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Integrative Complexity of American and Soviet Foreign Policy Rhetoric. A Time-Series Analysis
Abstract
Used the integrative complexity coding system to analyze official American and Soviet foreign policy statements concerned with problems that bore directly on American-Soviet relations issued between 1945 and 1983. Time series (ARIMA) and 2-stage least squares analyses revealed that the integrative complexity of Soviet statements was a function of Soviet complexity levels in the past, American complexity levels in the present, Soviet military or political interventions in other countries, the successful culmination of American-Soviet negotiations, and American presidential elections. The integrative complexity of American statements was a function of American complexity levels in the past, Soviet complexity levels in the past, presidential elections, changes in presidential administrations, Soviet military or political interventions in other countries, American military or political interventions in other countries, and the successful culmination of American-Soviet negotiations. Findings are interpreted in terms of 2 complementary levels of analysis: the study of cognitive processes and the study of bargaining and impression management strategies. (77 ref) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2012 APA, all rights reserved)
... • more complex, dialectical reasoning (aspects of which are central to the notions of integrative complexity (Tetlock, 1985) and wisdom ) -i.e., recognize the uncertainty and qualify forecasts by expressing multidetermined nature of predictions and considering both positive and negative aspects of the same forecast; • an outsider viewpoint and consider base-rate information (rather than focus on the focal event alone; Kahneman & Tversky, 1982). ...
... Past work has employed a range of human-based coding strategies to characterize epistemic concerns that share family resemblance with the notion of dialectical reasoning -i.e., consideration/acceptance of seeming contradictions (for reviews, see Grossmann, 2018;Peng and Nisbett, 1999). In particular, there is a substantive body of scholarship on coding open-ended reflections and justifications for presence of integrative complexity -a measure of complex thinking that includes evaluative differentiation (i.e., consideration of a number of distinct and contradictory dimensions of a problem) and conceptual integration (i.e., development of complex connections among differentiated characteristics) (Suedfeld et al., 1992;Suedfeld and Tetlock, 1977;Tetlock, 1985). Here, the evaluative differentiation component is closely connected to the idea of dialectical thinking, and has also been linked to superior accuracy in forecasting tournaments . ...
... Notably, the interview schedule in the World after Covid projects allowed to elegantly capture dialectical reasoning: Because experts provided responses to questions about most significant positive and negative consequences, human-based coders could categorize responses as those invoking dialectical thinking/ evaluate differentiation if participants explicitly acknowledged multi-determined nature of pandemic consequences or if they explicitly mentioned the same outcome as having both positive and negative consequences. This approach is similar to how human-based coding was employed to code dialectical thinking (e.g., Grossmann et al., 2010) or integrative complexity in the past (e.g., Tetlock, 1985), with an exception of a more constrained focus on responses to specific questions rather than free format rationales for one's judgment employed in prior research. The narrower format of open-ended questions allows both for greater precision in establishing reliability across coders as well as straightforward automated analysis of dialecticism beyond "bag-of-words" approaches-i.e., scoring of texts based on % of words from pre-defined word dictionaries-used in prior scholarship (e.g., Conway et al., 2014). ...
How do experts in human behavior think the world change after the COVID-19 pandemic? What advice do they have for the post-pandemic world? Is there a consensus on the most significant psychological and societal changes ahead? To answer these questions, we analyzed interviews from the World after COVID project – reflections of more than 50 of the world’s top behavioral and social science experts, including fellows of National Academies and presidents of major scientific societies. These experts independently shared their thoughts on possible psychological changes in society in the aftermath of the COVID-19 pandemic and provided recommendations how to respond to the new challenges and opportunities these shifts may bring. We distilled these predictions and suggestions via human-coded analyses and natural language processing techniques. In general, experts showed little overlap in their predictions, except for convergence on a set of social/societal themes (e.g., greater appreciation for social connection, increasing political conflict). Half of the experts approached their post-COVID predictions dialectically, highlighting both positive and negative features of the same domain of change, and many expressed uncertainty in their predictions. The project offers a time capsule of experts’ predictions for the effects of the pandemic on a wide range of outcomes. We discuss the implications of heterogeneity in these predictions, the value of uncertainty and dialecticism in forecasting, and the value of balancing explanation with predictions in expert psychological judgment.
... However, some work on ideology and integrative complexity suggests a pattern partially consistent with this hypothesis. Work on the relation between ideology and integrative complexity has consistently shown that politicians on the left are more complex than those on the right (Tetlock, 1983(Tetlock, , 1984(Tetlock, , 1985Tetlock et al., 1985;Tetlock et al., 1994;Thoemmes & Conway, 2007;Wasike, 2017;see Houck & Conway, 2019, for a summary meta-analysis). Although this work did not measure RWA or LWA, it is possible that this difference arises in part because persons high in LWAwho presumably comprise part of each liberal sampleexperience more value conflict on average than persons low in LWA, thus driving liberal scores up overall. ...
Left‐wing authoritarianism (LWA) has a controversial history in psychology. Some researchers have expressed skepticism about the existence of LWA, whereas others have argued that LWA is a valid construct. In the present article, we offer a framework to reconcile these two perspectives by proposing that ideologically based authoritarian norms are sometimes in conflict with the processes that create authoritarian individuals. In Western political contexts, authoritarian norms are more likely to occur on the conservative side of the political spectrum; but authoritarian attributes can occur in both conservatives and liberals. In our model, left‐wing authoritarians thus often occupy the space where forces influencing authoritarianism are in conflict. We review existing evidence related to the model, present novel evidence related to the model, derive four hypotheses from the model, and discuss criteria for falsifying the model. We conclude by considering the model's place in current research on the complexities of ideology.
... Örgüt kültürü, örgüt içinde yer alan farklılıkları ve çatışmaları azaltan ve çalışanları ortak bir amaç etrafında birleştiren bir etmendir (Akıncı, 1997). Bu açıdan örgütsel demokrasi, çalışanların dayanışmasına ve fikirlerin özgürce ifade edilmesi sürecine dayanmaktadır (Collom, 2001 (Tetlock, 1985;Geçkil ve Tikici, 2015). Bu açıdan örgütsel demokrasinin olduğu örgütlerde, karar sistemi olarak hafif derecede işçi katılımı ve işçilerin kendi kendilerini yönettikleri bir süreç söz konusu olabilmektedir (Smith, 1976). ...
Are U.S. political leaders becoming simpler in their rhetoric? To evaluate, we place the two most recent Presidents’ integrative complexity against a historical context for three different types of comparable materials. Results reveal that both Biden and Trump are simple when compared to the typical President. Further, segmented regression analyses reveal Biden's and Trump's low complexity is partially the continuation of an ongoing historical decline in complexity among Presidents. Importantly, this complexity decline is occurring for both Republicans and Democrats.
Researchers have long assumed that complex thinking is determined by both situational factors and stable, trait-based differences. However, although situational influences on complexity have been discussed at length in the literature, there is still no comprehensive integration of evidence regarding the theorized trait component of cognitive complexity. To fill this gap, we evaluate the degree that cognitive complexity is attributable to trait variance. Specifically, we review two domains of evidence pertaining to (a) the generalizability of individuals’ complex thinking across domains and the temporal stability of individuals’ complex thinking and (b) the relationship of complex thinking with conceptually related traits. Cumulatively, the literature suggests that persons’ cognitive complexity at any point in time results partially from a stable and generalizable trait component that accounts for a small-to-moderate amount of variance. It further suggests that cognitively complex persons are characterized by chronic trait-based differences in motivation and ability to think complexly.
Previous studies have found that the cognitive performance of government decision-makers declines in crises that result in war. This decline has been attributed to crisis-produced stress which leads to simplification of information processing. The present study tested the disruptive stress hypothesis in the context of Japan's decision for war in 1941. Two content analysis techniques, integrative complexity coding (Schroder et al.,) and cognitive mapping (Axelrod, 1976) were used to analyze the translated records of statements by key Japanese policy-makers. Comparisons between statements made in the early and late periods of the 1941 crisis yielded only weak evidence of cognitive simplification. Interestingly, however, the social context in which statements were made significantly affected the complexity of cognitive performance: Statements made in Liaison conterences (in which policies were formulated) were significantly less complex than statements made in Imperial conferences (in which policies were presented to the Emperor for approval). Theoretical and methodological implications of the results were discussed.
This paper explores the case for a general threat-rigidity effect in individual, group, and organizational behavior. Evidence from multiple levels of analysis is summarized, showing a restriction in information processing and constriction of control under threat conditions. Possible mechanisms underlying such a multiple-level effect are explored, as are its possible functional and dysfunctional consequences.
An integrative complexity coding system was used to explore the relations between cognitive style and political ideology among US Supreme Court justices who served on the Court between 1964 and 1978. The integrative complexity of case opinions that Ss authored during their 1st terms on the Court and the overall liberalism–conservatism of their voting records throughout their tenure were assessed. Consistent with past work on cognitive style and political ideology, Ss with liberal and moderate voting records exhibited more integratively complex styles of thought in their early case opinions than did those with conservative voting records. Unexpectedly, these relationships between cognitive style and ideology were more powerful on cases involving economic conflicts of interest than on cases involving civil liberties and rights issues. Results remain significant after controlling for a variety of demographic and background characteristics of the Ss (e.g., age, religion, quality of law school attended) and characteristics of the judicial opinions scored for integrative complexity (unanimous or split-Court, majority–minority status of opinion). Possible explanations for the results and processes that limit the cross-issue generality of relationships between cognitive style and ideology are discussed. (60 ref)
• Tested the cognitive vs rhetorical style hypothesis (conservatives have more simplistic rhetorical, not cognitive styles than liberals or moderates) by assessing the integrative complexity of 10 paragraph-sized statements of 81 senators in 5 US Congresses: 3 dominated by liberals and moderates (the 82nd, 94th, and 96th Congresses) and 2 dominated by conservatives (the 83rd and 97th Congresses). Results show that liberals and moderates were more complex than conservatives in the 82nd, 94th, and 96th Congresses but that these differences among ideological groups were much less pronounced in the 83rd and 97th Congresses. The change in pattern was due to sharp declines in the complexity of liberals and, to a lesser extent, moderates in conservative-dominated sessions, not to an increase in the complexity in conservatives. Conservatives displayed more traitlike stability in integrative complexity both within and across Congressional sessions. It is suggested that the integrative complexity of senatorial debate may be a joint product of relatively context-specific styles of political impression management and relatively stable cognitive styles of organizing the political world. (41 ref) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2012 APA, all rights reserved)
• Tested the cognitive vs rhetorical style hypothesis (conservatives have more simplistic rhetorical, not cognitive styles than liberals or moderates) by assessing the integrative complexity of 10 paragraph-sized statements of 81 senators in 5 US Congresses: 3 dominated by liberals and moderates (the 82nd, 94th, and 96th Congresses) and 2 dominated by conservatives (the 83rd and 97th Congresses). Results show that liberals and moderates were more complex than conservatives in the 82nd, 94th, and 96th Congresses but that these differences among ideological groups were much less pronounced in the 83rd and 97th Congresses. The change in pattern was due to sharp declines in the complexity of liberals and, to a lesser extent, moderates in conservative-dominated sessions, not to an increase in the complexity in conservatives. Conservatives displayed more traitlike stability in integrative complexity both within and across Congressional sessions. It is suggested that the integrative complexity of senatorial debate may be a joint product of relatively context-specific styles of political impression management and relatively stable cognitive styles of organizing the political world. (41 ref) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2012 APA, all rights reserved)
"Construct validation was introduced in order to specify types of research required in developing tests for which the conventional views on validation are inappropriate. Personality tests, and some tests of ability, are interpreted in terms of attributes for which there is no adequate criterion. This paper indicates what sorts of evidence can substantiate such an interpretation, and how such evidence is to be interpreted." 60 references. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2006 APA, all rights reserved).
Richardson models have often been used to describe reactive processes in arms races. This paper argues that, following the work of Otomar Bartos, negotiations may also be analyzed as a reactive process rather than as a process of discrete position changes. Four variants of the basic Richardson model were employed to determine whether the Partial Test Ban negotiations exhibited such an interactive pattern. In all four equations for the behavior of both the United States and the USSR the stimulus variable provided the greatest explanatory power, supporting the notion that these negotiations were reactive. Several important differences emerged, however, between the Test Ban negotiations and most arms races. On balance, the data gave strong support for the basic assumption of Richardson models, namely that negotiations may be treated as a highly reactive process.
Conceptual differentiation refers to the number of discrete elements of political information individuals utilize in their evaluation of political issues. In contrast with the more commonly used textbookish political knowledge indices, this measure corresponds more closely to knowledge-in-use. Conceptual integration is defined as the spontaneous and explicit organization of ideas and information in terms of abstract or ideological constructs and represents an expansion of Philip Converse's research on levels of ideological thinking in mass publics. These two related dimensions of political information processing emerge from a detailed content analysis of depth interview transcripts. The analysis reveals substantial variation in the way citizens relate the condition of their own lives to those of their fellow citizens and to political authorities. As expected, education plays a central role in explaning these patterns, but there are some surprising interactive linkages between education and patterns of political thought. One specially intriguing finding is that conservatives have significantly lower scores than liberals on indices of differentiation and integration. The ramifications of these findings for survey research methodology and theories of mass political behavior are discussed.
Reporting on a content analysis of speeches and interviews of Soviet Politburo members, this study provides an initial assessment of the personal characteristics of these political leaders. The characteristics examined are ethnocentrism, belief in one's own ability to control events, need for power, need for affiliation, conceptual complexity, self-confidence, distrust of others, and task orientation. In addition to describing Politburo members and exploring the impact of situational variables on their personal characteristics, interrelations are reported between these characteristics and background data as well as position on detente.
