

Ethiopia in the New Millennium: Issues of Democratic Governance

Solomon Addis Getahun, Assistant Professor of African and African Diaspora History, Central Michigan University

Abstract

This paper seeks to examine the roots of conflict in Ethiopia. It illustrates how the culture of intolerance and sense of entitlement, especially among the educated elite, has remained an impediment for the development of democratic governance.

Pre-twentieth century Ethiopia, by and large, was a society governed by Judeo-Christian beliefs and norms that revolve around honesty, loyalty, integrity and respect to elders and the law—the common law. However, with the introduction of Western education and the brief Italian occupation, these norms and beliefs were eroded but without a substitute. The country's educated elite, which vies to rule the country, lack a firm grounding in ideas of Western democracy. Yet, it also lacks footing in traditional rules and norms of governance which resulted in a perpetual conflict and disregard for human rights.

Introduction

A year ago, Ethiopians at home and abroad celebrated their new millennium with great fanfare. Its people and the country's leaders are hopeful that the New Millennium is Ethiopia's. They also believe that the New Millennium ushers in a new era in the country's history. In terms of economic development indeed, the country is making progress. New roads, most of them asphalted, are linking the capital, Addis Ababa, with the provinces. The capital can now boast of having a ring road and plans to have a six-lane express highway very soon. Airports that can handle Boeing jets are popping up here and there. The inauguration of manufacturing industries, or that sort, and the investment of millions of dollars by the Chinese, Diaspora Ethiopians, or Ethiopians and foreigners jointly is daily news. Agriculture, which is the backbone of Ethiopia's economy, is being diversified to include hitherto unknown products such as floriculture. So much so, the country's rose production soon might catch-up with coffee to become one of the major foreign exchange earning commodities—emblematic of Ethiopia's rosy future—and might even eclipse Kenya and Uganda (the major African suppliers of roses to Europe and other parts of the world) in rose production and export.¹ The establishment of hospitals, schools and universities are testimonies that signify the strides that Ethiopia is making to catch up with the rest of Africa, and to some degree the world at large. The country even produced its first domestic car, Abay, in October 2007, exactly ninety-nine years after Henry Ford produced the Model T in Detroit on October 1, 1908—though a clear signal of Ethiopia's aspiration in the New Millennium, though it is also unequivocal testimony that indicates the gap between Ethiopia and the developed world.

¹ Bonny Apunyu, "Ethiopia to lead in flower export in Africa, could earn \$600 mln. in 5 years," *Reuters*, March 24, 2007, <http://somalinet.com/news/world/East%20Africa/8847>; Amber Henshaw, "Flower farming blooms in Ethiopia," 25 May 2006, BBC, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/5016834.stm>

Though the Ethiopian Millennium celebration happened a mere seven years after the rest of the world had its, these few seven years seem to translate into hundreds of years when one compares Ethiopia and the advanced West. Thus, Ethiopia needs to run faster to bridge the gap between itself and the West. The catching up is even more evident and earnest in the realms of democratic governance, respect for individual rights and the law, a theme that requires us to delve into some aspects of the country's history in the now past century and beyond.

The Rule of Law in the Yesteryears

Throughout my teen years, I remember that if one uttered the words *behig amilak* (in the name of the law or in the name of God who created the law), *bebandiraw amilak* (in the name of the flag), or *benigusenegesitu amilak* (in the name of the Lord of the King of kings) everyone stopped in their tracks.

My parents used to tell me that an outlaw, *shefta*, who might have killed a person or might have committed treason against the state, could seek refuge in a church or monastery, a story which was also corroborated by foreign travelers and dignitaries that came to Ethiopia.² While surrendering to the church or monastery, the criminal rings the church bell, signaling the secular as well as the spiritual authorities that he has surrendered. The populace referred to such peaceful surrender as *dewulo geba*, he who rung the church bell and surrendered. From there, the *shifta* negotiates, through the church fathers and the elders, *shimagle*, the terms of his surrender to secular authorities or his accusers. Until the accused reached a settlement, he can stay in the church or the monastery, and no one can forcefully take him out from the abodes of the church, even the state!

Until the early decades of the 20th century, it was also customary for an Ethiopian to tie the end of the *kuta*, a toga like cotton cloth that Ethiopians wear, of the accused and go looking for a *nech lebash*, traditional police, an elder of the community, or any man of the law. Until the accuser returns with officials, the accused waits at the spot where the accuser left him/her. From there the law takes its course.³

In pre-20th century Ethiopia, there were no jails and prisons for criminals. Instead, there was what was known as the *quragna* system in which the culprit was handcuffed to the plaintiff's left hand until the latter got his justice. Walter Plowden, the British Consular Officer, reported, "Chaining is not much in use as a punishment...but rather as a precaution against escape...Having no prisons, the right hand of the prisoner is chained by the wrist to the left hand

² Walter Plowden who was British a councilor officer in Ethiopia in the 1850s documented the role of the church as a refugee and arbiter. See *Travels in Abyssinia and the Galla Country with an Account of a Mission to Ras Ali in 1848* (London: Longmans, Green, and CO., 1868), 84-106.

³ Salt attributed the practice of tying the garment of an offender to the high dose of Judaic practices in the daily lives of Ethiopians. See Henry Salt, *A Voyage to Abyssinia and Travels into the Interior of that County: Executed Under the Orders of the British Government in the Years 1809 and 1810* (London: Frank Cass & J. Rivington, 1814), 409-410

of some other person."⁴ Ironically, prisons were the abodes of the relatives of monarchs than petty criminals. the emperor often kept his nearest relatives, sometimes including his sons and daughters, in a mountains stronghold, one of the most known was the Amba Gishen, a highly guarded mountainous stronghold with only one outlet. There, members of the royal family who might potentially usurp power were kept until the death of the emperor or empress. Upon the emperor's death, a messenger was sent to summon the rightful heir to the throne. Of course, the royal prison had every amenity.

In addition to the royal courts where grievances, be it against the state or an individual, were aired and justice sought, it was habitual for Ethiopians to resolve their differences in an open court—a practice prevalent until the brief Italian occupation (1936-1941). The plaintiff and the defendant will designate a neutral party to serve as a judge or go to a judge, *wanber*, and present their case. The process is called *iset-ageba*, "give-take," which implies "if I happen to be at fault, I will accept the judgment and thus pay the penalty (give). But, if my case happens to be just, I am entitled to compensation etc, hence (take)." The process is also known as *tetayeq*, "be questioned". Such litigation is held on a non-working day, often times on a market day so that it will be convenient for the petitioners, the respondent, the judge and the jury. The latter is the public who has come to do business but also enjoys watching the *iset-ageba*. In those days, litigations were not only a means to justice but also an event where oratory, the mastery and use of *semina-werq*, the use of words with double meanings, was exhibited and appreciated. Ray, who witnessed such litigation during his stay in Ethiopia (Addis Ababa) in the 1930s, observed, "The Abyssinian is extremely fond of litigation...impromptu courts are a regular feature of street life...where every man conducts his own case, with the help of friends and witnesses; any passer-by can be called in to act as judge, and the venue of the court is a shady spot...Here one passes number of cases...conducted with a wealth of oratory and a vigor of gesture."⁵

After the open court litigation, if the defendant is found guilty, he is fined based on the amount of money they both proposed such as a bar of salt (*amole*), horses, mules, kilos of honey, wheat etc. A previously agreed sum will also be given to the *wanber* for his service. The latter has no salary except the income he makes from fines by being a judge. Of course, he is also a farmer. He secured the position of a magistrate either through appointment by the local magnate or by the community due to his incorruptible character.

The aforementioned traditions reveal that Ethiopians endorsed and respected the law without the threat and use of force. However, these days, the law seems to work with the threat and use of force, the gun—a reflection of the disconnect and mutual suspicion between the lawmakers and the enforcers (the state), in one hand and the citizens who were supposed to abide by the law, on the other. These days, no one will stop even if after an armed policeman

⁴ Plowden, *Travels*, 95; The practice of the *quragna* system was abolished during *Lij Iyasu's* tenure. See Gebre-Igziabihier Elyas, *Prowess, Piety and Politics: The Chronicles of Abeto Iyasu and Empress Zewditu of Ethiopia (1909-1930)*, Edited and translated by Reidulf K. Molver (Koln: Rudiger Koppe Verlag Koln, 1994), 37; Herbert Vivian, *Abyssinia: Through the Lion-Land to the Court of the Lion of Judah* (New York: Negro University Press, 1901), 244; Bahru Zewde, *A History of Modern Ethiopia, 1855-1974* (London: James Currey, 1991), 121-122

⁵ Rey, *The Real Abyssinia*, 127-128.

commanded someone to stop! In major cities like Addis Ababa, it is not unusual to see, or hear people screaming *yazew! yazew! leba! leba!*, “Catch him! thief! thief! while the policeman chases after and shoots at the alleged thief. On the eve of the downfall of the *Derg*, military officers were heard complaining about how they were unable to stop retreating soldiers even after they begged their soldiers to stop in the “name of the flag or Ethiopia.”

In pre-revolution days, the country's leaders were very accessible and loved. So much so, some emperors like Menelik were referred to with an affectionate name, *Imiye*, Mother while I remember Ethiopians (including myself) calling Haile Silassie *Ababa*, Father. An imperial visit was a time of excitement and joy. We would rush to the site of visitation to see Haile Silassie, to touch him, to be recognized by him. But, our leaders of revolution (1974-1991) and post-revolution years (1991 to Present) were and still are inaccessible. Nobody knows if they have visited a city, a village or a town. If they did, it was done in a clandestine manner. Except for the members of their inner circle, nobody is informed of the impending state visit. No one rushes to see and feel their presence. If he/she attempted, it is on the peril of his/her own death. Their armed escorts and plain-cloth security officers will not hesitate to shoot. We note their presence when all of a sudden access to certain roads is denied to the public and the streets are deserted except for a multitude of soldiers in complete battle gear. Then, people will whisper ‘some authority (official) has arrived’. Or, sometimes the evening news would announce their visit and hence departure. Thus, these days our leaders, rather rulers, are feared by the people. They, too, are scared of the people they rule, it seems.

Why Ethiopians are so suspicious and at times afraid of the state and what caused it? By examining some cultural and political developments that altered the traditional contract between the Ethiopian state and its citizens, the rulers and their subjects, this paper tries to point out some of the major causes for the fallout which in turn resulted in violations of human rights.

Some Basis of Legitimacy for the Ethiopian State: Federalism, Magnanimity and Compromise

Pre-Emperor Hile Sillassie I Ethiopia was essentially a federal state. The *nigusa negast*, king of kings (emperor), whose legitimacy rests on being the descendant of the Queen of Sheba and King Solomon, was king over all other kings in his realm. Except the periodic *gibr*, tribute that the emperor receives from the various hereditary rulers of the provinces or states, his authority over their domain was limited. An attempt to impose imperial authority, without the knowledge and consent of the local magnate, is usually met with stiff resistance. The maximum the king of kings can do was to replace the regional lord by another hereditary notable from the same region and probably from the same family. The allegiance of the people in each province is to the regional ruler who may be a *nigus* (king), a *ras* (head of the army) or a *dejzmach* (commander of the guard). It is through the provincial rulers that the emperor communicates to the people. To strengthen imperial authority, dynastic marriages are encouraged and cemented.⁶

⁶ Donald Crummy, "Family and Property amongst the Amhara Nobility," *The Journal of African History*, Vol. 24, No. 2, The History of the Family in Africa. (1983), 207-220; and "Abyssinian Feudalism," *Past and Present*, No.

On the other hand, regional lords cannot claim the imperial crown even if they are more powerful than the emperor is. Their attempt will be thwarted by a coalition of provincial lords and the emperor. The people and the Orthodox Church, too, will not recognize the usurper. The highest office a powerful regional lord can aspire to was a *bitwaded*, the "favorite of the emperor." The powerful lord, if he cannot have his way in becoming a *bitwaded* or discontented for other reasons, he will look for another person with imperial bloodlines. Such person could be the king's brother who is hungry for power and willing to unsettle his own brother—a phenomenon that was common in Ethiopia between 1769 and 1855 and which was known in history as the *zemen-mesafint*, the Era of the Princes.⁷

Throughout Ethiopia's imperial history, the only exception was Tewodros II (r. 1855-1868), who claimed the imperial throne by force than royal lineage. Even he has to ascribe his success in dethroning the legitimate rulers of the realm on divine intervention, and try and convince the disgruntled Orthodox church clergy, the masses as well as lords alike that his actions were the deeds of the Almighty that felt disgusted with the way things were run in Ethiopia. Once in power, despite his desire to bring the country under one umbrella, Tewodros did not dare replace the hereditary rulers of the various provinces with his own men. He always appointed notables from the locality who, however, accepted his over lordship.

Modern day rulers of Ethiopia that followed Tewodros, though appreciated his efforts in bringing all Ethiopians under one roof, adhered to tradition. Yohannis IV (r. 1868-1889), who was noted for his religious fervor, was always magnanimous in dealing with the regional rulers even after the latter had challenged his suzerainty. When King Tekele-Haymanot of Gojjam conspired with Menelik of Shoa against him, Yohannis sent his army and ransacked Gojjam. Nevertheless, when Tekele-Haymanot pleaded for mercy, Yohannis granted him. Yohannis extended the same mercifulness toward Menelik despite the latter's transience. Not only this, Yohannis let both Menelik and Tekele-Haymanot retained their hereditary fiefdoms and titles.⁸ Menelik II (r. 1889-1913), who was relatively powerful and resourceful than his predecessors and those who succeeded him, respected the autonomy of the provincial hereditary rulers as long as they accepted his supremacy. In provinces where he felt unease about their loyalty, Menelik stationed his army, just in case. Hereditary rulers of re-conquered Ethiopian territories such as *Abba* Jifar of Jimma, Jote of Dembi Dello, Moreda Kumsa of Leqa (present day Neqemte), Shek Khojelle of Assossa were all allowed to retain their title and hereditary territory. In short, despite his military might and success, Menelik recognized and respected their autonomy. Those who opposed his authority and dared to challenge him militarily, such as *Abba* Tona of Walaitta, were badly bruised. Even then, after he defeated Tona and captured him in battle, as tradition demands, Menelik chained *Abba* Tona with a gold chain, and brought him to Addis Ababa. Until

89. (Nov., 1980), 115-138; Gene Ellis, "The Feudal Paradigm as a Hindrance to Understanding Ethiopia," *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, Vol. 14, No. 2. (Jun., 1976), 275-295; Rey, *Real Abyssinia*, 122-124.

⁷ For the era of princes, see Abir, M. *Ethiopia: The Era of the Princes: The Challenge of Islam and the Reunification of the Christian Empire 1769-1855* (London: Longmans, 1968)

⁸ See Zewde Gebre-Sellassie, *Yohannes IV of Ethiopia: A Political Biography* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975), 17-53

his death, *Abba Tona* was in Menelik's palace with all the privileges and honor of a former regional king.⁹ His magnanimity, generosity and willingness to compromise brought Menelik the affectionate title, *immye*, mother. Thus, when the Italians challenged Ethiopia's sovereignty in 1896, Menelik successfully brought the provincial rulers on his side to fight against the Italians. The latter tried to capitalize on the traditional rancor between the center and periphery to defeat Menelik. Unfortunately, for the Italians, it did not happen.

The Breach of Contract between the Center and Periphery: The Legitimacy of the Ethiopian State in Question

Emperor Haile Sellassie's rule (1930-1974), however, was different from his predecessors. Until his rise to power, Ethiopia did not have a standing national army. Every adult Ethiopian was a soldier. Hence, at times of national crisis, the king of kings calls upon the provincial rulers to marshal their 'armies' and join him in a battle against the enemy. A ragtag peasant levy joins the battle with his own weapon such as *dula* (a stick), sword, spear, rifle etc. The soldier also comes with his own ration like *qolo* (roasted beans, chickpeas, wheat, barely), *quwanta* (dried meat like beef jerky), *ccochoero* (dried *injera*) etc. If the soldier finished his ration, he will live upon the people. The latter are expected to provide *mitten*, which is also known as *dirgo* (supply).

By establishing a national army, the Imperial Body Guard, which is armed and paid by the state, Haile Sellassie was able to neutralize the powers of the hereditary rulers of the provinces, and establish an absolute monarchy. In his drive to create a unitary and absolutist state, Haile Sellassie depended on the ideas and support of the European and American advisors and European educated Ethiopian intellectuals of early 20th century Ethiopia.¹⁰ These intellectuals, through their education and experiences in Europe, saw the merits of having an absolute monarchy in Ethiopia and supported Haile Sellassie full-heartedly. This coupled with the help of *Fitawrari* Habite-Giyorgis Dinagide, otherwise known as *Abba Mela* for his Machiavellian skills, Haile Sellassie emasculated potential opponents and the provincial hereditary rulers. Most of them were summoned to Addis Ababa, away from their power base, and kept there so that they cannot stir trouble in the provinces. Meanwhile, unaware of the intentions of Haile Sellassie, their subjects in the provinces did not mind as long as their notables were alive and well. Besides, in traditional Ethiopia, being near to the emperor was an honor. Some of the relatives of the provincial rulers who were alarmed by the situation were "bought" or silenced with imperial promises, often secretly. *Dejazmach* Balcha Abba Nefso of Sidamo

⁹ Such magnanimity against a vanquished enemy was very common prior to Menelik's time as well. When Bezibiz Kassa (Yohannis IV) defeated *Nigus* Tekele-Giyorgis, the latter was chained with gold chain. Yohannis even seated Tekele Giyorgis next to him and allowed him to witness his coronation as Yohannis IV King of Kings of Ethiopia. Marrying the daughter of the vanquished king or notable is another way of absolving animosity and cementing friendship, which is what Tewodros did to *Dejach* Wube of Semen. After defeating Wube, Tewodros married Truworq, one of the daughters of Wube. The latter, though defeated, was also allowed to rule his hereditary fiefdom, See Harold G. Marcus, *The Life and Times of Menelik II: Ethiopia 1844-1913* (Lawrenceville: The Red Sea Press, 1995) and *Haile Sellasse I: The Formative Years, 18892-1936* (Berkeley, 1987).

¹⁰ See Bahru Zewde, *Pioneers of Change in Ethiopia: The Reformist Intellectuals of the Early Twentieth Century* (Oxford: James Curry, 2002)

was a good instance of this. He was compelled to remain in the capital until the Italian invasion of 1936 and his death there after. Those who refused or became reluctant to come to the capital, like *Ras* Gugssa of Begemdir, were liquidated while his cousin, *Dejach* Ayale Birru, was deterred from joining his relative in battle against Haile Sellassie, with territorial promises—Gugissa's province of Begemider.

Haile Sellassie, though farsighted in his modernizing endeavor, was not ambivalent as Menelik was towards his nemesis. His rivals were known to die through mysterious circumstances that often happened after a short period of sickness. A good instance of this was the mysterious sickness of Empress Zawditu immediately after the defeat of her husband, *Ras* Gugisa of Begemider. The then officials, however, ascribed her sudden death to "broken heart" due to her husband's misfortune. *Lij* Iyasu's, Menelik's designated successor to the Ethiopian throne, demise further illustrates Haile Sellassie's uncommon response towards his political enemies. Iyasu, once he was dethroned by decree, was chased from place to place. Upon his capture, he was not accorded the traditional honor, the gold chain, which befits a former emperor. His death in 1936 was also shrouded with mysteries. It was alleged, however, that Haile Sillasse personally saw his execution before he left for Djibouti, to commence his life in exile in England.¹¹

The Italian occupation further accelerated the absolutist drive of Haile Sellassie. Based on ethnicity, the Italians divided the country into Galla, Sidam, Amara, Tigre, Somali etc., and appointed their colonial governors on each entity—very similar to the current administrative division of Ethiopia. Some of the hereditary rulers collaborated with Italians as a payback to what Haile Sellassie did to them. *Ras* Hailu of Gojjam, *Dejach* Ayalew Birru of Samen (North Gondar), *Ras* Mengsha of Tigray were among them. They somehow kept their fiefdoms in return for their loyalty to Fascist Italy.¹² Other hereditary notables such as *Ras* Kassa of Shoa, the son of the brother of Menelik and thus a legitimate claimant to the imperial throne, accompanied the emperor in exile. Men like *Dejach* Balcha, the hero and veteran of the Battle of Adwa, died fighting the Italians in 1936. The regional rulers, though they kept their traditional portfolio under Italian rule, their position was nominal. They had neither their armies nor the authority that they used to enjoy in pre-Italian times.

The aftermath of the Italian occupation was an opportune moment for Haile Sellassie to continue his absolutist drive in Ethiopia.¹³ The hereditary rulers of the provinces, especially those who collaborated with the Italians, were weakened. The populace regarded them as *banda*, collaborators. The only way by which they could keep their hereditary fiefdom was through absolute collaboration with Haile Sellassie submission to his rule.

¹¹ Marcus, *The Life and Times*, 249-281 and *A History of Ethiopia* (Berkeley: University of California, 1994), 104-163; Tibebe Eshete, "A Reassessment of Lij Iyasu's Political Career, with Particular Emphasis upon his Fall," in Melvin E Page, et al (eds), *Personality and Political Culture in Modern Africa: Studies Presented to Professor Harold G. Marcus* (Boston: Boston University, 1998), 163-179

¹² Alberto Sbacchi, *Ethiopia Undre Mussolini: Fascism and the Colonial Experience* (London: Zed Books Ltd., 1985), 129-154

¹³ Bahru, *A History*, 125-219

The *arbegnoch*, patriots and their leaders, most of them, were commoners who rose to the occasion. Thus, they were admired by the people and have their own following while the hereditary rulers who collaborated with the Italians were loathed as *banda*. Yet, the *arbegnoch* did not have a legitimate source of authority except for the recognition they received from Haile Sellassie. Yet the latter, who exiled himself to England during the period of Italian occupation, was suspicious of the *arbegnoch*. Instead, he chose individuals who were in exile, like him. As Richard Greenfield aptly summed, "There was pressure on him [Haile Sellassie] to reward powerful Patriot leaders but he also knew that it might be safer to appoint to high office those who had been in exile with him, for their future more obviously depended upon the stability of his throne . . . Haile Sellassie [also] announced his recognition of preferments [sic] given by the Italians since he could not risk a large number of deprived and aggrieved *shums* [collaborators] taking to brigandage."¹⁴

To make sure, Haile Sellassie integrated armies of the resistance days into the national army while a few of the resistance leaders became officers in the army. A good instance was *Balambaras Abebe Aregay*, who was one of the noted patriotic resistance leaders of Shoa (central Ethiopia) that rose to preeminence in the post-liberation period. He became *Ras*, a general and minister of defense of the Imperial Ethiopian Armed Forces until his death in the 1960 military coup d'état. Some of the prominent leaders of the *arbegnoch* such as Belay Zeleqe of Gojjam, who was the embodiment of trouble to the Italians in Gojjam, refused to recognize the "deserter" emperor, and was hanged in Addis. Others like *Ras Amoraw Wubineh Tessema*, one of the prominent leaders of the patriots of Begemeder and Samen (present-day Gondar) province, was demoted to the rank of *Dejazmach* and brought to Addis Ababa. The *Azmare*, the traditional musicians and performers, who noted the unfair treatment of the *arbegnoch* composed the following:

Ethiopia, my country you are foolish and naïve,
Instead of those who died for you, those who killed [betrayed] you were rewarded

Haile Sellassie, on his part, though had the support of the ever growing Ethiopian intellectuals and some of the *arbegnoch*, his legitimacy was questioned. Some never forgave him for abandoning Ethiopia at a time of her need. Hence, the adage,

A priest who is divorced, broke his vow, can not therefore perform priestly duties,
So is a king who retreated in the face of the enemy can not be a king

Thus, Haile Sellassie's option in consolidating his power rested in his ability to join forces with the *bandas* and the Western educated Ethiopians. The latter, whose eminence in the Ethiopian socio-economic and political horizon depended on Haile Sellassie's good will, served the emperor well—establishing an absolute monarchy—but only for a short while. Consequently, except for Tigray, Gojjam and parts of Wollega, governor-generals who were appointed by Haile Sellassie ruled all the provinces. Even in those provinces where the local magnates ruled, they

¹⁴ Richard Greenfield, *Ethiopia: A New Political History* (London: Frederick A. Praeger Publishers, 1965), 277.

were figureheads. Actual power rested in the center, Shoa, through the appointment of vice governors and other officials. As John Markakis aptly summed,

Within the traditional nobility, the Shoa families have enjoyed preferences by virtue of their affiliation with the ruling dynasty. The term 'Shoa rule,' as used by other groups, refers not only to the provincial origin of the dynasty, but also to the preponderance of officials in the central and provincial administration who came from this province...preference for fellow provincials...is a subordinate factor in recruitment at the center, partly because of the predominance of Shoa Amhara high officials, and partly because long service at the center has weakened the ties of other officials with their home provinces.¹⁵

The Colonial Virus in Ethiopia: I Am Educated & Therefore...

In much of Africa, Western education is the benefit of colonial occupation. The colonial masters of Africa decided to teach Africans partly for filling the lower level bureaucracy with African technocrats. In the meantime, colonial authorities also had to depend on traditional African chiefs to get some measure of legitimacy. As a result, parallel institutions that sometimes competed against each other continued to function under colonialism. However, after the end of the WWI, the Western educated Africans whom the British referred to as the "emergent" African elite and the "*effendi*" class while the French dubbed them the "*evolue*," began aspiring for more power, self-government and independence from colonial rule. On the aftermath of the WWII, the educated elite not only openly defied but also demanded more power than the traditional chiefs because they were educated and therefore more competent and efficient than traditional chiefs.¹⁶

The aspirations of the emergent elite were fulfilled with the demise of colonialism. The latter handed over power to the Western educated Africans. Nevertheless, what the former colonial masters and their African offspring's overlooked was that the newly independent African "territorial" states, as they existed today, are colonial creations and that the masses viewed them as alien institutions and nuisances. Meanwhile, traditional authorities and institutions were so weakened under colonialism, they were incapable of filling the power vacuum created as the result of the end of colonialism. Even if they have the capacity, traditional authorities did not have the desire to perpetuate the colonial legacy. In light of this, the new elite, whose basis of legitimacy is primarily Western education, increasingly resorted to violence to maintain its grip on state power—a highly centralized alien institution. One major consequence was that soon

¹⁵ Markakis, *Ethiopia*, 232, 247; For similar opinion, see Teshome Wagaw, *The Development of Higher Education and Social Change: An Ethiopian Experience* (East Lansing: Michigan State University, 1990), 106

¹⁶ For the circumstances that contributed for the rise African elites, their role during the colonial era, the reactions of the colonial officials and the new elites contribution toward independence in various parts of Africa, See Lucy Mair, "New Elites in East and West Africa," in Victor Turner, Ed., *Colonialism in Africa, 1870-1960, Profiles of Change: African Society and Colonial Rule*, Vol. 3 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1971), 167-212; Peter C. Lloyd, "The Rise of New Indigenous Elite," in Peter Duignan and L. H. Gann, Eds., *Colonialism in Africa, 1870-1960, The Economics of Change*, Vol. 4 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975), 546-563; Martin Kilson, "The Emergent Elites of Black Africa, 1900-1960," in L. H. Gann and Peter Duignan, Eds., *Colonialism in*

after independence most of the newly independent African states plunged into political crisis, civil war and military coup d'états.¹⁷

Ethiopia, which had never been colonized, was not spared of this virus, "I am educated and therefore I demand and deserve power!" The contagion of the virus was the result of two things. Every time Haile Sellassie sent Ethiopian students abroad or when he attended their graduation ceremony, in the civilian as well as military schools, he informed these Ethiopians that they were the "key" players in Ethiopia's future. He also told them that they were the "bridge" between Ethiopia and the outside world. One of the earliest educated Ethiopians observed "we young Abyssinians ... are in duty bound to our country. *We are the bridge that the Emperor has thrown across to European culture* [emphasis added].¹⁸ An American traveler, who came to Ethiopia half a decade before the fateful revolution, had also underlined the role of modern education in climbing the social ladder and the position of the educated Ethiopians in those days. "Their craving for educational opportunities-preferably abroad-rarely signifies a love of knowledge; it usually means that *education is seen to be the only possible route towards an improvement* [emphasis added] in their material and social position."¹⁹ She also indicated that the educated minority were handed "the key to Europe's cultural treasure-chest." In those days, Ethiopian university students, like their African counterparts, were "a pampered section of society," to use the expression's of Leo Zeilig.²⁰

Upon completing their education, Haile Sellassie rewarded them with government jobs that paid them well. So much so, Bahru Zawde, indicated, these foreign educated Ethiopians "do not even wait for their graduation ceremony."²¹ In addition to a government job with a handsome salary, Haile Sellassie even gave his sons and daughters in marriage to some of the educated elite, proving to them that through education anything is possible.²² While the emperor's actions installed the sense of duty and entitlement among the educated Ethiopians, the populace regarded them with awe. It believed in them. So much so, the masses coined a saying, *yetemare yigdelegn*, 'let the educated kill me!'

The honeymoon between Haile Sellassie and the newly educated Ethiopians lasted until the 1960 military coup d'état. After that, the relationship between the two went sour. By this time, the students of the University College of Addis Ababa had established a student council. Through this council, Ethiopian university students were closely affiliated with the Coordinating Secretariat of the International Student Conference, which was headquartered in Leiden, Holland. When the Imperial Bodyguard attempted the December 1960 against the emperor, they

Africa, 1870-1960, The History and Politics of Colonialism, 1914-1960, Vol. 2 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970), 351-394

¹⁷ Leo Zeilig, *Revolt and Protest: Student Politics and Activism in Sub-Saharan Africa* (London: Tauris Academic Studies, 2007), 21-93.

¹⁸ Ladislav Farago, *Abyssinia on the Eve* (London: Fakenham and Reasing, 1935.), 52.

¹⁹ Dervla Murphy, *In Ethiopia with a Mule* (London: Butler & Tanner Ltd., 1968), 147.

²⁰ Zeilig, *Revolt and Protest*, 21.

²¹ Bahru, *A History*, 62.

²² John Markakis, *Ethiopia: Anatomy and Traditional Polity*, 145-146

expressed their support to the coup makers.²³ The 1960s witnessed the independence of many African countries. The newly independent African states were suspicious of their former colonial masters. Yet, they were with little or no alternatives to train a cadre of intellectuals that can serve in the newly established universities, military academies and the bureaucracy. Consequently, some of them looked towards Ethiopia for help. Haile Sellassie was more than willing to offer help. Consequently, many students from the newly independent African countries came to Ethiopia.²⁴ Their presence at the University College of Addis Ababa, later on Haile Sellassie I University, and at Harar and Holeta Military Academies, was a testament to Ethiopia's commitment to Africa and the farsightedness of its "great leader," *talaku meri*. However, the Emperor's action has its downside as well. Soon, Ethiopian students learned, from their African classmates, that their country was in fact medieval for all intents and purposes. Those Ethiopians who returned from abroad further strengthened this view: Ethiopia is a backward country.²⁵

Awareness of Ethiopia's backwardness by the educated Ethiopians was not a new phenomenon. The pre-Italian educated Ethiopians were also aware of this fact. They had written and argued about it on *Aimero* and *Brihanina Selam* newspapers established by Emperor Menelik II and Haile Sellassie I respectively.²⁶ The difference between the pre-Italian Ethiopian intellectuals and those of the 1960s and the later period was that while the former advised the emperors to follow the right path regarding Ethiopia and were willing to work with the emperors, the latter demanded power and the end of the monarchy, traditional authority—like their fellow educated Africans—as a step towards modernization.

Some Cultural Practices that Reinforce Authoritarianism

At least, some of the emergent African elites had been exposed to the ideas and practices of peaceful political discourse, peaceful political demonstration and political association under colonialism. Their Ethiopian counterparts, however, had none of that experience. Political participation was unknown among Ethiopians. The *awaj*, decree, that often made upon the death

²³ For an extensive account and analysis of the 1960's military putsch and the Ethiopian university students involvement, see Richard Greenfield, *Ethiopia: A New Political History* (New York: Frederick A. Praeger Publishers, 1965), 337-452; See also Randi Ronning Balsvik, *Haile Sellassie's Students: The Intellectual and Social Background to Revolution, 1952-1977* (East Lansing: Michigan State University, 1985); Randi Ronning Balsvik, *The Quest for Expression: The State and the University in Ethiopia Under Three Regimes* (Addis Ababa: Addis Ababa University Press, 2007)

²⁴ One of the founders of the military wing of the African National Congress (ANC), Umkhonto we Sizwe, and the former South African president, Nelson Mandela and his colleagues were trained in Ethiopia. During Mengistu's reign, Ethiopia trained thousands of Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) and Zimbabwe African Peoples Union (ZAPU) members and provided scholarship to both members of the ANC, Namibian (SWAPO) and Zimbabwe's freedom fighters. It is unfortunate that there is no work that deals with Ethiopia's role and involvement in Africa's liberation struggle against colonialism or its involvement in the internal affairs of some of its neighbors such as Sudan and Somalia. On Mandela's training in Ethiopia, see Nelson Mandela, *Long Walk to Freedom: The Autobiography of Nelson Mandela* (Boston: Little Brown, 1994), 255-57, 260, 265-267.

²⁵ Balsvik, *Haile Sellassie's Students*, 205-220

²⁶ For an extensive examination of the pre-Italian occupation Ethiopian students, See Bahru Zewde, *Pioneers of Change in Ethiopia: The Reformist Intellectuals of the Early Twentieth Century* (London: James Currey, 2002)

of an emperor or empress is self explanatory for the absence of people's participation in the political process in Ethiopia:

Hear ye...hear ye!
Let Him not deny you ears
It is We who died
It is We who live/d
Merchants shall trade
Farmers shall till the land
Stay where you are! Be calm!

What the above decree tells the people is that "it is we who died, and it is we who live; and hence politics is none of your business. You, the people, are farmers and traders, good enough to be so. Because we died, do not think you will get a chance. Stay where you are and that is where you belong."

The patriarchal order of things was and still is visible in every aspect of Ethiopian life, including food and dining. Henry Salt, who travelled to Ethiopia in the 1810s, expressed his admiration for the skill and knowledge with which Ethiopians shared meat. He further indicated that such refined skill was the result of the necessity that each person should have his meat according to his social position and hence entitlement. He noted, "I may here mention, that the Abyssinian are, in general, very expert in the dissection of a cow, a circumstance owing to the necessity of a very exact division of the several parts among the numerous claimants, who are entitled to a certain portion of every animal that is killed."²⁷ Walter Plowden, who visited Ethiopia almost half a century later, reported, ". . . in slaying an ox, for example, each portion of meat, which, in their fashion of separation, must be a hundred or so, has its particular claimant, such as the wood-cutter, the grass-cutter, the shield-bearer, the singer or minstrel, the butcher, the maidservants, the *gambo* carriers, the *tej*-maker, and numerous others, all which are scrupulously exacted."²⁸ Herbert Vivian, who was in Ethiopia at the turn of the 20th century, remarked, "...what is specially to be observed among the Abyssinians is the way in which they cling to feudal traditions...The older men eat first, then the younger men, then the women, then the men-servant, and finally the female servants."²⁹

Some aspects that relate to child rearing in Ethiopia further illuminate the deeply imbedded cultural practice that hinders the practice of self-expression. For instance, the best behavior for an Ethiopian child is to be meek, humble, and not to talk unless asked. Ethiopian parental belief reflects an emphasis on family, group identity rather than independence and individual autonomy.

Traditional adages such as *kesew merto leshumet, keinchet merto letabot* (only a selected few are worthy of officialdom, so is the finest wood that is chosen for *tabot* [the replica of

²⁷ Salt, *A Voyage to Abyssinia*, 296

²⁸ Plowden, *Travels in Abyssinia*, 58

²⁹ Herbert Vivian, *Abyssinia: Through the Lion-Land to the Court of the Lion of Judah* (New York: Negro University Press, 1901), 216

Mosses' Tablet that is central for Ethiopian Christianity]) This, and saying such as *ketat tat yibelital* (all fingers are not equal), which means all men are not born equal, reflects the entrenched belief in uncontested authority. A glimpse at some of the names of country's modern institutions such as Ethiopian Light and Power *Authority*, Ethiopian Telecommunication *Authority*, Ethiopian Highway *Authority* [emphasis mine], and the title of the officials that run these institutions, *balesiltan*, authority, which is also applied to many government offices, *yebalesiltanu msiryabet*, entails uncontested authority and total submission for that authority. It is undeniable that there are government departments with names like "Ministry of Agriculture" etc. But, the fact that the officials in these structures are referred as *balesilatan* and the fact that such terms are even used in the academia to refer to a professor who had specialized in certain fields as *authority* instead of a specialist, tells us more than the apparent. A student cannot question the professor's work or write on the same topic hat his/her professor had written on. Thus, students are discouraged from working on similar topics and themes that the professor had already done. An attempt at that was considered as an affront to authority than a mere academic exercise—a practice who's roots could be traced back to the traditional institution of education, the church. The latter, in spite of its contribution to Ethiopian history, culture and education, is a very rigid and secretive institution. Church education, which more or less remained, the sole foundation of the pre-20th century Ethiopian education, encourages mimicking than innovation, advocates submission and unquestioning loyalty to authority.³⁰

Terms like *public servant* that could have been used to refer to government officials are non-existent in Ethiopia to this day. Therefore, political office and political participation was a privilege for the chosen few. The masses are not qualified thereby inhibiting popular participation in politics. Consequently, despite Ethiopia's centuries old independence and despite the exposure to Western education, the emergent elite of Ethiopia seem to know only one thing, the culture of the gun, *shiftnet*, which also seems to appeal to them more.

The Culture of *Shiftnet* (Banditry) as a Political Discourse in Ethiopia

Time and again, a series of European travelers who visited Ethiopia at various centuries had indicated the love Ethiopians had for the gun. Herbert Vivian, who visited Ethiopia in late 19th century, wrote that "...If you take man [an Ethiopian] out with you, buy a small thing and hand it to him to carry, he calls a coolie at once. He will carry your gun and as many cartridges as is physically possible, but not a bottle or a roll of cloth."³¹ C. F. Rey, who visited Ethiopia in the early decades of the 20th century, noted "...Fighting might almost be described as the national industry of Abyssinia. They have not only fought against other nations through the centuries, but have fought almost incessantly among themselves. The love of fighting is in the Abyssinian's blood; his earliest ambition even in childhood is to carry a rifle."³²

³⁰ For Ethiopian Orthodox Church structure, education and its role in society, see Teshome, *The Development*, 31-65

³¹ Vivian, *Abyssinia*, 217

³² C. F. Rey, *The Real Abyssinia* (Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott Company, ?), 149

In relation to this love of the gun, which therefore was a status symbol in pre-revolution Ethiopia, defiance to authority and *shiftnet*, was regarded as a mark of *jegninat* (bravery) and *wandinat* (manliness). It was also a means to climb the social ladder until the turn of the 20th century. Regarding this, Vivian observed, "...anybody,'...even the humble individual now addressing you may consider that he has the Imperial crown in his knapsack...I consult with half a dozen friends, and they agree to regard me as their leader. We take our spears and guns and ride out into a village. There we enroll the inhabitants by threats and promises. If I succeed, they shall have money and high official posts, whereas if they refuse to join me, I shall kill them and take everything they have."³³

A *shifta*, excepting Kassa (who was crowned as Emperor Tewodros II), though could never be an emperor, can rise to becoming a *bitwadad*, as long as he proved himself in battle and has mastered a good following. In pre 20th century Ethiopia, such men were co-opted into the ruling hierarchy through marriage, imperial recognition, land grant etc. In return, of course, they had to submit to imperial authority and have to exhibit their unfailing loyalty. While such rewards for rebelliousness and chivalry made the pre-20th century imperial political system open to inclusiveness, it also encouraged the culture of *shiftnet* and violence as means to an end. Emperor Haile Sellassie's attempt to discourage "the culture of the gun" by establishing a national army and rewarding the educated (education) failed in changing the deep-rooted culture of *shiftanet*. While the traditional nobility saw Haile Sellassie's absolutization drive as a power grab and an infringement on its hereditary rights, the educated Ethiopians, on their part, increasingly viewed Haile Sellassie's measure as undemocratic and his style of government an outmoded system inconsistent with the times. The result was the evolution of a hybrid or bastardized culture that combined the gun with Marxism-Leninism which, however, could not differentiate political slogan from principle, and which took or mistook differing political opinion for opposition and an affront.

In addition to the culture of *shiftnet*, the 1960s and 1970s political developments in Africa and the world further encouraged such behavior in Ethiopia. The period witnessed the rise of Marxist-oriented movements in Africa, Asia and Latin America. Chairman Mao Tse-Tung's slogan, "Political Power Grows Out of the Barrel of a Gun" echoed wide and far. With this, the military exploits of revolutionaries like Ernesto Guevara de la Serna, interchangeably known as Che Guevara and Che, and Ho Chi Min in Vietnam captivated the imaginations of the Ethiopian youth.³⁴ By mid 1970s, ashamed of Ethiopia's "feudal" and imperial heritage, and lured by Marxist-Leninist-Maoist rhetoric, educated Ethiopians sought solution for Ethiopia's ills from abroad. They soon established Marxist-Leninist political parties and national liberation fronts that believe in the violent takeover of power. This is exactly what had happened in Ethiopia since 1974. The Provisional Military Government, Coordinating Committee of the Armed Forces, otherwise known as *Derg*, regime that took over power in 1974; and that EPRDF government that followed in 1991. Both took power by force.

³³ Vivian, *Abyssinia*, 237

³⁴ Balsvik, *Haile Sellassie's Students*, 294-295

Despite the establishment of political parties and mass organizations since the 1970s, the lack of democratic institutions and tradition among Ethiopians remained a stumbling block for the development of democratic governance. Though there were signs of liberal tendencies in Haile Sellassie's Ethiopia such as constitutional monarchy, parliamentary system of government, free trade...etc., these were imported ideas. They were not indigenous, as in some other countries, where these traditions were developed through centuries of struggle and experimentation in governance. Therefore, for Ethiopian “intellectuals there were no liberal traditions, values and institutions to which they could succumb to or draw inspiration from; nor were there political institutions developed in liberal traditions to attract them.”³⁵ Hence, it is not uncommon to see Ethiopians agreeing on nine out of ten issues but end-up without doing anything because they could not reach on a consensus. Politics became a zero-sum-game. The prevalent political trend among Ethiopians is “if you are not with me you are against me,” and thus there are no compromises and meeting each other halfway. Political allegiance must be complete. Hence, among the generation of Ethiopians, who tried and still attempt to run the country, Bahru noted, “dissenting opinions were treated with intolerance.”³⁶ Assefa Endeshaw, an activist of the 1970s Ethiopia, concurred:

The current political stance of nearly all groups, whether in power or outside of it, is based, as it has always been, on *destroying everyone else and getting into the hot seat alone* [emphasis added]...On the other hand, the desire to accede to power at any cost rarely leads to creating alliances with similar minded movements or parties...a concerted attempt to join forces with organizations holding similar views and objectives, regardless of their strength or weakness, has not been the practice in Ethiopia. ...All this suggests that Ethiopian political organizations have failed to grasp the rudiments of a democratic struggle.³⁷

The consequence of intolerance to dissenting voice was arbitrary arrest, mass detention, torture and execution by thousands while hundreds of thousands flee the country for the neighboring countries and beyond, seeking refugee.

Conclusion:

The 1960s attempted military coup against Haile Sellassie indicated that the Lion of Judah could be challenged while the 1974 overthrow of his government proved that anyone with a gun could be at the helm of power. With this development, the shards of legitimacy that remained of the Ethiopian state was tossed aside thus opening the gets of office for anyone with guns, better guns. Yet, both the military government (*Derg*) and its opponents such as EPRP, AESM, EPLF,

³⁵ Gebru Mersha, "The Emergence of the Ethiopian 'left' In the Period 1960-1970 as an aspect of the formation of the 'Organic Intellectuals" A Paper prepared for the Conference on the *Ethiopian Left and the Revolution*, May 23-30, (1987), 28.

³⁶ Bahru, *A History*, 226.

³⁷ Assafa Endeshaw, *Ethiopia: Perspectives for Change and Renewal* (Singapore: Seng Lee Press, 2002), 324, 328-329.

TPLF etc vied against each other claiming to be authentic Marxists to legitimize their quest for power. After the demise of the *Derg* and the collapse of the Soviet Union, its main benefactor, Marxist-Leninist ideology became outmoded thereby denying the political opposition the basis of its legitimacy.

Since 1991, both the EPRDF (the current government in power) and its nemesis claimed to be champions of human rights and democratic governance. Yet, the political opposition, both at home and abroad, is very weak, disunited, often morbid in its outlook and intolerant, while the Ethiopian Peoples Revolutionary Democratic Forces (EPRDF) government, on its part, does not seem to leave room for political rapprochement. It is evident that since 1991, the country had registered remarkable economic progress. It is also undeniable that Prime Minister Meles Zenawe's government has one of the most progressive constitutions that the country ever had.³⁸ Yet, there is a mismatch between the constitution and the reality in Ethiopia. As the election of 2005 and a series of reports by Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International reveal, the government needs to do a lot more than having a fine constitution.³⁹ Both the Prime Minister and his party affiliates are not open to ideas other than theirs. It is very common to hear phrases such as *anidina-anid*, one and only one, *bichna-bica*, the sole solution/problem, *yaleqelet*, finished or irreversible, etc by EPRDF officials, which signify the refusal to head alternative ideas and opinions. Political dissention and peaceful opposition to the government is not taken lightly, while nationalist aspirations regarding Eritrea or opposition to its secession were regarded as "chauvinistic." Because of some of the high-handed measures of the government, or because of disillusionment due to unfulfilled promises, there are political groups and national liberation movements such as the Oromo Liberation Movement, the Ogaden Liberation Movement etc that have resorted to violence, armed struggle⁴⁰—following the tradition of the gun. Randi Ronning Balsvik, who keenly follows political developments in Ethiopia, summarized what he witnessed in present-day Ethiopia as follows:

The new regime opened up an entirely new opportunity for the development of an independent press, and it also encouraged religious freedom and the right of assembly...[With EPRDF's ascendancy to power] there was a clear sense of change in a more democratic direction...Many had hoped to see the possibility of a free and fearless development of political culture...However, events would demonstrate that even though everything seemed to be allowed, the reactions to political activism were highly unpredictable. In the society at large it soon became

³⁸ See the "Constitution of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia," *Federal Negarit Gazeta*, Year 1, No. 1, August 21, (1995), 1-38; See also the various proclamations regarding freedom of press, assembly such as "Political Parties Registration Proclamation," *Negarit Gazeta*, April 15, No. 35 (1993), 346-355; "Press Proclamation," *Negarit Gazeta*, No. 8, October 21, (1992), 30-38; "Peaceful Demonstration and Public Political Meeting Procedure Proclamation," *Negarit Gazeta*, Vol. 50, No. 4, August 12, (1991), 12-15.

³⁹ See for instance the reports of Amnesty International USA, between 1995 and 2009, <http://www.amnestyusa.org/all-countries/ethiopia/page.do?id=1011152> and the report of the Human Rights Watch on Ethiopia between the years of 1996 and 2009, http://www.hrw.org/en/search/apachesolr_search/Ethiopia+language%3Aen+tid%3A100?

⁴⁰ "Ethiopia's resilient prime minister: The two sides of Meles Zenawi," *The Economist*, August 13, 2009 http://www.economist.com/world/mideast-africa/displaystory.cfm?story_id=14222265

very clear that there were limits to the freedom of public debate and criticism of the Government. A new press law included clauses allowing the imprisonment of journalists for the loosely-defined crimes...There were also very clear indications that the Government fought steadily against expressions of concerted action in civil society, in the sense that it wanted to control all [activities].⁴¹

In light of the aforementioned realities, I would thus conclude by suggesting that for a better Ethiopia in the New Millennium, Ethiopians need to learn to compromise, to be magnanimous as a victor, to accept defeat gracefully as a "looser" and to appreciate diversity and to think and recognize that there might be other ways than what is espoused. Therefore, though Ethiopia had made significant stride in the realms of economic development in the New Ethiopian Millennium, it did not seem to have changed in the domains of democratic governance, accountability and individual freedom and hence I am inclined to ask, "Are we there yet?"

References

- Abir, M. *Ethiopia: The Era of the Princes: The Challenge of Islam and the Reunification of the Christian Empire 1769-1855*. London: Longmans, 1968.
- Amnesty International USA, <http://www.amnestyusa.org/all-countries/ethiopia/page.do?id=1011152>
- Assafa Endeshaw. *Ethiopia: Perspectives for Change and Renewal*. Singapore: Seng Lee Press, 2002.
- Bahru Zewde. *A History of Modern Ethiopia, 1855-1974*. London: James Currey, 1997.
- _____. *A History of Modern Ethiopia: 1855-1974*. London: James Curry, 1991.
- _____. *Pioneers of Change in Ethiopia: The Reformist Intellectuals of the Early Twentieth Century*. Oxford: James Curry, 2002.
- Balsvik, Randi. *Haile Sellassie's Students: The Intellectual and Social Background to Revolution, 1952-1977*. East Lansing: Michigan State University, 1985.
- _____. *The Quest for Expression: The State and the University in Ethiopia Under Three Regimes*. Addis Ababa: Addis Ababa University Press, 2007.
- Bonny, Apunya. "Ethiopia to lead in flower export in Africa, could earn \$600 mln. in 5 years." *Reuters*, March 24, 2007, <http://somalinet.com/news/world/East%20Africa/8847>
- Crummy, Donald. "Family and Property amongst the Amhara Nobility," *The Journal of African History*, Vol. 24, No. 2, The History of the Family in Africa. (1983): 207-220.
- _____. "Abyssinian Feudalism," *Past and Present*, No. 89. (Nov., 1980): 115-138.
- The Economist. "Ethiopia's resilient prime minister: The two sides of Meles Zenawi." *The Economist*, August 13, 2009, http://www.economist.com/world/mideast-africa/displaystory.cfm?story_id=14222265
- Ellis, Gene. "The Feudal Paradigm as a Hindrance to Understanding Ethiopia." *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, Vol. 14, No. 2. (Jun., 1976): 275-295.
- Farago, Ladislav. *Abyssinia on the Eve*. London: Fakenham and Reasing, 1935.
- Gebre-Igziabiher Elyas. *Prowess, Piety and Politics: The Chronicles of Abeto Iyasu and Empress Zewditu of Ethiopia (1909-1930)*. Edited and translated by Reidulf K. Molver. Koln: Rudiger Koppe Verlag Koln, 1994.
- Gebru Mersha. "The Emergence of the Ethiopian 'left' In the Period 1960-1970 as an aspect of the formation of the 'Organic Intellectuals'" A Paper prepared for the Conference on the *Ethiopian Left and the Revolution*, May 23-30, (1987)
- Greenfield, Richard. *Ethiopia: A New Political History*. London: Frederick A. Praeger Publishers, 1965.

⁴¹ *The Quest for Expression*, 117-118.

- Henshaw, Amber. "Flower farming blooms in Ethiopia," 25 May 2006, [BBC](http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/5016834.stm),
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/5016834.stm>
- Human Rights Watch, http://www.hrw.org/en/search/apachesolr_search/Ethiopia+language%3Aen+tid%3A100?
- Kilson, Martin. "The Emergent Elites of Black Africa, 1900-1960." In L. H. Gann and Peter Duignan, Eds.,
Colonialism in Africa, 1870-1960, The History and Politics of Colonialism, 1914-1960, Vol. 2. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1970. 351-394.
- Lloyd, Peter. "The Rise of New Indigenous Elite." In Peter Duignan and L. H. Gann, Eds., *Colonialism in Africa,
1870-1960, The Economics of Change*, Vol. 4. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975. 546-563.
- Mair, Lucy. "New Elites in East and West Africa." In Victor Turner, Ed., *Colonialism in Africa, 1870-1960, Profiles
of Change: African Society and Colonial Rule*, Vol. 3. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1971.
167-212.
- Mandela, Nelson. *Long Walk to Freedom: The Autobiography of Nelson Mandela*. Boston: Little Brown, 1994.
- Marcus, Harold. *The Life and Times of Menelik II: Ethiopia 1844-1913*. Lawrenceville: The Red Sea Press. 1995.
- _____. *Haile Sellasse I: The Formative Years, 1889-1936*. Berkeley: University of California, 1987.
- _____. *A History of Ethiopia*. Berkeley: University of California, 1994.
- Markakis, John. *Ethiopia: Anatomy and Traditional Polity*. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1974.
- Murphy, Dervla. *In Ethiopia with a Mule*. London: Butler & Tanner Ltd., 1968.
- Negarit Gazeta*. No. 1, (August 21, 1995), pp. 1-38.
- Negarit Gazeta*. No. 35, (April 15, 1993), pp. 346-355.
- Negarit Gazeta*. No. 8, (October 21, 1992), pp. 30-38.
- Negarit Gazeta*. No. 4, (August 12, 1991), pp. 12-15.
- Plowden, Walter. *Travels in Abyssinia and the Galla Country with an Account of a Mission to Ras Ali in 1848*.
London: Longmans, Green, and CO., 1868.
- Rey, C. F. *The Real Abyssinia*. Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott Company, ?
- Salt, Henry. *A Voyage to Abyssinia and Travels into the Interior of that County: Executed Under the Orders of the
British Government in the Years 1809 and 1810*. London: Frank Cass & J. Rivington, 1814.
- Sbacchi, Alberto. *Ethiopia Under Mussolini: Fascism and the Colonial Experience*. London: Zed Books Ltd., 1985.
- Teshome Wagaw. *The Development of Higher Education and Social Change: An Ethiopian Experience*. East
Lansing: Michigan State University, 1990.
- Tibebe Eshete. "A Reassessment of Lij Iyasu's Political Career, with Particular Emphasis upon his Fall." In Melvin
E Page, et al (eds), *Personality and Political Culture in Modern Africa: Studies Presented to Professor
Harold G. Marcus*. Boston: Boston University, 1998. 163-179
- Vivian, Herbert. *Abyssinia: Through the Lion-Land to the Court of the Lion of Judah*. New York: Negro University
Press, 1901.
- Zeilig, Leo. *Revolt and Protest: Student Politics and Activism in Sub-Saharan Africa*. London: Tauris Academic
Studies, 2007.
- Zewde Gebre-Sellassie. *Yohannes IV of Ethiopia: A Political Biography*. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975.

Published by the Forum on Public Policy

Copyright © The Forum on Public Policy. All Rights Reserved. 2009.