been forcibly deprived to them by the aggressor nations.

To foster the conditions in which the liberated people may exercise these rights, the three governments will jointly assist the people in any European liberated state or former Axis state in Europe where, in their judgment conditions require,

(a) to establish conditions of internal peace; (b) to carry out emergency relief measures for the relief of distressed peoples; (c) to form interim governmental authorities broadly representative of all democratic elements in the population and pledged to the earliest possible establishment through free elections of Governments responsive to the will of the people; and (d) to facilitate where necessary the holding of such elections.

The three Governments will consult the other United Nations and provisional authorities or other Governments in Europe when matters of direct interest to them are under consideration.

When, in the opinion of the three Governments, conditions in any European liberated state or former Axis satellite in Europe make such action necessary, they will immediately consult together on the measure necessary to discharge the joint responsibilities set forth in this declaration.

By this declaration we reaffirm our faith in the principles of the Atlantic Charter, our pledge in the Declaration by the United Nations and our determination to build in cooperation with other peace-loving nations world order, under law, dedicated to peace, security, freedom and general well-being of all mankind.

In issuing this declaration, the three powers express the hope that the Provisional Government of the French Republic may be associated with them in the procedure suggested.

[End first section published February, 13, 1945.]

III. DISMEMBERMENT OF GERMANY

It was agreed that Article 12 (a) of the Surrender terms for Germany should be amended to read as follows:

"The United Kingdom, the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics shall possess supreme authority with respect to Germany. In the exercise of such authority they will take such steps, including the complete dismemberment of Germany as they deem requisite for future peace and security."

The study of the procedure of the dismemberment of Germany was referred to a committee consisting of Mr. Anthony Eden, Mr. John Winant, and Mr. Fedor T. Gusev. This body would consider the desirability of associating with it a French representative.

IV. ZONE OF OCCUPATION FOR THE FRENCH AND CONTROL COUNCIL FOR GERMANY.

It was agreed that a zone in Germany, to be occupied by the French forces, should be allocated France. This zone would be formed out of the British and American zones and its extent would be settled by the British and Americans in consultation with the French Provisional Government.

It was also agreed that the French Provisional Government should be invited to become a member of the Allied Control Council for Germany.

V. REPARATION

The following protocol has been approved:

Protocol

On the Talks Between the Heads of Three Governments at the Crimean Conference on the Question of the German Reparations in Kind

1. Germany must pay in kind for the losses caused by her to the Allied nations in the course of the war. Reparations are to be received in the first instance by those countries which have borne the main burden of the war have suffered the heaviest losses and have organized victory over the enemy.

2. Reparation in kind is to be exacted from Germany in three following forms:

(a) Removals within two years from the surrender of Germany or the cessation of organized resistance from the national wealth of Germany located on the territory of Germany herself as well as outside her territory (equipment, machine tools, ships, rolling stock, German investments abroad, shares of industrial, transport and other enterprises in Germany, etc.), these removals to be carried out chiefly for the purpose of destroying the war potential of Germany. (b) Annual deliveries of goods from current production for a period to be fixed. (c) Use of German labor.

3. For the working out on the above principles of a detailed plan for exaction of reparation from Germany an Allied reparation commission will be set up in Moscow. It

will consist of three representatives - one from the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, one from the United Kingdom and one from the United States of America.

4. With regard to the fixing of the total sum of the reparation as well as the distribution of it among the countries which suffered from the German aggression, the Soviet and American delegations agreed as follows:

"The Moscow reparation commission should take in its initial studies as a basis for discussion the suggestion of the Soviet Government that the total sum of the reparation in accordance with the points (a) and (b) of the Paragraph 2 should be 22 billion dollars and that 50 per cent should go to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics."

The British delegation was of the opinion that, pending consideration of the reparation question by the Moscow reparation commission, no figures of reparation should be mentioned.

The above Soviet-American proposal has been passed to the Moscow reparation commission as one of the proposals to be considered by the commission.

VI. MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS

The conference agreed that the question of the major war criminals should be the subject of inquiry by the three Foreign Secretaries for report in due course after the close of the conference.

[Begin second section published February 13, 1945.]

VII. POLAND

The following declaration on Poland was agreed by the conference:

"A new situation has been created in Poland as a result of her complete liberation by the Red Army. This calls for the establishment of a Polish Provisional Government which can be more broadly based than was possible before the recent liberation of the western part of Poland. The Provisional Government which is now functioning in Poland should therefore be reorganized on a broader democratic basis with the inclusion of democratic leaders from Poland itself and from Poles abroad. This new Government should then be called the Polish Provisional Government of National Unity.

"M. Molotov, Mr. Harriman and Sir A. Clark Kerr are authorized as a commission to consult in the first instance in Moscow with members of the present Provisional Government and with other Polish democratic leaders from within Poland and from abroad, with a view to the reorganization of the present Government along the above lines. This Polish Provisional Government of National Unity shall be pledged to the holding of free and unfettered elections as soon as possible on the basis of universal suffrage and secret ballot. In these elections all democratic and anti-Nazi parties shall have the right to take part and to put forward candidates.

"When a Polish Provisional of Government National Unity has been properly formed in conformity with the above, the Government of the U.S.S.R., which now maintains

diplomatic relations with the present Provisional Government of Poland, and the Government of the United Kingdom and the Government of the United States of America will establish diplomatic relations with the new Polish Provisional Government National Unity, and will exchange Ambassadors by whose reports the respective Governments will be kept informed about the situation in Poland.

"The three heads of Government consider that the eastern frontier of Poland should follow the Curzon Line with digressions from it in some regions of five to eight kilometers in favor of Poland. They recognize that Poland must receive substantial accessions in territory in the north and west. They feel that the opinion of the new Polish Provisional Government of National Unity should be sought in due course of the extent of these accessions and that the final delimitation of the western frontier of Poland should thereafter await the peace conference."

VIII. YUGOSLAVIA

It was agreed to recommend to Marshal Tito and to Dr. Ivan Subasitch:

(a) That the Tito-Subasitch agreement should immediately be put into effect and a new government formed on the basis of the agreement. (b) That as soon as the new Government has been formed it should declare: (I) That the Anti-Fascist Assembly of the National Liberation (AVNOJ) will be extended to include members of the last Yugoslav Skupstina who have not compromised themselves by collaboration with the enemy, thus forming a body to be known as a temporary Parliament and (II) That legislative acts passed by the Anti-Fascist Assembly of the National Liberation (AVNOJ) will be subject to subsequent ratification by a Constituent Assembly; and that this statement should be published in the communiqué of the conference.

IX. ITALO-YUGOSLAV FRONTIER - ITALO-AUSTRIAN FRONTIER

Notes on these subjects were put in by the British delegation and the American and Soviet delegations agreed to consider them and give their views later.

X. YUGOSLAV-BULGARIAN RELATIONS

There was an exchange of views between the Foreign Secretaries on the question of the desirability of a Yugoslav-Bulgarian pact of alliance. The question at issue was whether a state still under an armistice regime could be allowed to enter into a treaty with another state. Mr. Eden suggested that the Bulgarian and Yugoslav Governments should be informed that this could not be approved. Mr. Stettinius suggested that the British and American Ambassadors should discuss the matter further with Mr. Molotov in Moscow. Mr. Molotov agreed with the proposal of Mr. Stettinius.

XI. SOUTHEASTERN EUROPE

The British delegation put in notes for the consideration of their colleagues on the following subjects:

(a) The Control Commission in Bulgaria. (b) Greek claims upon Bulgaria, more particularly with reference to reparations. (c) Oil equipment in Rumania.

XII. IRAN

Mr. Eden, Mr. Stettinius and Mr. Molotov exchanged views on the situation in Iran. It was agreed that this matter should be pursued through the diplomatic channel.

[Begin third section published February 13, 1945.]

XIII. MEETINGS OF THE THREE FOREIGN SECRETARIES

The conference agreed that permanent machinery should be set up for consultation between the three Foreign Secretaries; they should meet as often as necessary, probably about every three or four months.

These meetings will be held in rotation in the three capitals, the first meeting being held in London.

[End third section published February 13, 1945.]

XIV. THE MONTREAUX CONVENTION AND THE STRAITS

It was agreed that at the next meeting of the three Foreign Secretaries to be held in London, they should consider proposals which it was understood the Soviet Government would put forward in relation to the Montreaux Convention, and report to their Governments. The Turkish Government should be informed at the appropriate moment. The forgoing protocol was approved and signed by the three Foreign Secretaries at the Crimean Conference February 11, 1945.

E. R. Stettinius Jr. M. Molotov Anthony Eden

AGREEMENT REGARDING JAPAN

The leaders of the three great powers - the Soviet Union, the United States of America and Great Britain - have agreed that in two or three months after Germany has surrendered and the war in Europe is terminated, the Soviet Union shall enter into war against Japan on the side of the Allies on condition that:

1. The status quo in Outer Mongolia (the Mongolian People's Republic) shall be preserved.
2. The former rights of Russia violated by the treacherous attack of Japan in 1904 shall be restored, viz.: (a) The southern part of Sakhalin as well as the islands adjacent to it shall be returned to the Soviet Union; (b) The commercial port of Dairen shall be internationalized, the pre-eminent interests of the Soviet Union in this port being safeguarded, and the lease of Port Arthur as a naval base of the U.S.S.R. restored; (c) The Chinese-Eastern Railroad and the South Manchurian Railroad, which provide an outlet to Dairen, shall be jointly operated by the establishment of a joint Soviet-Chinese company,

it being understood that the pre-eminent interests of the Soviet Union shall be safeguarded and that China shall retain sovereignty in Manchuria;

3. The Kurile Islands shall be handed over to the Soviet Union.

It is understood that the agreement concerning Outer Mongolia and the ports and railroads referred to above will require concurrence of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek. The President will take measures in order to maintain this concurrence on advice from Marshal Stalin.

The heads of the three great powers have agreed that these claims of the Soviet Union shall be unquestionably fulfilled after Japan has been defeated.

For its part, the Soviet Union expresses its readiness to conclude with the National Government of China a pact of friendship and alliance between the U.S.S.R. and China in order to render assistance to China with its armed forces for the purpose of liberating China from the Japanese yoke.

(signed) Joseph Stalin Franklin D. Roosevelt Winston S. Churchill

February 11, 1945.

Appendix II

The Potsdam Conference¹⁹⁷

Protocol of the Proceedings, August 1, 1945

The Berlin Conference of the Three Heads of Government of the U.S.S.R., U.S.A., and U.K., which took place from July 17 to August 2, 1945, came to the following conclusions:

I. ESTABLISHMENT OF A COUNCIL OF FOREIGN MINISTERS.

A. The Conference reached the following agreement for the establishment of a Council of Foreign Ministers to do the necessary preparatory work for the peace settlements:

"(1) There shall be established a Council composed of the Foreign Ministers of the United Kingdom, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, China, France, and the United States.

"(2) (i) The Council shall normally meet in London which shall be the permanent seat of the joint Secretariat which the Council will form. Each of the Foreign Ministers will be accompanied by a high-ranking Deputy, duly authorized to carry on the work of the Council in the absence of his Foreign Ministers, and by a small staff of technical advisers.

" (ii) The first meeting of the Council shall be held in London not later than September 1st 1945. Meetings may be held by common agreement in other capitals as may be agreed from time to time.

" (3) (i) As its immediate important task, the Council shall be authorized to draw up, with a view to their submission to the United Nations, treaties of peace with Italy, Rumania, Bulgaria, Hungary and Finland, and to propose settlements of territorial questions outstanding on the termination of the war in Europe. The Council shall be utilized for the preparation of a peace settlement for Germany to be accepted by the Government of Germany when a government adequate for the purpose is established.

"(ii) For the discharge of each of these tasks the Council will be composed of the Members representing those States which were signatory to the terms of surrender imposed upon the enemy State concerned. For the purposes of the peace settlement for Italy, France shall be regarded as a signatory to the terms of surrender for Italy. Other Members will be invited to participate when matters directly concerning them are under discussion.

¹⁹⁷ *A Decade of American Foreign Policy : Basic Documents, 1941-49* Prepared at the request of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations By the Staff of the Committee and the Department of State, (Washington, DC : Government Printing Office), 1950.

" (iii) Other matters may from time to time be referred to the Council by agreement between the Member Governments.

"(4) (i) Whenever the Council is considering a question of direct interest to a State not represented thereon, such State should be invited to send representatives to participate in the discussion and study of that question.

"(ii) The Council may adapt its procedure to the particular problems under consideration. In some cases it may hold its own preliminary discussions prior to the participation of other interested States. In other cases, the Council may convoke a formal conference of the State chiefly interested in seeking a solution of the particular problem."

B. It was agreed that the three Governments should each address an identical invitation to the Governments of China and France to adopt this text and to join in establishing the Council. The text of the approved invitation was as follows:

Council of Foreign Ministers Draft for identical invitation to be sent separately by each of the Three Governments to the Governments of China and France.

"The Governments of the United Kingdom, the United States and the U.S.S.R. consider it necessary to begin without delay the essential preparatory work upon the peace settlements in Europe. To this end they are agreed that there should be established a Council of the Foreign Ministers of the Five Great Powers to prepare treaties of peace with the European enemy States, for submission to the United Nations. The Council would also be empowered to propose settlements of outstanding territorial questions in Europe and to consider such other matters as member Governments might agree to refer to it.

"The text adopted by the Three Governments is as follows:

"In agreement with the Governments of the United States and U.S.S.R., His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom and U.S.S.R., the United States Government, the United Kingdom and the Soviet Government extend a cordial invitation to the Government of China (France) to adopt the text quoted above and to join in setting up the Council. His Majesty's Government, The United States Government, The Soviet Government attach much importance to the participation of the Chinese Government (French Government) in the proposed arrangements and they hope to receive an early and favorable reply to this invitation."

C. It was understood that the establishment of the Council of Foreign Ministers for the specific purposes named in the text would be without prejudice to the agreement of the Crimea Conference that there should be periodical consultation between the Foreign Secretaries of the United States, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United Kingdom.

D. The Conference also considered the position of the European Advisory Commission in the light of the Agreement to establish the Council of Foreign Ministers. It was noted with satisfaction that the Commission had ably discharged its principal tasks by the recommendations that it had furnished for the terms of surrender for Germany, for the

zones of occupation in Germany and Austria and for the inter-Allied control machinery in those countries. It was felt that further work of a detailed character for the coordination of Allied policy for the control of Germany and Austria would in future fall within the competence of the Control Council at Berlin and the Allied Commission at Vienna. Accordingly it was agreed to recommend that the European Advisory Commission be dissolved.

II. THE PRINCIPLES TO GOVERN THE TREATMENT OF GERMANY IN THE INITIAL CONTROL PERIOD

A. POLITICAL PRINCIPLES.

1. In accordance with the Agreement on Control Machinery in Germany, supreme authority in Germany is exercised, on instructions from their respective Governments, by the Commanders-in-Chief of the armed forces of the United States of America, the United Kingdom, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and the French Republic, each in his own zone of occupation, and also jointly, in matters affecting Germany as a whole, in their capacity as members of the Control Council.

2. So far as is practicable, there shall be uniformity of treatment of the German population throughout Germany.

3. The purposes of the occupation of Germany by which the Control Council shall be guided are:

(i) The complete disarmament and demilitarization of Germany and the elimination or control of all German industry that could be used for military production. To these ends:-

(a) All German land, naval and air forces, the SS., SA., SD., and Gestapo, with all their organizations, staffs and institutions, including the General Staff, the Officers' Corps, Reserve Corps, military schools, war veterans' organizations and all other military and semi-military organizations, together with all clubs and associations which serve to keep alive the military tradition in Germany, shall be completely and finally abolished in such manner as permanently to prevent the revival or reorganization of German militarism and Nazism;

(b) All arms, ammunition and implements of war and all specialized facilities for their production shall be held at the disposal of the Allies or destroyed. The maintenance and production of all aircraft and all arms, ammunition and implements of war shall be prevented.

(ii) To convince the German people that they have suffered a total military defeat and that they cannot escape responsibility for what they have brought upon themselves, since their own ruthless warfare and the fanatical Nazi resistance have destroyed German economy and made chaos and suffering inevitable.

(iii) To destroy the National Socialist Party and its affiliated and supervised organizations, to dissolve all Nazi institutions, to ensure that they are not revived in any form, and to prevent all Nazi and militarist activity or propaganda.

(iv) To prepare for the eventual reconstruction of German political life on a democratic basis and for eventual peaceful cooperation in international life by Germany.

4. All Nazi laws which provided the basis of the Hitler regime or established discriminations on grounds of race, creed, or political opinion shall be abolished. No such discriminations, whether legal, administrative or otherwise, shall be tolerated.

5. War criminals and those who have participated in planning or carrying out Nazi enterprises involving or resulting in atrocities or war crimes shall be arrested and brought to judgment. Nazi leaders, influential Nazi supporters and high officials of Nazi organizations and institutions and any other persons dangerous to the occupation or its objectives shall be arrested and interned.

6. All members of the Nazi Party who have been more than nominal participants in its activities and all other persons hostile to Allied purposes shall be removed from public and semi-public office, and from positions of responsibility in important private undertakings. Such persons shall be replaced by persons who, by their political and moral qualities, are deemed capable of assisting in developing genuine democratic institutions in Germany.

7. German education shall be so controlled as completely to eliminate Nazi and militarist doctrines and to make possible the successful development of democratic ideas.

8. The judicial system will be reorganized in accordance with the principles of democracy, of justice under law, and of equal rights for all citizens without distinction of race, nationality or religion.

9. The administration in Germany should be directed towards the decentralization of the political structure and the development of local responsibility. To this end:

(i) local self-government shall be restored throughout Germany on democratic principles and in particular through elective councils as rapidly as is consistent with military security and the purposes of military occupation;

(ii) all democratic political parties with rights of assembly and of public discussion shall be allowed and encouraged throughout Germany;

(iii) representative and elective principles shall be introduced into regional, provincial and state (Land) administration as rapidly as may be justified by the successful application of these principles in local self-government;

(iv) for the time being, no central German Government shall be established. Notwithstanding this, however, certain essential central German administrative departments, headed by State Secretaries, shall be established, particularly in the fields of finance, transport, communications, foreign trade and industry. Such departments will act under the direction of the Control Council.

10. Subject to the necessity for maintaining military security, freedom of speech, press and religion shall be permitted, and religious institutions shall be respected. Subject

likewise to the maintenance of military security, the formation of free trade unions shall be permitted.

B. ECONOMIC PRINCIPLES.

11. In order to eliminate Germany's war potential, the production of arms, ammunition and implements of war as well as all types of aircraft and sea-going ships shall be prohibited and prevented. Production of metals, chemicals, machinery and other items that are directly necessary to a war economy shall be rigidly controlled and restricted to Germany's approved post-war peacetime needs to meet the objectives stated in Paragraph 15. Productive capacity not needed for permitted production shall be removed in accordance with the reparations plan recommended by the Allied Commission on Reparations and approved by the Governments concerned or if not removed shall be destroyed.

12. At the earliest practicable date, the German economy shall be decentralized for the purpose of eliminating the present excessive concentration of economic power as exemplified in particular by cartels, syndicates, trusts and other monopolistic arrangements.

13. In organizing the German Economy, primary emphasis shall be given to the development of agriculture and peaceful domestic industries.

14. During the period of occupation Germany shall be treated as a single economic unit. To this end common policies shall be established in regard to:

- (a) mining and industrial production and its allocation;
- (b) agriculture, forestry and fishing;
- (c) wages, prices and rationing;
- (d) import and export programs for Germany as a whole;
- (e) currency and banking, central taxation and customs;
- (f) reparation and removal of industrial war potential;
- (g) transportation and communications.

In applying these policies account shall be taken, where appropriate, of varying local conditions.

15. Allied controls shall be imposed upon the German economy but only to the extent necessary:

- (a) to carry out programs of industrial disarmament, demilitarization, of reparations, and of approved exports and imports.
- (b) to assure the production and maintenance of goods and services required to meet the needs of the occupying forces and displaced persons in Germany and essential to

maintain in Germany average living standards not exceeding the average of the standards of living of European countries. (European countries means all European countries excluding the United Kingdom and the U.S.S.R.).

(c) to ensure in the manner determined by the Control Council the equitable distribution of essential commodities between the several zones so as to produce a balanced economy throughout Germany and reduce the need for imports.

(d) to control German industry and all economic and financial international transactions including exports and imports, with the aim of preventing Germany from developing a war potential and of achieving the other objectives named herein.

(e) to control all German public or private scientific bodies research and experimental institutions, laboratories, et cetera connected with economic activities.

16. In the imposition and maintenance of economic controls established by the Control Council, German administrative machinery shall be created and the German authorities shall be required to the fullest extent practicable to proclaim and assume administration of such controls. Thus it should be brought home to the German people that the responsibility for the administration of such controls and any break-down in these controls will rest with themselves. Any German controls which may run counter to the objectives of occupation will be prohibited.

17. Measures shall be promptly taken:

(a) to effect essential repair of transport;

(b) to enlarge coal production;

(c) to maximize agricultural output; and

(d) to erect emergency repair of housing and essential utilities.

18. Appropriate steps shall be taken by the Control Council to exercise control and the power of disposition over German- owned external assets not already under the control of United Nations which have taken part in the war against Germany.

19. Payment of Reparations should leave enough resources to enable the German people to subsist without external assistance. In working out the economic balance of Germany the necessary means must be provided to pay for imports approved by the Control Council in Germany. The proceeds of exports from current production and stocks shall be available in the first place for payment for such imports.

The above clause will not apply to the equipment and products referred to in paragraphs 4 (a) and 4 (b) of the Reparations Agreement.

III. REPARATIONS FROM GERMANY.

1. Reparation claims of the U.S.S.R. shall be met by removals from the zone of Germany occupied by the U.S.S.R., and from appropriate German external assets.

2. The U.S.S.R. undertakes to settle the reparation claims of Poland from its own share of reparations.

3. The reparation claims of the United States, the United Kingdom and other countries entitled to reparations shall be met from the Western Zones and from appropriate German external assets.

4. In addition to the reparations to be taken by the U.S.S.R. from its own zone of occupation, the U.S.S.R. shall receive additionally from the Western Zones:

(a) 15 per cent of such usable and complete industrial capital equipment, in the first place from the metallurgical, chemical and machine manufacturing industries as is unnecessary for the German peace economy and should be removed from the Western Zones of Germany, in exchange for an equivalent value of food, coal, potash, zinc, timber, clay products, petroleum products, and such other commodities as may be agreed upon.

(b) 10 per cent of such industrial capital equipment as is unnecessary for the German peace economy and should be removed from the Western Zones, to be transferred to the Soviet Government on reparations account without payment or exchange of any kind in return.

Removals of equipment as provided in (a) and (b) above shall be made simultaneously.

5. The amount of equipment to be removed from the Western Zones on account of reparations must be determined within six months from now at the latest.

6. Removals of industrial capital equipment shall begin as soon as possible and shall be completed within two years from the determination specified in paragraph 5. The delivery of products covered by 4 (a) above shall begin as soon as possible and shall be made by the U.S.S.R. in agreed installments within five years of the date hereof. The determination of the amount and character of the industrial capital equipment unnecessary for the German peace economy and therefore available for reparation shall be made by the Control Council under policies fixed by the Allied Commission on Reparations, with the participation of France, subject to the final approval of the Zone Commander in the Zone from which the equipment is to be removed.

7. Prior to the fixing of the total amount of equipment subject to removal, advance deliveries shall be made in respect to such equipment as will be determined to be eligible for delivery in accordance with the procedure set forth in the last sentence of paragraph 6.

8. The Soviet Government renounces all claims in respect of reparations to shares of German enterprises which are located in the Western Zones of Germany as well as to German foreign assets in all countries except those specified in paragraph 9 below.

9. The Governments of the U. K. and U.S. A. renounce all claims in respect of reparations to shares of German enterprises which are located in the Eastern Zone of occupation in Germany, as well as to German foreign assets in Bulgaria, Finland, Hungary, Rumania and Eastern Austria.

10. The Soviet Government makes no claims to gold captured by the Allied troops in Germany.

IV. DISPOSAL OF THE GERMAN NAVY AND MERCHANT MARINE

A. The following principles for the distribution of the German Navy were agreed:

(1) The total strength of the German surface navy, excluding ships sunk and those taken over from Allied Nations, but including ships under construction or repair, shall be divided equally among the U.S.S.R., U. K., and U.S. A.

(2) Ships under construction or repair mean those ships whose construction or repair may be completed within three to six months, according to the type of ship. Whether such ships under construction or repair shall be completed or repaired shall be determined by the technical commission appointed by the Three Powers and referred to below, subject to the principle that their completion or repair must be achieved within the time limits above provided, without any increase of skilled employment in the German shipyards and without permitting the reopening of any German ship building or connected industries. Completion date means the date when a ship is able to go out on its first trip, or, under peacetime standards, would refer to the customary date of delivery by shipyard to the Government.

(3) The larger part of the German submarine fleet shall be sunk. Not more than thirty submarines shall be preserved and divided equally between the U.S.S.R., U. K., and U.S. A. for experimental and technical purposes.

(4) All stocks of armament, ammunition and supplies of the German Navy appertaining to the vessels transferred pursuant to paragraphs (1) and (3) hereof shall be handed over to the respective powers receiving such ships.

(5) The Three Governments agree to constitute a tripartite naval commission comprising two representatives for each government, accompanied by the requisite staff, to submit agreed recommendations to the Three Governments for the allocation of specific German warships and to handle other detailed matters arising out of the agreement between the Three Governments regarding the German fleet. The Commission will hold its first meeting not later than 15th August, 1945, in Berlin, which shall be its headquarters. Each Delegation on the Commission will have the right on the basis of reciprocity to inspect German warships wherever they may be located.

(6) The Three Governments agreed that transfers, including those of ships under construction and repair, shall be completed as soon as possible, but not later than 15th February, 1946. The Commission will submit fortnightly reports, including proposals for the progressive allocation of the vessels when agreed by the Commission.

B. The following principles for the distribution of the German Merchant Marine were agreed:-

(1) The German Merchant Marine, surrendered to the Three Powers and wherever located, shall be divided equally among the U.S.S.R., the U. K., and the U.S. A. The

actual transfers of the ships to the respective countries shall take place as soon as practicable after the end of the war against Japan. The United Kingdom and the United States will provide out of their shares of the surrendered German merchant ships appropriate amounts for other Allied States whose merchant marines have suffered heavy losses in the common cause against Germany, except that the Soviet Union shall provide out of its share for Poland.

(2) The allocation, manning, and operation of these ships during the Japanese War period shall fall under the cognizance and authority of the Combined Shipping Adjustment Board and the United Maritime Authority.

(3) While actual transfer of the ships shall be delayed until after the end of the war with Japan, a Tripartite Shipping Commission shall inventory and value all available ships and recommend a specific distribution in accordance with paragraph (1).

(4) German inland and coastal ships determined to be necessary to the maintenance of the basic German peace economy by the Allied Control Council of Germany shall not be included in the shipping pool thus divided among the Three Powers.

(5) The Three Governments agree to constitute a tripartite merchant marine commission comprising two representatives for each Government, accompanied by the requisite staff, to submit agreed recommendations to the Three Governments for the allocation of specific German merchant ships and to handle other detailed matters arising out of the agreement between the Three Governments regarding the German merchant ships. The Commission will hold its first meeting not later than September 1st, 1945, in Berlin, which shall be its headquarters. Each delegation on the Commission will have the right on the basis of reciprocity to inspect the German merchant ships wherever they may be located.

V. CITY OF KOENIGSBERG AND THE ADJACENT AREA.

The Conference examined a proposal by the Soviet Government to the effect that pending the final determination of territorial questions at the peace settlement, the section of the western frontier of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics which is adjacent to the Baltic Sea should pass from a point on the eastern shore of the Bay of Danzig to the east, north of Braunsberg-Goldap, to the meeting point of the frontiers of Lithuania, the Polish Republic and East Prussia.

The Conference has agreed in principle to the proposal of the Soviet Government concerning the ultimate transfer to the Soviet Union of the City of Koenigsberg and the area adjacent to it as described above subject to expert examination of the actual frontier.

The President of the United States and the British Prime Minister have declared that they will support the proposal of the Conference at the forthcoming peace settlement.

VI. WAR CRIMINALS.

The Three Governments have taken note of the discussions which have been proceeding in recent weeks in London between British, United States, Soviet and French

representatives with a view to reaching agreement on the methods of trial of those major war criminals whose crimes under the Moscow Declaration of October, 1943 have no particular geographical localization. The Three Governments reaffirm their intention to bring these criminals to swift and sure justice. They hope that the negotiations in London will result in speedy agreement being reached for this purpose, and they regard it as a matter of great importance that the trial of these major criminals should begin at the earliest possible date. The first list of defendants will be published before 1st September.

VII. AUSTRIA.

The Conference examined a proposal by the Soviet Government on the extension of the authority of the Austrian Provisional Government to all of Austria.

The three governments agreed that they were prepared to examine this question after the entry of the British and American forces into the city of Vienna.

It was agreed that reparations should not be exacted from Austria.

VIII. POLAND.

A. DECLARATION.

We have taken note with pleasure of the agreement reached among representative Poles from Poland and abroad which has made possible the formation, in accordance with the decisions reached at the Crimea Conference, of a Polish Provisional Government of National Unity recognized by the Three Powers. The establishment by the British and United States Governments of diplomatic relations with the Polish Provisional Government of National Unity has resulted in the withdrawal of their recognition from the former Polish Government in London, which no longer exists.

The British and United States Governments have taken measures to protect the interest of the Polish Provisional Government of National Unity as the recognized government of the Polish State in the property belonging to the Polish State located in their territories and under their control, whatever the form of this property may be. They have further taken measures to prevent alienation to third parties of such property. All proper facilities will be given to the Polish Provisional Government of National Unity for the exercise of the ordinary legal remedies for the recovery of any property belonging to the Polish State which may have been wrongfully alienated.

The Three Powers are anxious to assist the Polish Provisional Government of National Unity in facilitating the return to Poland as soon as practicable of all Poles abroad who wish to go, including members of the Polish Armed Forces and the Merchant Marine. They expect that those Poles who return home shall be accorded personal and property rights on the same basis as all Polish citizens

The Three Powers note that the Polish Provisional Government of National Unity, in accordance with the decisions of the Crimea Conference, has agreed to the holding of free and unfettered elections as soon as possible on the basis of universal suffrage and secret ballot in which all democratic and anti-Nazi parties shall have the right to take part

and to put forward candidates, and that representatives of the Allied press shall enjoy full freedom to report to the world upon developments in Poland before and during the elections.

B. WESTERN FRONTIER OF POLAND.

In conformity with the agreement on Poland reached at the Crimea Conference the three Heads of Government have sought the opinion of the Polish Provisional Government of National Unity in regard to the accession of territory in the north 'end west which Poland should receive. The President of the National Council of Poland and members of the Polish Provisional Government of National Unity have been received at the Conference and have fully presented their views. The three Heads of Government reaffirm their opinion that the final delimitation of the western frontier of Poland should await the peace settlement.

The three Heads of Government agree that, pending the final determination of Poland's western frontier, the former German territories east of a line running from the Baltic Sea immediately west of Swinamunde, and thence along the Oder River to the confluence of the western Neisse River and along the Western Neisse to the Czechoslovak frontier, including that portion of East Prussia not placed under the administration of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in accordance with the understanding reached at this conference and including the area of the former free city of Danzig, shall be under the administration of the Polish State and for such purposes should not be considered as part of the Soviet zone of occupation in Germany.

IX. CONCLUSION ON PEACE TREATIES AND ADMISSION TO THE UNITED NATIONS ORGANIZATION.

The three Governments consider it desirable that the present anomalous position of Italy, Bulgaria, Finland, Hungary and Rumania should be terminated by the conclusion of Peace Treaties. They trust that the other interested Allied Governments will share these views.

For their part the three Governments have included the preparation of a Peace Treaty for Italy as the first among the immediate important tasks to be undertaken by the new Council of Foreign Ministers. Italy was the first of the Axis Powers to break with Germany, to whose defeat she has made a material contribution, and has now joined with the Allies in the struggle against Japan. Italy has freed herself from the Fascist regime and is making good progress towards reestablishment of a democratic government and institutions. The conclusion of such a Peace Treaty with a recognized and democratic Italian Government will make it possible for the three Governments to fulfill their desire to support an application from Italy for membership of the United Nations.

The three Governments have also charged the Council of Foreign Ministers with the task of preparing Peace Treaties for Bulgaria, Finland, Hungary and Rumania. The conclusion of Peace Treaties with recognized democratic governments in these States will also enable the three Governments to support applications from them for membership of the United Nations. The three Governments agree to examine each separately in the near

future in the light of the conditions then prevailing, the establishment of diplomatic relations with Finland, Rumania, Bulgaria, and Hungary to the extent possible prior to the conclusion of peace treaties with those countries.

The three Governments have no doubt that in view of the changed conditions resulting from the termination of the war in Europe, representatives of the Allied press will enjoy full freedom to report to the world upon developments in Rumania, Bulgaria, Hungary and Finland.

As regards the admission of other States into the United Nations Organization, Article 4 of the Charter of the United Nations declares that:

1. Membership in the United Nations is open to all other peace-loving States who accept the obligations contained in the present Charter and, in the judgment of the organization, are able and willing to carry out these obligations;
2. The admission of any such State to membership in the United Nations will be effected by a decision of the General Assembly upon the recommendation of the Security Council.

The three Governments, so far as they are concerned, will support applications for membership from those States which have remained neutral during the war and which fulfill the qualifications set out above.

The three Governments feel bound however to make it clear that they for their part would not favour any application for membership put forward by the present Spanish Government, which, having been founded with the support of the Axis Powers, does not, in view of its origins, its nature, its record and its close association with the aggressor States, possess the qualifications necessary to justify such membership.

X. TERRITORIAL TRUSTEESHIP.

The Conference examined a proposal by the Soviet Government on the question of trusteeship territories as defined in the decision of the Crimea Conference and in the Charter of the United Nations Organization.

After an exchange of views on this question it was decided that the disposition of any former Italian colonial territories was one to be decided in connection with the preparation of a peace treaty for Italy and that the question of Italian colonial territory would be considered by the September Council of Ministers of Foreign Affairs.

XI. REVISED ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION PROCEDURE IN RUMANIA, BULGARIA, AND HUNGARY.

The three Governments took note that the Soviet Representatives on the Allied Control Commissions in Rumania, Bulgaria, and Hungary, have communicated to their United Kingdom and United States colleagues proposals for improving the work of the Control Commissions, now that hostilities in Europe have ceased.

The three Governments agreed that the revision of the procedures of the Allied Control Commissions in these countries would now be undertaken, taking into account the

interests and responsibilities of the three Governments which together presented the terms of armistice to the respective countries, and accepting as a basis, in respect of all three countries, the Soviet Government's proposals for Hungary as annexed hereto. (Annex I)

XII. ORDERLY TRANSFER OF GERMAN POPULATIONS.

The Three Governments, having considered the question in all its aspects, recognize that the transfer to Germany of German populations, or elements thereof, remaining in Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary, will have to be undertaken. They agree that any transfers that take place should be effected in an orderly and humane manner.

Since the influx of a large number of Germans into Germany would increase the burden already resting on the occupying authorities, they consider that the Control Council in Germany should in the first instance examine the problem, with special regard to the question of the equitable distribution of these Germans among the several zones of occupation. They are accordingly instructing their respective representatives on the Control Council to report to their Governments as soon as possible the extent to which such persons have already entered Germany from Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary, to submit an estimate of the time and rate at which further transfers could be carried out having regard to the present situation in Germany.

The Czechoslovak Government, the Polish Provisional Government and the Control Council in Hungary are at the same time being informed of the above and are being requested meanwhile to suspend further expulsions pending an examination by the Governments concerned of the report from their representatives on the Control Council.

XIII. OIL EQUIPMENT IN RUMANIA.

The Conference agreed to set up two bilateral commissions of experts, one to be composed of United Kingdom and Soviet Members and one to be composed of United States and Soviet Members, to investigate the facts and examine the documents, as a basis for the settlement of questions arising from the removal of oil equipment in Rumania. It was further agreed that these experts shall begin their work within ten days, on the spot.

XIV. IRAN.

It was agreed that Allied troops should be withdrawn immediately from Tehran, and that further stages of the withdrawal of troops from Iran should be considered at the meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers to be held in London in September, 1945.

XV. THE INTERNATIONAL ZONE OF TANGIER.

A proposal by the Soviet Government was examined and the following decisions were reached:

Having examined the question of the Zone of Tangier, the three Governments have agreed that this Zone, which includes the City of Tangier and the area adjacent to it, in view of its special strategic importance, shall remain international.

The question of Tangier will be discussed in the near future at a meeting in Paris of representatives of the Governments of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United States of America, the United Kingdom and France.

XVI. THE BLACK SEA STRAITS.

The Three Governments recognized that the Convention concluded at Montreux should be revised as failing to meet present-day conditions.

It was agreed that as the next step the matter should be the subject of direct conversations between each of the three Governments and the Turkish Government.

XVII. INTERNATIONAL INLAND WATERWAYS.

The Conference considered a proposal of the U.S. Delegation on this subject and agreed to refer it for consideration to the forthcoming meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers in London.

XVIII. EUROPEAN INLAND TRANSPORT CONFERENCE.

The British and U.S. Delegations to the Conference informed the Soviet Delegation of the desire of the British and U.S. Governments to reconvene the European Inland Transport Conference and stated that they would welcome assurance that the Soviet Government would participate in the work of the reconvened conference. The Soviet Government agreed that it would participate in this conference.

XIX. DIRECTIVES TO MILITARY COMMANDERS ON ALLIED CONTROL COUNCIL FOR GERMANY.

The Three Governments agreed that each would send a directive to its representative on the Control Council for Germany informing him of all decisions of the Conference affecting matters within the scope of his duties.

XX. USE OF ALLIED PROPERTY FOR SATELLITE REPARATIONS OR WAR TROPHIES .

The proposal (Annex II) presented by the United States Delegation was accepted in principle by the Conference, but the drafting of an agreement on the matter was left to be worked out through diplomatic channels.

XXI. MILITARY TALKS.

During the Conference there were meetings between the Chiefs of Staff of the Three Governments on military matters of common interest.

ANNEX I

TEXT OF A LETTER TRANSMITTED ON JULY 12 TO THE REPRESENTATIVES OF THE U.S. AND U. K. GOVERNMENTS ON THE ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION IN HUNGARY.

In view of the changed situation in connection with the termination of the war against Germany, the Soviet Government finds it necessary to establish the following order of work for the Allied Control Commission in Hungary.

1. During the period up to the conclusion of peace with Hungary the President (or Vice-President) of the ACC will regularly call conferences with the British and American representatives for the purpose of discussing the most important questions relating to the work of the ACC. The conferences will be called once in 10 days, or more frequently in case of need.

Directives of the ACC on questions of principle will be issued to the Hungarian authorities by the President of the Allied Control Commission after agreement on these directives with the English and American representatives.

2. The British and American representatives in the ACC will take part in general conferences of heads of divisions and delegates of the ACC, convoked by the President of the ACC, which meetings will be regular in nature. The British and American representatives will also participate personally or through their representatives in appropriate instances in mixed commissions created by the President of the ACC for questions connected with the execution by the ACC of its functions

3. Free movement by the American and British representatives in the country will be permitted provided that the ACC is previously informed of the time and route of the journeys.

4. All questions connected with permission for the entrance and exit of members of the staff of the British and American representatives in Hungary will be decided on the spot by the President of the ACC within a time limit of not more than one week.

5. The bringing in and sending out by plane of mail, cargoes and diplomatic couriers will be carried out by the British and American representatives on the ACC under arrangements and within time limits established by the ACC, or in special cases by previous coordination with the President of the ACC.

I consider it necessary to add to the above that in all other points the existing Statutes regarding the ACC in Hungary, which was confirmed on January 20, 1945, shall remain in force in the future.

ANNEX II

USE OF ALLIED PROPERTY FOR SATELITE REPARATIONS OR WAR TROPHIES

1. The burden of reparation and "war trophies" should not fall on Allied nationals.

2. Capital Equipment-We object to the removal of such Allied property as reparations, "war trophies", or under any other guise. Loss would accrue to Allied nationals as a result of destruction of plants and the consequent loss of markets and trading connections. Seizure of Allied property makes impossible the fulfillment by the satellite of its obligation under the armistice to restore intact the rights and interests of the Allied Nations and their nationals.

The United States looks to the other occupying powers for the return of any equipment already removed and the cessation of removals. Where such equipment will not or cannot be returned, the U.S. will demand of the satellite adequate, effective and prompt compensation to American nationals, and that such compensation have priority equal to that of the reparations payment.

These principles apply to all property wholly or substantially owned by Allied nationals. In the event of removals of property in which the American as well as the entire Allied interest is less than substantial, the U.S. expects adequate, effective, and prompt compensation.

3. Current Production-While the U.S. does not oppose reparation out of current production of Allied investments, the satellite must provide immediate and adequate compensation to the Allied nationals including sufficient foreign exchange or products so that they can recover reasonable foreign currency expenditures and transfer a reasonable return on their investment. Such compensation must also have equal priority with reparations.

We deem it essential that the satellites not conclude treaties, agreements or arrangements which deny to Allied nationals access, on equal terms, to their trade, raw materials and industry; and appropriately- modify any existing arrangements which may have that effect.

(b)Proclamation Defining Terms for Japanese Surrender, July 26, 1945

(1) We-The President of the United States, the President of the National Government of the Republic of China, and the Prime Minister of Great Britain, representing the hundreds of millions of our countrymen, have conferred and agree that Japan shall be given an opportunity to end this war.

(2) The prodigious land, sea and air forces of the United States, the British Empire and of China, many times reinforced by their armies and air fleets from the west, are poised to strike the final blows upon Japan. This military power is sustained and inspired by the determination of all the Allied Nations to prosecute the war against Japan until she ceases to resist.

(3) The result of the futile and senseless German resistance to the might of the aroused free peoples of the world stands forth in awful clarity as an example to the people of Japan. The might that now converges on Japan is immeasurably greater than that which, when applied to the resisting Nazis, necessarily laid waste to the lands, the industry and the method of life of the whole German people. The full application of our military power, backed by our resolve, All mean the inevitable and complete destruction of the

Japanese armed forces and just as inevitably the utter devastation of the Japanese homeland.

(4) The time has come for Japan to decide whether she will continue to be controlled by those self-willed militaristic advisers whose unintelligent calculations have brought the Empire of Japan to the threshold of annihilation, or whether she will follow the path of reason.

(5) Following are our terms. We will not deviate from them. There are no alternatives. We shall brook no delay.

(6) There must be eliminated for all time the authority and influence of those who have deceived and misled the people of Japan into embarking on world conquest, for we insist that a new order of peace security and justice will be impossible until irresponsible militarism is driven from the world.

(7) Until such a new order is established and until there is convincing proof that Japan's war-making power is destroyed, points in Japanese territory to be designated by the Allies shall be occupied to secure the achievement of the basic objectives we are here setting forth.

(8) The terms of the Cairo Declaration shall be carried out and Japanese sovereignty shall be limited to the islands of Honshu, Hokkaido, Kyushu, Shikoku and such minor islands as we determine.

(9) The Japanese military forces, after being completely disarmed, shall be permitted to return to their homes with the opportunity to lead peaceful and productive lives.

(10) We do not intend that the Japanese shall be enslaved as a race or destroyed as a nation, but stern justice shall be meted out to all war criminals, including those who have visited cruelties upon our prisoners. The Japanese Government shall remove all obstacles to the revival and strengthening of democratic tendencies among the Japanese people. Freedom of speech, of religion, and of thought, as well as respect for the fundamental human rights shall be established.

(11) Japan shall be permitted to maintain such industries as will sustain her economy and permit the exaction of just reparations in kind, but not those [industries] which would enable her to re-arm for war. To this end, access to, as distinguished from control of, raw materials shall be permitted. Eventual Japanese participation in world trade relations shall be permitted.

(12) The occupying forces of the Allies shall be withdrawn from Japan as soon as these objectives have been accomplished and there has been established in accordance with the freely expressed will of the Japanese people a peacefully inclined and responsible government.

(13) We call upon the government of Japan to proclaim now the unconditional surrender of all Japanese armed forces, and to provide proper and adequate assurances of their good faith in such action. The alternative for Japan is prompt and utter destruction.

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