Page 144

Frame 112206, serial 103

VERY URGENT

Moscow, June 4, 1940-12:25 a. m.

Received June 4, 1940-5:15 a. m.

No. 1063 of June 3

Molotov informed me today that Ambassador von Mackensen had stated to the Soviet Chargé in Rome around May 25-in connection with the apparently imminent Italian entrance into the war-that all problems in the Balkans are to be solved without war, i. e., by mutual cooperation among Germany, the Soviet Union, and Italy.

Molotov requested information as to whether this statement by Mackensen actually reflected the opinion of the Reich Government and the Italian Government.

Telegraphic instruction is requested.

SCHULENBURG

Frame 112208, serial 103

VERY URGENT

Moscow, June 6, 1940-3:55 p. m.

Received June 6, 1940-6:30 p. m.

No. 1079 of June 6

Reference your telegram of June 5, No. 938. [67]

In the conference on June 3, Molotov only asked for information without showing any intention of wanting to bind the German or Italian Government on any point. On the other hand, he showed clearly that the Soviet Government would be very pleased if Herr von Mackensen's statement reflected not only his personal opinion but actually the interpretation of the German and Italian Governments. The question as to how possible cooperation among the three in the Balkans would work out practically was not broached by Herr Molotov.

SCHULENBURG

[67] Not printed.

Page 145

Frames 334518-334519, serial 1228

IMMEDIATE

BERLIN, June 8, 1940.

CONFIDENTIAL (ALSO IN THE REICH)

Pol. V 1581g

Subject: Hetman Skoropadsky's contemplated visit with the Reich Protector.

Reference your report of May 27, 1940-5769/D.Pol.5. [68]

In view of German-Soviet relations, it appears advisable to avoid anything which would be likely to arouse the Soviet Government's distrust in the Ukranian question. Accordingly, the Foreign Office attaches importance to having the Ukrainian organizations in Greater Germany carry on no political activities. This also applies to former Hetman Skoropadsky and his movement. The importance of the Hetman Movement has declined lately, to be sure, in favor of the Ukrainian National Organization (U. N. O.), which was promoted by the competent German internal authorities, [69] but even now the Hetman still has numerous adherents at his disposition outside Germany, especially in the United States and Canada, where several thousand Ukrainians have pledged their oath of allegiance to him and recognize his family as the hereditary dynasty.

The Foreign Office and the Gestapo are continuously in contact with the Hetman, who has always maintained a loyal attitude toward Germany. To assure him and his family an income consistent with his position, a considerable allowance is paid to him regularly by the Foreign Office in addition to the monthly honorarium provided by the late Reich President Field Marshal von Hindenburg in 1928. Unfortunately relations with him have for some time been deteriorating, because the 73-year-old Hetman evidently considers it his main duty to attack and cast suspicion on the other Ukrainian groups, especially the above-mentioned U. N. 0. [69]

By order:

v. RINTELEN

[68] Not printed.

[69] The words underlined were stricken out in the draft of the letter.

Page 146

Frames 219495-219496, serial 432

BERLIN, June 11, 1940.

The Lithuanian Minister called on me today to inform me of the further progress of the discussions with the Soviet Union. After the Soviet Union had raised the question of the safety of the Soviet garrisons in Lithuania and had rejected the suggestion for a mixed commission to investigate the incidents, the Lithuanian Government had of its own accord taken a series of measures which it thought would satisfy the Soviet Union. It might perhaps be admitted that relations between the Soviet garrisons and the Lithuanian population had earlier been treated too casually. Restrictive and control measures had now been taken, and many arrests and house searches made, etc. It was known that no reply was received to the Lithuanian suggestion of sending the Foreign Minister to Moscow. It was, therefore, all the more surprising that not the Foreign Minister but Minister President Merkys was summoned to Moscow.

On June 7 Merkys had had his first conversation with Molotov. The latter had reproached him severely regarding the safety of the Soviet garrisons and in this connection presented a great many detailed incidents. Molotov had in particular maintained persistently that Butayeff, a member of the Red Army, who according to Lithuanian reports had committed suicide, had been shut by Lithuanians. He had expressed his dissatisfaction very plainly and stressed that the Lithuanian Ministry of the Interior was not equal to its task.

In a subsequent conversation on June 9, Molotov had brought up questions of foreign policy, which had increased Lithuanian fears regarding the course of the conversations. Molotov had maintained that a military alliance existed between the three Baltic States and as proof had referred to the frequent meetings of the chiefs of staff of the three countries and to other frequent conferences between Baltic personalities. Merkys had replied that there existed neither secret nor open agreements which could violate the letter or the spirit of the Agreement of October 10, 1939. There was the old political treaty between the Baltic States but no military alliance. Merkys had then himself expressed the wish to invite the Foreign Minister to the conversations. The latter had arrived in Moscow yesterday afternoon. Herr Skirpa had not yet received any more recent reports. From the

Page 147

standpoint of protocol, everything had taken place in very polite form.

The Lithuanian Government still did not know what the intentions of the Soviet Union might be. The Lithuanian Government was prepared to do even more for the safety of the garrisons than it had done so far. If the Soviet Union now made broader political or military demands, the Lithuanian Government could not take the responsibility for their acceptance. Thus far, the subject of Lithuania's relations with Germany had not been discussed during the foreign policy conversations. However, it was no doubt to be expected that the Soviet Union would raise questions in this respect, too. Here I interjected that there was nothing in German-Lithuanian relations which was not or should not be known by the Soviet Union.

Herr Skirpa asked whether we had not instructed our Ambassador in Moscow to make inquiries. I replied in the negative and avoided further discussion of the matter with the remark that our Ambassador would certainly make a report of his own accord.

WOERMANN

Frame 175538, serial 270

BERLIN, June 14, 1940-8:45 p. m.

Received Moscow June 14, 1940-11:30 p. m.

No. 1003 of June 13

For the Chief of Mission or his representative personally. Strictly secret. To be deciphered personally. To be treated as confidential.

From a strictly secret source with which you are acquainted it has come to our knowledge that the Soviet Minister in Stockholm, Frau Kollontay, recently stated to the Belgian Minister there that it was to the common interest of the European powers to place themselves in opposition to German imperialism. It had become evident that the German danger was far greater than had been believed.

The Reich Foreign Minister requests you, if opportunity arises, and without revealing the source, to discuss tactfully with Molotov the hostile attitude of Minister Kollontay toward Germany.

WEIZSÄCKER

Page 148

Frame 112211, serial 103

No. 1007 of June 16, 1940

Reich Foreign Minister's Special Train

Reference your telegrams 1063 [71] and 1094. [72]

Please reply orally to Herr Molotov's question as follows:

1. As Mackensen reported upon inquiry, he did not make such a definite statement as was reported by the Soviet Chargé in Rome to the Soviet Government. He had, instead, stated during the conversation with the Chargé that in his opinion Germany and Italy were agreed that the Balkans should remain quiet and that a settlement of the unsolved Balkan question could probably be brought about more easily and without the use of force after the war.

2. The Reich Government was gratified that the war had not spread to the Balkans. Germany was, in principle, not interested there territorially but only commercially. Our attitude toward the Soviet Union in this question was finally and irrevocably established by the definite Moscow Agreement.

3. Italy's attitude toward the Balkans was also made unequivocally clear by Mussolini's speech on June 10 to the effect that Italy had no intention of drawing the Balkans into a war.

RIBBENTROP

[71] Ante, p. 144. ([70] not used? LWJ)

[72] Not printed.

Frames 214876-214877, serial 407

No. . .

BERLIN, June 16, 1940.

To Baumschule [73] for Sonnleitner.

With reference to the despatches from Kaunas No. 96 and No. 97 of June 15 [74] forwarded by teletype.

The Lithuanian Minister called up at about 2 a. m. today and said that, in accordance with a telephone report from Eydtkuhnen, Presi-

[73] Code name for the field office of the Reich Foreign Minister.

[74] Neither printed.

Page 149

dent Smetona, accompanied by an adjutant and members of his family, as well as General Rastaikis (who was rejected by the Soviets as Prime Minister) and his brother, Colonel Rastaikis, with their wives, had arrived in Eydtkuhnen. The Minister, moreover, reported that a number of other prominent Lithuanian personalities were probably staying at the German-Lithuanian border and that they desired to enter Germany. Some of them would be in danger, should they fall into the hands of the Russians. The Minister requested that the German border authorities be instructed to let these personalities enter Germany. The official on [night] duty replied that he could not initiate anything independently in this matter and suggested making the request again in the morning.

By order of Under State Secretary Woermann I request instructions as to how to treat the application of the Lithuanian Minister. The question arises in particular whether former Interior Minister Skucas and the former director of the State Security Department, Powelaitis, who were to be tried in accordance with point 1 of the Soviet ultimatum, can be allowed to enter. Powelaitis, regarding whom inquiry has already been made there by teletype, has loyally cooperated with German authorities in fighting Polish intrigues.

Division for Political Affairs, Night Duty Officer

WELCK

Frame 214887, serial 407

The High Command of the Armed Forces [OKW] (Colonel von Geldern) reports that it has received from the Counterintelligence Office in Königsberg, the following communication:

Tonight at 3 o'clock President Smetona with family and entourage crossed the "green frontier." He had given orders to the Lithuanian garrisons of Mariampol and Tauroggen to cross the frontier into Germany fully equipped and armed.

The High Command of the Armed Forces requests instructions as to what action to take if the Lithuanian troops, which apparently have not yet arrived, should wish to cross the border.

VON KESSEL

BERLIN, June 16, 1940.

Page 150

Frame 214873, serial 407

BERLIN, June 16, 1940.

Baumschule No. 56 of June 16, 11:15 a. m.

1. I have already given orders through the Gestapo to intern the Lithuanian President, Smetona, with family and other functionaries who have crossed the "green frontier." This will be done by the Gestapo.

2. If Lithuanian troop contingents ask permission to cross the German border, this request may be granted. The troops are to be disarmed and likewise to be interned.

3. It is reported that a Lithuanian Colonel offered to have his regiment cross the border. It is requested that the disarming and interning of any Lithuanian soldiers who might cross the border be done by the Armed Forces in collaboration with the Border Police. In agreement with the State Police please take the measures necessary so that the border posts concerned may be immediately informed.

It is again pointed out that border crossings are to be permitted only upon request of the Lithuanians and that we, for our part, must not do anything to encourage such requests.

This communication is to be transmitted at once by the fastest route, orally and in written form, to the High Command of the Armed Forces [OKW] with the request for further action.

RIBBENTROP

Minute

The transmittal to the High Command of the Armed Forces [OKW] was made immediately in accordance with instructions. At the same time, the High Command of the Armed Forces [OKW] was asked to see to it that in every case of a border crossing of Lithuanian troop contingents a report be made immediately to the Foreign Office.

v. d. HEYDEN RYNSCH

Page 151

Frame 214886, serial 407

SECRET

BERLIN, June 16, 1940.

Pol. I M 8560g.

High Command of the Armed Forces, Foreign Branch [OKW Ausland], Major Krummacher, transmitted the following at 11:35 a.m.:

1. If Lithuanian troops cross the East Prussian border, they are to be disarmed. A further decision as to what is to be done with them should be awaited.

2. At present some German units are returning to their garrisons in East Prussia. They have received instructions not to undertake any maneuvers and to avoid anything which might look as if this return were in any way connected with events in Lithuania.

This is for your information so that possible Soviet Russian inquiries may immediately be answered in this sense."

von GROTE

Frame 214861, serial 407

Baumschule No. 57 of June 16.

Teletype to Herr v. Grundherr [75] via Minister's Office.

The Reich Foreign Minister requests you to submit a report as soon as possible as to whether in the Baltic States a tendency to seek support from the Reich can be observed or whether an attempt was made to form a bloc. Please transmit your report by teletype.

SONNLEITNER

[75] Of the Political Division of the German Foreign Office, in charge of Baltic affairs.

Page 152

Frames 214862-214864, serial 407

To Baumschule

BERLIN, June 17, 1940.

Reference telegram Baumschule No. 57 of June 16, 1940.

I. The cooperation between the Baltic States of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania is based on the Treaty of Mutual Understanding and Cooperation concluded for ten years by these three States on September 12, 1931. In addition, Latvia and Estonia signed a mutual defense pact on November 1, 1923. In practice, the political cooperation consisted mainly of semiannual conferences of Foreign Ministers and joint press conferences; on the other hand, there has often been an abundance of discord and rivalry within the Baltic Entente. Latvia and Estonia explicitly indicated their disinterestedness in the Memel and Vilna questions, which were important to Lithuania. The assertion, now made by Russia, that Lithuania had joined the Estonian-Latvian military pact, is, according to information available here, without any foundation. Because of the very similar economic structure of these countries, the economic cooperation between the three States, in spite of much effort during the last few years, made no appreciable progress. Since the conclusion of the Soviet Mutual Assistance Pact with the Baltic countries in September-October 1939 there has been no closer cooperation in an anti-Russian sense among the Baltic States. In view of the occupation of their countries by Soviet Russian troops, the three Baltic Governments were aware of the danger of such a policy.

II. For the same reason, there can be no question-during the last few months-of dependence in foreign policy on Germany by the Baltic States. The Lithuanian Government, to be sure, has probably not been quite certain until the last few days whether or not we were politically completely disinterested in Lithuania, so that in many circles, as for instance in the case of the Lithuanian Minister here, there was perhaps some hope that Germany would, in case of further Russian demands, put in a good word for Lithuania in Moscow, although there was never, of course, any occasion given on our part for such an assumption.

On the other hand, our economic relations with the Baltic States have been strengthened very much since the beginning of the war. Regarding the great importance of the Baltic States to the war economy of the Reich, please see the attached memorandum from Minister Schnurre.

GRUNDHERR

Page 153

The economic importance of the three Baltic States for our supply of food and of raw materials essential for war has become quite considerable as a result of the commercial treaties concluded with these three States during the last year. In the course of the last six months, we have furthermore concluded secret agreements with all three States whereby the entire export of these countries, except the small part going to Russia and another small portion which goes to neutral countries, will be sent to Germany. That means for all three States about 70 percent of their total exports. German imports from the three Baltic States will in the current year amount to a total of approximately 200 million Reichsmarks-comprising grain, hogs, butter, eggs, flax, lumber, seeds, and in the case of Estonia, petroleum.

The consolidation of Russian influence in these areas will seriously endanger these necessary imports. For one thing, the Russians will do their utmost to keep the raw materials, and especially food, at home for their own use. On the other hand, if part continues to go to Germany, they will make quite different demands in regard to deliveries of German products from those made in the past by the Baltic States, so that in effect the previous exchange of goods will break down. We were able to make the deliveries desired by the Baltic States much more easily, and in many cases, under the stress of circumstances, we were able to put these States off till later.

In contrast, the economic interests of the Soviet Union in the three Baltic States are of minor importance. The Soviet Union was able to secure only about 10 percent of the export trade of these countries for itself by means of the treaties it recently concluded.

SCHNURRE.

BERLIN, June 17, 1940.

Frame 214849, serial 407

Pol. VI 1673

BERLIN, June 17, 1940.

For information and the orientation of your conversation.

The unresisted reinforcement of Russian troops in Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia and the reorganization of the Governments of the Baltic States, sought by the Russian Government to bring about more

Page 154

reliable cooperation with the Soviet Union, are the concern of Russia and the Baltic States. Therefore, in view of our unaltered friendly relations with the Soviet Union, there is no reason for nervousness on our part, which some of the foreign press has tried to impute to us in only too transparent a manner.

Please refrain from making any statement during conversations which could be interpreted as partisan.

Please acknowledge receipt.

WEIZSÄCKER

Frame 112228, serial 103

VERY URGENT

Moscow, June 18, 1940-1:10 a. m.

Received June 18, 1940-4 a. m.

No. 1167 of June 17

Molotov summoned me this evening to his office and expressed the warmest congratulations of the Soviet Government on the splendid success of the German Armed Forces. Thereupon, Molotov informed me of the Soviet action against the Baltic States. He referred to the reasons published in the press and added that it had become necessary to put an end to all the intrigues by which England and France had tried to sow discord and mistrust between Germany and the Soviet Union in the Baltic States.

For the negotiations concerning the formation of the new Governments the Soviet Government had, in addition to the Soviet envoy accredited there, sent the following special emissaries:

To Lithuania: Deputy Commissar of Foreign Affairs Dekanosov; to Latvia: Vishinski, the representative of the Council of Ministers; to Estonia: Regional Party Leader of Leningrad Zhdanov.

In connection with the escape of Smetona and the possible crossing of the frontier by Lithuanian army units, Molotov stated that the Lithuanian border was evidently inadequately guarded. The Soviet Government would, therefore, if requested, assist the Lithuanian Government in guarding its borders.

SCHULENBURG

Page 155

Frames 112240-112241, serial 103

VERY URGENT

Moscow, June 23, 1940-9:26 p. m.

Received June 23, 1940-11:20 p. m.

No. 1200 of June 23

Reference your telegram No. 1065 of the 22d and my telegram No. 1195 of the 21st. [76]

Molotov made the following statement to me today: The solution of the Bessarabian question brooked no further delay. The Soviet Government was still striving for a peaceful solution, but it was determined to use force, should the Rumanian Government decline a peaceful agreement. The Soviet claim likewise extended to Bucovina, which had a Ukrainian population.

As justification Molotov declared that, although a long time had elapsed since his declaration before the Supreme Soviet, Rumania had done nothing to bring about a solution of the Bessarabian problem. Therefore, something would have to be done.

I stated to Molotov that this decision of the Soviet Government had not been expected by me. I had been of the opinion that the Soviet Government would maintain its claims to Bessarabia-not contested by us-but would not itself take the initiative toward their realization. I feared that difficulties in the foreign relations of Rumania, which was at present supplying us with very large amounts of essential military and civilian raw materials, would lead to a serious encroachment on German interests. I told Molotov that I would report to my government at once, and I requested him not to take any decisive steps before my Government had taken a stand concerning the intentions of the Soviet Government.

Molotov promised to inform the Soviet Government of my request but emphasized expressly that the matter was extremely urgent. Molotov added that the Soviet Government expected Germany not to hinder but to support the Soviets in their action. The Soviet Government on its part would do everything to safeguard German interests in Rumania.

[76] Neither printed.

Page 156

Accordingly, I request immediate instruction by wire. I take the liberty of calling attention to the numerous Volksdeutsche residing in Bessarabia and Bucovina for whom provision of some sort will have to be made.

SCHULENBURG

Frames 112244-112245, serial 103

Moscow, June 24, 1940-6:50 p. m.

Received June 25, 1940-1 a. m.

No. 1212 of June 24

The following information was published by Tass in the Soviet press of June 23, and previously broadcast over the radio on June 22:

"In connection with the entry of Soviet troops in the Baltic countries, rumors have recently again been spread to the effect that 100 to 150 divisions have been concentrated at the Lithuanian-German border, that this concentration of Soviet troops was due to the Soviet Union's dissatisfaction with Germany's successes in the West, and that this revealed a deterioration in Soviet-German relations, and is designed to exert pressure on Germany. Lately, various versions of these rumors are being repeated almost daily in the American, Japanese, English, French, Turkish and Swedish press.

Tass is authorized to state that all these rumors, the absurdity of which is obvious anyway, by no means correspond to the truth. In the Baltic countries there are actually neither 100 nor 150 divisions, but altogether no more than 18 to 20 divisions, and these divisions are not concentrated at the Lithuanian-German border but in the various districts of the three Baltic Republics, and their purpose is not to exert 'pressure' on Germany but to provide a guarantee for the execution of the mutual assistance pacts between the U.S.S.R. and these countries.

Responsible Soviet circles are of the opinion that the spreading of these absurd rumors aims particularly at clouding Soviet-German relations. These gentlemen, however, pass off their secret wishes as reality. Apparently, they are incapable of grasping the obvious fact that the good neighborly relations, resulting from the conclusion of the Non-aggression Pact between the U.S.S.R. and Germany, cannot be shaken by any rumors or petty poisonous propaganda, because these relations are not based on motives of opportunism but on the fundamental interests of the U.S.S.R. and Germany."

SCHULENBURG

Page 157

Frame 112246, serial 103

MOSCOW, June 24, 1940-6:49 p. m.

Received June 24, 1940-8:45 p. m.

No. 1213 of June 24

Reference my telegram No. 1212 of the 24th.

After the conclusion of our conversation of yesterday concerning Bessarabia (cf. telegram No. 1212 [1205?] of June 23d) Molotov, with obvious complacency, brought up the Tass communiqué of June 22, whereupon I expressed my appreciation.

I infer from the wording of the communiqué that Stalin himself is the author. The refutation of numerous rumors now circulating concerning differences between Germany and the Soviet Union and concerning troop concentrations in connection with Soviet operations in the Baltic region, and the unequivocal clarification of German-Soviet relations ought to be altogether to our advantage at this important juncture. However, the further aim of the communiqué, to emphasize German-Soviet solidarity as a preparation for the solution of the Bessarabian problem. is just as plain.

SCHULENBURG

Frames 179-181, serial F 19

The Secret Supplementary Protocol of August 23, 1939, reads as follows:

[Here follows the text of the Secret Supplementary Protocol of August 23, 1939, printed on page 78.]

As far as I can remember the following took place at that time:

At the time of the delimitation of the mutual spheres of interest in Eastern Europe, the Soviets stressed their interest in Bessarabia when the Southeast of Europe was mentioned. On this occasion I stated orally our disinterestedness in the Bessarabian question. However, in order not to put down explicitly in written form the recognition of the Russian claim to Bessarabia because of the possibility of indiscretions, with which we had to count in view of the then still very vague German-Russian relationship, I chose a formulation of a general nature for the Protocol. This was done in such a way that when the Southeastern European problems were discussed I declared

Page 158

very generally that Germany was politically disinterested in "these areas," i. e., in the Southeast of Europe. The economic interest of Germany in these Southeastern European territories was duly stressed by me. This was in accordance with the general instructions given by the Führer for Southeastern Europe and also, as I recall it, with a special directive of the Führer which I received before my departure for Moscow, in which the Führer authorized me to declare German disinterestedness in the territories of Southeastern Europe, even, if necessary, as far as Constantinople and the Straits. However, the latter were not discussed.

R[IBBENTROP]

BAUMSCHULE, June 24, 1940.

Frame 210475-210476, serial 380

VERY URGENT

Transmitted by telephone on June 25, 1940-6 p. m.

No. 1074 of June 25

For the Ambassador personally.

Please call on Herr Molotov and state the following:

1. Germany is abiding by the Moscow agreements. She takes, therefore, no interest in the Bessarabian question. In this territory live approximately 100,000 Volksdeutsche. Germany is naturally interested in the fate of these Volksdeutsche and expects their future to be safeguarded. The Reich Government reserves the right to make certain proposals to the Soviet Government at the appropriate time concerning the question of resettling these Volksdeutsche in the same manner as the Volksdeutsche in Volhynia.

2. The claim of the Soviet Government to Bucovina is something new. Bucovina was formerly an Austrian crown province and is densely populated with Germans. Germany is also particularly interested in the fate of these Volksdeutsche.

3. In the rest of Rumania Germany has very important [stärkste] economic interests. These interests include oil fields as well as agricultural land. Germany is, therefore, as we have repeatedly informed the Soviet Government, extremely interested in preventing these areas from becoming a theater of war.

4. Although fully sympathetic toward the settling of the Bessarabian problem, the Reich Government is, therefore, of the opinion that . . . [77] of the Soviet Union . . . [77] of the Moscow agreements, everything should be done in order to reach a peaceful solution of the Bessarabian question with the Rumanian Government. For its part the Reich Government would be prepared, in the spirit of the Moscow agreements, to advise Rumania, if necessary, to reach an amicable settlement of the Bessarabian question satisfactory to Russia.

Please point out again clearly to Herr Molotov our great interest in Rumania's not becoming a theater of war. As matters stand, we are of the opinion that a peaceful settlement in accordance with Russian views is altogether possible, provided the problem is properly handled.

We should be grateful to the Soviet Government for a communication concerning its ideas as to further treatment of the matter.

RIBBENTROP

Frames 224890-224891, serial 459

VERY URGENT

Moscow, June 26, 1940-12:59 a. m.

Received June 26, 1940-12:25 p. m.

No. 1233 of June 25

Reference your telegram No. 1074 of the 25th.

For the Reich Minister personally.

Instruction carried out at 9 o'clock this evening at Molotov's office. Molotov expressed his thanks for the understanding attitude of the German Government and its readiness to support the Soviet Union in achieving its claims. Molotov stated that the Soviet Government also desired a peaceful solution, but repeatedly stressed the fact that the question was particularly urgent and could brook no further delay.

I pointed out to Molotov that Soviet renunciation of Bucovina, which never belonged even to Tsarist Russia, would substantially facilitate a peaceful solution. Molotov countered by saying that Bucovina is the last missing part of a unified Ukraine and that for this reason the Soviet Government must attach importance to solving this question simultaneously with the Bessarabian question. Nevertheless, I gained the impression that Molotov did not entirely dismiss the possibility of

[77] Omission indicated in the Moscow Embassy text of message.

Page 160

renunciation of Bucovina in the course of the negotiations with Rumania.

Molotov stated that our wishes concerning the Volksdeutsche could certainly be met in a manner similar to the arrangement in Poland.

Molotov promised to consider most favorably our economic interests in Rumania.

In conclusion, Molotov stated that he would report the German point of view to his Government and inform me of its attitude as soon as possible. Molotov added that there had been no discussion of the matter in Moscow or in Bucharest, up to the present. He further mentioned that the Soviet Government simply wished to pursue its own interests and had no intention of encouraging other states (Hungary, Bulgaria) to make demands on Rumania.

SCHULENBURG

Frames 224892-224893, serial 459

VERY URGENT

MOSCOW, June 26, 1940-3:36 p. m.

Received June 26, 1940-10:35 p. m.

STRICTLY SECRET

No. 1235 of June 26

Reference my telegram No. 1195 of the 21st. [78]

Following the conversation which the Italian Ambassador, Rosso, had with Foreign Commissar Molotov on June 20, the latter summoned Rosso yesterday afternoon. Molotov explained that he had reported the Italian Government's views to his Government, which had approved them. The Soviet Government was of the opinion that Italian-Soviet relations should be re-established quickly and definitely and should be put on the same basis as those of Germany and the Soviet Government. Molotov stated in this connection that the Soviet Government and Germany were on excellent terms and that the relations between Germany and the Soviet Government were working out very well.

Molotov then declared that in his opinion the war would last until next winter, that there were some political questions, however, which had to be solved without delay, and that he could briefly characterize the Soviet Government's relations with various countries as follows: With Hungary the Soviet Government was maintaining good rela-

[78] Not printed.

Page 161

tions. Certain Hungarian requests were considered reasonable by the Soviet Government.

Bulgaria and the Soviet Union were good neighbors. The Soviet-Bulgarian relations were strong and could be strengthened even more. The Bulgarian demands for Dobruja and for access to the Aegean Sea were considered justified by the Soviet Government, which had recognized them and had no objections to their realization.

The Soviet Union's attitude toward Rumania was known. The Soviet Union would prefer to realize her claims to Bessarabia (Bucovina was not mentioned) without war, but, if that was impossible because of Rumanian intransigence, she was determined to resort to force. Regarding other areas of Rumania, the Soviet Government would communicate with Germany. The Soviet Government regards Turkey with deep suspicion. This was a result of Turkey's unfriendly attitude toward Russia and other countries, by which Molotov obviously meant Germany and Italy. Soviet suspicion of Turkey was intensified by the Turkish attitude in regard to the Black Sea, where Turkey desired to play a dominant role, and the Straits, where Turkey wanted to exercise exclusive jurisdiction. The Soviet Government was reducing a Turkish threat to Batum, against which it would have to protect itself toward the south and southeast, in which connection the German and Italian interests would be considered.

In the Mediterranean, the Soviet Government would recognize Italy's hegemony, provided that Italy would recognize the Soviet Government's hegemony in the Black Sea.

Ambassador Rosso wired Molotov's statements to his Government with the comment that he . . .* them very sensible and recommended that they be acted upon as soon as possible.

SCHULENBURG

Frames 210457-210458, serial 380

VERY URGENT

[Moscow, June 26, 1940.]

No. 1236 of June 26

Reference my telegram No. 1233 of June 25.

For the Reich Foreign Minister personally.

*Group missing, apparently "considered". [Footnote in the German text.]

Page 162

Molotov summoned me this afternoon and declared that the Soviet Government, on the basis of his conversation with me yesterday, had decided to limit its demands to the northern part of Bucovina and the city of Czernowitz. According to Soviet opinion the boundary line should run from the southernmost point of the Soviet West Ukraine at Mt. Kniatiasa, east along the Suczava and then northeast to Hertza on the Pruth, whereby the Soviet Union would obtain direct railway connection from Bessarabia via Czernowitz to Lemberg. Molotov added that the Soviet Government expected German support of this Soviet demand.

To my statement that a peaceful solution might more easily be reached if the Soviet Government would return the Rumanian National Bank's gold reserve, which had been transferred for safekeeping to Moscow during World War I, Molotov declared that this was absolutely out of the question, since Rumania had exploited Bessarabia long enough.

Regarding further treatment of the matter Molotov has the following idea: The Soviet Government will submit its demand to the Rumanian Minister here within the next few days and expects the German Reich Government at the same time urgently to advise the Rumanian Government in Bucharest to comply with the Soviet demands, since war would otherwise be unavoidable. Molotov promised to inform me immediately as soon as he had spoken to the Rumanian Minister.

Regarding the Rumanian Government's attitude toward the new Soviet Minister, Molotov appeared to be annoyed and pointed out that the Minister had not yet been given any opportunity to present his credentials, although the customary time had expired.

SCHULENBURG

N. B. General Köstring has been informed.

Page 163

Frame 224898, serial 459

VERY URGENT

MOSCOW, June 27, 1940-1:10 a. m.

Received June 27, 1940-6:30 a. m.

No. 1241 of June 26

Reference my telegram No. 1236 of June 26.

Molotov just informed me by telephone that he had summoned the Rumanian Minister at 10 o'clock this evening, had informed him of the Soviet Government's demand regarding the cession of Bessarabia and the northern part of Bucovina, and had demanded a reply from the Rumanian Government not later than tomorrow, i. e., on July [June] 27.

SCHULENBURG

Frame 224903, serial 459

SECRET

June 27, 1940-10:30 a. m.

The following instruction is to be transmitted immediately by telephone in plain to Minister Fabricius in Bucharest:

"You are requested to call immediately on the Foreign Minister in Bucharest and inform him as follows:

"The Soviet Government has informed us that it has demanded the cession of Bessarabia and the northern part of Bucovina from the Rumanian Government. In order to avoid war between Rumania and the Soviet Union we can only advise the Rumanian Government to yield to the Soviet Government's demand. Please report by wire."

End of the instruction to Bucharest.

RIBBENTROP

(Telephoned to Counselor of Legation Stelzer at 11:00 a. m.)

Page 164

Frames 112294-112297, serial 104

Tgb. Nr. A/3192/40

Moscow, July 11, 1940.

The renewed diplomatic activity which the Soviet Union has displayed during the last few weeks has naturally become a main subject of discussion among the members of the Diplomatic Corps here. Some things are not yet completely clear, as for instance the question as to why the Soviet Union just at this time proceeded or allegedly will yet proceed against a number of countries. Most of my colleagues are of the opinion that the Soviets, who are always very well informed, know or at least assume the end of the war to be imminent.

Regarding the action taken against Rumania, it has aroused general surprise here that the Soviet Union has also demanded the northern part of Bucovina. There had never been any statement of Soviet claims to this region. As is known, the Soviet Government has justified its claim by the fact that Bucovina has a Ukrainian population. This only applies to the northern part of the country, and the Soviet Union has finally contented itself with this part. I cannot get rid of the impression that it was Ukrainian circles in the Kremlin who have advocated and put through the claim for cession of Northern Bucovina. On several occasions, as for instance during the negotiations regarding the German-Soviet border in Poland, a very strong Ukrainian influence in the Kremlin was evident. Herr Stalin told me personally at that time that he was prepared to make concessions north of the boundary line where it runs through White Russia, but this was impossible in the south where Ukrainians live. Consequently, the cession of the city of Sinyava, very much desired by us, was cancelled by the Soviet Government after it had first agreed to it. It has not yet been possible to determine where this strong Ukrainian influence originates. There is no especially influential Ukrainian known to be among the immediate entourage of the leaders in the Kremlin. A clue might be obtained from the fact that young Pavlov (now in the Soviet Embassy in Berlin), who is the special pet of Herren Stalin and Molotov, once was described to me by Stalin as "our little Ukrainian."

Page 165

The entire political interest in Moscow is now focused on events in the Baltic States and what will happen in relation to Turkey and Iran.

Most people believe that the three Baltic States will be changed into entities completely dependent on Moscow, i. e., will be incorporated into the Soviet Union. The Legations of the three Baltic States here in Moscow expect to be completely dissolved and to disappear in a very short time. It is generally believed that the Soviet Government will demand the withdrawal of all foreign missions in Kaunas, Riga, and Reval. The excitement among Lithuanians, Latvians, and Estonians here is extremely great. However, actual developments will have to be awaited.

This, no doubt, applies likewise to Turkey and Iran. Both Ambassadors here assert that neither in Moscow nor in Ankara nor in Teheran have any demands been made up to the present. However, it is certain that the situation is serious. I may add that, at least in Iranian circles here, there is much resentment against us, because of the publication of the sixth White Book. They believe that the White Book has induced the Soviet Government to take action against Iran. However, the Iranian Ambassador here is too clever not to see that the documents in the White Book were only a pretext for the Soviet Government's conduct and that Moscow would simply have found another pretext if this one had not presented itself at the moment.

Finally an interesting detail:

The Turkish Ambassador here is telling his friends among the diplomats that he received a plain telegram-which he even produces-from Saracoglu on July 6, in which the latter denies his conversation with Massigli [79] and refers in this connection to telegraphic statements from him to that effect. In the same breath, the Turkish Ambassador declares significantly that it was very annoying that his conversation with American Ambassador Steinhardt [80] thus had also been revealed.

COUNT VON DER SCHULENBURG

[79] French Ambassador in Turkey.

[80] American Ambassador in the Soviet Union.

Page 166

Frame 112311, serial 104

VERY URGENT

Moscow, July 13, 1940-7:04 p. m.

Received July 13, 1940-9:10 p. m.

No. 1363 of July 13

Reference your telegram of the 8th, No. 1164, and my telegram of the 12th, No. 1348. [81]

Molotov summoned me today and stated the following: Stalin had carefully re-examined the situation with respect to the strip of Lithuanian territory and has concluded that our claim to this strip of territory and the Soviet obligation to cede it are incontestable. Under the present circumstances, however, the cession of this strip of territory would be extremely inconvenient and difficult for the Soviet Government. Therefore, Stalin and he himself earnestly request the German Government to consider whether, in conformity with the extraordinarily friendly relations between Germany and the Soviet Union, a way cannot be found which would leave this strip of territory permanently with Lithuania. Molotov added that we could of course at any time move the population of German origin out of Lithuania, as well as out of this strip of territory. Molotov stressed again and again the difficulties which would at present result for the Soviet Union from the cession of this strip of territory, and he made his and Stalin's request seem very urgent by repeatedly expressing hope of a German concession. Request instructions by wire. Perhaps, the Soviet request can be used to put through our economic and financial demands with respect to the Baltic States.

SCHULENBURG

Frames 112312-112313, serial 104

VERY URGENT

MOSCOW, July 13, 1940-9:17 p. m.

Received July 14, 1940-9:10 a. m.

SECRET

No. 1364 of July 13

Molotov informed me today that Cripps, the British Ambassador here, had been received by Stalin a few days ago upon request of the

[81] Neither printed.

Page 167

British Government. On instructions from Stalin, Molotov gave me a memorandum of this conversation.

Cripps inquired regarding the attitude of the Soviet Government toward the following questions:

1. The British Government was convinced that Germany was striving for hegemony in Europe and wanted to engulf all European countries. This was dangerous to the Soviet Union as well as England. Therefore both countries ought to agree on a common policy of self-protection against Germany and on the re-establishment of the European balance of power.

2. Irrespective of this, England would like to trade with the Soviet Union, provided that England's exports would not be resold to Germany.

3. The British Government was of the opinion that unification and leadership of the Balkan countries for the purpose of maintaining the status quo was rightly the task of the Soviet Union. Under present circumstances this important mission could be carried out only by the Soviet Union.

4. The British Government knew that the Soviet Union was dissatisfied with the regime in the Straits and in the Black Sea. Cripps was of the opinion that the interests of the Soviet Union in the Straits must be safeguarded.

Stalin's answers are given as follows:

1. The Soviet Government was, of course, very much interested in present events in Europe, but he (Stalin) did not see any danger of the hegemony of any one country in Europe and still less any danger that Europe might be engulfed by Germany. Stalin observed the policy of Germany, and knew several leading German statesmen well. He had not discovered any desire on their part to engulf European countries. Stalin was not of the opinion that German military successes menaced the Soviet Union and her friendly relations with Germany. These relations were not based on transient circumstances, but on the basic national interests of both countries.

The so-called European balance of power had hitherto oppressed not only Germany, but also the Soviet Union. Therefore, the Soviet Union would take all measures to prevent the re-establishment of the old balance of power in Europe.

2. The Soviet Union did not object to trading with England, but she contested the right of England or any other country to interfere with German-Soviet commercial relations. The Soviet Union would export to Germany, in accordance with treaty provisions, part of the

Page 168

nonferrous metals she bought abroad, because Germany needed these metals for the manufacture of the war materiel she delivered to the Soviet Union. If England did not recognize these conditions, trade between England and the Soviet Union was impossible.

3. In Stalin's opinion no power had the right to an exclusive role in the consolidation and leadership of the Balkan countries. The Soviet Union did not claim such a mission either, although she was interested in Balkan affairs.

4. Regarding Turkey Stalin declared that the Soviet Union was in fact opposed to the exclusive jurisdiction of Turkey over the Straits and to Turkey's dictation of conditions in the Black Sea. The Turkish Government was aware of that.

Frames 214783-214788, serial 407

BERLIN, July 22, 1940.

The Lithuanian Minister called on me today and stated the following:

In view of the important events in his country he considered it his duty not to let these events pass into history without taking action. He had summarized his attitude toward events in Lithuania in a letter to the Reich Foreign Minister. The presentation of this letter amounted to a unilateral act on his part, for which he alone assumed responsibility. He himself did not wish to cause any embarrassment to German policy by this act.

The matter arose in the following way: Some time ago, as a precaution, Foreign Minister Urbsys instructed all Lithuanian Ministers to take such a step in case of a transfer of sovereignty to the Soviet Union. On the basis of a communication between the Lithuanian Ministers he felt sure that a corresponding note would be presented today in all capitals in which Lithuania was represented. The Minister then handed me the enclosed letter, which contains "a most solemn and determined protest."

I told Herr Skirpa that for the time being I wanted to keep the document myself, and I assumed from his statements that he did not expect any comment on it. However, I could not tell him whether as the German Government we would be prepared to accept such a note at all, and we would therefore have to reserve the right to return it to him.

Page 169

The Minister then stated that particularly in view of the known attitude of Germany he had omitted one point in the note, which the other Lithuanian Ministers would include in their notes to the governments to which they were accredited, namely, the request that the incorporation not be recognized. The Minister asked whether he could not at least orally present this request here. I rejected this, whereupon the Minister stated that the request was to be considered as not having been made. Finally, the Minister said that he intended to make known his action by an announcement from the Berlin office of the Elte Agency, since this appeared to him necessary for the assertion of his personal attitude toward events.

I requested the Minister to refrain from this, and he promised to comply.

Transmitted to the Reich Foreign Minister through the State Secretary with the request for instructions whether the note should be retained here. The Latvian and Estonian Ministers may be expected to present similar notes here. The Latvian Minister had already made an appointment with me for 5:30 p. m. today.

WOERMANN

3991

BERLIN, July 21, 1940.

HERR REICH MINISTER: I have the honor, Excellency, to bring the following to your attention:

As is already known, on June 14, 1940, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics presented an ultimatum to Lithuania under flimsy and unjustified pretexts, in which it was demanded:

1. that the constitutional government of Lithuania be forced to resign immediately;

2. that the Minister of the Interior and the Chief of the State Security Police be tried without preferring charges based on law, and

3. that free and unlimited entry of Soviet military forces into Lithuania be granted.

On the following day the Russian Red Army, after having attacked the Lithuanian frontier guards, crossed the Lithuanian border and occupied all of Lithuania. Furthermore, a puppet government was forced upon us by a high Soviet official sent from Moscow for this purpose, and the entire administration was put under the control of the Government of the Soviet Socialist Republics.

Page 170

In order to incorporate Lithuania fully into the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, elections to the Seim (Parliament) were ordered on July 14, resulting in the greatest falsification of the will of the Lithuanian population.

In order to quell any expression of resistance, even before the elections all Lithuanian clubs and organizations were suppressed, the Lithuanian press was seized and its editors removed by force, and the more or less influential personalities in public life were arrested. People who previously were considered open enemies of the Lithuanian State were appointed to Government offices, particularly in the State Security Police.

The Communist Party was the only political organization which was allowed to function legally. And it then exerted the decisive influence on the scheduled elections. Only one list of candidates was permitted, namely, the one that was agreeable to the Communist Party.

In order to force the necessary participation in the elections anybody who did not wish to vote was threatened with being declared an enemy of the people, and personal attendance was strictly checked.

It was immediately obvious that the Seim, elected under such circumstances, was only a blind tool in the hands of the Communist Party and thereby of the Government of the Soviet Socialist Republics. Today, on July 21, 1940, the Seim adopted a resolution to establish the Soviet system within the country and to incorporate Lithuania into the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics of Russia.

All these measures of the Government of the U.S.S.R. amount to a flagrant violation of all treaties signed between the Republic of Lithuania and the U.S.S.R., in particular however:

1. of the Peace Treaty of July 12, 1920, by which the U.S.S.R. as successor of the former Russian Tsarist Empire recognized unconditionally the independence and autonomy of Lithuania, and by which she renounced forever all rights of sovereignty which Russia previously had over Lithuania (see article 1);

2. of the Non-aggression Pact of September 29, 1926, and of its renewals of May 6, 1931, and of April 4, 1934. In this Pact the U.S.S.R. obligates herself to respect the sovereignty of Lithuania as well as her territorial integrity and inviolability under all circumstances (see article 2) and to refrain from any use of force (article 3);

3. Of the Mutual Assistance Pact of October 10, 1939, in which the Government of the U.S.S.R. repeats a solemn assurance to Lithuania not to violate in any way the sovereignty of the Lithuanian State, as well as its internal order.

Page 171

In view of all these circumstances I feel compelled as the Minister appointed by the constitutional agencies of the Republic of Lithuania and accredited to the German Reich to lodge the most solemn and determined protest against the oppression of my country and the deprivation of sovereignty and national independence of Lithuania by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and to declare that because the above-mentioned resolution of the Seim was imposed by Russian occupation authorities it amounts to nothing but the most outrageous falsification of the expression of the will of the Lithuanian people and that it is in the sharpest conflict with the constitution and interests of the Lithuanian State' as well as the free right of self-determination of nations, and that, therefore, it cannot be recognized as valid in any way.

I avail myself of the opportunity to renew to Your Excellency the assurance of my highest consideration.

K. SKIRPA

Frames 214780-214781, serial 104

BERLIN, July 22, 1940.

The Latvian Minister called on me today and gave me the enclosed letter to the Reich Foreign Minister, in which he as Minister of the "legitimate Government of Latvia" protests against the incorporation of Latvia into the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. In this connection the Minister remarked that he would not think of creating any difficulties for Germany. None could, in his opinion, result from his entering this protest here.

I told Herr Kreewinsch that I would keep his letter personally for the time being. I would notify him later whether the letter could remain here or not.

In connection with the memorandum of the conversation with the Lithuanian Minister [82] there is transmitted herewith this report to the Reich Foreign Minister through the State Secretary, with the request for action.

WOERMANN

[82] Ante, p. 168

Page 172

BERLIN, July 22, 1940.

HERR REICH MINISTER: I have the honor to inform Your Excellency of the following:

The Parliament which convened on the 21st instant in Riga has proclaimed Latvia a Soviet Republic, and it has addressed to Moscow the request that Latvia be incorporated into the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. This resolution lacks any legal basis, since Parliament itself owes its existence to elections which were held under the terror of Russian occupation and which could not in any way be considered a free expression of the popular will. Previous to this, the invasion of Latvia by Soviet troops was already a violation of all existing treaties between Latvia and the Soviet Union.

As Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary of the legitimate Government of Latvia I consider it my duty respectfully to inform Your Excellency of my protest against the above-mentioned action.

Accept, Excellency, the renewed assurances of my highest consideration.

EDG. KREEWINSCH

Frame 214771, serial 407

BERLIN, July 24, 1940.

I returned today in a friendly manner the notes regarding the incorporation of their countries into the Soviet Union to the Lithuanian and Latvian Ministers and justified this by stating that we could accept from Ministers only notes which they presented here in the name of their Governments. At the same time, in accordance with instructions, I did not indicate that they were returned by order of the Reich Foreign Minister.

The Estonian Minister likewise wished to hand me a similar note today. I requested him to refrain from doing so, giving the appropriate reasons.

The Lithuanian Minister informed me that of his own accord he had sent the Lithuanian Government a telegram of protest against the

Page 173

resolution of incorporation into the Soviet Union, stating among other things that he did not consider this resolution binding on the Lithuanian people, the nation or himself. The Lithuanian and Estonian Ambassadors told me that they had not sent a similar telegram and did not contemplate doing so.

Furthermore, I told the three Ministers that they and the other members of the Legation, including families, if they so desired, could remain in Germany. The three Ministers expressed their very great appreciation for this and also requested me to thank the Reich Foreign Minister.

WOERMANN

Frame 112343, serial 104

VERY URGENT

Moscow, July 29, 1940-7:10 p. m.

Received July 29, 1940-8:20 p. m.

No. 1500 of July 29

Reference my telegram of the 16th, No. 1472. [83]

Molotov summoned me today and stated that the Soviet Government was very much interested in receiving information about the subject of the recent discussions of Germany and Italy with the Hungarian, Rumanian, Bulgarian, and Slovakian statesmen. I replied that I did not have any information yet, but would request it.

Speedy instructions by wire are requested, particularly in view of the speech on foreign policy Molotov is expected to make on August 1.

SCHULENBURG

Frame 112344, serial 104

URGENT

BERLIN, July 30, 1940.

No. 1307

Reference your telegrams No. 1472 [83] and 1500.

For the Ambassador personally.

Reich Foreign Minister requests that you inform Herr Molotov

[83] Not printed.

Page 174

at the first opportunity of the latest state visits to Germany, to the following effect:

The visit of the Rumanian Prime Minister and Foreign Minister in Germany was occasioned by the fact that the King of Rumania and the Rumanian Government lately had repeatedly requested the Reich Government to express its attitude toward the Hungarian and Bulgarian desires for [territorial] revision. During the visit, the Rumanian statesmen were advised by us to meet revisionist claims on a fair and reasonable basis and to negotiate directly with the Hungarian and Bulgarian Governments for this purpose. The Rumanian statesmen now held out prospects of initiating such negotiations. During the Bulgarian visit we notified Bulgarian statesmen to that effect. End of the instructions by the Reich Foreign Minister.

In accordance with instructions I shall similarly inform Ambassador Shkvarzev.

A report by wire is requested.

WEIZSÄCKER

Frame 357760, serial 1379

BERLIN, August 2, 1940-4:24 p. m.

Received Moscow, August 2, 1940-8:45 p. m.

No. 1339 of August 2

Reference your telegram of July 13, No. 1363.

You are requested to inform Herr Molotov that the Reich Government has taken cognizance of the wish of the Soviet Government that Germany leave to the Soviet Union that part of Lithuania allocated to Germany by the Moscow agreements. This would represent a rather considerable change in the Moscow Treaty to the disadvantage of Germany. Before the Reich Government can consider the matter in detail, therefore, I should be interested in hearing what quid pro quo the Soviet Government would propose.

RIBBENTROP

Page 175

Frame 211004, serial 384

RM 21/40

I received the Soviet Ambassador, Herr Shkvarzev, today and strongly remonstrated with him regarding the article, published in Riga in the newspaper Jaunakas Zinas on the 5th instant, entitled "German Communists Against Dictate at Compiegne." I strongly emphasized that this was an outright inflammatory article against Germany. The attacks on the German Government contained in that article were not calculated to further good German-Russian relations, which after all were desired by both sides. The contents and implications of this article did not correspond to the letter or the spirit of the Moscow agreements. The article was also in diametrical opposition to the desire, recently expressed by the Führer and the day before yesterday by Molotov in Moscow, of further strengthening friendly German-Russian relations. I requested the Ambassador to inform his Government immediately of this talk and to notify it that the Reich Government considered it appropriate to suppress such articles in the future.

Herr Shkvarzev did not make any comment on the article itself, but promised to report the matter immediately to Herr Molotov. As basis for his report a copy of the German News Agency despatch of the 6th instant covering the article was handed to him.

R[IBBENTROP] [85]

BERLIN, August 6, 1940.

Frame 357784, serial 1379

CONFIDENTIAL

BERLIN, August 9, 1940.

W XII 5228

For personal information only.

The incorporation of Lithuania into the territory of the Soviet Union creates a completely new situation for the Memel Free Port Zone. The Free Port Zone represented an international obligation,

[85] Signature supplied from another copy of this memorandum.

Page 176

made to facilitate the return by little Lithuania of her most important port to Germany. For Russia, which has expanded and has at her disposal a great number of Baltic Sea ports, it has lost its real significance; its continued existence would lead to politically dangerous Russian privileges on German territory. If Russia should demand the continuance of the Free Port Zone in Memel, the position taken here will be that the promises given in the German-Lithuanian Treaty of March 22, 1939, are no longer applicable to a Lithuania which has been incorporated into the Soviet Union. The competent offices wild initiate the necessary steps for terminating the present state of affairs. The question of handling Russian traffic via the German port of Memel will especially be kept in mind.

By order:

SCHNURRE

Frame 112386, serial 104

VERY URGENT

Moscow, August 13, 1940-12:25 a. m.

Received August 13, 1940-4:25 a. m.

SECRET

No. 1638 of August 12

Reference my telegram of the 7th, No. 1590. [86]

Concerning the Lithuanian strip of territory Molotov today handed me a long memorandum stating that territorial compensation was unacceptable to the Soviet Union, but declaring readiness to pay 3,860,000 gold dollars within 2 years (i. e., half of the sum the U. S. A. paid to Russia for the cession of Alaska), either in gold or goods, as Germany may prefer, for the retention of the strip of territory by the Soviet Union.

The text of the memorandum will be sent Wednesday via courier by plane.

SCHULENBURG

[86] Not printed.

Page 177

Frames 100-101, serial F 18

RM 22

Subject: Conversation with the Russian Ambassador.

The Russian Ambassador made an appointment with me today in order to give me the answer of the Russian Government to the complaint concerning the article in the Latvian newspaper Janaukas Zinas. He said that he had instructions from his Government to inform me that the appearance of the article was due to a misunderstanding. His Government had given instructions to Latvia, which now belonged to the Soviet Union, that in the future such articles were to be suppressed.

I answered the Russian that I took note of that. Such articles were not advantageous for the development of the good German-Russian relations which we desired. In the German press in turn we would not tolerate articles against Russian conditions either.

I then asked the Ambassador what truth there was to press reports of a stiffening in Russo-Finnish relations; whether they had reached a final understanding on the Aaland problem or whether there were otherwise any reasons for this stiffening. Herr Shkvarzev stated that he had no information on that point.

The Ambassador and his interpreter made a somewhat dejected impression during the talk.

R[IBBENTROP]

BERLIN, August 14, 1940.

Frames 112436-112437, serial 104

URGENT

Moscow, August 30, 1940-10:12 p. m.

Received August 31, 1940-12:10 a. m.

No. 1799 of August 30

Reference instruction W XII 5228 of August 9.

Last night Molotov asked me to see him and handed me a note verbale, [87] in which the attention of the German Government is called to activities of German authorities in the Memel Free Port Zone which

[87] Not printed.

Page 178

violate rights and interests of the Lithuanian Soviet Republic. Disregarding the rights fixed in the German-Lithuanian Treaty of May 20 concerning the Memel Free Port Zone (which are quoted in detail in the note verbale) German authorities had ordered German troops to invade the territory of the Free Zone, had discontinued the activities of the Customs Office, and had declared that all Lithuanian goods in this zone were to be removed. The German authorities had thereby seriously affected the economic situation and commercial possibilities of Lithuania, which now forms part of the Soviet Union. The Soviet Government was of the opinion that the Lithuanian Soviet Republic was entitled to all the rights and privileges granted by the German-Lithuanian Treaty as well as by the letters exchanged between Schnurre and Norkaitis on May 20, 1939, and that their validity could not be terminated by a unilateral act.

Molotov added orally that just as the German Government takes for granted the fulfillment of the commercial treaties concluded between Germany and the Baltic countries, so also must the Soviet Government demand the observance of the German-Lithuanian Treaty with regard to the Memel Free Port Zone which was likewise a commercial treaty.

Please enable me as soon as possible to answer the note verbale, the text of which will follow by the next courier.

Minister Schnurre will give his opinion on this issue separately.

SCHULENBURG

Frames 357804-357807, serial 1379

VERY URGENT

BERLIN, August 31, 1910-3:12 a. m.

Received Moscow August 31, 1940-10 a. m.

No. 1565 of August 30

Please call on Herr Molotov and inform him orally of the Vienna conversations and the German-Italian award in the Hungarian-Rumanian matter, approximately as follows:

As Molotov was previously informed, both the Rumanian and the Hungarian Governments some time ago solicited the advice of the Führer and the Duce on the solution of the problem of territorial revision. The Führer and the Duce urgently advised both parties, as well as the Bulgarian Government, to come to an understanding as promptly as possible by way of direct, bilateral negotiations.

Page 179

While the Bulgaro-Rumanian negotiations led relatively soon to an agreement in principle, and we can now look forward to the early conclusion of a formal agreement, it recently became more and more obvious that the Hungarian-Rumanian negotiations were running into very great difficulties and that no progress was discernible in reconciling the viewpoints of the two parties. Lately relations between Hungary and Rumania deteriorated to such an extent that the possibility of military complications had to be seriously faced. In compliance with the repeated requests of both the Hungarian and the Rumanian Governments, the Government of the Reich and the Italian Government found it necessary in repeated personal consultations to influence both parties toward effecting a speedier understanding. For this purpose, the meeting in Vienna was agreed upon a few days ago on very short notice. Since the attitude of the Rumanians and of the Hungarians held out no prospect of an agreement by direct negotiation, and since both parties requested arbitration by Germany and Italy, the Government of the Reich and the Italian Government withdrew their previous objections to such arbitration and assumed the task of settlement by arbitration.

The Government of the Reich decided upon this course in agreement with the Italian Government, because it was evident that there was no further prospect of reaching a peaceful solution by any other means and because both Axis Powers have a fundamental interest in the maintenance of peace and order in those areas. This concern arises, as has always been understood between ourselves and the Soviet Government, primarily from the fact that Germany and Italy are very closely involved [verknütpf] with the Rumanian economy. So, for example, the extraction of Rumanian oil, its shipment to Germany, the uninterrupted importation of Rumanian grain into Germany, etc., are becoming of ever more vital significance for the Axis Powers. Hence an armed conflict in those areas, whatever its cause, could not have been tolerated by the Axis. After the Soviet Government had peacefully settled her controversy with Rumania, and the Rumanian-Bulgarian problem likewise approached a settlement, it was imperative that the last remaining territorial problem should not lead to an armed conflict. Because of the very complicated geographical and ethnological situation in Transylvania, the decision was not an easy one. However, we finally found a way out of the difficulties, which was based upon a just and impartial consideration of all the interests concerned. By their award, which was accepted by both parties without reservation, Germany and Italy have now secured the peace that was threatened in the

Page 180

Danube region. But in order to forestall once and for all a repetition of differences which might easily arise in areas of such territorial and ethnological complexity, the Axis Powers have undertaken to guarantee the territory of Rumania, which has now been definitively pacified. Since the award necessarily involved the cession of a considerable portion of Rumanian territory, it was a natural need for the Rumanians henceforth to be able to regard their boundary with Hungary and their territory in general as definitively secured. Since the territorial demands made by the Soviet Government on Rumania have been settled by the cession of Bessarabia, since the Bulgarian demands are now in course of being met, and since Rumania, through the award, has obtained her definitive boundary with Hungary, there could remain from this standpoint no further objection to the granting of such a guarantee by the Axis Powers.

Please tell Herr Molotov on my behalf that in view of the friendly relations between our countries, I attach great importance to informing the Soviet Government of these events.

We assume that, from the points of view set forth above, the Soviet Government, too, will welcome the settlement achieved by the Axis and regard it as a valuable contribution toward securing the peace in the Danube region.

RIBBENTROP

Frame 112444, serial 104

VERY URGENT

Moscow, September 1, 1940-2:08 a.m.

Received September 1, 1940-4:40 a. m.

SECRET

No. 1815 of August 31

Reference your telegram of the 30th, No. 1565.

For the Reich Foreign Minister.

Instruction carried out. Molotov, who was reserved, in contrast to his usual manner, expressed his thanks for the information and stated as follows:

The Soviet Government was already informed regarding the Vienna conversations by the press and the radio. He asked me to call the attention of the German Government to the fact that by its action it

[88] A marginal note reads: "Forwarded under No. 95 at 5:30 a. m., September 1, to the Special Train. Telegram Control Office, September 1."

Page 181

had violated article 3 of the Non-aggression Pact, which provided for consultation. The Soviet Government had been confronted with accomplished facts by the German Government; this violated existing agreements and conflicted with assurances the Soviet Government had received from Germany regarding questions of common interest to both countries. The present case involved two of the Soviet Union's neighbors, where she naturally had interests.

I told Molotov that I could not take a stand with regard to his remarks and that I would immediately notify my Government. Personally, I supposed that there had been no time for consultation in the present case because of the urgency of the matter.

SCHULENBURG

Frames 357818-357821, serial 1379

BERLIN, September 3, 1940-6:20 a. m.

Received Moscow September 3, 1940-1:50 p. m.

No. 1580 of September 3

Reference your telegram No. 1815.

Please call on Herr Molotov again and to his statement that Germany, by her conduct in Vienna, had violated the obligation to consult contained in article 3 of the Non-aggression Pact, reply in accordance with the following memorandum and afterwards hand him this memorandum as a summary of your instructions. If there is anything you wish to say regarding the instructions, please report to me before you call on Molotov.

In his last oral discussion with Ambassador Count von der Schulenburg, when the latter acquainted him with the conferences at Vienna, Chairman Molotov said that he had to call Germany's attention to the fact that by her conduct in Vienna she had violated article 3 of the German-Russian Non-aggression Pact of August 23, 1939, which provided for consultation. The Soviet Government had been confronted by Germany with accomplished facts, which violated existing agreements and conflicted with assurances the Soviet Government had received from Germany regarding questions of common interest to the two countries. The present case involved two of the Soviet Union's neighbors, in which she naturally had interests.

Page 182

Conscious of her friendly relations with the Soviet Union, which have developed in a manner satisfactory to both parties. and have been intensified both in the economic and in the political field since the conclusion of the treaties of 1939, the Government of the Reich takes the following position on the construction placed by the Soviet Government on the German-Russian Non-aggression Pact:

In article 3 of the German-Russian Non-aggression Pact an obligation was agreed upon for reciprocal information and consultation on questions of interest to both parties. Likewise at Moscow at the delimitation of the respective spheres of influence, an interest in Bessarabia was stressed on the part of Soviet Russia, while Germany declared herself disinterested in these areas. But that Germany is intensely concerned in the remaining Rumanian territories and the other problems of the Danube region, and is even vitally concerned there, in view of the close interpentration of the German economy with Rumania, particularly in the questions of oil and grain, is generally known and has, moreover, been communicated to the Soviet Government on various occasions and been recognized by it in its entirety. On the other hand, after the settlement of the Bessarabian question a like interest in the rest of Rumanian territory on the part of the Soviet Union is not evident, and has not been expressed to the Government of the Reich, either at the Moscow settlement or later. The same is true of Hungary. Hence the existence of mutual interests within the meaning of the Non-aggression Pact of Moscow is out of the question here. Thus, even if Rumania and Hungary are neighboring countries, Germany has certainly not committed a violation of the obligation for mutual consultation.

The Government of the Reich, moreover, believes itself the more justified in this view, in that the Soviet Government itself, on the occasion of various political moves in the recent past, by no means considered the fact of contiguity to Germany of the territories affected by her acts as a reason for prior consultation with the Government of the Reich. In this connection, the Government of the Reich refers to Russian action in the Baltic States, especially Lithuania. In the latter case, besides the fact that Lithuania is adjacent to Germany, an obligation existed to surrender to Germany a certain area in the southwest of Lithuania in the event that the Soviet Union should take special measures on Lithuanian territory for the safeguarding of her interests. Nevertheless, the Soviet Union effected a military occupation of that area also, although as a result of the Russian measures it should have been treated forthwith as German territory. Only

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after representations by the Government of the Reich was this question reopened.

Further, one might add that at the occupation of Bessarabia and Northern Bucovina the Government of the Reich likewise received only very short notice from the Soviet Government, although in view of the many Germans living there, in this case also, Germany had a special interest, and although the Government of the Reich had already pointed out that for Germany it was a new issue [ein Novum]. Nevertheless, in view of its cordial relations with the Soviet Union and in its desire to see the Danube region remain at peace, the Government of the Reich took it upon itself to give the Rumanian Government, which had made the most importunate representations for assistance to the Government of the Reich, the stern advice to settle this question peacefully, which meant the cession of that territory to the Soviet Union.

In conclusion, the Government of the Reich would like further to observe with reference to the statement that Germany had confronted the Soviet Union with accomplished facts, that while the moves of the Soviet Union were planned moves for the occupation of various territories in the neighborhood of Germany and were not previously announced to the Government of the Reich, the steps of the Reich Government in the case of Rumania and Hungary served the purpose of securing the peace in the Danube region, which was gravely threatened by the tension between the two countries, and this could only be accomplished by rapid diplomatic intervention. Moreover, the Government of the Reich is probably not mistaken in believing that by its campaign of pacification in the Danube area it has rendered a substantial service to all countries bordering on that area.

RIBBENTROP

Frames 357823-357824, serial 1379

VERY URGENT

Moscow, September 4, 1940-5:30 p. m.

No. 1841 of September 4

Reference your telegram No. 1580 of September 3.

I would appreciate authorization to supplement the ideas contained in the memorandum to be handed to Molotov in the sense that the

Page 184

Soviet Government really set off the great complex of questions by its settlement of the Bessarabian matter with unexpected speed and that it had thereby forced us, in order to avoid military complications in the Balkans, to take quick decisions in the matter of the Rumanian-Hungarian dispute. The beginning of the next to the last paragraph of the memorandum might give the Soviet Government the chance to protest that, before its action in Bessarabia, it had given the German Government the opportunity to state its views and had waited for the latter.

Further I would suggest deleting, in the third paragraph of the memorandum, the words: " . . . and has not been expressed to the Government of the Reich, either at the Moscow settlement or later," because they could provide Molotov with the opportunity again to revert to the talk between Mackensen and the Soviet Chargé in Rome last May (see our telegrams No. 1063 of June 3, No. 1079 of June 6, No. 1094 of June 7, [89] and the telegraphic instruction No. 1007 of June 15 [16]) and to state that the Soviet Government had at the time repeatedly demonstrated its interest.

Furthermore, my interview with Molotov would be substantially facilitated if I were enabled at the same time to communicate to him the position of the German Government, for which Molotov has in the meantime pressed several times, in the matter of the strip of Lithuanian territory as well as in the question of the Free Port Zone of Memel (see our telegrams No. 1799 and 1800 of August 30). [90] The question of the Free Port Zone of Memel was taken up with Schnurre on September 2 by Mikoyan in a manner which leaves no doubt as to the resentment felt by the Soviet Government, and makes much more difficult the further pursuit of our interests in the Baltic States. (See telegram No. 1829 of September 3). [91]

Please wire instructions.

SCHULENBURG

[89] Telegram of June 7 not printed.

[90] Latter not printed.

[91] Not printed.

Page 185

Frame 112457, serial 104

STATE SECRET

BERLIN, September 5, 1940.

No. 1604

The Navy intends to abandon the base on the Murman Coast, as such are now available in Norway. Please inform the Russians of this decision and, on behalf of the Government of the Reich, convey our thanks for valuable assistance. In addition to the official note, the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy intends also to express his gratitude in a personal letter to the Commander-in-Chief of the Soviet Navy. Therefore please wire when notification has been made.

WOERMANN

Frames 357827-357830, serial 1379

VERY URGENT

BERLIN, September 6, 1940-4:35 a. m.

Received Moscow, September 6, 1940-10 a. m.

No. 1609 of September 5

For the Ambassador personally.

Reference your telegram No. 1841.

To your suggestions I state the following for your information:

1) It is correct that the Hungarian and Bulgarian revisionist demands on Rumania were set in motion by the occupation of Bessarabia and Northern Bucovina. However, we cannot very well claim that it was the Russian action which made our diplomatic intervention so urgent that for this reason it was no longer possible for us to approach the Soviet Union. Besides, the necessity for swift diplomatic action is emphasized in the closing sentence of the memorandum. You will please insert therefore, in the first sentence of the next to the last paragraph of the memorandum, after the words "occupation of Bessarabia and Northern Bucovina," the qualifying clause: "which also gave the impulse for the launching of revisionist demands on Rumania."

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2) That the Soviet Government, before the occupation of Bessarabia and Northern Bucovina, formally gave us an opportunity to express our views is not disputed in our memorandum, but it is stressed that it gave us only a very short period in which to do so. In this regard, therefore, a change in the memorandum is not necessary.

3) The words in the third paragraph of the memorandum, stating that a like interest in Rumania on the part of the Soviet Union was not expressed to the Government of the Reich, either at the Moscow settlement or later, please leave unchanged. If Herr Molotov should object that the Soviet Government had demonstrated its interest in Rumania during discussion of the conversation between Mackensen and the Soviet Chargé in Rome, the reply should be made that such an interest could not be inferred from his inquiry at that time, as he had then only inquired about the attitude of the Reich Government toward an alleged statement of Mackensen, which in fact he had not made in the sense imputed to him at all. Besides, I might tell you for your personal information that this passage in our memorandum is of particular importance because we are anxious at this opportunity to demonstrate once and for all to the Soviet Union that we have really vital importance [Bedeutung] and predominant interests in Rumania which led us to guarantee the Rumanian territory within its present borders. Please bear this in mind in connection with the orientation of your conversations now and in the future as well. If necessary, you could point out orally to Herr Molotov in this connection that after the settlement of the Bessarbian question the purely geographical contiguity of the Soviet Union to Rumania could not be invested with a significance comparable to the German interests in Rumania. The Soviet Union, in contrast to Germany, certainly has sufficient oil wells and grain production, so that her relationship to Rumania for this very reason could decidedly not be placed on a level with ours. But please do not of your own accord give occasion for a discussion in such detail.

4) I leave it to you whether or not you think it opportune to bring up on this occasion the question of the strip of Lithuanian territory. If you think it advisable, you may tell Herr Molotov that the Government of the Reich is prepared in principle, against adequate compensation, to forego the cession of the strip of Lithuanian territory which was agreed upon in Moscow. The compensation which the Soviet Union has offered is certainly not acceptable to us. At the

Page 187

moment we are engaged in drawing up a proposal for adequate compensation and we shall soon approach the Soviet Government with this proposal.

5) On the other hand, I request you not to broach the question of the Free Port of Memel on this occasion. We must persist in our view that we cannot grant the Soviet Government a free port zone in Memel. But this question will have to be discussed separately with the Soviet Government.

Please report by wire on the course of your interview with Herr Molotov.

RIBBENTROP

Frame 112472, serial 104

VERY URGENT

Moscow, September 10, 1940-12:55 a. m.

Received September 10, 1940-4:30 a. m.

No. 1884 of September 9

Reference your telegram No. 1609 of the 5th.

For the Reich Minister personally.

Instruction carried out. Handed memorandum to Molotov this evening. Molotov read it through attentively and declared that the matter was so important for the Soviet Government that it would reply in writing. But he had to state now, that the position taken by the German Government could not alter the Soviet position. The Soviet Government persisted in its view that the conduct of the German Government in Vienna was not entirely in good faith [nicht ganz loyal], as [the German Government] could not have been in doubt that the Soviet Government was interested in Rumania and Hungary. The Soviet Government was, however, by no means disputing the fact that Germany had special interests in Rumania.

To justify his position, Molotov pointed out that the entire world press assumed as a matter of course that in the present case a consultation between Germany and the Soviet Union had certainly taken place.

SCHULENBURG

Page 188

Frame 214737, serial 407

URGENT

Moscow, September 10, 1940-5:58 p. m.

Received September 11, 1940-8 p. m.

No. 1900 of September 11

Reference your telegram No. 1649 of the 10th. [92]

Molotov displayed great interest in, and had me repeat several times, the statement that "the Government of the Reich is prepared in principle, against adequate compensation, to forego the cession of the strip of Lithuanian territory which was agreed upon in Moscow." I had the impression that Molotov was satisfied. The statement that the compensation offered was certainly not acceptable to us and that we were engaged in drawing up a counter-proposal, Molotov noted with interest, without any further comment.

SCHULENBURG

[92] Not printed.

Frames 0463-0464, serial F 5

RAM 37 g. Rs.

BERLIN, September 16, 1940.

No. . .

For the Ambassador personally.

Please call on Herr Molotov on the afternoon of September 21, if by that time you are not otherwise instructed, and communicate to him verbally and casually, preferably while engaged on another errand, the following:

The continued penetration of English planes into Germany and into the territories occupied by Germany makes it necessary to strengthen the defenses at several points, and particularly in northern Norway. Part of this reinforcement is an antiaircraft artillery battalion, which, with its equipment, is to be stationed in northern Norway. Investigation of the transport facilities revealed that for this purpose the route by way of Finland would present the least difficulty. This

Page 189

antiaircraft battery will presumably be landed near Haparanda on September 22 and transported to Norway, part way by rail, and the rest by road.

The Finnish Government, appreciating the special circumstances, has granted the German request to permit this transport to take place.

We are anxious to inform the Soviet Government of this step in advance. Wire report that instruction has been carried out.

We assume-and request express confirmation-that the Soviet Government will keep this communication strictly secret.

RIBBENTROP

Frame 0464-serial F 5

No. . .

BERLIN, September 16, 1940.

For the Minister personally.

Arrangements have been made by German and Finnish military authorities for the transport of an antiaircraft artillery battalion through Finland. I wired the Moscow Embassy in this matter as follows:

Insert [preceding document].

End of telegram to Moscow.

Please notify the Foreign Minister in Helsinki on the afternoon of September 21 of the step which is being taken in Moscow.

RIBBENTROP

Frames 112531-112538, serial 104

SEPTEMBER 21, 1940.

Subject: Interview with Molotov on Vienna conversations.

Before my departure for Berlin, Molotov received me at 5 p. m. on September 21, 1940. On this occasion he handed me an exhaustive memorandum [93] in reply to the German memorandum on the subject of

[93] For text, see enclosure to this document.

Page 190

the Vienna conversations, which I had transmitted to him on September 9, 1940, on behalf of the Government of the Reich. [94]

In the course of the interview, Molotov explained verbally the contents of the memorandum, expressing essentially the same ideas as on September 9. (See memorandum of Hilger, Counselor of Embassy, of September 18, 1940.) [95]

When I pointed out that I could not recall that he-Molotov-had ever spoken of German support for the claims of the Soviet Government to Southern Bucovina and that I could merely remember the casual little phrase that the Soviet Government would "for the present" confine itself to Northern Bucovina, Molotov replied that apparently he had made this remark in an indefinite way at the time.

Then Molotov reverted-repeatedly-to the last paragraph of the memorandum, in which he emphasized that an amendment or annulment of article 3 of the Non-aggression Treaty might be discussed, if this article inconvenienced us in any way or had proved restrictive.

I replied that in my opinion the German Government had no intentions at all along these lines.

Herr Molotov further stated that the German action at Vienna had given the foreign press cause to speak of German-Russian disagreements and to assert that the guarantee of the Rumanian border was directed against the Soviet Union. It would have been easy to forestall such rumors by asking the Soviet Government in advance about its intentions. In this case, the Soviet Government would have given the unequivocal reply that it had no aggressive designs on Rumania.

In conclusion, Herr Molotov repeated his request that during my stay in Berlin I do everything to clarify the position of the Soviet Government on this question, which, of course, I promised to do.

COUNT VON DER SCHULENBURG

Moscow, September 21, 1940.

In reply to German Ambassador Count von der Schulenburg's memorandum of September 9 of this year, the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs has the honor to state as follows:

[94] For text, see telegrams from the Reich Foreign Minister to the German Ambassador in the Soviet Union, Nos. 1580 of September 3 and 1609 of September 5, 1940, ante, pp. 181 and 185.

[95] Not printed. For the Ambassador's account of his presentation of the German memorandum, see his telegram No. 1884 of September 9, 1940, ante, p. 187.

Page 191

1) In reply to the declaration of the People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs, V. M. Molotov, of August 31 of this year, to the effect that the Government of the German Reich had disregarded article 3 of the treaty of consultation, the Government of the German Reich states that Germany did not violate her obligation to consult. In justification of its position, the Government of the German Reich states that, after the solution of the Bessarabian question, the U.S.S.R. and Germany, from the standpoint of the Moscow Non-aggression Pact, no longer had any common interests with respect to Rumania and Hungary.

The Soviet Government is of the opinion that such a construction by the Government of the German Reich contravenes article 3 of the Treaty of August 23, 1939, by virtue of which the contracting parties obligate themselves in the future to "maintain continual contact with one another for the purpose of consultation in order to exchange information on problems affecting their common interests."

There is no doubt that the decisions reached at Vienna regarding the transfer of a considerable portion of Transylvania to Hungary and regarding the guarantee of the national territory of Rumania by Germany and Italy involve the very questions that affect the common interests of our countries and consequently make the consultation provided for in article 3 of the Treaty of August 23, 1939 obligatory. Definite information regarding the above-mentioned decisions at Vienna was not given by the Government of the German Reich to the Soviet Government until after the Vienna Award, which confronted the Soviet Government with an accomplished fact.

The Soviet Government must also point to the fact that the granting of the guarantee to Rumania in respect to her national territory gave justification for the assertion that this action of the Government of the German Reich was directed against the U.S.S.R. As is known, assertions of this kind actually received a wide circulation. If, however, the Government of the German Reich had approached the Government of the U.S.S.R. on this question in advance, every justification for the circulation of such assertions would have disappeared and the Government of the German Reich at the same time would have fully convinced itself that the U.S.S.R. does not intend to threaten the territorial integrity of Rumania. From this is evident the extraordinary importance of timely information and consultation on questions affecting the common interests of the U.S.S.R. and Germany.

Page 192

The Soviet Government regrets to have to state that the view expressed in the reply of the Government of the German Reich of September 9 of this year is also at variance with the declaration made on June 23 of this year by Count von der Schulenburg on behalf of the Government of the German Reich. As is known, the Government of the German Reich in that case replied-to a specific inquiry of the Soviet Government-that the obligation to inform and consult arising from article 3 of the Treaty is applicable to the countries of southeastern Europe and the Balkans. It appears from the foregoing that the Government of the German Reich in June of this year recognized the obligation to consult on questions concerning such countries as Rumania and Hungary, particularly on such important questions as those dealt with at Vienna, which affect the interests of the U.S.S.R.

The Soviet Government, for its part, considers it as its duty to state that it reaffirms its declarations concerning the recognition of the special economic interests of Germany in Rumania, especially in the domain of oil and grain supplies. At the same time, however, it is compelled to declare that the inference which might be drawn from Count von der Schulenburg's memorandum of September 9 of this year is incorrect: that after the solution of the Bessarabian question the Soviet Government had recognized in its entirety the exclusive interest of Germany in the Rumanian question and also in other questions affecting the Danube basin. In reality, the Soviet Government has neither orally nor in writing recognized any such rights on the part of Germany.

2) To justify the omission of such a consultation with the Government of the U.S.S.R. in the Vienna decisions, the Government of the German Reich cites the fact that allegedly the Government of the U.S.S.R. did not consult with the Government of the German Reich, either, on its measures in the Baltic States, especially in Lithuania, and gave only short notice with regard to Bessarabia and Northern Bucovina.

The Soviet Government must, in the first place, point out that during the entire period of the validity of the Treaty of August 23, 1939 the Government of the German Reich did not once declare that the Soviet Government had violated its treaty obligations or had failed to consult with the Government of the German Reich on the above-mentioned questions. The Soviet Government is of the opinion that the best way to establish mutual understanding and to secure the complete and effective performance of the obligations imposed by the Treaty is by a timely declaration of claims that may arise, in case

Page 193

there actually are such claims. The Soviet Government must point out that during the whole year that the Treaty of August 23, 1939 has been in effect it kind not received any such declarations or claims from the Government of the German Reich.

To turn to the substance of the above-mentioned matter, the Soviet Government believes it necessary to declare that the said statement of the Government of the German Reich is not in accord with the real situation. The Soviet Government not only informed the Government of the German Reich in advance regarding the measures it intended to take in the Baltic States, especially in Lithuania, but even received from the Government of the German Reich on June 17 of this year a communication stating that the measures taken by the Soviet Government in those countries were regarded by Germany as measures which concerned solely the Soviet Union and those countries. Such a declaration from the Government of the German Reich was entirely comprehensible to the Soviet Government, as Germany had as recently as August 1939 recognized the special interests of the Soviet Union in respect to the Baltic States, and the measures which the Soviet Union had taken regarding those states, especially Lithuania, in no way went beyond the scope of the Soviet-German Pact of August 23, 1939. In regard to a certain area in the Southeast of Lithuania, however, the Soviet Government in June of this year clearly confirmed the rights of Germany, and reserved its new proposals concerning this Lithuanian area for a special arrangement with the Government of the German Reich.

The same holds true as regards the question of Bessarabia and Bucovina, in regard to which the Soviet Government held a consultation with the Government of the German Reich, at which it met the viewpoint of the Government of the German Reich by substantially paring down its intentions with regard to Bucovina. At the same time it voiced the hope that the Government of the German Reich would give its support in the future, when the question of Southern Bucovina was reopened. This declaration of the Soviet Government met with no objection from the Government of the German Reich.

Its attitude on questions pertaining to Rumania was, moreover, communicated by the Soviet Government on June 25 of this year to the Italian Government through the Italian Ambassador, Herr Rosso, and it was convinced that the Government of the German Reich would be duly informed of this communication of the Soviet Government. In this communication, the Soviet Government, while emphasizing that it wished to obtain from Rumania merely what rightfully belonged to it, declared: "Regarding other territories of Rumania, the

Page 194

U.S.S.R. is mindful of the interests of Italy and Germany and is prepared to come to an understanding with them on these questions."

On the basis of the foregoing explanations, the Soviet Government deems it necessary to declare that the measures it took in regard to the Baltic States and in Bessarabia were entirely in accord with the Soviet-German Treaty, while the new and lesser problems which were not anticipated in this Treaty are being solved and will be solved by the Soviet Government in consultation with the Government of the German Reich.

Hence the reference by the Government of the German Reich to the measures carried out by the Soviet Union in the Baltic region as an explanation of the failure to consult with the Soviet Government regarding the Vienna decision is not confirmed by the facts and therefore not justified.

3) In conclusion the Government of the German Reich points to the circumstance that in the solution of the Hungarian-Rumanian dispute on August 30 it had to proceed by swift diplomatic intervention.

Here the Soviet Government deems it necessary to recall that this question had been considered as early as the conferences in Salzburg between the Government of the German Reich and the Governments of Hungary and Rumania and that, consequently, the Government of the German Reich had sufficient time at its disposal to consult with the Soviet Government on this question.

The aforesaid circumstances, therefore, cannot serve as justification for the failure of the Government of the German Reich to comply with the obligation to consult, imposed by the Non-aggression Treaty, in the Rumanian question and in the Hungarian-Rumanian dispute.

The Soviet Government is firmly convinced that the precise and strict observance of this Treaty, particularly of article 3 of the Treaty, is also one of the most important conditions in the matter of the pacification of the Danube region, to which reference is made in the memorandum of September 9 of this year.

In conclusion, the Soviet Government deems it necessary to add to the foregoing considerations that, if article 3 of the Non-aggression Treaty involves certain inconveniences and restrictions from the standpoint of the Government of the German Reich, the Soviet Government is prepared to negotiate on the question of an amendment to or deletion of this article of the Treaty. The Soviet Government considers it desirable to have a special agreement to consider the time and manner of dealing with this question.

Moscow, September 21, 1940.