Very broad perspective is really impressive.
It is interesting how to analyze Japans strategic role and ability in Big Politics of the world from the West.
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The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order (English Edition) Kindle版
The classic study of post-Cold War international relations, more relevant than ever in the post-9/11 world, with a new foreword by Zbigniew Brzezinski.
Since its initial publication, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order has become a classic work of international relations and one of the most influential books ever written about foreign affairs. An insightful and powerful analysis of the forces driving global politics, it is as indispensable to our understanding of American foreign policy today as the day it was published. As former National Security Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski says in his new foreword to the book, it “has earned a place on the shelf of only about a dozen or so truly enduring works that provide the quintessential insights necessary for a broad understanding of world affairs in our time.”
Samuel Huntington explains how clashes between civilizations are the greatest threat to world peace but also how an international order based on civilizations is the best safeguard against war. Events since the publication of the book have proved the wisdom of that analysis. The 9/11 attacks and wars in Iraq and Afghanistan have demonstrated the threat of civilizations but have also shown how vital international cross-civilization cooperation is to restoring peace. As ideological distinctions among nations have been replaced by cultural differences, world politics has been reconfigured. Across the globe, new conflicts—and new cooperation—have replaced the old order of the Cold War era.
The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order explains how the population explosion in Muslim countries and the economic rise of East Asia are changing global politics. These developments challenge Western dominance, promote opposition to supposedly “universal” Western ideals, and intensify intercivilization conflict over such issues as nuclear proliferation, immigration, human rights, and democracy. The Muslim population surge has led to many small wars throughout Eurasia, and the rise of China could lead to a global war of civilizations. Huntington offers a strategy for the West to preserve its unique culture and emphasizes the need for people everywhere to learn to coexist in a complex, multipolar, muliticivilizational world.
Since its initial publication, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order has become a classic work of international relations and one of the most influential books ever written about foreign affairs. An insightful and powerful analysis of the forces driving global politics, it is as indispensable to our understanding of American foreign policy today as the day it was published. As former National Security Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski says in his new foreword to the book, it “has earned a place on the shelf of only about a dozen or so truly enduring works that provide the quintessential insights necessary for a broad understanding of world affairs in our time.”
Samuel Huntington explains how clashes between civilizations are the greatest threat to world peace but also how an international order based on civilizations is the best safeguard against war. Events since the publication of the book have proved the wisdom of that analysis. The 9/11 attacks and wars in Iraq and Afghanistan have demonstrated the threat of civilizations but have also shown how vital international cross-civilization cooperation is to restoring peace. As ideological distinctions among nations have been replaced by cultural differences, world politics has been reconfigured. Across the globe, new conflicts—and new cooperation—have replaced the old order of the Cold War era.
The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order explains how the population explosion in Muslim countries and the economic rise of East Asia are changing global politics. These developments challenge Western dominance, promote opposition to supposedly “universal” Western ideals, and intensify intercivilization conflict over such issues as nuclear proliferation, immigration, human rights, and democracy. The Muslim population surge has led to many small wars throughout Eurasia, and the rise of China could lead to a global war of civilizations. Huntington offers a strategy for the West to preserve its unique culture and emphasizes the need for people everywhere to learn to coexist in a complex, multipolar, muliticivilizational world.
- ISBN-13978-1451628975
- 出版社Simon & Schuster
- 発売日2007/5/31
- 言語英語
- ファイルサイズ7268 KB
- 販売: Amazon Services International LLC
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著者について
Samuel P. Huntington was the Albert J. Weatherhead III University Professor at Harvard University, where he was also the director of the John M. Olin Institute for Stategic Studies and the chairman of the Harvard Academy for International and Area Studies. He was the director of security planning for the National Security Council in the Carter administration, the founder and coeditor of Foreign Policy, and the president of the American Political Science Association. --このテキストは、絶版本またはこのタイトルには設定されていない版型に関連付けられています。
レビュー
Henry A. KissingerSam Huntington, one of the West's most eminent political scentists, presents a challenging framework for understanding the realitites of global politics in the next century. "The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order" is one of the most important books to have emerged since the end of the Cold War. --このテキストは、kindle_edition版に関連付けられています。
抜粋
The Clash Of Civilizations and the Remaking Of World Order
On January 3, 1992, a meeting of Russian and American scholars took place in the auditorium of a government building in Moscow. Two weeks earlier the Soviet Union had ceased to exist and the Russian Federation had become an independent country. As a result, the statue of Lenin which previously graced the stage of the auditorium had disappeared and instead the flag of the Russian Federation was now displayed on the front wall. The only problem, one American observed, was that the flag had been hung upside down. After this was pointed out to the Russian hosts, they quickly and quietly corrected the error during the first intermission.
The years after the Cold War witnessed the beginnings of dramatic changes in peoples’ identities and the symbols of those identities. Global politics began to be reconfigured along cultural lines. Upside-down flags were a sign of the transition, but more and more the flags are flying high and true, and Russians and other peoples are mobilizing and marching behind these and other symbols of their new cultural identities.
On April 18, 1994, two thousand people rallied in Sarajevo waving the flags of Saudi Arabia and Turkey. By flying those banners, instead of U.N., NATO, or American flags, these Sarajevans identified themselves with their fellow Muslims and told the world who were their real and not-so-real friends.
On October 16, 1994, in Los Angeles 70,000 people marched beneath “a sea of Mexican flags” protesting Proposition 187, a referendum measure which would deny many state benefits to illegal immigrants and their children. Why are they “walking down the street with a Mexican flag and demanding that this country give them a free education?” observers asked. “They should be waving the American flag.” Two weeks later more protestors did march down the street carrying an American flag—upside down. These flag displays ensured victory for Proposition 187, which was approved by 59 percent of California voters.
In the post-Cold War world flags count and so do other symbols of cultural identity, including crosses, crescents, and even head coverings, because culture counts, and cultural identity is what is most meaningful to most people. People are discovering new but often old identities and marching under new but often old flags which lead to wars with new but often old enemies.
One grim Weltanschauung for this new era was well expressed by the Venetian nationalist demagogue in Michael Dibdin’s novel, Dead Lagoon: “There can be no true friends without true enemies. Unless we hate what we are not, we cannot love what we are. These are the old truths we are painfully rediscovering after a century and more of sentimental cant. Those who deny them deny their family, their heritage, their culture, their birthright, their very selves! They will not lightly be forgiven.” The unfortunate truth in these old truths cannot be ignored by statesmen and scholars. For peoples seeking identity and reinventing ethnicity, enemies are essential, and the potentially most dangerous enmities occur across the fault lines between the world’s major civilizations.
The central theme of this book is that culture and cultural identities, which at the broadest level are civilization identities, are shaping the patterns of cohesion, disintegration, and conflict in the post-Cold War world. The five parts of this book elaborate corollaries to this main proposition.
Part I: For the first time in history global politics is both multipolar and multicivilizational; modernization is distinct from Westernization and is producing neither a universal civilization in any meaningful sense nor the Westernization of non-Western societies.
Part II: The balance of power among civilizations is shifting: the West is declining in relative influence; Asian civilizations are expanding their economic, military, and political strength; Islam is exploding demographically with destabilizing consequences for Muslim countries and their neighbors; and non-Western civilizations generally are reaffirming the value of their own cultures.
Part III: A civilization-based world order is emerging: societies sharing cultural affinities cooperate with each other; efforts to shift societies from one civilization to another are unsuccessful; and countries group themselves around the lead or core states of their civilization.
Part IV: The West’s universalist pretensions increasingly bring it into conflict with other civilizations, most seriously with Islam and China; at the local level fault line wars, largely between Muslims and non-Muslims, generate “kin-country rallying,” the threat of broader escalation, and hence efforts by core states to halt these wars.
Part V: The survival of the West depends on Americans reaffirming their Western identity and Westerners accepting their civilization as unique not universal and uniting to renew and preserve it against challenges from non-Western societies. Avoidance of a global war of civilizations depends on world leaders accepting and cooperating to maintain the multicivilizational character of global politics.
In the post-Cold War world, for the first time in history, global politics has become multipolar and multicivilizational. During most of human existence, contacts between civilizations were intermittent or nonexistent. Then, with the beginning of the modern era, about A.D. 1500, global politics assumed two dimensions. For over four hundred years, the nation states of the West — Britain, France, Spain, Austria, Prussia, Germany, the United States, and others — constituted a multipolar international system within Western civilization and interacted, competed, and fought wars with each other. At the same time, Western nations also expanded, conquered, colonized, or decisively influenced every other civilization (Map 1.1). During the Cold War global politics became bipolar and the world was divided into three parts. A group of mostly wealthy and democratic societies, led by the United States, was engaged in a pervasive ideological, political, economic, and, at times, military competition with a group of somewhat poorer communist societies associated with and led by the Soviet Union. Much of this conflict occurred in the Third World outside these two camps, composed of countries which often were poor, lacked political stability, were recently independent, and claimed to be nonaligned (Map 1.2).
In the late 1980s the communist world collapsed, and the Cold War international system became history. In the post-Cold War world, the most important distinctions among peoples are not ideological, political, or economic. They are cultural. Peoples and nations are attempting to answer the most basic question humans can face: Who are we? And they are answering that question in the traditional way human beings have answered it, by reference to the things that mean most to them. People define themselves in terms of ancestry, religion, language, history, values, customs, and institutions. They identify with cultural groups: tribes, ethnic groups, religious communities, nations, and, at the broadest level, civilizations. People use politics not just to advance their interests but also to define their identity. We know who we are only when we know who we are not and often only when we know whom we are against.
Nation states remain the principal actors in world affairs. Their behavior is shaped as in the past by the pursuit of power and wealth, but it is also shaped by cultural preferences, commonalities, and differences. The most important groupings of states are no longer the three blocs of the Cold War but rather the world’s seven or eight major civilizations (Map 1.3). Non-Western societies, particularly in East Asia, are developing their economic wealth and creating the basis for enhanced military power and political influence. As their power and self-confidence increase, non-Western societies increasingly assert their own cultural values and reject those “imposed” on them by the West. The “international system of the twenty-first century,” Henry Kissinger has noted, “… will contain at least six major powers — the United States, Europe, China, Japan, Russia, and probably India — as well as a multiplicity of medium-sized and smaller countries.”1 Kissinger’s six major powers belong to five very different civilizations, and in addition there are important Islamic states whose strategic locations, large populations, and/or oil resources make them influential in world affairs. In this new world, local politics is the politics of ethnicity; global politics is the politics of civilizations. The rivalry of the superpowers is replaced by the clash of civilizations. --このテキストは、kindle_edition版に関連付けられています。
Chapter 1
The New Era in World Politics
INTRODUCTION: FLAGS AND CULTURAL IDENTITY
On January 3, 1992, a meeting of Russian and American scholars took place in the auditorium of a government building in Moscow. Two weeks earlier the Soviet Union had ceased to exist and the Russian Federation had become an independent country. As a result, the statue of Lenin which previously graced the stage of the auditorium had disappeared and instead the flag of the Russian Federation was now displayed on the front wall. The only problem, one American observed, was that the flag had been hung upside down. After this was pointed out to the Russian hosts, they quickly and quietly corrected the error during the first intermission.
The years after the Cold War witnessed the beginnings of dramatic changes in peoples’ identities and the symbols of those identities. Global politics began to be reconfigured along cultural lines. Upside-down flags were a sign of the transition, but more and more the flags are flying high and true, and Russians and other peoples are mobilizing and marching behind these and other symbols of their new cultural identities.
On April 18, 1994, two thousand people rallied in Sarajevo waving the flags of Saudi Arabia and Turkey. By flying those banners, instead of U.N., NATO, or American flags, these Sarajevans identified themselves with their fellow Muslims and told the world who were their real and not-so-real friends.
On October 16, 1994, in Los Angeles 70,000 people marched beneath “a sea of Mexican flags” protesting Proposition 187, a referendum measure which would deny many state benefits to illegal immigrants and their children. Why are they “walking down the street with a Mexican flag and demanding that this country give them a free education?” observers asked. “They should be waving the American flag.” Two weeks later more protestors did march down the street carrying an American flag—upside down. These flag displays ensured victory for Proposition 187, which was approved by 59 percent of California voters.
In the post-Cold War world flags count and so do other symbols of cultural identity, including crosses, crescents, and even head coverings, because culture counts, and cultural identity is what is most meaningful to most people. People are discovering new but often old identities and marching under new but often old flags which lead to wars with new but often old enemies.
One grim Weltanschauung for this new era was well expressed by the Venetian nationalist demagogue in Michael Dibdin’s novel, Dead Lagoon: “There can be no true friends without true enemies. Unless we hate what we are not, we cannot love what we are. These are the old truths we are painfully rediscovering after a century and more of sentimental cant. Those who deny them deny their family, their heritage, their culture, their birthright, their very selves! They will not lightly be forgiven.” The unfortunate truth in these old truths cannot be ignored by statesmen and scholars. For peoples seeking identity and reinventing ethnicity, enemies are essential, and the potentially most dangerous enmities occur across the fault lines between the world’s major civilizations.
The central theme of this book is that culture and cultural identities, which at the broadest level are civilization identities, are shaping the patterns of cohesion, disintegration, and conflict in the post-Cold War world. The five parts of this book elaborate corollaries to this main proposition.
Part I: For the first time in history global politics is both multipolar and multicivilizational; modernization is distinct from Westernization and is producing neither a universal civilization in any meaningful sense nor the Westernization of non-Western societies.
Part II: The balance of power among civilizations is shifting: the West is declining in relative influence; Asian civilizations are expanding their economic, military, and political strength; Islam is exploding demographically with destabilizing consequences for Muslim countries and their neighbors; and non-Western civilizations generally are reaffirming the value of their own cultures.
Part III: A civilization-based world order is emerging: societies sharing cultural affinities cooperate with each other; efforts to shift societies from one civilization to another are unsuccessful; and countries group themselves around the lead or core states of their civilization.
Part IV: The West’s universalist pretensions increasingly bring it into conflict with other civilizations, most seriously with Islam and China; at the local level fault line wars, largely between Muslims and non-Muslims, generate “kin-country rallying,” the threat of broader escalation, and hence efforts by core states to halt these wars.
Part V: The survival of the West depends on Americans reaffirming their Western identity and Westerners accepting their civilization as unique not universal and uniting to renew and preserve it against challenges from non-Western societies. Avoidance of a global war of civilizations depends on world leaders accepting and cooperating to maintain the multicivilizational character of global politics.
A MULTIPOLAR, MULTICIVILIZATIONAL WORLD
In the post-Cold War world, for the first time in history, global politics has become multipolar and multicivilizational. During most of human existence, contacts between civilizations were intermittent or nonexistent. Then, with the beginning of the modern era, about A.D. 1500, global politics assumed two dimensions. For over four hundred years, the nation states of the West — Britain, France, Spain, Austria, Prussia, Germany, the United States, and others — constituted a multipolar international system within Western civilization and interacted, competed, and fought wars with each other. At the same time, Western nations also expanded, conquered, colonized, or decisively influenced every other civilization (Map 1.1). During the Cold War global politics became bipolar and the world was divided into three parts. A group of mostly wealthy and democratic societies, led by the United States, was engaged in a pervasive ideological, political, economic, and, at times, military competition with a group of somewhat poorer communist societies associated with and led by the Soviet Union. Much of this conflict occurred in the Third World outside these two camps, composed of countries which often were poor, lacked political stability, were recently independent, and claimed to be nonaligned (Map 1.2).
In the late 1980s the communist world collapsed, and the Cold War international system became history. In the post-Cold War world, the most important distinctions among peoples are not ideological, political, or economic. They are cultural. Peoples and nations are attempting to answer the most basic question humans can face: Who are we? And they are answering that question in the traditional way human beings have answered it, by reference to the things that mean most to them. People define themselves in terms of ancestry, religion, language, history, values, customs, and institutions. They identify with cultural groups: tribes, ethnic groups, religious communities, nations, and, at the broadest level, civilizations. People use politics not just to advance their interests but also to define their identity. We know who we are only when we know who we are not and often only when we know whom we are against.
Nation states remain the principal actors in world affairs. Their behavior is shaped as in the past by the pursuit of power and wealth, but it is also shaped by cultural preferences, commonalities, and differences. The most important groupings of states are no longer the three blocs of the Cold War but rather the world’s seven or eight major civilizations (Map 1.3). Non-Western societies, particularly in East Asia, are developing their economic wealth and creating the basis for enhanced military power and political influence. As their power and self-confidence increase, non-Western societies increasingly assert their own cultural values and reject those “imposed” on them by the West. The “international system of the twenty-first century,” Henry Kissinger has noted, “… will contain at least six major powers — the United States, Europe, China, Japan, Russia, and probably India — as well as a multiplicity of medium-sized and smaller countries.”1 Kissinger’s six major powers belong to five very different civilizations, and in addition there are important Islamic states whose strategic locations, large populations, and/or oil resources make them influential in world affairs. In this new world, local politics is the politics of ethnicity; global politics is the politics of civilizations. The rivalry of the superpowers is replaced by the clash of civilizations. --このテキストは、kindle_edition版に関連付けられています。
登録情報
- ASIN : B000R1BAH4
- 出版社 : Simon & Schuster (2007/5/31)
- 発売日 : 2007/5/31
- 言語 : 英語
- ファイルサイズ : 7268 KB
- Text-to-Speech(テキスト読み上げ機能) : 有効
- X-Ray : 有効にされていません
- Word Wise : 有効
- 付箋メモ : Kindle Scribeで
- 本の長さ : 370ページ
- Amazon 売れ筋ランキング: - 1,693位洋書 (洋書の売れ筋ランキングを見る)
- - 1位Dutch History
- - 2位Syria History
- - 3位Communism & Socialism
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トップレビュー
上位レビュー、対象国: 日本
レビューのフィルタリング中に問題が発生しました。後でもう一度試してください。
2023年8月11日に日本でレビュー済み
Amazonで購入
2014年3月27日に日本でレビュー済み
Amazonで購入
いろいろな物の見方のあること、より幅広い考え方をもつことを教えられました。
2009年5月3日に日本でレビュー済み
1996年にSamuel Huntington氏が世に送り出した「文明の衝突」は 国際関係論に大きな影響を与えました。イデオロギーをベースにした超大国による冷戦体制の終焉にあたり、文明、文化圏をベースにした多元的拮抗体制への移行を予見した著者の洞察には感嘆するばかりです。冷戦終了後、東欧周辺で広まった民族紛争(チェチェン、アゼルバイジャン、アルメニア、クロアチア、セルビア、ボニスア)の解説は彼の論理を支持すると共に時事問題の歴史的背景理解の参考にもなります。大局としては、アジア地域の経済的発展、 イスラム圏の人口増加により、近代化で先行し軍事力を背景に勢力を拡大した西洋の相対的競争力の低下を予想。米国の多文化主義に懐疑的、西洋(ヨーロッパ)の将来は米国の西洋文化へのコミットメントに掛かっていると結論付けます。日本については特異な文明として孤立するリスクを指摘も、揺れる文明(Swing civilizations)としてロシア、インドと共に、今後の三大文明である西洋、中国、イスラムとの連携が鍵と見る。彼の予想は、日本はアジアでの成長を享受するため中国との連携を強め、インドは中国の勢力を牽制するため米国(西洋)との連携を強める。文明の大規模な衝突を回避するため、大国の他文明の紛争介入のリスクを警告。異文化との共通項を探り、相互理解を深めることが普遍的文明の向上に繋がるのではないかと結びます。 共通の利害と価値観を共有して初めて成熟した国際社会が成立する、との指摘。これから、文明間の鍔迫り合いを超えて、地球温暖化や気候変動等の世界的危機を機会に変えられないのか。。。
2010年3月11日に日本でレビュー済み
英語の勉強にと読んだ本書。政治学の言葉が多くて難しく、途中の中断期間を経て、2年越しでようやく読了。
内容は、ソ連が崩壊し、冷戦構造が終わったこの世界が、今後どうなっていくのかを、世界を主要な9つの文明に分け、その対立構造から見ていくという地政学の本。イスラム圏と西洋文明の対立構造など、本書が書かれた1998年から後に起きた事件を考えてみれば、先を見越した予言の書であったことがよくわかる。
著者は一文明がいたずらに他の文明に介入することを戒めている。西洋文明の中心地たるアメリカはまさにイスラム文明に介入し、泥沼の苦労を味わっている。まさに本書の予言的価値が感じられる現実だ。
さて、扱いは小さいながらも、日本は、中国などと一緒にされず、一個の独立した文明として扱われているのが嬉しい。ただ今後中国の影響下に置かれるのは避けられないとも書かれている。国民感情として、それはどうかな〜とも思うけど。
とにかく、国際政治を見る目が変わること間違いないしの一冊です。
内容は、ソ連が崩壊し、冷戦構造が終わったこの世界が、今後どうなっていくのかを、世界を主要な9つの文明に分け、その対立構造から見ていくという地政学の本。イスラム圏と西洋文明の対立構造など、本書が書かれた1998年から後に起きた事件を考えてみれば、先を見越した予言の書であったことがよくわかる。
著者は一文明がいたずらに他の文明に介入することを戒めている。西洋文明の中心地たるアメリカはまさにイスラム文明に介入し、泥沼の苦労を味わっている。まさに本書の予言的価値が感じられる現実だ。
さて、扱いは小さいながらも、日本は、中国などと一緒にされず、一個の独立した文明として扱われているのが嬉しい。ただ今後中国の影響下に置かれるのは避けられないとも書かれている。国民感情として、それはどうかな〜とも思うけど。
とにかく、国際政治を見る目が変わること間違いないしの一冊です。
2004年8月17日に日本でレビュー済み
著者の最新刊が話題になっていたので、昔の話題作である本著を買ってみました。
理論を単純化し過ぎという批判もあるのでしょうが、そうした視点を提示することに意義があるでしょうし、その比類ない迫力とスケールに、圧倒されます。
湾岸戦争、イラク戦争といった出来事に接するにつれ感じるのは、自分がいかに現代の歴史について無知であるかということです。大学受験で出題されないからという単純な理由で、主に大正以降の日本と世界の歴史について全く勉強しないまま社会人になってしまった自分ですが、そういう人は多いのでは。
今日世界で起こっていることは、一番近い過去との連続であり、縄文・弥生に強い人は受験戦争は戦えますが、現代を生き抜くことは出来ません。
サッカーアジア杯に於ける中国人の敵意むき出しも、ワートレに飛行機をぶち込んだイスラム教徒も根っこにあるのは概ね同じだと知るに至ると、この本のコワサが身に沁みて、ぞっとします。そうした歴史の流れを踏まえず、さしたる覚悟もなく、「純粋な善意」だけで平和やボランティアを唱える人たちにも是非一読をすすめたいところです。
原著は、専門的な馴染みのない英単語が多いのと1文が長いので骨が折れますが、めげずにとばして読んでいくと、繰り返し繰り返しロジカルに論旨が展開していきますのでその内にわかってきます。学者さんの書く、無駄のない文章というのは、こういうものなんでしょうかね。
理論を単純化し過ぎという批判もあるのでしょうが、そうした視点を提示することに意義があるでしょうし、その比類ない迫力とスケールに、圧倒されます。
湾岸戦争、イラク戦争といった出来事に接するにつれ感じるのは、自分がいかに現代の歴史について無知であるかということです。大学受験で出題されないからという単純な理由で、主に大正以降の日本と世界の歴史について全く勉強しないまま社会人になってしまった自分ですが、そういう人は多いのでは。
今日世界で起こっていることは、一番近い過去との連続であり、縄文・弥生に強い人は受験戦争は戦えますが、現代を生き抜くことは出来ません。
サッカーアジア杯に於ける中国人の敵意むき出しも、ワートレに飛行機をぶち込んだイスラム教徒も根っこにあるのは概ね同じだと知るに至ると、この本のコワサが身に沁みて、ぞっとします。そうした歴史の流れを踏まえず、さしたる覚悟もなく、「純粋な善意」だけで平和やボランティアを唱える人たちにも是非一読をすすめたいところです。
原著は、専門的な馴染みのない英単語が多いのと1文が長いので骨が折れますが、めげずにとばして読んでいくと、繰り返し繰り返しロジカルに論旨が展開していきますのでその内にわかってきます。学者さんの書く、無駄のない文章というのは、こういうものなんでしょうかね。
2002年6月28日に日本でレビュー済み
原文で読んだので難しかったです。こういう専門的な論文は,小説なんかと違って,想像で読める部分があまりないので,結構苦労しました。かなりの英語力が必要だと思いますが,時間をかければ読めます。
2015年3月14日に日本でレビュー済み
Amazonで購入
題名と本の表紙だけの案内で買ったのですが、字があまりに小さく、読量が進みません。
当方77歳、も少し時の大きさなのも案内して下さい。 以上
当方77歳、も少し時の大きさなのも案内して下さい。 以上
他の国からのトップレビュー
André Luiz
5つ星のうち5.0
Simplesmente espetacular!
2023年11月23日にブラジルでレビュー済みAmazonで購入
Faço relações internacionais e sempre quis ler esse livro, pois são recomendados por vários professores. Adorei o livro, detalha bastante sobre as civilizações e do porquê elas agem daquele jeito. O livro é espetacular, super recomendo!!
André Luiz
2023年11月23日にブラジルでレビュー済み
このレビューの画像
Michael Murphey
5つ星のうち5.0
Classic
2023年4月17日にカナダでレビュー済みAmazonで購入
A modern classic, which when paired with Mearsheimer's Tragedy of Great Power Politics, and Spengler's Decline of the West outlines a set of paradigms for our news.
Prof. Dr. Alfons Schröer
5つ星のうち5.0
Ein grundlegendes Buch
2024年4月11日にドイツでレビュー済みAmazonで購入
Der Titel schreckt ab. Vor allem in einem politischen Umfeld, wo wir viel von Diversität und Multi Kulti hören und lesen und dadurch auch beeinflusst werden. Huntington vertritt die These und begründet sie, dass es keine universelle Kultur auf der Welt gibt. Das bedeutet, es bestehen sehr unterschiedliche Weltordnungen und Werteordnungen nebeneinander. Eine universelle Kultur ist zwar denkbar, aber nur dann, wenn es ein universelles "Imperium", eine Art Weltregierung geben würde. In der Realität existieren aber viele Kulturen nebeneinander.
Das bedeutet praktisch, dass eine Kritik an den Verhältnissen in einer anderen Kultur wie zum Beispiel China oder auch Russland überheblich ist. Sie entstammt einem westlichen Verständnis, das ganz naiv davon ausgeht, dass alle Welt nach unserem Verständnis glücklich werden sollen und müssen. Im schlimmsten Fall verbunden mit Drohungen und Sanktionen.
Was interessiert das praktisch? Eine Analyse für Soziologen und andere, aber politisch praktisch wertlos?
Im Gegenteil. Wenn man als ein sehr simples Beispiel die deutsche Politik vertreten durch die Innenministerin bei der Fussball WM in Katar nimmt, dann erkennt man sofort, wie absurd das Verhalten der Ministerin in einem arabischen Land, wo sie Gast war, gewesen ist. Relativ offenherzig - diplomatisch formuliert - und mit einer Armbinde, die die Gastgeber erziehen wollte, ihr Verhältnis zur Homosexualität zu verändern, in aller Öffentlichkeit, das war eine kulturelle Anmassung ohne gleichen und ohne jeden Sinn. Der Westen kann eben nicht davon ausgehen, dass eine islamische Gesellschaft unsere liberalen Vorstellungen übernimmt, er kann noch nicht einmal davon ausgehen, dass diese Gesellschaft das überhaupt toleriert. Wir müssen daher lernen, mit diesen Unterschieden umzugehen. Wir müssen die Welt nicht erziehen. Und wir würden damit auch inzwischen scheitern, da sich die Machtverhältnisse zu Lasten von Europa und den USA deutlich verschieben.
Das bedeutet praktisch, dass eine Kritik an den Verhältnissen in einer anderen Kultur wie zum Beispiel China oder auch Russland überheblich ist. Sie entstammt einem westlichen Verständnis, das ganz naiv davon ausgeht, dass alle Welt nach unserem Verständnis glücklich werden sollen und müssen. Im schlimmsten Fall verbunden mit Drohungen und Sanktionen.
Was interessiert das praktisch? Eine Analyse für Soziologen und andere, aber politisch praktisch wertlos?
Im Gegenteil. Wenn man als ein sehr simples Beispiel die deutsche Politik vertreten durch die Innenministerin bei der Fussball WM in Katar nimmt, dann erkennt man sofort, wie absurd das Verhalten der Ministerin in einem arabischen Land, wo sie Gast war, gewesen ist. Relativ offenherzig - diplomatisch formuliert - und mit einer Armbinde, die die Gastgeber erziehen wollte, ihr Verhältnis zur Homosexualität zu verändern, in aller Öffentlichkeit, das war eine kulturelle Anmassung ohne gleichen und ohne jeden Sinn. Der Westen kann eben nicht davon ausgehen, dass eine islamische Gesellschaft unsere liberalen Vorstellungen übernimmt, er kann noch nicht einmal davon ausgehen, dass diese Gesellschaft das überhaupt toleriert. Wir müssen daher lernen, mit diesen Unterschieden umzugehen. Wir müssen die Welt nicht erziehen. Und wir würden damit auch inzwischen scheitern, da sich die Machtverhältnisse zu Lasten von Europa und den USA deutlich verschieben.
L
5つ星のうち5.0
Bien.
2023年7月17日にスペインでレビュー済みAmazonで購入
Lo pedí en inglés porque me hacía falta para un trabajo relacionado con el tema. Es fácil de entender, está todo bastante bien explicado. Incluye imágenes y gráficas. La letra es más bien pequeña.
Mattia
5つ星のうち5.0
Il libro necessario a capire le dinamiche socio-culturali di questo secolo.
2022年2月14日にイタリアでレビュー済みAmazonで購入
Mi è piaciuto tantissimo, si può considerare pro-America fino ad un certo punto. L'autore era americano chiaro, però le sue idee e le sue opinioni sono espresse in maniera obiettiva ed oggettiva con moltissimi riferimenti a fonti autorevoli ed affidabili quindi non considero questo libro propaganda pro-America ma veramente un capolavoro, un lavoro minuzioso da parte di Huntington nel farci capire le varie connessioni, scontri e alleanza tra le varie civiltà esistenti nel mondo (che lui suddivide in sette).
Consiglio la lettura ai più giovani per farsi un'idea chiara di ciò a cui stiamo andando incontro, e non solo, anche a chiunque voglia approfondire la questione europea degli ultimi 20 anni.
Consiglio la lettura ai più giovani per farsi un'idea chiara di ciò a cui stiamo andando incontro, e non solo, anche a chiunque voglia approfondire la questione europea degli ultimi 20 anni.