by Drew Powers

An advertisement from the University of Washington yearbook, the Tyee, from 1933. Note that the ad mentions that the bank is "strong enough to protect all," an implicit reference to the recent failure of the nation's banks. The banking crisis and state-wide then national closure of banks during the spring of 1933 preserved public faith in American finance and allowed the newly-elected Roosevelt administration and Congress to stabilize the American economic system. Businesses and people across the country found various creative ways to keep business running during the bank closures, relying on a system of checks, credit, and payment slips. (Courtesy of the University of Washington Library, Special Collections)

Just days before Franklin D. Roosevelt's inauguration as President, the United States was in the middle of a banking panic. On March 3, 1933, Washington Governor Clarence Martin closed all Washington State banks and declared a three-day “bank holiday,” working with other state governments to pushing for the passage of a federally mandated bank holiday. The banking system was unable to keep up with the panicked withdrawals that customers were making from their bank accounts, rendering banks incapable of providing money many customers had deposited. With the passing of Washington State Senate Bill No. 185 on March 2, 1933, Governor Martin was able to force a temporary closure of all state banks.

This holiday lasted longer than three days, however, after newly elected President Roosevelt declared a nation-wide bank holiday from March 6th until the 9th, which would later be extended to March 13th. This was a period of economic stress, inability to effectively use earned money, and difficulty in buying goods. Seattle residents' survival tactics during this time provides a window into understanding how the United States as a nation was able to weather the bank holiday and financial panic using checks and credit as currency, exhibiting the interdependence and creativity that the financial crisis required of ordinary people. Nationally, the Roosevelt Administration and Congress’ actions in this period can be seen as one of the most important legislative actions of the Great Depression era, for their management of the 1933 banking crisis preserved American capitalism, gained public credibility for the ability of government to solve the crisis, and set in place a template for future solidification of the American economic system.[1]

The state of American banks in 1933 was unsure, and there was widespread fear, based on previous closures, that banks funds were mismanaged and that hard-earned deposited money could disappear overnight. The American banking system was a patchwork of branch banks, which could share funds and resources across localities, and local unit banks, which were more vulnerable to the crisis. State laws in many states prevented branch banks from developing, making many state’s banks increasingly vulnerable as the 1929 crash reduced customers’ ability to pay back loans. As payment of loans and deposits provided most of the cash flow and backing of American banks, this put banks in constant need of money in order to hand out withdrawals and pay their creditors, leading to bank closures.[2]

Even more, financial mismanagement and elite corruption ruined banks and destroyed public faith in American finance. In December, 1930, the Bank of United States in New York City closed, locking up over $286 million belonging to more than 400,000 people.[3] The problem started with the two heads of the Bank of United States, Bernard Marcus and Saul Singer, purchasing their own bank's stocks with bank funds to drive up prices, giving out tremendous amounts of loans, and using bank assets for their own personal real estate dealings. Upon a semiannual review by the New York State Banking Department, the examiner reported that many of the bank's $70,314,423 in real estate holdings were frozen, that loans to affiliates should be reduced, that the bank should not borrow from the Federal Reserve in order to lend to its subsidiaries, and that loans whose only security was the bank's own stock should be removed.[4]

Marcus and Singer had announced they had a solution to the problem, yet continued illegal operations in order to facilitate a merger and cover their tracks. Eventually their holdings were facing huge depreciation and stocks were selling at $40 per unit. From their loans totaling more than $37 million, they judged that some $9 million were doubtful, $14 million slow, and the other $14 million subject to criticism for being repaid.[5] Marcus and Singer kept this information to themselves, claiming that they could report much larger capital, surplus, and undivided profits to the directors. The bank was having difficulty finding a merger and eventually their difficulties became public on December 10th, resulting in huge amounts of depositors withdrawing their savings from Bank of United States branches.[6] This panic was unavoidable; even with cash being rushed to branches the demand was ceaseless, as people sought to withdraw entire accounts in order to not lose their money.

By December 11, 44,000 depositors had accounts of less than $400, and both Marcus and Singer were sent to jail.[7] As historian Susan Estabrook Kennedy states it in her book, The Banking Crisis of 1933, “the closing of the Bank of United States illustrated that combination of inept management, government timidity, and impersonalization of finance which had brought down more than 5,000 banks during the 1920s and would topple another 5,000 in the first three years of the Great Depression.”[8] This banking crisis sparked fear in depositors all across the nation, causing many people to hoard their cash, even withdrawing funds from financially sound banks. Over the next three years, banks were hit by more and more similar situations like the Bank of United States faced, causing, as Kennedy stated, thousands of banks to go under. Given the national banking crisis at hand, many states were taking matters into their own hands towards the end of Herbert Hoover's presidency in 1933.

By late February 1933, and early March, many states had already closed their banks indefinitely, or had declared a banking holiday, with California announcing a holiday on March 2nd.[9] By March 3rd, 5,504 banks with deposits of $3,432,000,000 had closed their doors throughout the nation, whether permanently or temporarily, by governor-decree. The Federal Reserve Board, on March 3, insisted on banks’ temporary closures and even drafted an order declaring a national bank holiday, but it was dependent on the signature of the President.[10] Hoover refused to agree to the national bank holiday, and the severely damaged yet nationally visible New York and Chicago banks remained open, too afraid to take the blame of closing themselves yet trying to get their state governors to order a closure to avoid bank failures.[11] Because of Hoover's inaction, New York governor Herbert Lehman announced a statewide holiday at 2:30 AM on March 4th, followed by the governor of Illinois.[12] At this point, the crisis was so dire that bankers themselves were pushing for governor assistance, yet many governors were afraid to act without a federal and presidential mandate. Although Hoover had failed to act, governors and bankers began taking their own steps in the hopes of forcing Franklin Delano Roosevelt to mandate closure after his inauguration on March 4th.

The facade of Washington Mutual Bank in Seattle, 1938. Though Washington Mutual weathered the crisis of 1933, they couldn't overcome the Great Recession of the 2000s. Click image to enlarge. (Courtesy of the Museum of History and Industry)

As part of this push, on March 3, 1933, Governor Clarence Martin of Washington State declared a three-day banking holiday. Martin, along with several other state governors, proclaimed these holidays in response to the states that declared holidays out of necessity, and in Washington's case also to give support for California's moratorium, the Pacific coast's chief financial state.[13] In his statement authorizing the bill, Martin stated that although the banks would be legally closed on holiday, other businesses and schools would operate normally. Some banks chose not to take part in the state-wide holiday, like the banks of Walla Walla County.[14] In the Seattle Daily Journal of Commerce, concerned with local and national business dealings, Washington’s bank holiday was compared to Oregon's state action, which was also a three-day banking moratorium. Oregon Governor Meler made some changes to his holiday, however, authorizing Portland banks to limit withdrawals to $25 except for mortgage payments and other emergency needs. However, paychecks, no matter for what sum they were drawn, were being honored by all banks.[15]

After this first day of the Washington bank holiday a March 4th article in the Seattle Daily Journal of Commerce explained how to stimulate Seattle's business during the closure. The article argued that one of the best methods of stimulating business locally would be the issuance of clearing house certificates by banks rather, rather than limiting the amount of withdrawals, as Oregon had done.[16]

Seattle's popular newspapers gave a detailed account of what the Washington-state banking holiday really meant in their March 3rd issues. The Seattle Star explained that the bank holiday in Seattle meant that neither withdrawals nor deposits could be made, and the safety deposit departments would also be closed. For all intents and purposes, the banks would be considered closed and on holiday, while businesses would go on as usual. In addition to making this clarification, the Seattle Star also reassured its readers that the situation needed patience, not hysteria. The author, seemingly fond of metaphors, argued that Seattle needed to sit tight in the boat but keep pulling the oars, and went on to reassure readers about the solidity of Washington’s banking structure. The Seattle Star reported that the Washington moratorium was patterned after similar moves in other states, not because of any weakness in Washington’s banking structure. Seattle's banks especially had kept themselves in strong condition, having the highest degree of liquidity, or the ability to pay in cash, in the country.[17] The Seattle Post-Intelligencer, another local newspaper, reported on the difficulties the closure could produce for businesses that remained open: for example, stores and business houses needing small change to carry on business would have to seek accommodation outside of banks.[18] Yet the Seattle Star maintained its positive stance by saying that upon the banks reopening they will open under regulations dictated by reason, that the banks will be better suited to protect the people. They urged the reader to believe their money would be safer, and their jobs and businesses as well. The article again used the metaphor saying, “This incident proves, again that we are all in the same boat. All right, let's sit tight in the boat but let's keep pulling hard at the oars.”[19] The newspapers exhibited huge patriotic confidence in the government's, and Roosevelt's, ability to solve the banking crisis. Articles like these were important in alleviating any worries readers might have had and to convince them to trust in the country’s ability to weather the crisis.

Aside from the fears of the general public, Seattle merchants and business owners were also concerned about the closure, and they quickly conferred on the morning of Friday, March 2, to make plans for conducting business normally without cash. It was decided that charge accounts in good standing would be continued, and personal checks from customers for the exact amount of purchase would be accepted. Store checks were to be given for change on payroll checks tendered in payment of purchases, but cash refunds were not to be made. Grocers and other food dealers also made plans to take care of the needs of their customers for the holiday, which would last until Tuesday, March 6. The Seattle Star assured the public that utility companies would continue to accept checks in payment of bills, as usual. The articles explained the planning of business leaders yet kept the bank closure in a positive light, arguing that the holiday would give banks time to plan for future business and ensure the safety of all deposits.[20]

The second day of the bank holiday, Saturday, March 4, found Seattle adjusting its business affairs to meet the situation with courage and resourcefulness. Governor Martin made some changes to the holiday rules to alleviate some stress, most notably allowing safety deposit box holders full access to their holdings and making change for users with very large cash bills who could not make change elsewhere.[21] Stores and business houses continued business as usual with private credit taking the place of currency where necessary.[22] The New York Stock Exchange and Seattle Stocks were closed on March 4 as well, in tandem with the bank holidays.

Washington Governor Clarence Martin, a fiscally conservative Democrat, who ordered a state-wide bank closure concurrent with other states across the nation who were seeking to pressure the incoming Roosevelt administration to stabilize the banking system.

Seattle's Retail Trade Bureau chairman, Max A. Silver, announced on March 4th that during the bank holiday large stores in Seattle would operate under certain agreed-upon regulations.[23] First, customers would be asked to give personal checks in the exact amount of the purchase or payment, and that payroll checks or checks of well-known companies would also be accepted on account for purchases, with store checks being given for the amount of the difference. For returned merchandise, credit slips or store checks would be given instead of cash refunds. The stores could not cash checks, money orders, warrants or traveler's checks, but of course, they could accept cash as payment if the customer had it and was willing to spend it.[24] In the case of federal employees it was mentioned that they were to be paid with checks drawn from the United States Treasury and their checks could be cashed at the post office. The Seattle Retail Grocer's Association stated that Seattle's retail grocers had not yet fixed upon any set policy during the bank holiday: larger stores that had a credit business were taking personal checks, but the “cash and carry” stores were only able to rely on customers with cash.[25] In general businesses were able and willing to take checks instead of cash, signaling their faith that the banks would resume regular operations soon. The system was working exceptionally well and businessmen were overall “quite satisfied,” the upbeat Seattle Star reported on March 4th.[26] Newspapers assured the public that local Seattle companies like the Pacific Telephone & Telegraph Co. and the Puget Sound Power and Light Co. were accepting personal checks for their corresponding bills.

One of Seattle's bigger newspapers, the Seattle Post-Intelligencer, pushed a constant message as their solution to the banking crisis: buy American. This message carried over from Hoover's presidency and marked the P-I’s confidence that America's economic situation would improve with increased sales for American industry. The P-I put this “buy American” spin on the Star’s message of positive collectivity, writing of Seattle’s Ford Motor Company that “Every car bought from this plant means nine days' work for some Seattle mechanic. Buy American!”[27] Both the P-I and the Star sought to reassure readers in different ways that if they banded together, they could survive the bank closure and aid the economy.

Inaugurated in the middle of these state-mandated banking holidays, the new President Roosevelt was quick to act on the matter. Roosevelt called a nation-wide four-day banking holiday on March 6, buying time for his advisors to come up with a more long-term solution. In Roosevelt's announcement of the federally mandated bank holiday, he argued that it was necessary because of “heavy and unwarranted withdrawals of gold and currency from our banking institutions for the purpose of hoarding.”[28] Yet it is also likely that Roosevelt’s four-day closure was heavily influenced by the pattern of state-wide bank closures that had taken place at the end of Hoover’s term.

Roosevelt ordered that during the holiday no banks should “pay out, export, earmark, or permit the withdrawal or transfer in any manner or currency, or take any other action which might facilitate the hoarding thereof; nor shall any such banking institution or branch pay out deposits, make loans or discounts, deal in foreign exchange, transfer credits from the United States to any place abroad, or transact any other banking business whatsoever.”[29] Historian Susan E. Kennedy explains the situation, stating that Roosevelt left room in the proclamation for the Secretary of the Treasury, William Woodin, to permit normal or usual banking functions, the issuance of scrip, and creation of special accounts for new deposits where necessary.[30] Roosevelt limited the initial moratorium to four days, but intended to implement it again later, as he correctly thought it would be unwise to suspend banking indefinitely in the first closing.[31]

Roosevelt's administration began planning the solution to the banking crisis immediately after the bank holiday was proclaimed. Initially, scrip—paper currency—was used as a temporary solution to the lack of available cash. The Seattle Post-Intelligencer announced on March 6th that an issue of $25,000,000 in scrip was authorized to be printed in the region, with $15,000,000 printing immediately. Scrip was guaranteed to be accepted by banks, and merchants were told to accept the certificates in lieu of the current currency used in exchange.[32] The newspaper added that once the scrip was in circulation that checks could be cashed in for scrip, and that all business would continue as normal with the use of the new “money".[33]  Even without the issued scrip issued, Seattle's business had carried on through beginning of the state-wide banking holiday. The Seattle Star reported on March 7 that “businessmen generally awaited the issue of scrip eagerly, confident that the certificates would greatly stimulate trade, thinking people will not be so anxious to hoard scrip.”[34]

Seattle newspapers reported on ways that businesses were aiding their employees during the cash shortage and bank holiday. The Seattle Star carried a story describing how Boeing Airplane Co. had purchased 3,000 streetcar tokens and arranged credit for gasoline and groceries for its 1,650 employees, since workers had received paychecks on March 4th that they were unable to cash due to the holiday.[35] The Seattle Daily Times reported that at the Fisher Flouring Mills, the company was ready to cash checks for its employees and had offered car tokens and credit at certain stores. The Ford Motor Company branch in Seattle was also cashing checks for its workers. The Puget Sound Power & Light Company and the Pacific Telephone & Telegraph Company reported they were making cash advances to their employees against money due them on the payroll, sufficient to take care of necessities. The Seattle Daily Times also added that the Western Dairy Products Company had paid its employees by check as usual but that it had offered to cash these checks for employees if needed.[36] Some of Seattle's bigger retail stores, like Frederick & Nelson, The Bon Marche, and Rhodes Department Store, normally paid their employees in cash, and this custom was continued throughout the holiday.[37]

The Seattle Post-Intelligencer also gave reports of businesses that were willing to help the entire community, not just their employees. The Firestone Service Stores, Inc, for example, declared that bank holiday or no bank holiday they would cash checks in the regular order of business, just as they had done in the past, and that they would also accept checks. A Firestone manager was quoted as saying that “we have every confidence in Seattle's banking interests and we will accept checks to the amount of purchase on any Seattle bank. The credit of our customers remains unimpaired at any Firestone Service Store.” Firestone also changed their hours to remain open longer on Sundays, from 8am to 6pm, for the convenience of the community and its customers.[38] Even entertainment industries began to accept checks and IOUs instead of cash, the P-I reported on March 11, as Seattle theaters the Paramount, the Fifth Avenue, the Coliseum, the Egyptian, and the Neptune instituted policies to lessen the impact of the cash shortage on their business.[39]

On Wednesday, March 8th, Secretary of the Federal Treasury William Woodin had begun allowing banks to cash small checks to the amount of $25 on a case-by-case basis if sufficient need could be determined. This was to ensure that no people were put in too dire a situation before the circulation of scrip, which was expected to begin on Friday, March 10. However, it turned out that scrip was never put into circulation in Seattle, and plans for its use were abandoned on Friday, March 10th when Seattle banks decided to file for reopening.

Franklin Delano Roosevelt in Seattle in 1932. President Hoover had refused to mandate a nation-wide bank holiday and thus allow for large-scale Congressional reform to the American banking system. Pushed by local banks and then state governors hoping the new President would act, Roosevelt's administration closed down banks nationwide and developed a strategy for preserving American capitalism and resotring public faith in the American banking system. Click image to enlarge. (Courtesy of the Museum of History and Industry)

Roosevelt signed the Emergency Banking Act of 1933 on Thursday, March 9th, and shortly afterward issued a proclamation extending the holiday indefinitely.[40] With the Emergency Banking Act, Roosevelt announced that instead of issuing scrip, Congress was working on a bill to manage the banks and come up with a longer-term solution. Because the issuance of scrip was abandoned, the nation's twelve Federal Reserve banks were allowed to open on the seventh day of the banking holiday, March 11th, to distribute new money and make loans to approved banks.[41] The Emergency Banking Act not only approved the initial holiday implemented by Roosevelt, but also gave him the power in a time of national emergency to regulate or prohibit operations in member banks of the Federal Reserve System.[42] Under this act, banks could apply for licenses to reopen—as Seattle’s banks did on March 10th—, which would be issued by state authorities if the banks were deemed sound and reliable. State authorities or reserve banks would then review applications, determine if banks were financially sound, and then assure the support of the Federal Reserve through the bank’s reopening period, though the government did not guarantee that it would back bank deposits.[43]

The Emergency Banking Act organized the nation's banks into three categories when determining their soundness and ability to continue business. About 50% of the nation's banks, holding nearly 90% of the country's total resources, were judged to be safe and allowed to reopen by March 15.[44] Forty-five percent of the nation's banks were placed under conservators, or regulations, and were only able to pay out a certain percentage of deposits. These banks were subject to reorganization overseen by the Reconstruction Finance Corporation, while the remaining unstable banks, approximately 5% of the nation’s total, were closed permanently without any plans for reorganization.[45] On Monday, March 13th, banking truly resumed across the United States with the opening of licensed institutions in each of the twelve Federal Reserve cities. These banks opened with full facilities and sufficient supplies of Federal Reserve notes.[46]

Seattle banks, which were opened on March 14th, were faced with a huge amount of deposits, totaling around $20,000,000 on the first day of reopening.[47] Despite previous fears of mass withdrawals, bank customers nationwide seemed to have developed a newfound trust in the national banking system and federal oversight of financial institutions. The Seattle Daily Times reported on Thursday, March 16th, that thousands of banks had reopened without restrictions and that nation's fears should be put to rest by the now-stable banks.[48] Depositing money into the banks had become a patriotic act, signifying confidence in Roosevelt's administration, and a symbolic act of communalism and trust that other Americans would do the same. An article in the Seattle Daily Journal of Commerce depicted this new sentiment with a short fiction. While standing outside a Seattle bank, a man skeptical of the bank’s recovery was shown considering taking out a withdrawal. Though he was reluctant to try, the man “put on his disguise (false whiskers)” and walked up to the banking window. When he whispered to the bank teller, meekly asking for two dollars, the teller gave a broad smile and handed him two dollars from a large stack, with no debate or pause. The story ended with the man admitting that he didn't really need the money and was just testing the banks for their soundness, and announcing his intention to promptly re-deposit his two dollars to show his support of the banking system.[49]

Seattle’s experience was similar to the reactions of the public nation-wide. Individuals responded good-naturedly to the banking holiday, despite the general fear many had of the banks’ financial weakness. Many speculated that if nothing else, suspension of all banking at least gave some respite from the constant and depressing reports of bank failures.[50] People came up with creative ways to conduct business during the holiday: on a Salt Lake City trolley, a pair of trousers paid one man’s fare, Alaskan miners used gold dust to replace small change, a Philadelphia department store allowed customers to charge streetcar tokens on their credit accounts, and the Lewiston, Montana Democrat-News accepted ten bushels of wheat in payment for a year’s subscription. An Oklahoma City hotel agreed to accept payment of guest's bills with “anything we can use in the coffee shop,” resulting in a patron paying with a pig.[51] It seems that despite the lack of cash, few travelers nation-wide suffered from the lack of real money, as railroads accepted checks for passenger and freight charges, and most tourists remained on vacation and sustained themselves by postal money orders and $50 advances from the American Express Company.[52]

For about a month deposits to United States banks far exceeded withdrawals. In the case of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, $18 million was paid out to its member banks, while it took in $27 million.[53] The reopened banks also managed to spark business activity nation-wide, aided by the new circulation of cash and the nation's diminishing fear of spending. Stock exchanges were reopened and stocks rose steadily, with government bonds, corporate bonds, and other basic commodities rising.[54] Though retail reported near-normal business interactions, not all industries were able to pick up their old levels of productivity. The automobile industry and public construction, for example, remained slow and unaffected by the banks reopening.[55] Many banks still needed reorganization and many others were limited by conservators, but the nation was on its way to a recovery from the severe 1933 banking crisis.

Seattle's situation during the banking crisis was similar to many other cities in the United States. Common survival techniques arose as cash became scarce, as businesses and groceries accepted credit and paychecks and gave change in their own company checks. Many larger businesses sought to aid their employees and community during the bank holiday by issuing cash or providing transportation fare.

Though state banks had forced their governors to declare state-wide bank holidays in response to President Hoover’s inaction, making it near-impossible for Roosevelt to do anything other than issue a federal mandate, he was able to move quickly to prevent any extreme damage to the banking system or federal finances, and to prevent a wholesale loss of public faith in the American economy.[56] Indeed, the containment of the banking crisis in 1933 and the creative ways that local businesses and ordinary people developed to survive the crisis and keep business running seemed a good omen for Seattle and the nation’s ability to save the American economic system during the Great Depression.

Copyright (c) 2010, Drew Powers
HSTAA 498 Winter 2010
 

[1] Erik Rauchway, The Great Depression and the New Deal: A Very Short Introduction (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008), 57-59.
[2] Erik Rauchway, The Great Depression and the New Deal: A Very Short Introduction (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008), 30.
[3] Susan Estabrook Kennedy, The Banking Crisis of 1933 (University Press of Kentucky, 1973), 1.
[4] Kennedy, The Banking Crisis of 1933, 2.
[5] Kennedy, The Banking Crisis of 1933, 3.
[6] Kennedy, The Banking Crisis of 1933, 4.
[7] Kennedy, The Banking Crisis of 1933, 4.
[8] Kennedy, The Banking Crisis of 1933, 5.
[9] Kennedy, The Banking Crisis of 1933, 144.
[10] Kennedy, The Banking Crisis of 1933, 144.
[11] Kennedy, The Banking Crisis of 1933, 150.
[12] Kennedy, The Banking Crisis of 1933, 150.
[13] “Here is what the bank holiday really means,” Seattle Star, March 3, 1933, 1.
[14] “Walla Walla County Banks Remain Open, Seattle Post Intelligencer, March 4, 1933, 8.
[15] “All pay checks honored by banks in Portland,” Seattle Daily Journal of Commerce, March 4, 1933, 1.
[16] “To Stimulate Business,” Seattle Daily Journal of Commerce, March 4, 1933, 8.
[17] “Sit Tight in the Boat But Keep Pulling the Oars,” Seattle Star, March 3, 1933, 1.
[18] “Governor Takes Immediate Action Under New Law,” Seattle Post Intelligencer, March 3, 1933, 1.
[19] “Sit Tight in the Boat But Keep Pulling the Oars,” Seattle Star, March 3, 1933, 1.
[20] “Sit Tight in the Boat But Keep Pulling the Oars,” Seattle Star, March 3, 1933, 4.
[21] “Seattle Set for Holiday,” Seattle Star, March 4, 1933, 3.
[22] “Seattle Set for Holiday,” Seattle Star, March 4, 1933, 3.
[23] “Rules for Stores,” Seattle Star, March 4, 1933, 3.
[24] “Rules for Stores,” Seattle Star, March 4, 1933, 3.
[25] “Rules for Stores,” Seattle Star, March 4, 1933, 3.
[26] “Pay Checks Issued,” Seattle Star, March 4, 1933, 3.
[27] “M'Kay Urges 'Buy American',” Seattle Post Intelligencer, March 2, 1933, 5.
[28] Kennedy, The Banking Crisis of 1933, 158.
[29] “The President’s Proclamation,” Seattle Post Intelligencer, March 6, 1933, 1.
[30] Kennedy, The Banking Crisis of 1933, 159.
[31] Kennedy, The Banking Crisis of 1933, 160.
[32] “The President's Proclamation,” Seattle Post Intelligencer, March 6, 1933, 1.
[33] “President Orders 4-day holiday for Banks, Bans Gold-Hoarding,” Seattle Post Intelligencer, March 6, 1933, 1.
[34] “Seattle Banks Ready to Open, Seattle Star, March 7, 1933, 3.
[35] “Boeing Co. Supplies Employees With Food,” Seattle Star, March 4, 1933, 3.
[36] “Seattle Firms Supply Cash to their Employees,” Seattle Daily Times, March 7, 1933, 5.
[37] “Seattle Firms Supply Cash to their Employees,” Seattle Daily Times, March 7, 1933, 5.
[38] “Firestone will Cash Checks,” Seattle Post Intelligencer, March 5, 1933, 11.
[39] “Theatres here accept checks,” Seattle Post Intelligencer, March 11, 1933, 10.
[40] Kennedy, The Banking Crisis of 1933, 177.
[41] “Banking Holiday Extended by Roosevelt; Senate and House Pass Emergency Bill,” Seattle Daily Journal of Commerce, March 10, 1933, 1.
[42] Kennedy, The Banking Crisis of 1933, 177.
[43] Kennedy, The Banking Crisis of 1933, 179.
[44] Kennedy, The Banking Crisis of 1933, 187.
[45] Kennedy, The Banking Crisis of 1933, 187.
[46] Kennedy, The Banking Crisis of 1933, 187.
[47] “Deposits Swamp Seattle Banks,” Seattle Daily Times, March 14, 1933, 1.
[48] “Confidence and Currency Flow Enliven Banks,” Seattle Daily Times, March 16, 1933, 1.
[49] “He Got His Two Dollars, But Today it Goes Back to Bank Where it Belongs,” Seattle Daily Journal of Commerce, March 15, 1933, 10.
[50] Kennedy, The Banking Crisis of 1933, 161.
[51] Kennedy, The Banking Crisis of 1933, 161.
[52] Kennedy, The Banking Crisis of 1933, 161.
[53] Kennedy, The Banking Crisis of 1933, 187.
[54] Kennedy, The Banking Crisis of 1933, 188.
[55] Kennedy, The Banking Crisis of 1933, 189.
[56] Kennedy, The Banking Crisis of 1933, 189.