George Trofimoff Affidavit

George Trofimoff Affidavit

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

TAMPA DIVISION

CASE NO. 8:00-CR-197-T-24C

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

GEORGE TROFIMOFF,

a/k/a George Von Trofimoff,

a/k/a “Antey,” a/k/a “Markiz,” a/k/a “Konsul”

INDICTMENT

The Grand Jury charges:

COUNT ONE

A. INTRODUCTION

At all times relevant to this indictment:

1. The defendant, GEORGE TROFIMOFF, a/k/a George Von Trofimoff, a/k/a “Antey,” a/k/a “Markiz,” a/k/a “Konsul,” was born in Germany to Russian émigrés, and became a naturalized United States citizen in 1951. He enlisted in the United States Army in 1948 and received a commission in the United States Army Reserve in 1953. He was honorably discharged from active duty in the United States Army in 1956, and retired from the United States Army Reserve with the rank of Colonel in 1987. From 1959 through 1994, TROFIMOFF was employed by the United States Army as a civilian working in military intelligence, serving primarily in Germany.

2. Pursuant to Executive Order 12958 and its preceding Orders, information, the unauthorized disclosure of which could reasonably be expected to cause “damage to national security,” must be classified as CONFIDENTIAL and properly safeguarded. Information, the unauthorized disclosure of which reasonably could be expected to cause “serious damage to the national security,” must be classified as SECRET and properly safeguarded. Information, the unauthorized disclosure of which could reasonably be expected to cause “exceptionally grave damage to the national security,” must be classified as TOP SECRET and properly safeguarded.

3. Throughout his career with the United States Army, TROFIMOFF held SECRET and TOP SECRET clearances, and received periodic briefings and acknowledged his responsibilities in handling classified information.

4. The United States, the Federal Republic of Germany, Great Britain, and others were member nations of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), which provided for a common defense against the threat of military aggression.

5. Until in or around 1991, the principal military threat to the NATO countries was from the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (Soviet Union) and its Warsaw Treaty organization (Warsaw Pact) allies, which included German Democratic Republic (East Germany), the Polish People's Republic, the People's Republic of Hungary, the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic, and the People's Republic of Bulgaria.

6. Since in or around 1991, NATO has guarded against potential threats from former republics of the Soviet Union, including the Russian Federation, and their allies.

7. As a member of NATO the United States had a military intelligence presence in Western Europe, including the 66th Military Intelligence Group (MIG).

8. A mission of the 66th MIG was to work together with the military intelligence services of other countries in collecting intelligence about Warsaw Pact countries. One source of this intelligence was interviews of refugees and defectors from Warsaw Pact countries. Some such interviews were conducted by military intelligence personnel assigned to Joint Interrogation Centers (JIC).

9. A JIC at Nuernberg in the Federal Republic of Germany was staffed by United States Army personnel as well as other United States, German, British, and French military personnel, From 1969 to 1994, the defendant GEORGE TROFIMOFF was the Chief of the United States Army Element at the Nuernberg JIC,

10. The United States Army Element at the Nuernberg JIC received classified information, including documents produced by members of the United States intelligence community such as the Defense Intelligence Agency.

11. As Chief of the United States Army Element at the Nuernberg JIC, TROFIMOFF had access to all classified information, including documents, received by and produced by the United States Army Element.

12. Among the classified documents related to the national defense of the United States which were maintained at the Nuernberg JIC were the following:

(a) Intelligence Objectives, which listed current intelligence information required by the United States.

(b) Intelligence Priorities for Strategic Planning, which identified and ranked the current intelligence needs of the United States military.

(e) Soviet and Warsaw Pact Order of Battle documents which detailed the United States' current state of knowledge of Soviet and Warsaw Pact military organizations and capabilities.

(d) Collection Support Briefs on specific topics such as the current chemical and biological warfare threat posed by the Soviet Union and its Warsaw Pact allies and others.

(e) Intelligence Information Reports, which were reports of information responsive to identified intelligence collection requirements, obtained from various sources including interviews of refugee and defectors.

13. The Committee for State Security of the Soviet Union (Komitet Gosudarstvennoy Bezopasnosti, referred to as the KGB) was the principal intelligence and counterintelligence service of the Soviet Union and was organized into Chief Directorates, Departments and Services. The KGB viewed the United States as the principal adversary, or main enemy, of the Soviet Union, and as the KGB's primary intelligence target.

14. Among the KGB's missions was counterintelligence, which was aimed at identifying and counteracting the threat posed to the security of the Soviet Union by hostile intelligence services, such as those of the United States. This mission required the KGB to obtain intelligence information about the state of adversaries' knowledge about the military preparedness of the Soviet Union and its Warsaw Pact allies.

15. A method by which the KGB obtained intelligence information about its adversaries was to recruit persons having authorized access to such intelligence information to provide it to the KGB, thereby giving the KGB the opportunity to identify, penetrate, and neutralize potential threats to the Soviet Union, and to conduct denial and deception.

16. The Russian Orthodox Church was an organized religious institution within the Soviet Union and had churches and officials, including clergy, both within the Soviet Union and abroad.

17. The KGB exploited the Russian Orthodox Church and its officials, including clergy, in furtherance of the missions of the KGB.

18. Igor Vladimirovich Susemihl, a/k/a Zuzemihl, also called “Iriney,” was a priest of the Russian Orthodox church who served as the Archbishop of Vienna and Austria and Temporary Archbishop of Baden and Bavaria, and later served as Metropolitan of Vienna and Austria, and who resided in the vicinity of Munich, Federal Republic of Germany, until his death in 1999.

19. The defendant GEORGE TROFIMOFF was raised in Germany with Susemihl, who was also the son of Russian émigrés, and TROFIMOFF considered Susemihl to be his “brother.” Beginning during the 1960s, TROFIMOFF and Susemihl met often and maintained a close personal relationship.

20. In or about 1969, after the defendant GEORGE TROFIMOFF became the Chief of the United States Army Element at the Nuernberg JIC, Susemihl recruited him into the service of the KGB.

21. Within the KGB, the First Chief Directorate (FCD) was primarily responsible for foreign intelligence.

22. Within the FCD, Directorate K was responsible for the KGB's counterintelligence mission abroad.

23. KGB officers who had counterintelligence responsibilities often operated abroad from diplomatic missions of the Soviet Union. These intelligence officers worked for Line KR of Directorate K.

24. The Order of the Red Banner is the oldest Soviet award and was presented to citizens and non-citizens for special bravery, self-sacrifice, and courage displayed in the defense of the socialist homeland, including special bravery and courage displayed in accomplishing special assignments, and special bravery and courage displayed in support of the state security of the Soviet Union.

25. Since 1992, the Russian Foreign Intelligence Service (Sluzhba Vneshney Rezvedki Rossii, referred to as the SVRR) has been the successor to the KGB as the foreign intelligence service of the Russian Federation.

B. The Agreement

26. Beginning on or about an unknown date which was at least 1969, and continuing through in or around the spring of 1995, both dates being approximate and inclusive, in the Federal Republic of Germany, the Republic of Austria, and elsewhere outside the jurisdiction of any State or district of the United States, the defendant,

GEORGE TROFIMOFF,

a/k/a George Von Trofimoff,

a/k/a “Antey,” a/k/a “Markiz,”

a/k/a “Konsul,”

did knowingly and willfully combine, conspire, confederate, and agree with various other persons whose names are both known and unknown to the Grand Jury, to knowingly and willfully communicate, deliver, and transmit and to attempt to communicate, deliver, and transmit directly and indirectly to a foreign government, that is, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and to representatives, officers, agents, and employees thereof, documents, photographs, photographic negatives, and information relating to the national defense of the United States, with intent and reason to believe that the same would be used to the injury of the United States and to the advantage of a foreign nation, in violation of Title 18, United States Code, Section 794(a).

C. The Manner and Means of the Conspiracy

27. It was part of the conspiracy that agents, representatives, officers, and employees of the KGB/SVRR would and did recruit individuals who had access to classified information relating to the national defense of the United States to obtain such information and transmit it to agents, representatives, officers, and employees of the KGB/SVRR. The persons recruited to conduct such espionage were called “agents-in-place.”

28. It was further part of the conspiracy that agents, representatives, officers, and employees of the KGB/SVRR would and did pay money - including regular cash payments, bonuses, and special payments - to their agents-in-place, including the defendant GEORGE TROFIMOFF, in exchange for classified information relating to the national defense of the United States, including those documents described in Paragraph 12.

29. It was further part of the conspiracy that agents, representatives, officers, and employees of the KGB/SVRR would and did have meetings in the Federal Republic of Germany and the Republic of Austria with their agents-in-place for the purpose of obtaining classified information relating to the national defense of the United States, and in exchange would give these persons monetary payments and instructions for further espionage activities on behalf of the KGB/SVRR.

30. It was further part of the conspiracy that agents, representatives, officers, and employees of the KGB/SVRR would and did provide to their agents-in-place, and cause their agents-in-place to purchase, obtain, and use, equipment, including, but not limited to, photographic equipment and film, for the purpose of furthering their espionage activities on behalf of the KGB/SVRR.

31. It was further part of the conspiracy that agents, representatives, officers, and employees of the KGB/SVRR would and did cause its agents-in-place to secretly carry classified documents relating to the national defense of the United States, away from the locations where they were supposed to be kept, by utilizing briefcases and bags.

32. It was further part of the conspiracy that agents, representatives, officers, and employees of the KGB/SVRR would and did utilize agents and apparently innocent persons to spot, assess, and co-opt targets for recruitment as agents-in-place, and to introduce those persons to agents, representatives, officers, and employees of the KGB/SVRR.

33. It was further part of the conspiracy that officers and agents, representatives, officers, and employees of the KGB/SVRR and their agents-in-place, and their agents-in-place, would and did use innocuous explanations for their activities on behalf of the KGB/SVRR.

34. It was further part of the conspiracy that the KGB/SVRR would and did protect its agents-in-place through disinformation and other means.

35. It was further part of the conspiracy that the KGB/SVRR would and did assign to its agents code names which were periodically changed. The KGB/SVRR assigned to the defendant, GEORGE TROFIMOFF, the code names “Antey,” “Markiz,” and “Konsul,” and assigned to Igor Susemihl the code name “lkar.”

36. Aleksandr Vasilyevich Blagov, a/k/a “Vlagov,” was a KGB/SVRR officer who operated out of Soviet/Russian diplomatic missions in Europe and maintained contact with Igor Susemihl and others in furtherance of the missions of the KGB/SVRR.

37. It was further part of the conspiracy that agents, representatives, officers, and employees of the KGB/SVRR would and did continue to communicate with their agents-in-place after the agents-in-place had ceased providing intelligence information to the KGB/SVRR, in order to ensure continued loyalty and protection.

38. It was further part of the conspiracy that the defendant, GEORGE TROFIMOFF, and others would and did misrepresent, conceal, and hide, and cause to be misrepresented, concealed, and hidden, the acts done in furtherance of the conspiracy.

D. Overt Acts

39. In furtherance of and to effect the objects of the conspiracy, the defendant, GEORGE TROFIMOFF, did commit various overt acts, including but not limited to, the following: (Unless otherwise stated, these overt acts each occurred between at least 1969 and December 1994.)

(1) GEORGE TROFIMOFF secretly took classified United States documents relating to the national defense away from the Nuernberg JIC.

(2) GEORGE TROFIMOFF secretly photographed classified United States documents relating to the national defense.

(3) GEORGE TROFIMOFF secretly removed and replaced staples in classified United States documents relating to the national defense in order to photograph the documents' contents.

(4) GEORGE TROFIMOFF secretly returned classified United States documents relating to the national defense to the Nuernberg JIC.

(5) GEORGE TROFIMOFF purchased a Minox camera at the direction of the KGB, but “turned it back in” through Igor Susemihl because “it was too dangerous to have.”

(6) GEORGE TROFIMOFF used a double-frame camera to photograph the contents of classified United States documents relating to the national defense.

(7) GEORGE TROFIMOFF made and used a device to place documents while he photographed them, “so the page would fit exactly.”

(8) GEORGE TROFIMOFF possessed two goose neck lamps in 1994.

(9) GEORGE TROFIMOFF purchased film.

(10) GEORGE TROFIMOFF put rolls of exposed film back into their original boxes and glued the boxes shut.

(11) GEORGE TROFIMOFF stored boxes of exposed film at his home until he delivered them to Igor Susemihl or to KGB officers.

(12) GEORGE TROFIMOFF hand carried boxes of exposed film to Igor Susemihl.

(13) GEORGE TROFIMOFF hand carried boxes of exposed film to KGB intelligence officers.

(14) GEORGE TROFIMOFF maintained a regular relationship with and had frequent contacts with Igor Susemihl.

(15) GEORGE TROFIMOFF traveled to Amstetten, Austria, and met with a KGB officer.

(16) GEORGE TROFIMOFF traveled to Zell am See, Austria, and met with a KGB officer.

(17) GEORGE TROFIMOFF traveled to Bad lschl, Austria, and met with a KGB officer.

(18) GEORGE TROFIMOFF traveled to Hallein, Austria, and met with a KGB officer.

(19) GEORGE TROFIMOFF traveled to in or around St. Johann, Austria, and met with a KGB officer.

(20) GEORGE TROFIMOFF met with KGB officer Anatoliy Tikhonovich Kireyev, a/k/a Kireev.

(21) GEORGE TROFIMOFF met with KGB officer Victor Aleksandrovich Chernyshev, a/k/a Tschernyshev.

(22) GEORGE TROFIMOFF met with KGB officer Yuriy Vasilyevich Lysov.

(23) GEORGE TROFIMOFF turned over to the KGB photographs of documents from the JIC which he believed would be of value to the KGB and could not be traced to him.

(24) GEORGE TROFIMOFF received periodic cash payments in Deutschmarks from Igor Susemihl, and from KGB officers.

(25) GEORGE TROFIMOFF received cash bonuses from the KGB.

(26) GEORGE TROFIMOFF received approximately 90,000 Deutschmarks from KGB.

(27) GEORGE TROFIMOFF used an oral recognition signal or statement, called a “parole”, when he met with a KGB officer.

(28) GEORGE TROFIMOFF concealed from his wives his espionage activities and the true nature of the money he received from the KGB.

(29) GEORGE TROFIMOFF failed to report his relationship with Igor Susemihl, to the United States Army, as he was required to do.

(30) In or around December 1994, GEORGE TROFIMOFF and Igor Susemihl told authorities in Germany that money TROFIMOFF received from Igor Susemihl was personal loans.

(31) In or after December 1994, GEORGE TROFIMOFF discarded a tripod.

(32) GEORGE TROFIMOFF was awarded the Order of the Red Banner.

E. Venue

Venue is obtained by Title 18, United States Code, Section 3238.

All in violation of Title 18, United States Code, Section 794(c).

Forfeitures

1. The allegations contained in Count One of this Indictment are hereby realleged and incorporated by reference for the purpose of alleging forfeitures, pursuant to the provisions of Title 18, United States Code, Section 794(d).

2. From his engagement in any or all of the violations alleged in Count One, punishable by imprisonment for more than one year, the defendant shall forfeit to the United States, pursuant to Title 18, United States Code, Section 794(d)(1)(A) and (B), all of his interest in:

a. Property constituting and derived from any proceeds the defendant obtained, directly or indirectly, as a result of such violations; and

b. Property used and intended to be used in any manner or part to commit or to facilitate the commission of such violations.

3. If any of the property described above as being subject to forfeiture, as a result of any act or omission of the defendant:

a. cannot be located upon the exercise of due diligence;

b. has been transferred, sold to, or deposited with, a third party;

c. has been placed beyond the jurisdiction of the Court;

d. has been substantially diminished in value; or

e. has been commingled with other property which cannot be subdivided without difficulty;

it is the intent of the United States, pursuant to Title 21, United States Code, Section 853(p), as incorporated in Title 18, United States Code, Section 794(d)(3), to seek forfeiture of any other property of said defendant up to the value of the above forfeitable property.

All in violation of Title 18, United States Code, Section 794.

A TRUE BILL,

_____________________

FOREPERSON

DONNA A. BUCELLA

United States Attorney

__________________________

WALTER E. FURR, III

Assistant United States Attorney

Chief, Narcotics Section

__________________________

LAURA A. INGERSOLL

Senior Trial Attorney

Internal Security Section

United States Department of Justice