DICTA´TOR
DICTA´TOR an extraordinary magistrate at Rome. The
origin of the name is obscure, the derivation given by Cicero (
de
Rep. 1.40, 63), “dictator ab eo appellatur quia
dicitur” (cf. Varr.
L. L. 6.61), being impossible,
though historically significant; while the derivation from
dictare, which is evidently etymologically correct,
is hard to connect with the historical use of the term. It is probable that
the word was originally used with a somewhat indefinite sense, especially as
we find it applied to a very different office in some of the towns of
Latium, as, for instance, at Alba, Lanuvium, Cora, Tusculum, and Nomentum
(
Cic. pro Mil. 10, 27). At
Rome this magistrate was originally called
magister
populi and not
dictator, and in
the sacred books he was always designated by the former name down to the
latest times. (
Cic. de Rep.
1.40, 63;
de Leg. 3.3, 9;
de
Fin. 3.22, 75; Varr.
L. L. 5.82; Festus, s. v.
optima lex, p. 198, ed. Müller.)
On the establishment of the Roman republic the government of the state was
entrusted to
two consuls, that the citizens might be
the better protected against the tyrannical exercise of the supreme power.
But it was soon felt that circumstances might arise in which it was
[p. 1.631]of importance for the safety of the state that the
government should be vested in the hands of a single person, who should
possess for a season absolute power, and from whose decision there should be
no appeal to any other body. Thus it came to pass that in B.C. 501, nine
years after the expulsion of the Tarquins, the dictatorship (
dictatura) was instituted. The name of the first
dictator and the immediate reason of his appointment were differently stated
by the annalists. The oldest authorities mention T. Larcius, one of the
consuls of the year, as the first dictator, but others ascribed this honour
to M‘. Valerius. (
Liv. 2.18.) Mommsen
holds that the dictatorship of the latter was the first, but that it was
omitted under the false belief that no one who had not been consul would be
created dictator. Livy states (
l.c.) that a
formidable war with the Latins led to the appointment; and he also found
mentioned in the annals that the consuls of this year were suspected of
belonging to the party of the Tarquins; but in the latter case T. Larcius
could not have been one of the consuls. Dionysius relates at length
(5.63-70) that the plebs, who were oppressed by the weight of their debts,
took advantage of the danger of the republic to obtain some mitigation of
their sufferings, and refused to serve in the army, and that thereupon
recourse was had to a dictator to bring them to their duty. But as Livy
makes no mention of any internal disturbances in this year, and does not
speak of any commotions on account of debts till four years subsequently, we
may conclude that Dionysius has in this case, as he has in many others,
deserted the annalists in order to give what appeared to him a more
satisfactory reason. It is true that the patricians frequently availed
themselves of the dictatorship as a means of oppressing the plebs; but it is
certainly unnecessary to seek the first institution of the office in any
other cause than the simple one mentioned by Livy; namely, the great danger
with which the state was threatened. Modern scholars have stated other
reasons for the establishment of the dictatorship, which are so purely
conjectural and possess such little inherent probability, that they do not
require any refutation. Thus Niebuhr infers (
Hist. of Rome,
vol. i. p. 564) from the Roman dictator being appointed only for six months,
that he was at the head both of Rome and of the Latin league, and that a
Latin dictator possessed the supreme power for the other six months of the
year; but this supposition, independent of other considerations, is
contradicted by the fact, that in the year in which the dictator was first
appointed, Rome and the Latins were preparing for war with one another.
Mommsen, on the other hand, maintains that the inconsistent accounts as to
the origin of the dictatorship indicate that it must have been from the
first an integral part of the republican constitution, and that the dictator
was regarded as
collega maior of the consuls.
Most recent scholars dispute this view (Herzog, 1.128; Willems,
Droit
Romain, p. 267, &c.), which is only an inference, and is
not supported by any ancient authority.
By the original law respecting the appointment of a dictator (
lex de dictatore creando), no one was eligible for
this office unless he had previously been consul (
Liv.
2.18). Madvig's notion that
consulares
legere means “the exconsuls elected”
(
Verf. 1.487) has found little support. We find, however, a
few instances in which this law was not observed, and Mommsen rejects
altogether Livy's vague account of the proposal of this law. (See, e. g.
Liv. 4.26,
48;
7.24.) When a dictator was considered
necessary, the senate passed a senatusconsultum that one of the consuls
should nominate (
dicere) a dictator; but this
decree was not formally necessary, hence Plutarch (
Plut. Marc. 24) is right in saying that the dictator is not
elected by the people nor by the senate. We find, indeed, an instance (
Liv. 4.57) in which the decree of the senate
enjoining the appointment of a dictator was vetoed by the tribunes, and
hence lost all legal force; but the appointment was made. In almost all
cases, however, we find mention of a previous decree of the senate (see,
e.g.,
Liv. 2.30;
4.17,
21,
23,
26,
57;
6.2;
7.21;
8.17;
9.29;
10.11;
22.57). Niebuhr
indeed supposes (
Hist. of Rome, vol. i. p. 567) that the
dictator was originally created by the curiae, like the kings, but this
theory needs no refutation (cf. Mommsen,
Röm.
Staatsr. ii.2 141; Madvig,
Verf.
1.487, note).
The nomination or proclamation of the dictator by the consul was necessary in
all cases. It was always made by the consul, probably without any witnesses,
between midnight and morning, and with the observance of the auspices (
surgens or oriens nocte silentio1
dictatorem dicebat,
Liv. 8.23,
9.38,
23.22;
Dionys. A. R.
10.11). The technical word for this nomination or proclamation
was
dicere (seldom
creare or
facere). So essential was
the nomination of the consuls, that we find the senate on one occasion
having recourse to the tribunes of the people to compel the consuls to
nominate a dictator, when they had refused to do so (
Liv. 4.26). After the battle at the lake Trasimenus, all
communication with the surviving consul was cut off. A difficulty thus
arose, but unfortunately the text of Livy (
22.8）
is corrupt, and it is not possible to determine exactly how it was met. The
best MS. reads
nec dictatorem populo creare
poterat. This has been commonly altered into
populus, but Weissenborn reads
praetor, and Madvig
populo non consulto
senatus. Mommsen (
C. I. L. i. p. 288) rejects
the whole clause, and maintains that a praetor was competent to create a
dictator. The reading in the next clause,
prodictatorem, is due solely to an erroneous conjecture. (Cf.
Herzog, 1.725.) It seems not improbable that a resolution of the senate
empowered a praetor to take the votes of the people as to the selection of
the dictator. Livy (
22.31) seems to regard
Fabius as acting only
pro dictatore. In the
same spirit it became a question, whether the tribuni militum with consular
power could nominate a dictator, and they did not venture to do so till the
augurs had been consulted and declared it allowable (
Liv. 4.21), after which they frequently exercised this power.
The nomination of Sulla by an interrex and of Caesar by a praetor was held
to be contrary to all precedent and altogether illegal. (Comp.
Cic. Att. 9.1. 5) The senate seems
[p. 1.632]to have usually mentioned in their decree the name
of the person whom the consul was to nominate (
Liv.
4.17,
21,
23,
46;
6.2;
7.12 ; 8.17; 9.29; 10.11; 22.57); but that the
consul was not absolutely bound to nominate the person whom the senate had
named is evident from the cases in which the consuls appointed persons in
opposition to the wishes of the senate (
Liv.
8.12,
Epit. 19;
Suet. Tib.
2). It is doubtful what rule was adopted, or whether any existed, for
the purpose of determining which of the two consuls should nominate the
dictator. In one case we read that the nomination was made by the consul who
had the fasces (
Liv. 8.12), in another that it
was decided by lot (4.26), and in a third that it was matter of agreement
among themselves (4.21). In later times the senate usually entrusted the
office to the consul who was nearest at hand. The nomination took place at
Rome, as a general rule; and if the consuls were absent, one of them was
recalled to the city, whenever it was practicable (
Liv.
7.19;
23.22); but if this could not
be done, a senatusconsultum authorising the appointment was sent to the
consul, who thereupon made the nomination in the camp (
Liv. 7.21;
8.23;
9.38 ; 25.2 ; 27.5). Nevertheless, the rule was maintained that
the nomination could not take place outside of the
Ager
Romanus, though the meaning of this expression was extended so
as to include the whole of
Italia. Thus we find
the senate in the second Punic war opposing the nomination of a dictator in
Sicily, because it was outside of the ager Romanus (
extra
agrum Romanum--eum autem Italia terminari,
Liv. 27.5).
Originally the dictator was of course a patrician. The first plebeian
dictator was C. Marcius Rutilus, nominated in B.C. 356 by the plebeian
consul M. Popillius Laenas. (
Liv. 8.17.) The
eligibility of a plebeian to this office seems to have been regarded as a
necessary inference from the Licinian law, which threw open the consulship.
The reasons which led to the appointment of a dictator required that there
should be only one at a time. The only exception to this rule occurred in
B.C. 217, when a resolution of the people created Minucius a colleague with
equal powers to Fabius Cunctator, who was at the time holding the
dictatorship (
Liv. 22.25). Polybius expressly
calls Minucius a dictator, and he is described as such in an inscription
(
C. I. L. i. p. 556). In B.C. 216 after the battle of
Cannae, M. Fabius Buteo was nominated dictator for the purpose of filling up
the vacancies in the senate, although M. Junius Pera was discharging the
regular duties of the dictator. Livy asserts that Fabius resigned on the day
of his nomination on the ground that there could not be two dictators at the
same time. (
Liv. 23.22,
23;
Plut. Fab. 9.) He discharged,
however, the duty of filling up the senate, for which he was appointed; and
Mommsen regards the words put into his mouth by Livy as invented by the
annalists, as a protest against the unconstitutional procedure of the
previous year. The dictators that were appointed for carrying on the
business of the state were said to be nominated
rei
gerundae causa, or sometimes
seditionis
sedandae causa; and upon them, as well as upon the other
magistrates, the imperium was conferred by a
Lex
Curiata. (
Liv. 9.38,
39;
Dionys. A. R.
5.70.) Dictators were also frequently appointed for some special
purpose, and frequently one of small importance, of whom further mention
will be made below. At present we confine our remarks to the duties and
powers of the
dictator rei gerundae causa.
The dictatorship was limited to six months (
Cic.
de Leg. 3.3;
Liv.
3.29,
9.34,
23.23;
Dionys. A. R. 5.70,
10.25;
D. C.
36.17,
42.21 ;
Zonar. 7.13), and no instances occur in which a person held this
office for a longer time, for the dictatorships of Sulla and Caesar are of
course not to be taken into account. On the contrary, though a dictator was
appointed for six months, he often resigned his office long previously,
immediately after he had despatched the business for which he had been
appointed. (
Liv. 3.29,
4.46,
6.29.) His powers also ceased with
the expiration of the term of office of the consul who had appointed him
(Mommsen,
Röm. Staatsr. ii.2
152). As soon as the dictator was nominated, a kind of suspension took place
with respect to the consuls and all the other magistrates, with the
exception of the tribuni plebis. It is frequently stated that the duties and
functions of all the ordinary magistrates entirely ceased, and some writers
have even gone so far as to say that the consuls abdicated (
Plb. 3.87;
Cic. de
Leg. 3.3;
Dionys. A. R.
5.70,
72); but this is not a
correct way of stating the facts of the case. The regular magistrates
continued to discharge the duties of their various offices under the
dictator, but they were no longer independent officers, but were subject to
the higher imperium of the dictator, and obliged to obey his orders in
everything. We often find the dictator and the consuls at the head of
separate armies at the same time, and carrying on war independent of one
another (
Liv. 2.30,
8.29); we see that the soldiers levied by the dictator took the oath
of allegiance to the consul (
Liv. 2.32), and that
the consuls could hold the consular comitia during a dictatorship (
Liv. 23.23). All this shows that the consuls did
not resign their functions, although they were subject to the imperium of
the dictator; and accordingly, as soon as the dictator abdicated, they again
entered forthwith into the full possession of the consular power. (
Dionys. A. R. 5.70;
Liv. 4.27.)
The superiority of the dictator's power to that of the consuls consisted
chiefly in the three following points-greater independence of the senate,
more extensive power of punishment without any appeal (
provocatio) from their sentence to the people, and
irresponsibility. To these three points must of course be added that he was
not fettered by a colleague. We may naturally suppose that the dictator
would usually act in unison with the senate; but it is expressly stated that
in many cases where the consuls required the co-operation of the senate, the
dictator could act on his own responsibility. (
Plb.
3.87.) For how long a time the dictatorship was a
magistratus sine provocatione, is uncertain. That there was
originally no appeal from the sentence of the dictator is certain, and
accordingly the lictors bore the axes in the fasces before them even in the
city, as a symbol of their absolute power over the lives of the citizens,
although by the Valerian law the axes had disappeared from the fasces of the
consuls.
[p. 1.633]（
Liv. 2.18,
29,
3.20;
Zonar. 7.13;
Dionys.
A. R. 5.70,
75; Pompon.
de Orig. Jur. § 18.) That an appeal afterwards
lay from their sentence to the people, is expressly stated by Festus (s. v.
optima lex), and it has been supposed that
this privilege was granted by the Lex Valeria Horatia, passed after the
abolition of the decemvirate in B.C. 449, which enacted “ne quis
ullum magistratum sine provocatione
crearet.” (
Liv. 3.15.) But eleven
years afterwards the dictatorship is spoken of as a
magistratus sine provocatione; and the only instance in Livy
(
8.33,
34) in
which the dictator is threatened with provocatio, certainly does not prove
that this was a legal right; for L. Papirius, who was then (B.C. 325)
dictator, treated the provocatio as an infringement of the rights of his
office. We may therefore suppose that the Lex Valeria Horatia only applied
to the regular magistracies, and that the dictatorship was regarded as
exempt from it. It is more probable that the right of appeal (within the
city) was granted by the third Valerian law
de
provocatione (B.C. 300), which Livy describes as
diligentius sancta (10.10). It is true that these
words cannot in themselves denote any extension of the right of appeal, but
it is not unnatural to suppose that an extension to the only case hitherto
excluded accompanied the provision of more effective securities. In
connexion with the
provocatio there arises
another question respecting the relation of the dictatorship to the tribunes
of the plebs. We know that the tribunes continued in office during a
dictatorship; but we are expressly informed that they had no control over a
dictator, and could not hamper his proceedings by their
intercessio or
auxilium
(Zonaras,
7.15). The few instances which appear
to prove the contrary are to be explained in a different manner, as Becker
has shown (cf. Mommsen,
Röm. Staatsr. ii.2 157). That the tribunes continued in office as
independent magistrates during a dictatorship, while all the other
magistrates became simply the officers of the dictator, may perhaps be
explained by the fact, that the
lex de dictatore
creando was passed before the institution of the tribuneship of
the plebs, and consequently made no mention of it; and that as a dictator
was appointed in virtue of a senatusconsultum, the senate had no power over
the tribunes of the plebs, though they could suspend the other magistrates.
It has been already stated that the dictator was irresponsible; that is, he
was not liable after his abdication to be called to account for any of his
official acts. This is expressly stated by ancient writers (
Zonar. 7.13;
Dionys.
A. R. 5.70,
7.56;
Plut. Fab. 3; Appian,
App. BC 2.23), and, even if it had not been stated, it would
follow from the very nature of the dictatorship. We find moreover no
instance recorded in which a dictator after his resignation was made
answerable for the misuse of his power, with the exception of Camillus,
whose case however was a very peculiar one. (Compare Becker,
Römisch. Alterth. vol. ii. part ii. p. 172.)
In was in consequence of the great and irresponsible power possessed by the
dictatorship, that we find it frequently compared with the regal dignity,
from which, though in theory quite different, it practically only differed
in being held for a limited time. (
Cic. de
Rep. 2.32;
Zonar. 7.13;
Dionys. A. R. 5.70,
73; Appian,
App.
BC 1.99;
Tac. Ann. 1.1.) There
were, however, a few limits to the power of the dictator. 1. The most
important was that the period of his office was only six months. 2. He had
not power over the treasury, but could only make use of the money which was
granted him by the senate. (
Zonar. 7.13.) 3. He
was not allowed to leave Italy, since he might in that case easily become
dangerous to the republic (
D. C. 36.17); though
the case of Atilius Calatinus in the first Punic war forms an exception to
this rule. (
Liv. Epit. 19.) 4. He was not
allowed to ride on horseback at Rome, without previously obtaining the
permission of the people (
Liv. 23.14;
Zonar. 7.13); a regulation apparently capricious,
but perhaps adopted that he might not bear too great a resemblance to the
kings, who were accustomed to ride. Mommsen finds in this curious limitation
an indication of his special function as commander of the infantry (
magister populi).
The insignia of the dictator were nearly the same as those of the kings in
earlier times, and of the consuls subsequently. Instead however of having
only twelve lictors, as was the case with the consuls, he was preceded by
twenty-four bearing the axes as well as the fasces. The
sella curulis and
toga praetexta
also belonged to the dictator. (
Plb. 3.87 ;
Dionys. A. R. 10.24;
Plut. Fab. 4; Appian,
App. BC 1.100;
D. C. 54.1.)
The preceding account of the dictatorship applies more particularly to the
dictator rei gerundae causa; but dictators
were also frequently appointed, especially when the consuls were absent from
the city, to perform certain acts which could not be done by any inferior
magistrate. These dictators had little more than the name; and as they were
only appointed to discharge a particular duty, they had to resign
immediately that duty was performed, and they were not entitled to exercise
the power of their office in reference to any other matter than the one for
which they were nominated. The occasions on which such dictators were
appointed, were principally:--1. For the purpose of holding the comitia for
the elections (
comitiorum habendorum causa),
first in B.C. 351 (
Liv. 7.22) and frequently
afterwards. 2. For fixing the
clavus annalis in
the temple of Jupiter (
clavi figendi causa) in
times of pestilence or civil discord, because the law said that this
ceremony was to be performed by the
praetor
maximus, and after the institution of the dictatorship the latter
was regarded as the highest magistracy in the state (
Liv.
7.3). 3. For appointing holidays (
feriarum
constituendarum causa) on the appearance of prodigies (
Liv. 7.28), and for officiating at the public games
(
ludorum faciendorum causa), the presidency
of which belonged to the consuls or praetors (8.40, 9.34). 4. For holding
trials (
quaestionibus exercendis, 9.36), though
Mommsen doubts whether this was not an appointment
rei
gerundae causa, as it is described in the Capitoline
Fasti. 5. And on one occasion, for filling up
vacancies in the senate (
legendo senatui,
23.22).
Along with the dictator there was always a
magister
equitum, the nomination of whom was left to the choice of the
dictator, unless the senatusconsultum specified, as was sometimes
[p. 1.634]the case, the name of the person who was to be
appointed (
Liv. 8.17;
22.57). The magister equitum had, like the dictator, to receive the
imperium by a lex curiata (
Liv. 9.38). The
dictator could not be without a magister equitum, and, consequently, if the
latter died during the six months of the dictatorship, another had to be
nominated in his stead. The magister equitum was subject to the imperium of
the dictator, but in the absence of his superior he became his
representative, and exercised the same powers as the dictator. In B.C. 217,
shortly before legal dictators ceased to be appointed, we find an instance
of a magister equitum being invested with an imperium equal to that of the
dictator, so that there were then virtually two dictators, but this is
expressly mentioned as an anomaly, which had never occurred before (
Plb. 3.103,
106). The
rank which the magister equitum held among the other Roman magistrates is
doubtful. Niebuhr asserts (vol. ii. p. 390), “No one ever supposed
that his office was a curule one;” and if he is right in
supposing that the consular tribunate was not a curule office, his view is
supported by the contention of a dictator in Livy, that the imperium of the
magister equitum was not superior to that of a consular tribune (6.39).
Cicero on the contrary places the magister equitum on a par with the praetor
(
de Leg. 3.3, 9), and Mommsen holds that he probably had
the curule chair, and certainly the
praetexta
and six lictors. After the establishment of the praetorship, it seems to
have been considered necessary that the person who was to be nominated
magister equitum should previously have been praetor, just as the dictator,
according to the old law, had to be chosen from the consulars (
D. C. 42.21). Accordingly, we find at a later
time that the magister equitum had the insignia of a praetor (
D. C. 42.27). The magister equitum was
originally, as his name imports, the commander of the cavalry, while the
dictator was at the head of the legions, the infantry (
Liv. 3.27), and the relation between them was in this respect
similar to that which subsisted between the king and the tribunus celerum.
Dictators were only appointed so long as the Romans had to carry on wars in
Italy. A solitary instance occurs in the first Punic war of the nomination
of a dictator for the purpose of carrying on war out of Italy (
Liv. Epit. 19); but this was never repeated,
because, as has been already remarked, it was feared that so great a power
might become dangerous at a distance from Rome. But after the battle of
Trasimene in B.C. 217, when Rome itself was threatened by Hannibal, recourse
was again had to a dictator, and Q. Fabius Maximus was appointed to the
office. In the next year, B.C. 216, after the battle of Cannae, M. Junius
Pera was also nominated dictator, but this was the last instance of the
appointment of a
dictator rei
gerundae causa. From that time dictators were
frequently appointed for holding the elections down to B.C. 202, but from
that year the dictatorship disappears altogether. After a lapse of 120
years, Sulla caused himself to be appointed dictator in B.C. 82,
reipublicae constituendae causa (
Vell. 2.28); but, as Niebuhr remarks, “the
title was a mere name, without any ground for such a use in the ancient
constitution.” Neither the magistrate (
interrex) who nominated him, nor the time for which he was
appointed, nor the extent and exercise of his power, was in accordance with
the ancient laws and precedents; and the same was the case with the
dictatorship of Caesar. Soon after Caesar's death the dictatorship was
abolished for ever by a lex proposed by the consul Antonius (
Cic. Phil. 1.1;
Liv.
Epit. 116;
D. C. 44.51). The title
indeed was offered to Augustus, but he resolutely refused it in consequence
of the odium attached to it from the tyranny of Sulla when dictator (
Suet. Aug. 52).
Sometimes a substitute was invented for the dictatorship, whenever the
circumstances of the republic required the adoption of extraordinary
measures, by the senate investing the consuls with dictatorial power. This
was done by the formula,
Videant or
dent operam consules, ne quid respublica detrimenti
capiat. We find instances of this in the earliest time of the
republic (
Liv. 3.4,
6.19), as well as later; as, for instance, in the case of Cicero
(Sall.
Cat. 29;
Plut. Cic.
14). Sometimes this power was granted to other magistrates in
addition to the consuls (Caes.
B.C. 1.5;
Cic. Rabir. perd. 7).
(Becker,
Röm. Alterth. ii. part 2.150 foll.,
supplemented from recent authorities, especially Mommsen,
Röm. Staatsr. 2.133-172.)
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