The Berlin Airlift is remembered as a symbol of American resolve
in the early years of the Cold War, but it also demonstrated
the power of logistics in attaining a strategic objective.
There is
no practicability in maintaining our position in
Berlin and it must not be evaluated on that basis
. . . . We are convinced that our remaining in Berlin
is essential to our prestige in Germany and in Europe.
Whether for good or bad, it has become a symbol of
American intent. |
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With those words, General Lucius D. Clay, the U.S. Commander
in Chief, European Command (CINCEUR), and Military Governor
of Germany, set the resolve of the military to meet the tide
of communism in 1948 Europe in a unique way. The resulting
Berlin Airlift, or Operation Vittles, revolutionized U.S.
strategic doctrine and demonstrated how logistics can win
wars. Without
firing a shot, Allied interests were secured in Europe. [“Operation
Vittles” was the U.S. name for the airlift. The British
called their operation “Plain Fare.”]
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A C-7 transport
leaves Rhein Main Air Base in West Germany on 30
September 1949 to make the last flight of the Berlin
Airlift. |
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Former Allies Divide Over Berlin
Post-World War II Germany was an occupied nation divided
into four zones, each controlled by one of the victorious
Allies.
Berlin, the capital of Germany, similarly was divided into
Soviet, British, French, and American sectors. The Soviet
Union had wasted no time in expanding communism and its
sphere of influence in Eastern European countries. It was
anxiously
eyeing Germany to also fall within that group. To that
end, it would do anything to prevent the creation of a
unified,
democratic, capitalist Germany. A divided Berlin, however,
sat like a cancer in the heart of the Soviet sector.
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First Lieutenant
Gail Halvorsen, USAF, became famous for “Operation
Little Vittles.” He rigged miniature parachutes
with American candy bars and gum and then dropped
the parachutes over Berlin for German children to
retrieve. |
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Making Germany an ally through economic aid was imperative
to the United States. Germany’s importance rested
in its location and large population. Geographically, Germany
is near the center of Europe. It twice rose to world power
within the first half of the 20th century, and the potential
existed for its people to do so again. In their book, Airbridge
to Berlin: The Berlin Crisis of 1948, its Origins and Aftermath,
D.M. Giangreco and Robert E. Griffin point out that Germany
was so important to the United States that Secretary of
State George C. Marshall tied the whole recovery of war-ravaged
Europe to the restoration of the German economy. The Soviets
agreed with this view of the importance of Germany. Vyacheslav
M. Molotov, the Soviet Foreign Minister, noted, “What
happens to Berlin, happens to Germany; what happens to
Germany, happens to Europe.”
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German children
living near Tempelhof Air Base in Berlin, where the
U.S. transports unloaded their airlift supplies,
play Luftbrucke (air bridge) using model American
planes. |
|
In December 1947, diplomatic meetings between the four
occupying powers were suspended indefinitely because they
could not reach a consensus on unifying Germany. Great
Britain, France, and the United States went forward with
plans for forming a West German state. By the end of March
1948, the Soviets were inspecting all trains entering their
sector of Berlin for proper permits. A short, 10-day airlift
of supplies to the West Berlin military garrison made the
Soviets ease their restrictions, but harassment of access
continued until June. No thought was given to the needs
of Berlin’s civilian population during this abbreviated
airlift.
Soviet Blockade Leads to Airlift
One of the first steps by Great Britain, France, and the
United States toward establishing an independent West Germany
was a reform of the German currency. This currency reform
would include the Allied sectors in Berlin. The Soviets
regarded the establishment of a German currency in Berlin
as a provocation and responded by immediately suspending
rail and highway passenger traffic into and out of Berlin.
Four days after the new deutsche mark (the new West German
currency) was implemented in Berlin on 20 June 1948, the
Soviets blockaded all ground transportation routes to the
city. Giangrenco and Griffin point out that their goal
was “. . . starving out the population and cutting
off their business.” The Soviets believed that, by
isolating Berlin, the city would fall under their control.
They also believed that the United States and Great Britain
eventually would pull out of Germany altogether, and Germany
then would be ripe to fall under Soviet influence.
The Allied logistics juggernaut wasted no time in leaping
into action to support the people of Berlin. Plans for
using an airlift had been discussed already. The task was
daunting: the U.S. Air Force, just 9 months old at the
time, had only two troop carrier squadrons in Europe, and
Berlin had a population of approximately two million to
support. Nevertheless, the first aircraft landed within
2 days with supplies for the Berliners and the garrison.
Like many military operations conducted without the benefit
of lessons learned, there was a steep learning curve at
the beginning. The Allies had to operate within three 20-mile-wide
air corridors. Berlin started with two airfields but had
two more built and operating within 5 months. Command and
control also was difficult. Doctrine on emergency airlift
operations was lacking, cargo was not prioritized, and
loading and unloading operations were not organized.
It did not take long before the airlift became a multinational
and joint logistics marvel. The U.S. Army procured supplies
and moved them by ground (aided by German railroads), the
U.S. and British navies transported bulk fuel and supplies
to continental Europe, and the U.S and British air forces
flew the supplies thus assembled into Berlin.
The minimum supply tonnage in June 1948 was computed initially
at 4,500 tons daily. Because of continued operational success,
this level was increased to 5,620 tons daily by the fall
of 1948. By January 1949, the city of Berlin was able to
stockpile supplies and increase the daily food ration from
1,600 calories to 1,880 calories per person. In April 1949,
Operation Vittles staged a 1-day demonstration. In a 24-hour
period, 1,398 flights delivered over 13,000 tons of coal
without accident or injury. Many private donations, such
as toys, clothes, and candy, also were flown in throughout
the operation.
When supply flights actually increased despite the German
winter and continued to grow as the better weather of spring
arrived, the Soviets realized the airlift could not be
stopped. On 12 May 1949, the blockade was lifted and ground
transportation flowed east to Berlin. The airlift continued,
however, until West Germany was formally declared a nation
(the Federal Republic of Germany) in September 1949. By
the time the operation ended, 278,228 flights had delivered
2,326,406 tons of supplies. The United States conducted
189,963 of those flights carrying 1,783,573 tons of supplies,
of which 1,421,119 tons were coal.
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Citizens
of Berlin watch a C–54 transport land at Tempelhof
Air Base in Berlin
in 1948. |
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Response Sets Precedent for Logistics Influence
The Berlin Airlift changed the way modern war is waged. It
showed that, by logistically supporting a beleaguered population,
political and military interests can be secured. Projection
of humanitarian aid and logistics accomplished this. The
Berliners had to endure reductions in services from public
transportation and public utilities (gas, electric, heat),
unemployment resulting from businesses closing because of
reduced power, food rationing, and a lack of fresh groceries
such as milk, meat, and vegetables. Had the Western powers
let the Berliners suffer under the Soviet siege, Berlin would
have surrendered to the Soviet blockade and Soviet influence
would have been strengthened in Germany. Many credit the
Marshall Plan with stemming the tide of communism in Europe,
but without the Berliners’ resolve to stand up to Soviet
tyranny and the logistics support of Operation Vittles, communism
could be alive and well in Germany today.
Current U.S. Army operational doctrine recognizes the need
to assist civilians as demonstrated in the Berlin Airlift.
Field Manual 3–0, Operations, states—
In support
operations, Army forces provide essential support,
services, assets, or specialized resources to help
civil authorities deal with situations beyond their
capabilities. The purpose of support operations is
to meet the immediate needs of designated groups
for a limited time, until civil authorities can do
so without Army assistance. In extreme or exceptional
cases, Army forces may provide relief or assistance
directly to those in need. |
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The Berlin Airlift was the first time the United States linked
a support operation to a strategic and political objective.
It set the precedent for, and demonstrated the success that
can result from, aiding a civilian population. To put the
airlift in perspective, the U.S. Air Forces in Europe Web
site makes
this observation—
A comparison
with the recent multinational airlift into Sarajevo
[Bosnia] suggests how intense an effort the Berlin
Airlift was. From July 1992 to January 1996, 179,910
tons of cargo
was airlifted into Sarajevo. The Berlin Airlift delivered more than that in March
1949 alone, and did it again in each of the four months that followed. |
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Even today, in Iraq, Afghanistan, Bosnia, and Kosovo, the
United States is applying the lessons learned from the
Berlin Airlift.
Not only does the United States operate a logistics pipeline
using air transportation assets, but it also is trying
to win the hearts and minds of the local populations by
helping
them
meet their daily needs. The prominence of civil affairs
units on today’s battlefields reflects this goal.
U.S. citizens also continually funnel private donations
through service
members.
Like the servicemen involved in Operation Vittles, U.S.
servicemen helping civilians in current operations represent
America’s
spirit and generosity as much as U.S. diplomacy does. Americans
have realized that, to effect real change in a country, its
people have to embrace that change. As a first step toward
change, Americans are extending their generosity—just
as they did in Berlin 67 years ago.
ALOG
Major Gregory C. Tine, MDARNG, is an Active Guard/Reserve officer serving as
the Support Operations Officer in the 29th Infantry Division (Light) Division
Support Command. He has a B.S. degree from Northern Michigan University and is
a graduate of the Armor Officer Basic Course, the Signal Officer Transition Course,
the Quartermaster Officer Advanced Course, and the Combined Arms and Services
Staff School. This article is adapted from a paper he prepared for the Command
and General Staff Officers Course.