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ジェイムズ・ダンバー
道徳哲学講義ノート

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James Dunbar Institutes of Moral Philosophy (1789–1794) edited from the Aberdeen University MS 3107/5/2/6 by the kind permission of the Library, with an introduction for Japanese readers, by Hiroshi Mizuta.

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解説

—アバディーン啓蒙について　bio-bibliographical に—

水田　洋

1

この手稿は、ジェイムズ・ダンバー (James Dunbar, 1742–98) が、1789 年から 94 年にかけて、アバディーン大学キングズ・カレジでおこなった、道徳哲学の講義ノートと想定されるものであって、手稿自体には、署名も年代の記入もないが、B6 判ぐらいの用紙の両面をつかった 40 ページの手稿が、アバディーン大学図書館に、そういうものとして所蔵されている。

解説と転写は、アバディーン大学トマス・リード研究所にフェロウとして滞在中の水田がおこない、篠原久氏(関西学院大学)に原文のゼロックス・コピーによって点検していただき、古典語については、西村賀子氏(市邨学園短期大学)に確認していただいた。

印刷にあたって、つぎのような原則にしたがった。まず、2 ページにわたる道徳哲学の目次らしいものは、全体をもれなく解読することが困難なうえに、かならずしも手稿の内容と対応していないとおもわれるので、省略し、別に目次と人名索引を作成する。略字・略語は、Mr Dr のような慣用語をのぞいて、すべて復原し、誤記は [ ] 内に訂正する。ただし、現行の綴や用語法とちがっていても、当時の慣用と考えられるものは、*OED* を参照して保存する。書名や専門用語のアンダラインは省略する。

なお、章節の構成はもちろん原文どおりだが、見られるとおり、混乱している。Section I がないのは、法律の條項の様式とおなじだからいいとしても、Part I、Part II のあとに本体論 Pneumatology の Part II、Part III がくるし、最後の政治学は Chapter でなく Part にわかれている。はじめの Part I、Part II は Introduction のなかの区分で、本体論の Part II、Part III は、それぞれ I と II のまちがいだと考えるか、逆にそれは III と IV であって、はじめの I と II は本体論の Parts であると考えるかという、ふたつのなかでは、講義のなかでの本体論の定義から、後者をとるのが妥当だろう。

2

ダンバーは、農地改革論[1]でしられるウィリアム・オウグルヴィ (William Ogilvie, 1736–1819) とともに、スコットランド啓蒙思想のなかのアバディーン啓蒙の、最後の世代に属し、啓蒙思想の試金石となったアメリカとフランスの革命を知っている。スコットランド啓蒙思想のにない手たちの大部分が革命に背をむけたのに、かれらはそうではなかった。ダンバーの見解は、つぎのふたつの著書によっても知ることができるが、そのほかにはこの道徳哲学ノートと手紙—

通[2]しか、かれが書いたものはのこされていない。

James Dunbar, *De primordiis civitatum oratio. In qua agitur de bello civili inter M. Britanniam et colonias nunc flagranti.* London, 1779.

James Dunbar, *Essays on the history of mankind in rude and civilized ages.* London and Edinburgh, 1780. The second edition, with additions, London and Edinburgh, 1782.

いまアバディーン啓蒙の最後の世代と書いたが、スコットランドの四つの大学都市のうち、エディンバラとグラーズゴウにくらべて、アバディーンの啓蒙思想の研究はたちおくれていた。もちろん、エディンバラやグラーズゴウを地域的に特定した啓蒙思想の研究がとくにおおかったわけではないが、アダム・スミスについてはグラーズゴウが、ヒュームやファーガスンなどについてはエディンバラが、とうぜんのこととして前提されていたのである。

ところが、1986年にアバディーン大学で、「アバディーンと啓蒙」[3]の国際学会が開催されたころから、事情がかわってきた。ひとつは、大学創立500年の記念事業として、大学史関係の研究と出版への助成がおこなわれたことであり、もうひとつは、トマス・リード研究所の設立である。後者は、名称や責任者がたびたびかわり、現在ではトマス・リードともスコットランド啓蒙思想とも関係のない、医療社会史あるいは医療社会学の方向に進んでいる[4]ので、すくなくとも当分のあいだは、アバディーン啓蒙思想にかんする成果を期待することはできないが、前者は『アバディーン大学史500年記念研究双書』全10巻のなかに、つぎのふたつの啓蒙思想研究を生みだした。

Roger L. Emerson, *Professors, patronage and politics. The Aberdeen Universities in the eighteenth century.* Qiuncentennial studies in the history of the University of Aberdeen. Aberdeen University Press, 1992.

Paul B. Wood, *The Aberdeen enlightenment. The arts curriculum in the eighteenth century.* Qiuncentennial studies in the history of the University of Aberdeen. Aberdeen University Press, 1993.

これよりはやく、アバディーン哲学協会(賢人クラブ)について、つぎのような資料と研究が出版されていることを、指摘しておこう。

H. Lewis Ulman, *The minutes of the Aberdeen Philosophical Society 1758–1773.* Published for Aberdeen University Studies Committee by Aberdeen Univertsity Press, 1980.

Stephen A. Conrad, *Citizenship and common sense: The problem of authority in the social background and social philosophy of the Wise Club of Aberdeen.* A Garland series of outstanding dissertations. n. p., 1987.

(ここに出ている Aberdeen University Press は、大学とは関係のないパーガモン系の出版社で、倒産したといわれている。『アバディーンと啓蒙』の出版社も、これとおなじである)。

アバディーンについての研究のたちおくれの理由のひとつとして、ここでは啓蒙思想がほとん

ど大学(キングズ・カレジとマーシャル・カレジ)のなかに限定され、したがって出版された著作もすくないということがあげられよう。著者だけでなく出版者もすくなかったのである。[5]

アバディーン啓蒙の父といわれるジョージ・ターンブル(George Turnbull, 1698–1748)は1721年にエディンバラ大学を出てマーシャル・カレジのリージェント[6]になるが、はやくも1727年には辞任してアバディーンをはなれる。たまたまかれがおしえたクラスにトマス・リード(Thomas Reid, 1710–96)がいたために、かれはアバディーン啓蒙の父とよばれるようになるのだが、かれとアバディーンとの関係は、1721–23, 1723–26のふたつのクラスだけであって、かれの著書はほとんどすべてアバディーンをはなれてから書かれ出版された。かれが1727年にマーシャル・カレジから最初の法学博士の学位を授与されながら、その学位は無価値だとしてエディンバラであらためて学位をとったということ[7]も、かれとアバディーンとの関係を象徴しているといえるかもしれないし、逆に、そのように大学をはなれたこと[8]が、*DNB*にその名がのこらなかった理由であるかもしれない。

*DNB*に記載がないために、かれの著作については、暫定的につぎのようなものをあげるにとどめなければならない(かれについては、注3にあげた学会報告書のなかにふたつの論文がある)。

George Turnbull, *Theses philosophicae de scientiae naturalis cum pholosophia morali conjunctione.* Aberdeen, J. Nicol, 1723.

George Turnbull, *Theses academicae de pulcherrima mundi.* Aberdeen, J. Nicol, 1726.

George Turnbull, *A philosophical inquiry concerning the connexion between the doctrines and miracles of Jesus Christ.* London, R. Willock, 1726.

George Turnbull, *Christianity neither false nor useless.* London, R. Willock, 1732.

George Turnbull, *A treatise on ancient painting, containing observations on the rise, progress, and decline of that art amongst the Greeks and Romans. The high opinion which the great men of antiquity had of it; its connexion with poetry and philosophy; and the use that may be made of it in education: To which are added some remarks on the peculiar genius, character, and talents of Raphael, Michael Angelo, Nicholas Poussin, and other celebrated modern masters; and the commendable use they made of the exquisite remains of antiquity in painting as well as sculpture.* London, A. Millar, 1740.

George Turnbull, *The principles of moral philosophy. An inquiry into the wise and good government of the moral world. In which the continuance of good administration, and of due care about virtue, for ever, is inferred from present order in all things, in that part chiefly where virtue is concerned.* 2 vols. London, printed for the author, and sold by A. Millar, 1740.

Jo. Got. Heineccius, *A methodical system of universal law: or, the laws of nature and*

nations deduced from certain principles, and applied to proper cases. Translated, and illustrated with notes and supplements, by George Turnbull, LL.D. To which is added, a discourse upon the nature and origin of moral and civil laws; in which they are deduced, by an analysis of the human mind in the experimental way, from our internal principles and dispositions. 2 vols. London, George Keith, 1741.

ターンブルの弟子でアバディーン啓蒙を代表するかのようにいわれるリードでさえ、主著の出版はすべて、アバディーンからグラーズゴウに移る年以降である。もちろんかれは、1726年にマーシャル・カレジを卒業して1764年にスミスの後任としてグラーズゴウに移るまで、ほとんどアバディーンとその周辺ですごしたのだし、とくに1751年からは、キングズ・カレジのリージェントとして、また1758年からはアバディーン哲学協会の創立メンバーとして、アバディーンの啓蒙思想ときりはなすことのできない関係にあった。だから、かれの思想は、ターンブルとちがって、アバディーンで形成され、アバディーンにかなりの影響を与えたということができるだろう。しかし、アバディーン啓蒙思想の著作活動ということをげんみつに解すれば、かれのものはふくまれない。

Thomas Reid, An essay on quantity; occasioned by reading a treatise, in which simple and compound ratios are applied to virtue and merit. *Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society,* vol. 45, 1748.

Thomas Reid, *An inquiry into the human mind, on the principles of common sense.* Edinburgh, 1764.

Thomas Reid, *Essays on the intellectual powers of man.* Edinburgh, 1785.

Thomas Reid, *Essays on the active powers of man.* Edinburgh, 1788.

Thomas Reid, Observations on the danger of political innovation, from a discourse delivered on the 28th November 1794, before the Literary Society in Glasgow College. *Glasgow Courier,* December 18. 1794.

Thomas Reid, Statistical account of the University of Glasgow. *Statistical account of Scotland,* edited by John Sinclair. London, 1799.

Thomas Reid, *Analysis of Aristotles's logics, with remarks.* Edinburgh, 1806.

Thomas Reid, *Philosophical orations. Delivered at graduation ceremonies in King's College, Aberdeen, 1753, 1756, 1759, 1762.* Edited with an introduction, from the Birkwood manuscripts, by W.R. Humphries. Aberdeen, 1937.

Thomas Reid, *The philosophical orations of Thomas Reid delivered at graduation ceremonies in King's College, Aberdeen, 1753, 1756, 1759, 1762.* Edited by D.D. Todd. Translated by S.M.L. Darcus. Philosophical Research Archives 3, 1977.

Thomas Reid, *Thomas Reid's lectures on the fine arts.* Transcribed from the original

manuscript, with an introduction and notes by Peter Kivy. The Hague, 1973.

Thomas Reid, *Practical ethics being lectures and papers on natural religion, self-government, natural jurisprudence, and the law of nations.* Edited from the manuscripts with an introduction and a commentary by Knud Haakonssen. Princeton University Press, 1990.

あとの4点はいずれも死後の出版で、手稿によるものである。キングズ・カレジの卒業式告辞は、ラテン語ではあるが式場で読まれたのだから、完全に未公表とはいえないだろうが、さいごの2点は、グラーズゴウ時代の手稿である。

定職がなかったターンブルの主著が、自費出版(ミラーは販売だけ)であったのにくらべると、リードはロウランドに移ったためもあって、出版の機会にはめぐまれていたようたようであり、著作集も1819年の3巻本からハミルトン編の包括的な2巻本(1846)になり、それが版をかさねてきた。ただし、フランス革命に触発された発言は、著作集にはなく、グラースゴウでの後任者アーチボールド・アーサー (Archibald Arthur, 1744–97) の論文集に再録されている (*Discourses on theological and literary subjects.* Glasgow, 1803)。[9]

ターンブルとリードがアバディーン啓蒙に対して以上のような関係であるとすれば、いわば生粋のアバディーン啓蒙のにない手としては、誰がいるのだろうか。

注

(1) [William Ogilvie], *An essay on the right of property in land, with respect to its foundation in the law of nature; its present establishment by the municipal laws of Europe; and the regulations by which it might be rendered more beneficial to the lower ranks of mankind.* London, J.Walter, [1781].

この本は1838年にチャーティストによって再刊されただけでなく、そのごもマクドナルドが長篇の伝記を附して、さらにベーアがペインとスペンスの農業論とともに、再刊した。邦訳はベーア編のものによっている。刊行年は、マクドナルドが原典のタイトルページそのままだとして1782としているが、原典には年の記載はない。ここでは*NDB*によって1781とする。

Birthright in land by William Ogilvie with biographical notes by D.C. Macdonald. London, 1891.

The pioneers of land reform, Thomas Spence, William Ogilvie, Thomas Paine, with an introduction by M.Beer. London, 1920. 四野宮四郎訳『近代土地改革思想の源流』御茶の水書房、1982.

(2) バハン伯デーヴィド・ステュアート・アースキン (David Steuart Erskine, 11th earl of Buchan, 1742–1829) にあてた手紙が、エディンバラ大学図書館にある。具体的なことがらはそれだけではわからないが、アースキンの改革案への支持表明である。

(3) Jennifer J. Carter and Joan H. Pittock [Pittock-Wesson] (eds.), *Aberdeen and the enlightenment.* Proceedings of a conference held at the University of Aberdeen. Aberdeen University Press, 1987. これにはフィールディングについての日本人の報告がまぎれこんでいる。『トム・ジョーンズ』にはジャコバイト反乱が出てはくるが、アバディーンの啓蒙とは関係がない。そのためかこの報告に対しては、質問が皆無であったという。リードとの関係では、このころ Reid Studies, No. 1 (1986–87) が、アバディーン大学から発刊されたが、まもなく消滅した。トマス・リード研究所の動向とともに、学内の権力闘争がからんでいるようである。

(4) アバディーン大学創立500年記念事業のひとつとして、トマス・リード研究所主催の医療史国際学会があったが、アバディーンについては、地方事情の一部会があるだけであった。そこでとりあげられたデーヴィド・スキーン (David Skene, 1731–70) については後述する。University of Aberdeen quincentennial conference on the history of medicine. Changing organisms: organisms and change. 29 June - 2 July 1995.

(5) 1726–75 の期間におけるアバディーンの出版者数は、グラーズゴウの約三分の一であった (75 対 24)。量だけでなく質についても、グラーズゴウのファウルズやユリーに対応するものは、アバディーンにはいなかった。Cf. H.R. Plomer, G.H. Bushnell, & E.R. McC. Dix, *A dictionary of the printers and booksellers who were at work in England, Scotland and Ireland from 1726 to 1774.* The Bibliographical Society, 1968, pp. 422–3.

(6) Regent というのは、一人の教師が全科目を教える制度で、オクスブリジのテューターに似ているが、18世紀のスコットランド諸大学では次第に廃止され、アバディーンがいちばんおくれた。

(7) M.A. Stewart, George Turnbull and educational reform, in *Aberdeen and the enlightenment,* p. 97.

(8) ibid., pp. 97–8. アバディーンをはなれてから、ターンブルは主として家庭教師や私塾によって生活し、1742年にアイアランドの寒村の教区牧師として、ようやく定職をえた。

(9) これは同僚のウィリアム・リチャードスン (William Richardson, 1743–1814) によって編集されたアーサーの遺稿集である。ふたりはほぼ同年令で、ともにアダム・スミスの弟子であった。

3

ダンバーとオウグルヴィが、アバディーン啓蒙の最後の世代だと、まえに書いておいた。それは啓蒙思想というものが、18世紀とともにとはいわないまでも、市民革命の余波とともにおわるという考えかたによる。そのおわりかたについての詳論は、いまの問題ではない。固有の意味でのアバディーン啓蒙のにない手たちは誰かと問うことは、ターンブルとダンバーたちのあいだを

問うことである。

さしあたって、方法はふたつある。第一はアバディーン哲学協会の会員をしらべることで、これについてはアルマンの前掲書にリストがある。第二は、アバディーン大学の人文関係の教員をしらべることで、これもまたウッドの前掲書にかなり網羅的な紹介がある。

哲学協会の会員は15名で、すでに名前をあげた3名(リード、オウグルヴィ、ダンバー)をのぞけばつぎの12名である(ターンブルははやくアバディーンを去った)。James Beattie (1735–1803), George Campbell (1719–96), John Farquhar (1732–68), Alexander Gerard (1728–95), Thomas Gordon (1714–97), John Gregory (1724–73), John Ross (c. 1730–c. 1800), David Skene (1731–70), George Skene (1742–1803), John Stewart (c. 1708–66), Robert Trail (1720–75), William Traill (1746–1831). かれらのうちで、ファーカーは牧師で、遺著として説教集(*Sermors on various subjects*, 1772)があるだけであり、ゴードンは、会員としては活動的であったが、著書はない。グレゴリーは開業医で、ロンドンとエディンバラでくらすことがおおかった(1766年にエディンバラ大学医療実務教授)。著書はアバディーン時代の報告をまとめたものがひとつと、エディンバラ時代のものが三つある(*Comparative view of the state and faculties of man with those of the animal world,* 1765. *Observations on the duties and offices of a physician, and on the method of prosecuting enquiries in philosophy,* 1770. *Elements of the practice of physic,* 1772. *A father's legacy to his daughters,* 1774.)。医療実務にかんする著書には、社会的関心がみられるかもしれない。ロスについては、1767–90年にヒブル語の教授であったことのほかには、ほとんど知られていない。D. スキーンは、夭折した医学の教授で、のこされた数百ページの手稿によって社会的関心を知ることができるが、著書はない(かれについては後述)。G. スキーンは、1760年にマーシャル・カレジの自然哲学の教授、75年に社会・自然史の教授、88年に辞任して開業医となったが、著書はない。ステュアートはリードの同級生、マーシャルの数学教授で、関心はひろかったが、ニュートンの翻訳のほかには著書はない。R. トレイルは、哲学協会で1758年にルソーの不平等起源論について報告してまもなく、グラーズゴウ大学の東洋語(のちにリーチマンのあとをついで神学)の教授になり、アバディーンとは縁がきれた。短期間ながらスミスの同僚だったわけである。W. トレイルは、1766年にグラーズゴウ大学を卒業して、マーシャルの数学教授になった。著書としては、『代数学原理』のほかに、グラーズゴウの数学教授、ロバート・シムスンの伝記がある(*Elements of algebra,* Aberdeen, 1770. *An account of the life and writings of Robert Simson, M.D., professor of mathematics in the University of Glasgow,* Bath, 1812).

以上、アバディーン哲学協会のメンバーをほぼアルファベット順に紹介しながら、3人については説明を保留した。それはビーティ、キャンベル、ジェラードである。じつはこの3人だけが、*DNB* に収録されているのだ。*DNB* はそのほかにトマス・ブラクウェル父子(Thomas Blackwell the elder, 1660?-1728; Thomas Blackwell the younger, 1701–57), パトリック・コプラン

ド(Patrick Copland, 1749–1822), デーヴィド・フォーダイス(David Fordyce, 1711–51), ロバート・イードゥン・スコット(Robert Eden Scott, 1770–1811)をあげているが、このなかで注目すべきものは、フォーダイスだけだといっていいだろう。

ブラックウェル父子については、父は神学の、子はギリシァ語の教授で、ともに学長(principal, 主任教授と訳すべきか)になったことを指摘しておく。父ブラクウェルは、スコットランド教会のなかでは民衆派(牧師任命権についての)に属したようで、著書でも啓示宗教を擁護している[1]。しかし1715年のジャコバイト反乱ののち、マーシャル・カレジではかれだけが、反ジャコバイトとして、地位をたもつことができた。子のブラクウェルは、バークリがバミューダ学校計画に、ギリシァ語の教授として予定するほどの名声をえていたが、著書はほとんどホメロスにかんするものである[2]。ただし、かれが1748年にジョージ2世によって学長に任命されたのは、父のばあいとおなじく、1745年のジャコバイト反乱と関係があるかもしれない。つまり、親子とも名誉革命=ハノーヴァー体制の支持者だった、ということである。

コプランドは数学の教授で、著書もその範囲に限定されている。スコットは、キングズ・カレジの哲学の教授(他の学科を歴任)で、スコットランド・コモン・センス学派に属するとされているが、著書はすべて19世紀になってからの出版であるから、一応、アバディーン啓蒙の枠外としておく[3]。

注目すべきだといったフォーダイスは、アバディーンの商人で市長にもなったジョージ・フォーダイスの次男、マーシャル・カレジ出身でその道徳哲学教授になった(1742)。しかし、大陸旅行の帰途、オランダ近海で嵐にあって死亡した。そのため、著書のうち2点は遺著であるし、哲学協会の創立以前に死んだので、その名簿からひろったときにはもれていた。『道徳哲学要論』は、はじめ匿名でドズリーの評論集に発表され、のちに単行本になったので、匿名のものを初版としている。

[David Fordyce], *Dialogues concerning education.* 2 vols. London, 1745–8.

[David Fordyce], On ethics, on morality, *The modern preceptor,* vol. 2, pp. 241–379. London, Dodsley, 1748.

David Fordyce, *Elements of moral philsophy.* London, 1754. 4th edition, 1769. French tr., 1756, German tr., 1757.

David Fordyce, *Theodorus, a dialogue concerning the art of preaching.* London, 1752.

[David Fordyce], *The temple of virtue. A dream.* Published by James Fordyce. London, 1757.

フォーダイスは、教職につくまえに(1737?)イングランドに旅行し、ウォーバトン(William Warburton, 1698–1779)やミドゥルトン(Conyers Middleton, 1683–1750)などにあっていた。ミドゥルトンは、理神論者といわれるが、とにかくケンブリジの教授になったのだから、国教会の広教派というところだろう。フォーダイスとかれらとの思想的交流の内容はわからないが、ド

ズリの前掲評論集に寄稿することになったのは、このイングランド旅行がきっかけであったと見てまちがいあるまい。この論文が主著となったことは上記のとおりであるが、さらに『エンサイクロピディア・ブリタニカ』(1771)の編集者ウィリアム・スメリー(William Smellie, 1740–95)によって、やや省略されて「道徳哲学」の項目として収録された[4]。したがって、主著自体が版をかさね、フランス語、ドイツ語(スイス)に翻訳されたほかに、ふたつのポピュラーな形態でそれはひろく読まれたのである。その内容については、「エンサイクロペディアの初版における道徳哲学」[5]で一応説明したので、ここではくりかえさないが、そのときはフォーダイスが全然視野にはいっていなかったことを、告白しておく。

注

(1) Thomas Blackwell, *Ratio sacra, or an appeal unto the rational world about the reasonableness of revealed religion ... directed against the three prevailing errors of atheism, deism, bourignonism.* Edinburgh, 1710.

Thomas Blackwell, *Schema sacrum, or a sacred scheme of natural and revealed religion, making a scriptural-rational account of these three heads ... of creation ... of divine predestination ... and of the wise divine procedure in accomplishing the scheme.* Edinburgh, 1710.

Thomas Blackwell, *Methodus evangelica.* London, 1712.

二番目の著書は1800年に再版が出ただけでなく、1774年にボストンでForma sacraという題でアメリカ版が出た。

(2) [Thomas Blackwell], *An enquiry into the life and writings of Homer.* London, 1735.

Thomas Blackwell, *Proofs of the enquiry into Homer's life and writings, translated into English; being a key into the Enquiry ...* . London, 1747.

[Thomas Blackwell], *Letters concerning mythology.* London, 1748.

(3) もちろん、この枠の設定はまったく根拠がないわけではないが、便宜的なものである。19世紀にはいっても、ドゥガルド・ステュアート、ジェイムズ・マキントッシュ(後述)、ウィリアム・バロンなどの著書は出版されている。

(4) Roger Emerson, Science and moral philosophy in the Scottish enlightenment, *Studies in the philosophy of the Scottish enlightenment,* edited by M.A. Stewart, Oxford, 1990, p. 26. Cf. Paul B. Wood, op. cit., p. 53.

(5) 水田洋『アダム・スミス研究』未来社、1968, 補論一、第六章。初出は『経済科学』第12巻第2号(1965)。

夭折したフォーダイスのあとを、マーシャル・カレジでつぐのがジェラードであり、1760年にかれが神学教授の席にうつると、その弟子のビーティが哲学の教授になる。ジェラードは1728年うまれだから、当時の大学入学年令の14才になるのは1742年で、それはフォーダイスが就任した年である。他方、ビーティがマーシャルに入学したのは1749年で、フォーダイスはその翌年に大陸旅行にでるのだから、ふたりのあいだには師弟関係がなりたつ可能性はほとんどない。したがって、フォーダイス→ジェラード→ビーティという単線的な師弟関係を考えていいだろう。

キャンベルは3人のなかでは最年長であるが、かれがマーシャルにくるのは、まずブラクウェルの後任の学長として(1759)であり、 かれはマーシャルの出身ではあるが、 それまではアバディーンシャー各地の牧師であった。1771年にジェラードがキングズに移ると、かれはその後任として神学教授となり、学長と教授をかねて、1792年(1795年説もある)までマーシャルにとどまる。こういう事情なので、かれは哲学協会のはじめからおわりまで(1758–73)、すなわちもっとも長期の会員でありながら、大学啓蒙といわれるアバディーンの啓蒙思想運動のなかでの役割は比較的ちいさかった。

かれは『奇蹟論』(1762)でヒュームを批判したことで有名だが、事前にヒュウ・ブレアを通じて手稿をヒュームに見せているし、序文ではヒュームに敬意を表明しているので[1]、教会内の保守派には評判がよくなかった。二番目の著書である『修辞哲学』(1776)は、哲学協会での報告を仕あげたものといわれ、ブレアの『修辞学・文体論講義』(1783)とともに、スコットランド啓蒙思想のこの分野を代表する。ただし、ブレアはスミスのエディンバラ講義におうことをみとめているし、スミスの影響はセントアンドルーズのウォトスンやバロンにもおよんでいることを、考慮しなければならないが。

キャンベルはそのほかにアメリカ反乱などについての説教を公刊し、その主要なものは『奇蹟論』のあとの版(たとえば1824)に収録されている。

George Campbell, *A dissertation on miracles: containing, an examination of the principles advanced by David Hume, Esq. in an Essay on miracles.* Edinburgh, 1762. これは著者の死後も版をかさねたが、とくに1812年以後の版にはヒュームやブレアの手紙が追加されたほか、説教集がふくまれている。『修辞哲学』その他の著作はつぎのとおりで、6巻本の著作集もある。

George Campbell, *The philosophy of rhetoric.* 2 vols. London, 1776.

George Campbell, *The nature, extent, and importance, of the duty of allegiance: a sermon preached at Aberdeen, December 12, 1776, being the fast day appointed by the king, on account of the rebellion in America.* Aberdeen, 1776. The second edition, with notes and

illustrations, Aberdeen, 1778.

George Campbell, *The happy influence of religion on civil society: a sermon preached at the Assizes at Aberdeen, Sunday, May 2, 1779.* Aberdeen, 1779.

George Campbell, *New Testament, gospels: the four gospels translated from the Greek, with preliminary dissertations and notes,* Edinburgh, 1789.

George Campbell, *Lectures on ecclesiastical history.* London, 1800.

George Campbell, *Lectures on systematic theology and pulpit eloquence.* London, 1807.

George Campbell, *The works of George Campbell, in six volumes.* London, 1840.

ジェラードの最初の著書は、マーシャル・カレジの教育改革論で、タイトル・ページには著者名はなく、「当局 Faculty の命令により立案」とされているが、その裏面には「哲学教授アレグザンダー・ジェラード氏が Faculty の命令によって立案し、本学で実施された教育案の説明が報告されるのを聴き、それが印刷されるように指示した。学長 T. ブラックウェル署名」と印刷されている。このパンフレットは、それ自体の重要性にくわえて、1770 年にリガでドイツ訳が出版されたことにより、アバディーン啓蒙の波及の一例を示すものとなった。

ここでのジェラードの中心的な主張は、伝統的スコラ的学問を、「科学的」哲学によっておきかえようということであって、ターンブルやフォーダイスを継承したものといえる。ストア哲学、ベイコン、ロックが推称され、哲学は「正確で広範な自然史」を基礎としなければならないとされる。自然史・自然科学への関心のつよさは[2]、学問の未分化のせいもあろうが、歴史への関心とともに、イギリス経験論の特徴である。この関連でのストアへの引照は、普遍的自然秩序(自然法)の探究という観点からであって、経験論と矛盾しない。

このパンフレットのドイツ訳は、本文 36 ページ、訳者の「序文」4 ページ、「考察」44 ページという構成だから、訳者の方がページ数がおおい。訳者がジェラードから刺激をうけて論じているのは、哲学教育における論理学と歴史(自然史をふくむ)の役割である。リガで歴史をといえばヘルダー (Johann Gottfried Herder, 1744-1803) をおもいださざるをえない。かれはケーニヒスベルクのカントのもとでまなんだのち、1764 年にリガに教会学校の教師として着任した。69 年 6 月にコペンハーゲン行の船にのるまで、ここでかれのパトロンとなったのは、ケーニヒスベルクで知りあった、4 才年うえの出版者、ハルトクノッホ (Hartknoch) であった。[3] ジェラードのドイツ訳は、1770 年にハルトクノッホによって出版されている。さしあたって、ヘルダー書誌のなかにこのドイツ訳を見いだすことができないが、かれとハルトクノッホの親交を考えれば、まったく関与しなかったとはおもわれない。

ジェラードには、エディンバラの選良協会の懸賞論文公募に入選した(審査員のなかにヒュームとスミスがいた)『Taste 論』[4] (1759) がある。これはたいへん好評で、増補されて版をかさね、フランスとドイツで翻訳された。初版には、著者の意志ではなく、ヴォルテール、ダランベール、モンテスキュウの goût 論の翻訳がつけくわえられたが、これがまたスメリーのつまみぐいの対

象となって、『エンサイクロピディア・ブリタニカ』の taste の項目に採録されたのである。[5] ジェラードの著書としては、つぎのものがあるが[6]、肝心の「道徳哲学講義」は出版されず、ロバート・モーガンが筆記した約 800 ページが、アバディーンでなくエディンバラ大学図書館にある。マイクロフィルム・コピーは入手したものの、それを読まないジェラード論ではあまり意味がない。ウッドの前掲書は、副題が示すとおり、人文カリキュラムを対象とするものなので、ジェラードの講義をこのノートによって紹介している。

[Alexander Gerard], *Plan of education in the Marischal College and University of Aberdeen, with the reason of it, drawn up by order of the faculty.* Aberdeen, printed by James Chalmers, 1775. *Alexander Gerards Gedanken von der Ordnung der philosophischen Wissenschaft, nebst dem Plan des Unterrichts in dem Marschallscollegio und der Universität Aberdeen,* aus dem Englischen übersetzt, mit einigen Philosophie betreffenden Betrachtungen. Riga, bey Johann Friedrich Hartknoch, 1770.

Alexander Gerard, *An essay on taste. With three dissertations on the same subjects, by Mr. De Voltaire, Mr. D'Alembert, F. R. S., Mr. De Montesquieu.* London, A. Millar: A. Kincaid and J. Bell, in Edinburgh, 1759.

Alexander Gerard, *The influence of the pastoral office on the character examined; with a view, especially, to Mr. Hume's representation of the spirit of that office.* A sermon preached before the synod of Aberdeen, at Aberdeen, April 8, 1760. Aberdeen, 1760.

Alexander Gerard, *The influence of piety on the public good:* A sermon preached in the High Church of Edinburgh, May 31, 1761, before His Grace Charles Lord Cathcart, the Lord High Commissioner to the General Assembly of the Church of Scotland. Edinburgh, 1761.

Alexander Gerard, *Dissertations on subjects relating to the genius and the evidences of Christianity.* Edinburgh: A. Millar, London; A. Kincaid and J. Bell, Edinburgh, 1766.

Alexander Gerard, *An essay on genius.* London, W. Strahan, T. Cadell; W. Creech, Edinburgh, 1774.

Alexander Gerard, *Liberty the cloke of maliciousness, both in the American rebellion, and in the manners of the times:* A sermon preached at Old Aberdeen, February 26, 1778, being the fast-day appointed by proclamation, on account of the rebellion in America. Aberdeen, 1778.

Alexander Gerard, *Sermons.* 2 vols. London, C. Dilly, 1780–82.

Alexander and Gilbert Gerard, *A compendious view of the evidence of natural and revealed religion.* London, 1828.

ウッドによる紹介のなかで、ジェラードの講義の特徴とおもわれるのは、第一にかれが前任者

たちとちがって講義を、論理学と形而上学からはじめないで、心理学と自然神学からはじめたこと、第二に市民社会の起源を原契約にもとめ、その秩序は神意にではなく財産のバランスによるとしていることである。

『Taste 論』については、ジェラードが、自然のなかに理性は法則を発見し、taste が美を発見するとして、役割をわけたのち、一方では美的判断力と道徳的判断力との一致を否定し(シャーフツベリ批判)、他方では科学における理性の支配、taste の従属という地位が逆転すると、虚偽の理論が導入されるといっていることを紹介しておく。この論文ですでにかれは天才について、その第一の資質はもっともとおい諸観念の結合である(スミスの哲学者をおもわせる)としていた。[7]

ビーティは、*DNB* にまず詩人と規定されているように、未完の長詩 *Minstrel* (Bk. 1, 1771; Bk. 2, 1774) によって有名であるが、さしあたってはこれにふれる必要はあるまい。ある文学史は、かれを「つまらぬ詩人にして哲学者」[8] としてしりぞけているが、当時はヒューム批判によって、保守派に歓迎された哲学者ではあった。

かれのマーシャルにおける道徳哲学講義は、その要約と称するものが、1000 ページをこえる 2 巻本として出版されている。全体の構成は伝統にしたがっているらしいが、リードの影響をうけたのか common sense の強調が目だつ。ジェラードとちがって、理性のうえにコモン・センスをおくのであり、またそれがヒュームの懐疑論を批判するさいのよりどころであった。しかし同時にビーティは、学生に対して、形而上学にまどわされるなと警告している。

かれの講義は、第 1 巻が第 1 部心理学、第 2 部自然神学、第 2 巻があらためて道徳哲学と題されて、第 1 部倫理学、第 2 部経済学、第 3 部政治学、第 4 部論理学という構成になっている。もうひとつ、ジェラードに見られないのは、奴隷および黒人が、経済学の章で論じられていることで、アメリカの独立と奴隷貿易問題とのインパクトであろう。経済学といっても、伝統的概念にしたがっているので、そこでとりあげられているのは、家族＝家計であって、家族のなかでの主人と奴隷の関係が主題なのである。そのかわりに政治学には、市民社会論、政治形態論、選挙法改革論とともに、財政論がふくまれている。以下のようなビーティの著作のうち、題名でもわかるとおり、最初のものがヒューム批判として版をかさねるのだが、はじめはヒューム批判ということで出版者が難色をしめし、全額を著者が負担することを求めた。

James Beattie, *An essay on the nature and immutability of truth; in opposition to sophistry and scepticism.* Edinburgh, 1770.

James Beattie, *Essays: on the nature and immutability of truth in opposition to sophistry and scepticism; on poetry and music as they affect the mind; on laughter and ludicrous composition; on the utility of classical learning.* Edinburgh, 1776.

James Beattie, *A list of two hundred Scoticisms. With remarks.* Aberdeen, 1779.

James Beattie, *Dissertations, moral and critical: on memory and imagination. On dreaming. The theory of language. On fable and romance. On the attachments of kindred. Illustrations*

on sublimity. London, 1783.

James Beattie, *Elements of moral science.* 2 vols. Edinburgh, 1790–93.

マーシャルでの道徳哲学がほぼ以上のようであったのに対して、キングズでは、リードが1764年にグラーズゴウに転じ、翌年にはダンバーが講義を開始する。リードの助手であったロドリク・マクロード(Roderick Macleod)や古典学教授のトマス・ゴードン(前出)も講義をしたらしいが、ウッドの紹介以上のことはわからない。[9]

しかし、まえにふれたように、夭折した医学教授デーヴィド・スキーンを無視するわけにはいかない。かれはアバディーンの開業医の子で、1748年にマーシャルを卒業して大陸旅行(いわゆるgrand tour)に出発、帰国後、1751–53年にエディンバラ、ロンドン(ハンター)、パリで学んだ。マーシャルの医学教授になったのは67年で、まもなく夭折してしまうのだが、哲学協会にはじめから参加していた。経済的にめぐまれた家庭的背景をもつとともに、開業医としての父の仕事をたすけたことが、社会的関心を目ざめさせたのではないかと、おもわれる。

かれには著書はないが、アバディーン大学図書館には数百ページの手稿が保存されている。その大部分は未完であったり、下書きであったりするが、注目すべきものとして、「オランダ貿易論」「石炭論」をあげておきたい。前者は、オランダの富裕が、所有の安全と信仰の自由によって可能になったことをみとめたうえで、その富裕が道徳的退廃をもたらしたと結論している。当時としてとくにめずらしいものではないとはいえ、アバディーン啓蒙における「富と徳」の問題が、医学の教授によって定式化されたのは、なにを意味するのだろうか。スキーンは、石炭を論じても石炭労働者の奴隷状態にふれ、専門の助産術(midwifery)を人口問題の関連で考えるというように、医学的人間観察にはじめから社会的視角をもっているのである。

注

(1) *DNB, q. v.*

(2) 自然科学(数字をふくむ)への関心のつよさは、かならずしもアバディーン啓蒙の特色とはいえないかもしれないが、後述のスキーンのような例は、エディンバラ、グラーズゴウには見あたらない。

(3) Rudolf Haym, *Herder, mit einer Einleitung von Wolfgang Harich.* 2 Bde. Berlin, Aufbau-Verlag, 1954. Bd. 1, SS. 87–333.

(4) このことばは趣味と訳されることがおおいが、カントの判断力とおなじく、美的判断力とでもいうべきものではないかとおもう。

(5) 藤江効子「趣味 Taste について」『桐朋学園大学研究紀要』第4集、1978年6月。

(6) このうち「牧師職」についての説教は、2巻本の『説教集』に収録されているが、「アメリカ反乱」についてのものは、見あたらない。ここではシャーの紹介による。Richard Sher, *Church and university in the Scottish enlightenment. The moderate literati of Edinburgh.*

Edinburgh, 1985, p. 268, n. 15.

(7) ジェラードの taste および genius 論については、濱下昌宏『18 世紀イギリス美学史研究』多賀出版、1993 年、第 5 章がある。

(8) David Daiches, *A critical history of English literature in two volumes.* London, 1960, p. 774.

(9) Wood, op. cit., pp. 106–7, 152–6. ゴードンの後任がオウグルヴィである。

5

ようやくダンバーを紹介するところにきた。かれはスコットランド北部、ネアンシャーの旧家にうまれ、キングズ・カレジを 1761 年に卒業した。1765 年に母校の共同リージェント、66 年に単独リージェントとなり、94 年に退職するまでその地位にあった。まえに注記(1 の (6))したように、ひとり(またはふたり)で全教科を担当するリージェント制は、学問の専門化・分化に対応できないものとなり、エディンバラでは 1708 年、グラーズゴウでは 1727 年に廃止された。アバディーンでもマーシャルでは 1754 年に廃止されたのだが、キングズは伝統を固守し、廃止にむけてのダンバーの努力も、在任中には実をむすばなかった。そのためにかれは、苦手の数学も教えなければならなかったので、かれがうけもった学生のひとり、ジェイムズ・マキントッシュ (1765–1832) は、自分が数学ができないのは、そのせいだといっている。

マキントッシュは、バークを批判して *Vindiciae Gallicae. Defence of French revolution and its English admirers against the accusations of the Right Hon. Edmund Burke; including some strictures on the late productions of Mons. de Calonne.* London, 1791. を書いた一応のラディカルであり、スコットランド啓蒙の最後のというよりもそれを 19 世紀にうけついだ世代に属し、そのインドへの波及についても注目すべき人物であるが[1]、かれの回想記のなかのダンバー像は、つぎのとおりである。「道徳的政治的な思索においては、かれは初歩的な教育内容を、(当然そうあるべきように)伝達するのではなく、絶叫した。たしかにかれは、この職務に必要な精確さと冷静さを、完全に欠いていた。しかしかれは、かれの生徒のうちの何人かを、通俗的水準よりたかくひきあげる情熱を、みずから感じていただろうし、それを絶叫によってかれらにふきこんだだろう。それは、実証的な知識より重要でさえありえたのである。かれは高潔でリベラルな精神の持主であり、対アメリカ戦争へのきわめて積極的な反対者であった。1782 年の春のこと、ノース卿の免職が伝えられたとき、かれは路上であった私に、いつもの大げさな調子でいった、"そうだマキントッシュ君、おめでとう、アウゲアス王の牛舎は清掃されたのだ"」[2](アウゲアスは 3000 頭の牛を飼いながら、牛舎を30年間一度も掃除をしなかったが、ヘラクレスが一日で清掃した)。

マキントッシュが書いているように、ダンバーは、対アメリカ武力干渉に反対し、保守的なキングズ・カレジだけでなくスコットランド啓蒙思想家のなかでも、小数派であった。そのことはかれのスミス称賛とむすびついていただろう。前述のように、アバディーンでもアメリカ問題に

ついて、ジェラードとキャンベルの説教がのこされている。キングズ・カレジの教授会は1792年に、議会に対して奴隷貿易禁止の請願をしないことを、決議したほどだったが、そのときにもダンバーは、ギルバート・ジェラード(アレグザンダーの息子)とともに、この決議に反対した。「奴隷貿易は、イギリスの名前にとって不名誉であり、人間本性を堕落させ、キリスト教の精神に真向から対立する…とかれらは考える」というのが、反対理由であった。[3)]

はじめにあげたように、ダンバーはアメリカ問題についてラテン語の小著を書き、スコットランド啓蒙思想の人類史的関心をうけついで主著を書いた。後者は翌年に増補版を出すほど好評で、おなじ年にはドイツ訳も出た。以下に紹介する講義ノートは、先行する両著に対して、すくなくともふたつの特徴をもつ。第一は、ダンバーの晩年のものと推定されるので、フランス革命を経過した段階のかれの思想を示しているということであり、第二は、道徳哲学という主題が、人類史とならんでスコットランド啓蒙思想の主柱であることである。しかしながら、これだけの分量で1学年の講義をカヴァーするのは不可能であって、ジェラードやビーティの講義ノートはこの10倍をこえているし、ダンバーもこのノートに説明を追加することをのべている。だから、このノートだけでかれの思想を判断することはできないが、基本的にはリードの影響のもとに、無神論問題(ヒューム)や利己心問題(スミス)などについて、どちらかといえば保守の側にたちながら、政治的には、抵抗権をみとめ、アメリカに前例のない平等で完全な政治形態をみている。もちろん、前例のかぎりではイギリスの混合制限君主政治を最善とするのだが。

それでは、アバディーンにおける相対的に進歩的な立場を、かれがどうやって構築したかということになると、判断の材料がない。伝記のなかに空白期間(61年の卒業から65年の就職まで)があるので、盟友オウグルヴィとおなじくグラーズゴウでスミスの講義をきいたという可能性も、ないわけではない。主著と講義でのスミス称賛や、オウグルヴィのグラーズゴウでの学友であったバハン伯[4)]が、ダンバーともしたしかったことを見ると、そう考えたくなるが、これまでのところでは、証拠はない。

ダンバーについての研究文献としては、ベリーがLSEの学位論文でかれをとりあげ、『人類史論』のリプリント版の序文と4篇の論文を書いている。

C.J. Berry, James Dunbar 1742–1798. A study of his thought and his place in and contribution to the Scottish Enlightenment. Unpublished PhD thesis London 1970.

C.J. Berry, James Dunbar and ideas of sociality in eighteenth century Scotland. *Il pensiero politico,* anno VI, n. 2, Firenze, 1973, pp. 188–201.

C.J. Berry, James Dunbar and the American war of independence. *Aberdeen University Review,* XLV. 1973–4, pp. 255–66.

C.J. Berry, "Culture" in the eighteenth century: James Dunbar and the Scottish case. *Texas studies in literature and language,* XVI, 2 (summer 1974), pp. 281–92.

C.J. Berry, James Dunbar and the enlightenment debate on language. *Aberdeen and the*

enlightenment, edited by J. J. Carter and J. H. Pittock [Pittock-Wesson], Aberdeen University Press, 1987, pp. 241–50.

注

(1) かれは 1805–11 年に記録官および裁判官としてボンベイに滞在した。 かれの文化活動については、Kitty Datta, James Mackintosh, learned societies in India, and enlightenment ideas, *Aberdeen and the enlightenment* (op.cit), pp. 40–51.

(2) *Memoirs of the life of ... Sir James Mackintosh. Edited by his son.* 2nd ed. London, 1836, vol. 1, p. 12.

(3) King's College minutes, 3 March 1792.

(4) 2 の注(2)参照。 視野をひろげるために附記しておけば、 アースキン兄弟 (バハン伯デーヴィド・ステュアート・アースキン、1742–1829; ヘンリ、1746–1817; トマス、1750–1823) は、経済学者サー・ジェイムズ・ステュアートの甥(同名法律家の孫)にあたり、ともにラディカル・ウィッグとして有名であった。とくにトマスがペインを弁護して、皇太子の顧問としての地位をうしなったことは、よくしられているし、ヘンリも内乱法案を違憲としたことによって法曹協会会長に再任されなかった。

(みずた　ひろし　名古屋大学名誉教授)

Contents

Institutes of Moral Philosophy [1789–1794]

James Dunbar

Aberdeen University Library MS 3107/5/2/6.

Introduction

Human knowledge in all its variety and extent has been distributed into three general Provinces, Poetry, History, and Philosophy: Poetry is principally addressed to the imagination, History to the memory, and Philosophy to the reasoning faculties. In every species of knowledge the mind must exert collectively its various intellectual powers, but each of these provinces refers to that talent which is those principally exercised. Poetry indeed being consecrated to the imagination cannot in strict propriety be accounted a science, tho' it is sometimes ranked among the sciences by the courtesey of the learned. It is conversant in fiction not in realities, but, it imitates the truth of things and is often the vehicle of moral wisdom. The divisions of Poetry into the Narrative, or Heroic, the Dramatic, and the Alegorical. We describe those departments without descending into details and illustrate the character of the ancient Muse. Learning in its infancy was fostered in her arms, nor could have grown up into Science [1v] and flourished among men "Vatem ni musa dedisset". Poetry, Music and Painting, and Scupture are all sister arts, and may all be included in that division of Knowledge which is addressed principally to the imagination. History is divided into Sacred, Civil, and Natural. Sacred History is subdivided into two branches, the principal one consists in the detail of those memorable facts and events recorded in Holy Writ; the other branch is collateral only, and may rather be termed Ecclesiastical as relating to Ecclesiastical establishments, and consisting chiefly in the authentic memorials and institutions of the Christian church. Profane, or civil history also consists of two great divisions, the one records the occurrences and revolutions that have happened in the progressive order of Society, or in the Chronological order of the world, the other division relates to the origin and progress of arts and sciences, and may be called literary history. Natural History in a large sense comprehends the history of all the phenomena both in the natural and in the moral world, and is by consequence the basis of all sound philosophy. Philosophy is divided into Theology, the Science of Man, and of the creatures below him, and science of external or corporeal nature; the last of these divisions comprehends natural Philo[2]sophy and Mathematics, and these sciences have been by us subdivided into various branches which it is unnecessary to recapitulate. The two former divisions of Philosophy receive in common

the appellation of Pneumatology, Pneumatics, or the science of Spirit. What rank the human mind holds in the intellecual scale it is impossible to ascertain. There are no doubt various orders of created beings superior to man, yet these not being accessible to our observation cannot be the objects of Science. How far the chain of being extends we know not, but this we know that the first as well as the last order of created beings must be at an infinite distance from that Supreme Being whence they are all derived. Natural Theology then, or the science of the Supreme Mind ought in the order of dignity to precede all the sciences, but as our apprehensions of the Divine Nature must be drawn either from revelation or from the reason of our own minds, the first part of Pneumatology will consist in a survey and analysis of the human faculties; the second part of Pneumatology will treat of the improvement of which our faculties are susceptible; the third part will treat of the nature of the Soul, and of the questions hence resulting, it will treat also of man as a system compouded of mind and body and of the varieties observable in the human species. After these divisions the last division of [2v] Pneumatology will relate to our knowledge concerning the Supreme Mind. From these branches of Pneumatology are derived Logic, Ethics, and Politics. Logic prescribes rules for the conduct of the understanding. Ethics prescribes rules for the conduct of life and declares our duty in all the various circumstances and relations of our being. Politics considers that artificial union which constitutes a state, it enquires into the character of communities, into the forms of Government, and into the various objects of public concern, as manufactures, arts and commerce, peace and war, alliances, treaties, and the order of internal laws. In the above account of Philosophy and the sciences we have ommitted Ontology, or general metaphysics which has been dignified by the followers of Aristotle with the name of the First Philosophy. This science treats, or affects to treat of being in general, and in the abstract. But this field in our opinion is naturally barren or at least not fit to be cultivated by the human faculties. The science of general axioms is another science extolled by Lord Bacon as a science of a higher stage, but in our opinion, it may be altogether abandoned as unproductive and fallacious, and unworthy of being Numbered in the Catalogue of Science. A person who is master of two sciences perfectly independent of each other may illustrate the maxims of each by reciprocal allusions. But the know[3]ledge of the one science could not have produced the other, their maxims are convertible only by the imagination, and by analogy accommodated to a different standard of things. The science then of general axioms might serve in some degree for the purposes of declamation, or the embellishment of discourse, but it converys no real

information, it rests on remote analogies, and is of little utility either in disclosing nature or in abridging art. Thus having presented to your view a general scheme, we return to the first part of pneumatology or the speculative science of man, and in entering on this design, it is shewn that the same causes which retarded the progress of natural science in the ages of antiquity, have equally operated to the disadvantage of moral science. In both sciences experience and observation must be the basis of all sound theory. But, in the application of experiment to moral subjects, there are peculiar difficulties which deserve to be stated and to be du[e]ly estimated by philosophers. There are three sources whence the knowledge of mind and of its faculties are drawn, the structure of language, an attention to the course of human actions, and refle[c]tion. The last is the principal source, and in exploring that source there are difficulties of considerable magnitude, but there are also peculiar advantages on the side of moral investigation which shall be pointed out and illustrated. These preliminary observations being made we descend according to our plan into an analysis of the human faculties.

[3v] Part I. Chap. I. Of the Human Mind and its Faculties.

To explore the essence of mind were[sic] an attempt equally vain and impracticable. All our knowledge whether of mind or of body must be derived from induction and by consequence all questions relative to the nature of mind are premature untill we have examined and analyzed its operations. Every man is conscious of the existence of his own mind and of its being capable of variety of exertions. The existence of other objects is intimated by certain signs and in the exercise and interpretation of those signs consists natural language, without which artificial language could have no existence, as will be shewn in future discussions. The evidence of sense by which we perceive external objects has been called in question by some philosophers, but the evidence of consciousness by which we have an immediate and intuitive knowledge of the existence of our own mind and its operations precludes all uncertainty or doubt. These mental operations are so subtile and often so complex that it is difficult to pursue the analysis of the mind in an unexceptionable order. Of the progressive order of the mental faculties as they seem to rise up in man and of the influence of Society in calling them forth into exertion we have given some account in the Essays on the History of Mankind, to which these accademical institutes will occasionally refer. In general we may resolve the mental faculties or operations into those of the Understanding, and those of the will. To the understanding belong Per[4]ception, Memory, Imagination, Reasoning. To the Will belong not only

Volition or a determination of the mind to act after a certain mannner, but likewise every principle which prompts the soul to action, as passions, affections, instincts, and feelings of every denomination. Suitably to this plan we begin with the analysis of the Understanding.

Section II. Of the intellectual Powers.

The common division of the intellectual powers has been into simple apprehension, judgement, and reasoning. But this division tho' formerly admitted in the schools includes not memory, an essential act of the understanding, and being in our opinion otherwise defective and derived from very questionable theory we do not hesitate to reject. The following arrangement will be far more commodious. First we treat of the Perceptions of external sense, or the operations of the five senses, as they are usually called. 2do. of Memory. 3tio of imagination and 4to we consider in these order the reasoning faculties. But prior to this detail and with a view to its illustration, we institute a general account of the origin of ideas and of their scientific arrangements.

Chap. II. Of the arrangement and distribution of our Ideas.

The term idea in popular language is equivalent to the terms Conception, Apprehension, Notion, and implies an act or operation of the mind. But, in philosophical language the term idea implies the object of thought and not the act or operation of the mind called thought. The abuse of this [4v] term as will afterwards appear has been productive of false theory, for the thinking principle, the act of thinking, and the object of thought are perfectly distinct, and are accordingly distinguished in the structure of all languages. Mr Locke who introduces the term idea in almost every page uses it commonly to denote the object of perception, but, tho' that acceptation alone is agreeable to his definition of the term, he uses it also not unfrequently to denote perception itself, and the indefinite application of the term idea is rightly considered as the capital blemish in Mr Locke[']s philosophy. We use the term idea in its popular acceptation as implying every notion or conception of the mind, and shall afterwards comments on its more equivocal and mysterious import in the themes of philosophy. The mind of man originally unfurnished acquires from experience the materials of knowledge, and derives a number of its perceptions and sensations from external sense. In the generation of those perceptions and sensations, the mind is in a great measure passive, and if no impression has been made upon the organ, conceptions or ideas of a certain class are utterly excluded, nor can

ever be infused by any language or supplied by any device of the mind. Our ideas are either simple or complex; Simple ideas are such as admit of no separation, and consequently elude all definition; Attempts towards such definitions examples of which will be here produced disgrace the school of Aristotle and abound in the scholastic philosophy, but happily for learning, the scholastic jargon is [5] no more. Complex ideas are such as are formed by the understanding from the repetition, comparison, or combination of the [deleted?] simple ideas. And while simple ideas are few in number and are purely the work of nature; complex ideas are various, and may be multiplied and diversified by the mind at pleasure. All our ideas according to Mr Locke flow from two great fountains Sensation and reflection. This account of things tho' liable to objection as will afterwards appear, may however with some cautions and illustrations be admitted without much inconveniency. By ideas then of Sensation, we understand all the knowledge ultimately derived to the mind by the impressions of outward objects. By ideas of Reflection, we understand not only with Mr Locke all the knowledge of which the mind is capable from the consciousness of its own operations, but also, all the knowledge competent to the mind independently of corporeal sense. Complex ideas, which as has been already observed arise from the repetition or combination of the simple, are reduced by Mr Locke to three general classes, Modes, Substances, and Relations. Modes are either simple or mixed: Substances are either individual or collective: and relations arise from the comparison of objects and are of various denomination, as resemblance, contrariety, cause and effect etc. This arrangement being made, and a general survey being taken of the philosophy of Locke, we proceed to enquire into the doctrine of ideas considered as the images or representations of things in the mind, and pursue the history of the rise and progress of this opinion, The influence of analogical reasonings in moral subjects will be here detected and exposed, and an account will be given of ancient and modern systems.

Chap. III. Of the Ideal System and of the Analysis of Sense.

[5v] All things according to the antients consisted of matter or form, or were compounded of both. The maxim, "ex nihilo nihl fit" commanded universal assent, and the counterpart of the maxim, "in nihilum nil potest reverti", was established on the same foundation. The eternity of matter was accordingly assumed in every system. Plato adopted this opinion, but farther contended for the independent existence of eternal forms, and to these forms he gave the name of ideas. This doctrine of ideas however tho' embellished by Plato and universally called the Platonic system, was in reality of prior

origin, and the invention of the Pythagorean School. Aristotle dissented from his master Plato in the doctrine of ideas: Matter alone Aristotle considered as eternal and capable of existing without form. But, forms according to Aristotle had no independent existence and presupposed the existence of matter, yet forms were regarded by him as images or phantasms in the mind essential to all the acts of sense or intellect. It was these images alone which were present to the mind in all its operations, and it was these images which were denominated species by Aristotle and ideas by Plato. Such was the hypothesis of Aristotle whose authority was revered in the schools of Europe for upwards of a thousand years. The aera of the new philosophy commences with De[s]cartes, who possesses the merit of breaking analogical connections, and of pointing out a juster method of pursuing moral researches to succeeding philosophers. But, the analogical notions still predominated, tho' the order was redressed, and as the ancient systems had a tendency to materialize mind and its faculties, so the Cartesian system had a tendency to spiritualize body and its properties. The Cartesian or modern system, has received [6] various alterations from the hands of Malebranche, Locke, Berk[e]ley, and Hume: all of whose opinions will be considered. The Divine Mind says Malebranche, is the place of ideas, as space is of body; and whatever is exterior to the Soul we perceive in God. Mr Locke confounds reflection with consciousness; and his division of our ideas into those of sensation and of reflection will appear to be incomplete and fallacious. For, many of our notions are neither objects of sense, nor operations of the mind. The doctrines of Berk[e]ley and Hume will be more particularly examined, as containing in them the most absolute Scepticism with regard to the first principles of the human understanding. Mr Locke gives up the secondary qualities of body, but contends for the primary: Berk[e]ley discards both, and mind alone with its ideas are allowed to exist. Hume by a similar process of investigation questions the existence of mind, and leaves nothing, but impressions and ideas in the Universe. The fallacy of such doctrines has been detected and exposed by the masterly author of the Inquiry into the human mind, who, by an exact analysis has shewn that our sensations are totally different from our perceptions of outward objects, or their qualities; and has thereby pointed out errors in the past concoction of the Ideal System. The same author in his later publication of essays on the intellectual powers of man, has with additional force shaken the ideal system to its foundations. The want of precision in language favoured the ideal system. [6v] From ancient hypotheses it derived its strength. But, freed from those embarassments, the belief of the reality of external things rests upon original principles in the human

constitution to which metaphysical engines are opposed in vain. There certainly exists not a material world which is the model or archetype of our sensations, but that is not the world whose existence has commanded, commands, and will command the universal assent of mankind. The shadows of Plato, the species of Aristotle, the films of Epicurus are the productions of unwarranted hypothesis which disappear in the light of genuine Philosophy, and of Common Sense. Nor are these rightly considered ever at variance. The sensations we derive from sense when intense command our attention, but when moderate often pass unregarded in their proper character, yet become by the appointment of nature, the signs which indicate the qualities of body to which they bear no resemblance. And, if we should admit, the non existence of body to be possible, yet still it must be allowed that we have perceptions of extension, solidity, figures, and other qualities as well as of a subjet in which they inhere, which none of our sensations resemble or can resemble: But which they iresistibly suggest. Sensations then are rightly considered as the natural signs of outward objects. To ask why they are so, is to ask why we are made as we are made. And in all such questions, Reason must be for ever silent. As the sounds in artificial language might remain, while the correspondent ideas were different or interchanged, so our sensations might all remain, while they were rendered the [7] signs of other perceptions. The one connection is not more arbitrary on the part of man, than the other connection may be arbitrary on the part of Nature. And as on ordinary occasions, the sounds in artificial language are not regarded as sounds but merely as signs of thought. So in the language of sensation on ordinary occasions, the sensations themselves are not regarded as such but merely as signs which intimate the existence and qualities of external things. All knowledge whatever consists in the interpretation of natural signs, or of those instituted by art. Natural signs are rightly distinguished into three orders or classes, the First, is interpreted by experience alone, The Second is interpreted by a natural principle without reasoning or experience, and relates to objects of which we had a prior conception, The third class is also interpreted by a natural principle independent of experience, but suggests objects of which we had no prior conception. The first class forms the foundation of all genuine philosophy: The second class forms the language of Nature, consisting in the features or lineaments of the countenance, the gestures of the body, and the modulations of sound; and this class gives birth to all the fine arts: The third class consists in our sensations which necessarily suggest a sentient being, to which they belong, and convey a variety of other information relative to mind and body. It deserves however to be remarked that the Ideal System

which denies the existence of body and which tho' deduced scientifically from ancient hypotheses is generally accounted modern, was not unknown to the philosophers of antiquity. The theory of the [7v] Luna[t]ic sect as described by Cicero seems to coincide with the doctrines with which the Bishop of Cloyne has amused the modern world, and similar doctrines are to be traced in the east among the Indian nations, but such scepticism we have shewn cannot be maintained, and while it is impossible to demonstrate the existence of the material world it is no less impossible to reject the authority on which the belief of its existence is established. Our senses in strict language never deceive us, tho' we may often draw false inferences from their intimations, and those inferences have been denominated improperly fallacies of the senses. The illustration of this doctrine may be given from a particular analysis of each sense. And the senses in their various functions will appear to be full of utility, and an admirable part of Nature[']s economy. The distinction between original and acquired perception will be exactly defined and exemplified. And having enquired in the conclusion, how far the mind may be pronounced active in sensation, we pursue the order of this course in the analysis of the other faculties.

Chap. IV. Of Memory.

The provinces of sense and memory are perfectly distinct tho' not accurately distinguished in common language. For the present tense which is limited to a point in philosophy has considerable latitude in the ordinary forms of speech. Our sensations and perceptions it is evident would contribute little towards knowledge without the power of contemplating them afterwards, and recalling them to the mind. This proceeding of intellect is called memory, and is simple, original, and there[8]fore undefinable. A faculty that referred to the future with the same conviction, that memory refers to the past would constitute prescience. But as no such faculty belongs to man, of its operations we can form no conception. The account which has been given of memory in the Ideal Philosophy serves rather to confound than to illustrate its nature. The knowledge we receive from memory as well as from sense is immediate and direct, and consequently by referring that knowledge to any perception of the agreement or disagreement of ideas, is to involve it in unintelligible theory. The images of things which according to Mr Locke are present to the mind in all the operations of sense are supposed in this theory to be laid up in the memory as in a storehouse, whence they may be drawn and contemplated without the aid or repetition of the original impressions, by which those images were

formed. But the images thus retained by the memory are supposed gradually to decay and unless renewed by the senses at last to disappear and vanish. The inscriptions in the mind are effaced by time, and the imagery moulders away. Thus an attempt has been made to illustrate a faculty purely intellectual, by an allusion to corporeal nature. The platonists, and peripatetics coincided in such representations, nor have the moderns in general presumed to dissent from the ancient schools. Even Descartes, who considered thought as the essence of the soul, by assuming the memory consisted in certain traces made on the brain by thought has rendered that faculty corporeal. And, like Aristotle from the moisture and softness of the brain in the womb, he accounts for [8v] the total oblivion of that existence that precedes the birth. In the philosophy of Hume, impressions and ideas exhaust the universe, and according to him memory and imagination differ in degree only, not in kind. They are regarded as convertible powers, or at least the vivacity of the perception is the only criterion by which their operations can be distinguished. By consequence, truth and falsehood will also be convertible. By this magic of perception, the evidence of memory and of sense will be equally subverted, scepticism will triumph, and conviction of every kind will be destitute of all solid foundation. But these absurdities have already been detected and exposed. If the ideas of memory and imagination were allowed, in the cases mentioned by Mr Hume, to be sometimes undistinguishable, and if the degree of vivacity in the conception of the object should in these cases occasion the illusion, yet no sceptical conclusion could be established on that foundation. The fallacy of the doctrine consists in this, it assumes as the sole criterion of truth and fiction the usual tho' not necessary concomitants of those perceptions, and it infers, from the uncertainty or suspense of the mind in a few rare instances, its fallibility in every other where conviction is irresistible. The absurdity of such conclusions must be subversive of the theory from which they are legitimately drawn, and the evidence of memory, like that of sense, may be pronounced irresistible because founded on original principles in the human constitution, which being antecedent to all reason[9]ing, are rightly denominated judgements of nature, or principles of common sense. The utility then of memory, its defects and strength on different constitutions, its various phenomena and the laws which regulate its operations are the particulars which deserve our consideration in this inquiry. From an attention to those laws are derived expedients for [thus?] assisting this faculty, and enlarging the sphere of its operations. The relation of time and space, similarity, contrariety, pleasure and pain, and other circumstances give stability to an object in the repositories of thought, and thereby facilitate and promote both the

spontaneous and active exertions of the retentive faculty. The science of memory consists in forming combinations and associations founded on that knowledge. The ancient invention of the [μ]γημογκια or the art of memory is ascribed to Simonides, it was improved by Metrodorus and seems to have made some figure in the ancient schools. Of this invention we have an account in the works of Tully, and particularly in the 3d book of his Rhetorica addressed to Herennius. The ground of this art consists in forming a combination between intellectual and sensible objects, for the former are recalled with more facility when cloathed in sensible form and reduced into order. Accordingly prenotion and emblem are insisted on by Lord Bacon as subsidiary to memory and essential to its more rigorous exertions. But, it ought to be observed that retention greatly depends on the force of the original impression, nor can the loci and imagines of the ancients, or any expedient supply any natural imbecility or defect in the original impression. And the [9v] most valuable art of memory is unquestionably the art of attention. Habit and the passions, we also observe, greatly heighten the tendency of associations. In the recollection of the past, the mind is sometimes passive, sometimes active. And hence, we distinguish memory into casual and intentional operations. This distinction is recognized by Aristotle and while he admits that passive memory belongs to animals, he considers active memory, or reminiscence as exclusively the prerogative of man, and of beings of a superior order. To will the existence of, an object totally unknown, seems to imply a contradiction, or an impossibility in the exertions of intellect: But an object unknown in itself may have known relations and in consequence of its relations which are recognized by the mind, a train of thought may be pursued which will ultimtely terminate in the recovery of the object desired. The laws of memory being once established analytically, we may proceed synthetically to solve various appearances and to account for several apparent singularity by a reference to the general laws. Memory will be farther considered relative to the system of the mind. The anecdote of Themistocles is well known. Oblivion is often subservient to our happiness and tranquility. And it is obvious to observe that many inconveniences might arise from possessing memory in a degree disproportioned to the other powers of the mind. A degree of memory that might exalt the understanding of a Bacon or a Newton, might derange and incom[m]ode the understanding of meaner mortals. The œconomy therefore of Nature in the measure of this faculty bestowed on man is highly [10] worthy of observation. While memory has its limitations in the largest mind, it is susceptible of improv[e]ment even in a mind of imbecillity. And without culture cannot arrive at its perfection. We may admire the

compass of this talent in a Themistocles, or deplore its imbecillity in a Messala Corvinus, and we may observe between these extremes fast gradations in this gift of Nature: Yet in the most capacious minds, that which is remembered, to that which is forgotten bears but a small proportion. All our ideas of the past fade in the mind by time, and unless often renewed or recalled finally perish. One stage of our being tends to create an oblivion of another, and unless this faculty shall be confirmed and inlarged, there might ensue in some future period a total oblivion of the present life. It is however sufficient that the faculty by a proper culture answers all the ends of our present being. This culture of memory is not equally indispensable in all ages and all professions, tho' it is manifestly of consequence in all times and situations. By habits of vigilance and attension, by the frequent renovation of the first impressions, and by philosophical arrangements and combinations of thought we may secure as far as possible the acquisitions of the mind. It is the treasures of memory which the imagination opens, transposes and adorns. And [μ]νημοσύνη was happily represented by the masters of ancient wisdom, as the mother of the Muses. But it belongs to Logic to prescribe prac[10v]tical rules for the improvement of this faculty; and it belongs to Ethics to inculcate the duty of attending to every species of intellectual improvement. In pneumatology the survey and analysis of memory form our more immediate progress.

Chap. V. Of Imagination and the principles of association.

A perception or sensation may be presented to the mind by memory or imagination. In the one case there is a conviction of that existance, in the other case there is a simple apprehension of the object accompanied with no such belief. It belongs to memory to preserve the original order and position of its ideas, but it is the office of imagination to present the objects of thought in every possible variety of union or separation, and without regard to reality of existence. According to Mr Hume, the belief or assent which attends the perceptions of sense, or of memory depends on the vivacity of the ideas, presented to the mind; and by consequence, objects of sense of memory and of imagination will be convertible. The vivacity indeed may sometimes induce a momentary belief, yet the permanent distinctions of truth and fals[e]hood are recognized by every understanding, and any illusion of fancy that confounded these distinctions and undermined conviction would amount to insanity and delirium. The memory is a judging faculty and compels belief. Simple apprehension implies no judgement, and the conception of an object, is neither the [11] criterion of truth or existence, nor even of possibility. Mr.

Hume's theory of belief therefore, tho' the legitimate offspring of the ideal philosophy scarcely merits a serious refutation. The faculty of imagination has been called a creative faculty, but it ought to be remembered that it can never go beyond our original fund of simple ideas, and consequently that its exertions consist in the arrangement, not in the creation of the materials of thought. The successive train of thought, tho' in part under the dominion of the will, is influenced by situations and modes of life, by the present temper and disposition of the mind, and by habits of our own formation. Those relations which influence our train of thinking have been called principles of association, and the imagination has been nightly distinguished into passive and active. Passive imagination consists in the admission of ideas associated together according to certain laws independent of the will. Of these laws or principles of association, the most considerable are Resemblance, Contrariety, Contiguity in time or place, and Causation or the relation of cause and effect. But this enumeration, it may be observed, is exceedingly general and incomplete. In order too, to understand the extent of those relations, it is to be observed, that the connection of two objects in the imagination may be formed where no immediate relation subsists, if a third object is interposed related to both. And by more interpositions, the chain may be lengthened and the connection maintained tho' by each remove the relation is proportionally weakened. Such connectons and [11v] transitions of imagination are conformable to the order of nature. Thus a man is not only connected with a father, and a son, but with his remote ancestors, and with his remote posterity. The qualities or relations of ideas which fit them for being associated have been traced with superior discernment by Lord Kaims[Kames] in his elements of Criticism, and are distinguished still more accurately into simple and compound by Dr. Gerrard [Gerard] in his essay on Genius. Resembrance, contrariety, and contiguity or vicinity seem to exhaust the simple relations, and the compound are produced by the union of those simple relations with one another or with other circumstances. Of this class are coexistence, causation, and order; and without such principles of union these could be no regularity, or cohesion in our ideas. This proceeding of the mind is of high importance in the human constitution. Our sentiments, passions, desires, tastes, habits of thinking and of acting are greatly influenced by the connections of the imagination. In the conduct therefore of this quality, the greatest vigilance is required. Superstition, fanaticism, sympathies, antipathies, predelections, prejudices, and errors of every kind both in speculation and in practice are derived from this source. And a great part of mental discipline consists in breaking the force of false associations. These when confirmed by

habit are often not to be broken at once either by reason or experience. It is by contrary habits alone that the mind is disengaged from their dominion, and in this very way alone reason recovers its freedom. But [12] to inculcate the necessity of this moral discipline belongs to Ethics. Active imagination consists in transposing our ideas at pleasure. Nothing, it has been often said, is freer than imagination, yet in all its regular productions regard must be shewn to the natural connections of things. On this faculty depend invention, description, and design. Without it, man could scarce deserve the appellation of an intelligent being. Its efforts are vast and sublime, are circumscribed within no limits of time or place and fail only in grasping at infinitude and eternity. The pleasures and pains communicated thro the medium of this faculty will be afterwards insisted on when we come to form an estimate of human happiness and misery. At present we consider imagination merely as a proceeding of intellect, and suggest rather than expatiate on its extensive influence, which will farther appear on reviewing those powers of the mind which we have referred to the will. We next proceed to the consideration of the other acts of the understanding.

Chap. VI. Of Abstraction.

Having completed our analysis of imagination, we next enquire into the quality of the mind called abstraction. By abstraction the mind decompounds the objects of thought, and states qualities and circumstances apart from the actual assemblages of Nature. Any quality or attribute thus apprehended may be considered as common to different subjects, or attributes thus apprehended [12v] may be combined into one whole, and a name may be given to the combination. In the one case the mind forms a general conception by analysis, and in the other case by combination. Thus generalization necessarily implies abstraction, but abstraction does not necessarily imply generalization. A general conception thus formed was in the antient philosophy called an universal or predicable. By this effect of abstraction, we are able to reduce our ideas to classes, and to form general conclusions. Hence the invention of general terms in language which are capable of being predicated concerning a great number of particular objects. The mind begins in its infancy to practise this art, and grows more expert in proportion to its strength. Without such an art, no artificial language could ever be formed by men. The distinction between a language in its primitive simplicity and in a more advanced stage, and the gradual arrival of nations, as well as men, at the full exertion of the powers of abstraction and generalization are topics which we have discussed in the essays on the history of

mankind to which therefore, we must again refer. Some farther considerations will be here offered relative to the philosophy of grammar and of gradual formation of the different parts of speech. The common division of language into eight parts is extremely inaccurate. Speech may be distinguished with more propriety into Substantives, Attributives, and Connectives. This scien[13]tific division is adopted by Dr Blair in a work which abounds with judicious criticism. In another work entitled the diversions of purley or *έπεα πτερόεγτα* by Mr Horn[e] Tooke. That author admits only of two sorts of words, noun and verb: all the rest according to him is abbreviation. But, without entering at present into Mr Tooke[']s ingenious theory we shall expound the other division above specified. Substantives denote the names of objects really existing as man, country, house etc, or abstract ideas as virtue, wisdom, folly etc; and include the personal pronouns. Attributives denote a quality or attribute of any substance, and comprehend abjectives, verbs, and some adverbs. By an attributive something is predicated concerning an object of thought, and all verbs can be resolved into adjectives along with a few auxiliary verbs. The most considerable of these auxiliary verbs are to be and to have; the former of which is called the substantive verb, and the latter the possessive verb. By these expedients therefore, conjugation may be simplified, and is accordingly simplified in all the modern tongues: Adjectives are very inproperly called nouns by grammarians, for they have a nearer affinity to verbs, nor can any good reason be assigned for the rule of concord between adjective and substantive in the Greek and Latin tongues, unless this reason be admitted, that a number of words with similar terminations contribute to the smoothness and harmony of sound. Connectives comprehend, prepositions, conjunctions, interrogatives and some adverbs. In general they intimate the relations of thought [13v] and in the use of these expedients there subsist[s] a remarkable distinction between the simple and more compounded languages. As the auxiliary verbs simplify conjugaton, so prepositions may simplify declension and have actually simplified it in all the modern tongues. But this simplification far from contributing to the perfection of language renders the modern tongues in many respects inferious to the Greek and Latin and the other laguages of antiquity. The lower animals seem to be totally incapable of abstraction, and by consequence incapable of inventing artificial language, or of apprehending any general proposition. This faculty of abstraction in its various exertions is immediately subservient to reason, and we therefore proceed in the order of these institutes to analyse that distinguishing act of the understanding which is called Reason.

Chap. VII. Of Reason

Reason is usually represented as the leading faculty of the mind. Man values himself on the possession of this faculty, and conceiving it to be denied to the animals or to be imparted to them in a degree scarce discernable, regards it as his peculiar and distinguishing perfection. To this faculty has been assigned a very extensive province. And in ordinary language, this faculty is said to decide concerning truth and falsehood in every proposition. Ratio, says Cicero, qua una praestamus be stiis, per quam conjectura valemus, argumentamur, refellimus, discerimus, confirmamus aliquid, concludimus, certe est communis. Doctrina differensi quidem facultate par. According to the [14] logicians, the province of deciding between truth and falsehood is shared by judgement, and it is the office of reason to correct, or to confirm the prior determination of the judgement by a more exact comparison of the objects. In the language of Mr Locke, judgement presumes only, but reason perceives the agreement or disagreement of ideas; and upon this presumption or perception, all knowledge, whether probable or certain, depends. This doctrine concerning the agreement or disagreement of ideas has been already examined, and it has appeared in our analysis of the senses and of memory, that knowledge may be acquired without any such proceeding of the mind. Judgement necessarily accompanies sensation, perception by the senses, consciousness, and memory. But no judgement accompanies simple apprehension, tho' some exercise of judgement is also requisite in forming all abstract and general conceptions. Of our judgements, some may be pronounced to be intuitive, and others are grounded on argument. Reason, then, may be defined to be that faculty by which the mind forms inferences and conclusions from the combination of first principles immediately recognized by judgement. There are some truths which are perceived as necessary by immediate intuition, and the combination of these forms that chain of reasoning called demonstration. There are other prepositions which the mind likewise perceives by intuition as highly probable or certain; and assents to with full conviction. These are contingent truths, and must be taken for granted in all arts and sciences. In mathematics, and in natural philosophy [14v] the first principles are universally allowed; and the ascertainment of the first principles in all the moral sciences, is a great desideratum in logic; and would mark a most important one in the progress of human knowledge, and without first principles, reasoning could have no foundation. Intuitive judgements therefore are prior to reason in the order of the understanding. This being premised, modes of reasoning may be divided into abstract, and experimental. The former is employed chiefly in the science of number and quantity:

matter of fact and existence are the foundations of the latter: and both species of reasoning are frequently blended together, both in natural and in moral philosophy. An argument may be taken a priori, or a posteriori. A priori reasoning is admissable [admissible or admittable] in mathematics, because the definition of the object exhausts its essence. But a posteriori reasonings alone must be the foundation of all theory concerning mind or body. Yet theory being once established on that foundation, arguments a priori are then, and not till then perfectly admissable [admissible or admittable]. Thus it appears that in natural and moral philosophy the analytic method must be pursued in the primary investigation of truth: But truths once discovered and digested into theory may be expounded synthetically. The faculty of moral discerment is another principle of the understanding allied to reason which is supreme in the constitution, and deserves the fullest consideration. But as this faculty is an active as well as [15] an itellectual power, it will be considered with more propriety, after we have reviewed those mental acts which we refer to the will. Meanwhile as an appendix to our analysis of the understanding, we shall deliver a short account of the ancient logic, or of that which is usually denominated the art of reasoning.

Chap. VIII. Of the logic of Aristotle and of the Schools.

The artificial rules of ancient logic on account of the figure they have made in the world, challenge some attention in philosophy. These real excellence perhaps entitles them to none, and the art tho' full of ingenuity, is now generally explodded [exploded] as affording little or no advantage in the investigation of truth. Arrangement is no doubt of indispensable importance in the art of reasoning, and in this view, the categories of the ancients exhibit one of the boldest efforts of the human genius. Modern logic is derived from the ancient dialectica, and from the subtile distinctions of Aristotle. By him, every object of thought was supposed to be reducible to one or other of these ten categories, viz. substance, quantity, quality, relation, place, time, position, habit, action, and passion. Thus in the language of Aristotle, *ἕκαστον, ἤτοι, οὐσἀαν, σημαίνει, ἢ πόσον, ἢ ποῖον, ἢ πρός τι, ἢ που, ἢ ποτε, ἢ κεῖσθαι, ἢ ἔχειν,* [15v] *ἢ ποιεῖν, ἢ πάσχειν.* Whatever can be attributed to any subject was supposed to be reducible to one or other of five classes of predicates called the five predicables, or the five universals, namely, genus, species, difference, property, and accident. Those ten categories, and these five predicables were borrowed probably from Archytas of Tarentum, or, at least, from the Pythagorean school. Nor is it improbable that Pythagoras himself was the inventer. The number of categories according to

Plato were only five, namely, substance, identity, diversity, motion, and rest: or, in Plato's own language *οὐσία, ταυτότης, η[ἑ]τερότης, κίνησις, καὶστάσις*. But whatever we pronounce concerning the invention of categories and predicables: the whole theory of pure categorical syllogisms as laid down in his analytics, Aristotle claims as his own. Every syllogism or conclusion consists of two terms, a subject and a predicate. The predicate is called the great term; and the subject is called the little term. To shew the connection of these is the end of syllogism: and this is to be performed by resorting to a third idea or mean term. A syllogism then is an argument which consists of three propositions. In the 1st, the predicate of the conclusion or great term is connected with the mean term and it is called the major of the argument. In the 2d proposition, the subject of the conclusion, or the little term is connected with the mean term, and it is called the minor of the argument. These two propositions major and minor are called premises: and these premises must virtually contain the conclusion, which dropping the mean term declares the connec[16]tion of subject and predicate. Syllogisms are distinguished by figure and mode. The figure of a syllogism is determined by the position of the mean term. If the mean term be subject of the major and predicate of the minor; the syllogism is said to be of the first figure. If the mean term stands predicate in both premises the syllogism is of the 2d figure. And if the mean term be subject in both premises, the syllogism is of the 3d figure. These are all the figures admitted by Aristotle: but Galen superadded a fourth, wherein the mean term stands predicate of the major and subject of the minor. This figure accordingly, which is the converse of the first, is called the Galenic figure. The mode of a syllogism depends on the quality and quantity of the propositions belonging to it. Now it is evident, there are four kinds of propositions thus distinguished. viz. An universal affirmative, an universal negative; a particular affirmative, and a particular negative. These propositions were denoted by the vowels a,e,i,o, according to the following rule. Assenit a, negat e, ed universaliter ambo. Assent i, negat o, sed particulariter ambo. It follows then from the doctrine of combination, that the modes of syllogism in each figure are 64, and consequently 192 in the three figures of Aristotle. Of these, 14 modes only are proved to be the legitimate which are pointed out in the following barbarous ones invented in the middle ages long after the days of Aristotle.

Barbara, celarent, darii, ferio, dato primae [16v] Caesare, camestris, festino, baroco, secundae.

Tertia grande solens secitat daracti felactom abjungeris disamis datisi bocardo ferison. The four modes of syllogism in the 1st figure here specified are shewn to be

conclusive in a direct manner; and the other ten authorized modes are established by a process of reduction. Thus in every authorized mode, a necessary connection is shewn to subsist between the premises and the conclusion. But syllogisms perfect in form may be vicious in matter, for the premises may be true or false, probable or improbable. And it is evident, that whatever falacy, uncertainty, or ambiguity reside in the premises, must affect the conclusion. Hence, syllogisms are distributed into apodictical, dialectical, and sophistical; all which will be here explained. Such is a summary of the art of categorical syllogism so much calebrated in former ages. The whole art turns upon this hinge that whatever is affirmed or denied of a genus may be affirmed or denied of every species or individual belonging to that genus. A principle indeed consonant ot truth but not very profound as has been justly observed by Dr Reid, whose account of the logic of Aristotle inserted in Lord Kaims[Kames]'s sketches on the history of man, is correct and masterly. If the logic of Aristotle had been used only for the purpose of detecting error, it would merit high commendation, but it served the purpose as effectually of intangling truth and giving plausibility to error. In all physical and moral reasoning, we proceed by analysis and ascend from particulars to universals. But in syllogism, that order is reversed and from hence it appear[s] that the whole art is merely didactic and leads [17] not to the discovery of physical or moral truth. The categories, the predicables, and the whole theory of syllogism as delivered by Aristotle were adopted by the scholastics, and besides these categorical syllogisms which belong to figure and mode, there are others of various description which cannnot be tried by that standard. The whole syllogistic art has been greatly abused, and served in the hands of the scholastics the purposes of learned ignorance and ecclesiasticall tyranny. Thought was subjected to words, and every thesis true or false was capable of being maintained almost with equal plausibility by the dexterous management of logical arms. The logic of Aristotle and the abuse of words, almost exhausted the learning of Europe from the ninth to the fifteenth century, when a dawn of science began to appear. The human mind however could not be fettered forever, and the authority of the Stagyrite is no more. Analytical reasoning or the art of induction introduced by Lord Bacon forms a memorable aera, and from that aera the sciences have flourished with wonderful success. The novum organum of Bacon has led to discoveries, to which the organism of Aristotle never could have conducted mankind; and the art of reasoning now proceeds in a happier train. Natural logic is very different from the artificial logic of the schools. The n[w]iles of Aristotle make some figure in verbal controversy, in science none. And even in the arts that make a figure in debate, the wiles

of Aristotle are [17v] no longer formidable. They are rightly regarded as the engines of barbarous war; but by no means as the refined instruments of eloquence, or as the irresistible armour of philosophy. From this historical digression we return to the plan of these institutes, and having analyzed the several acts of the Understanding, we proceed to enquire into those active powers of the mind which are in general referred to the will.

Part II. Of the will

Introduction

The faculties of the mind considered in the preceding analysis are commonly referred to the understanding, and may be denominated the speculative powers of man. The faculties now to be analyzed are commonly referred to the will and are denominated the active powers of man. They are more immediately with Ethics, as the former were with logic. For they lead to all the variety of action which composes the detail of human life. Both our speculative and active powers are called acts of the mind. But as the former terminate in speculation or in conviction, the latter lead more directly to action. And hence the distinction between our speculative and active powers has a manifest foundation in nature: nor is the preeminence of man above the inferior orders of life more conspicuous in his [18] intellectual exertions, than in his more dignified principles of his action, and his capacity of self government. It is impossible to give a logical definition of power either speculative or active, because its essence is unknown. Of active power therefore the mind can form no direct conception. We cannot in strict language affirm that the mind is conscious of the existence of active power, but of its exertions the mind is conscious and those exertions necessarily imply the existence of the power whence they arise. Of power therefore we can form a relative conception, we can conceive power relatively to the subject in which it resides, and to the nature and extent of its operations. This being premised we enter on the analysis of the active powers of man.

Chap I. Of propensity and moral sentiment.

Pleasure and pain are derived to the mind from the operations both of external and internal sense. Whatever produces pleasure is the natural object of desire. Whatever produces pain is the natural object of aversion. Stimulated by desire or aversion [18v] the mind is prone to act, and this propensity is followed by volition or the final determination of the mind which immediately proceedes action. Both men and animals are active in

consequence of original instincts, impulses or propensities which produce their effects and embrace their objects prior to all experience of pleasure or of pain. But experience may afterwards produce a new train of desire, and hence the distinction of direct and indirect, of primary and secondary passions, and hence too, the various modifications of hope and fear. Human propensities have also been distinguished into animal and rational. The former are common to man and the animals, the latter belong to man as a rational being or as a moral agent. But it belongs to ethics to ascertain the order and dignity in all the propensities of man. Our desires accoding to the agitation produced in the mind may also be distinguished into two classes, the calm and the violent. The calm desires when duly regulated were referred by the ancients to rational appetite. The more vehement and tumultuary were referred by them to sensitive appetite. Suitably to this distinction, we begin with the consideration of calm desires.

[19] Sect. II. Of affection or calm desire.

The general modifications of desire are distinguished by a reference to the individual or to the public. That general desire of happiness which is inseparable from our nature constitutes selflove; and each particular affection which terminates in selfgratification alone is referred to the private class of desire. A similar distribution may be made of public desires. The love of the species, or a general desire of the happiness of others is essential to humanity; and constitutes calm disinterested benevolence. The love of our country or lesser system, and every calm affection that is directed to any select part of mankind, belongs to this class of desire. But tho' sympathy is mutual between man and man, and tho' there is in human nature a foundation of general love, the application of it is governed by circumstances. Hence, the various relations of life, and the corresponding modifications of social attachment. The heart expands itself by degrees, and rises by a gradation of sentiment from the more confined to the more enlarged affections, untill at length it embraces the whole species, and even the whole system of being. Thus in the language of the poet, "Selflove but serves the virtuous mind to wake,/ As the small peble stirs the peaceful lake;/ The center moved a circle streight succeeds/ another still, and still another spreads./ Thence, parent, neighbour, first it will embrace/ This country next, and next all human race." [19v] These private and public affections are perfectly distinct, and may occasionally oppose each other, and occasionally augment each others strength. The one are as real as the other, and can be resolved into no refinement of selflove. It were as absurd in theory to resolve the social principle into selflove as to

resolve the selfish principle into social love. I love the system or the community of mankind from the relation it bears to myself, is a proposition not more intelligible than the converse, viz. I love myself from the relation I bear to the general system. The language of nature is more correctly thus, I love the system, and independently of that system I love myself, or I love myself, and independently of this selflove, I love the system. Yet, as every man is constituted by nature more immediately his own guardian than the guardian of any community, hence selflove is originally strong and requires no culture. The social affections too which approach the nearest to selflove have proportional strength, and the social principle opens only by degrees into general philanthropy. It is accordingly the maxim of civilized and cultivated man, Homo sum nil humani a me alionum puto [Terentius: Heauton Timorumenos]. For the disinterestedness of the social affections as perfectly distinct from selflove we may appeal to the feelings even of the most obdurate heart and to the phenomena in human life. There is a pleasure which attends the exercise of all kind affections, but this pleasure is the effect not [20] the motive to kindness. Selflove has no creative power and the confounding the pleasure with the influencing motive of the will has led to false theory with regard to the mind. In examining into the foundations of morality it will be afterwards shewn, that the approbation attending the moral virtues cannot by any philosophic chemistry be deduced from the elements of selflove. At present it is sufficient to have shewn in philosophic theory that those are two grand propensities in the heart of man which are not necessarily dependent on each other. These propensities are steady and uniform. And tho' they subsist in various degrees of strength in different tempers, and are liable to be warped by a thousand contingencies, they are essential in some degree to the whole race of mankind, and it is the description of every region of the globe barbarous and civilized. "Sunt hic etiam sua premia laudi. Sunt lacrymae renum et mentem morialia tangunt." [Vergilius: Aeneis I. 461–2.]

Sect.III. Of the division of passions

In treating of the more vehement affections or passions, a similar arrangement may be observed, as in treating of the calm desires. Both have often the same object they differ only in the effect produced upon the mind, and it deserves to be remembered that a passion comes us directly to its object without any immediate reference to private or to public good. The passion may often stand in opposition to cool desire and may impel the mind to a different object. In which competition, sometime the one and sometimes the

other may predominate. To the private [20v] class of desire whether of the calmer or more violent kind may be referred to the love of life, ambition, emulation, pride, private resentment, all the appetites of sense and a variety of other impulses. To the social, or more generous class we may refer philanthropy, sympathy, patriotism, strong or natural affection, and all the various modifications of social love, diversified according to the object of the passion. But exclusive of those general arrangements, there are various passions which may be occasionally directed either to private or to public good, and consequently belong equally to either class, as anger, indignation, and various modifications of hope and fear. It deserves also to be observed that the feelings which prompt to action are usually of a complicated nature, and participate in common of public and private motive. But an action is represented as interested or disinterested according as we conceive the complex principle which led to it to be composed chiefly of private or of social impulse and it will afterwards appear that our approbation or disapprovation of an action will in many instances depend on the predominancy or deficiency of social love in the sentiment from which the action flowed. Our affections then or passions may be distinguished into selfish, social, and mixed. With regard to the unsocial or malevolent passions of rancour, revenge, envy, misanthropy, these are vices and distempers and are excited by false judgements and associations. But pure disinterested malice far from having any place in our original frame, does not appear to have any existence even in the corruptions of the human heart.

Sect.IV. Of the phenomena of the passions.

[21] So active is the human genius as to reject even placid repose. Nor would a man, were he certain of the most pleasing dreams be reconciled to the sleep of Endimion. The lethargy of the mind and the consequent stagnation of human affairs are precluded by the various passions which have been called emphatically the gales of life. Observations therefore will be here made on the more remarkable phenomena of the passions, on the interior of appetite, on sympathy or the communication of passion, and on the dependence of all our desires on opinion, custom, and imagination. By the medium of imagination, eloquence, poetry, and painting, acquire an ascendency over the passions of the heart, for the general idea of advantage which makes no figure in the imagination never interests the passions like the prospect of specific good. The imagination and the passions are so closely united that whatever affects the former faculty cannot be altogether indifferent to the latter. The same principles of association influence both and on lively

passions, a lively imagination is an almost inseparable attendant. There is an immence variety of circumstances which have a natural tendency to heighten or to depress the passions, and some of these may be reduced to theory. Nothing, it may be observed, more powerfully animates any affection or passion than to conceal some part of its object, by throwing it into a sort of shade, while enough is [21v] seen to prepossess us in its favour. Imagination is thus set at work, and bestows on the object all the colouring and heightening of fiction. It has been well observed by a French author, that the absence of the object destroys weak passions but augments the strong, as the wind extinguishes a candle but blows up the fire. In the one case, the object is apt to die away in the imagination; but in the other case, the object remaining in the full view of the mind, the imagination is active in presenting all the circumstances that animate the passion, while the uneasiness of absense gives it new force and violence. It may farther be remarked as a phenomenon of passion, that it acquires additional strength from the number of sacrifices that are made in the course of indulgence. Thus the delicate and tender child who has given the mother most anxiety and concern is usually, caeteris paribus, the favorite child. For amidst the struggle of contending passions, that which predominates as if it had absorbed the rest is heightened by the accession of the opposing passions. Opposition like a gentle gale fans the passion by calling forth an effort of mind; and it raises the tone of the master passion, and inspires a sort of elevation and triumph. The soul in this exulting state in a manner courts opposition, as if eager to display its magnanimity. It is thus Ascanius in the pride of his heart and full of juvenile ardour wantonely sollicits danger agreeably to the natural representation of the Mantuan Muse [22] At puer Ascanius etc. Lib 18. 156.

While opposition supports and fills the passions, compliance often relaxes their tone, and an unresisted passion gradually of itself subsides. Uncertainty with regard to the object is another circumstance that like opposition increases the ferment of the passion. And it is to be observed that uncertainty tho' it makes an essential ingredient in the composition both of hope and fear, is however more allied to fear. For being in itself disagreeable it more easily associates with and augments the emotions of distress. Security or even dispair by removing the uncertainty tends ultimately to diminish the passions. It may also be observed that the mind inflated by any high passion, acquires a new one with a proportionable degree of vigour, and the sudden transition from a high passion to its opposite is more natural than the transition from a high passion to indifference. Every passion, agreeable or painfull, public or private, may be wound up to

a pitch that may be destructive of animal life. A ferment is stirred up in the blood, and the fibres of the system cannot resist the movement by which it is agitated amidst the shock of the tumultuary passions. The person who announced the victory at Marathon instantly dropt down dead. And modern history informs us of a man who died of joy on the restoration of the house of Stewert after the period of the civil war and the usurpation of Cromwell. History accounts many similar examples of the fatal effects of immoderate joy as well as of immoderate sorrow. The animating [22v] principle of all the passions is sympathy. The force of sympathy is conspicuous thro' the whole animal creation, but in man, it is that transcendent power which forms an emolument essential to his existence, and he can hardly form a wish which has not some reference to social life. Having instituted these observations on the philosophy of the passions, we next examine into certain powers of perception, which implying intellectual judgement, as well as sensibility or taste may perhaps with almost equal propriety be referred to the understanding or to the will. We treat accordingly in the first place concerning those senses by which we perceive external beauty, harmony, and grandeur.

Chap. II. Of the more refined powers of perception.

The faculties by which we perceive harmony, beauty, and grandeur form parts of human nature, which by some writers have been denominated powers of imagination in order to distinguished them from the operations of external sense. But this name is not applicable to them in strict and philosophical language. The existence indeed of those refined powers of perception presupposes imagination. But the powers themselves are not implied either in the external senses or in imagination. Mr Hutcheson with more tho' perhaps not with exact propriety has affixed the name of reflex or secondary senses to those powers, by which the mind perceives beauty and grandeur of every kind whether natural, intellectual, or moral. Suitable to this idea, the objects of those reflex senses are either of external or internal source. We begin with the former. [23] The mind in consequence of natural powers recognizes harmony, beauty, and grandeur exclusive of all arbitrary associations or reflections on utility. Ideas of utility indeed, and various associations mingle occasionally with all perceptions of beauty, and independently of the utility of the end, the fitness of the means to produce that end is an original source of pleasure. But the beauty of utility, of art, and of contrivance is of a different order from that beauty which we are now contemplating. Certain combinations and[?] forms are pronounced beautiful or great in consequence of the intimations they bring and perhaps

in all our perceptions of external beauty and grandeur, there is some reference to the agency of a designing mind. The constituent parts of personal beauty have been reduced to colour, form, expression and grace. Of which the two former have been called the body, and the two latter the soul. Love is the sentiment that corresponds with beauty,[.] respect [Respect] reverence, and devotion are the sentiments raised by the sublime. The qualities of outward object which are the occasions or antecedents of those perceptions, and the passions founded upon them are the circumstances which first require consideration. Variety has been regarded as the great foundation of beauty in the works of nature, and regularity and uniformity in the works of art. Mr Addison has accordingly rested beauty on this one criterion of uniformity amidst variety. But those qualities tho' of importance, by no means exhaust the description of natural beauty. The beauty of colour, for example, cannot be estimated by that criterion. Yet the beauty of colour and of form belong to the lowest order; and perhaps the objects of sense ultimately derive all their beauty from the beauties [23v] of mind which are hence suggested to the imagination. The line of beauty and the line of grace, as far as proportion is concerned have been traced with geometrical accuracy by Mr Hogarth in his analysis of beauty. But expression is the criterion by which all the higher orders of beauty must be examined. The same observation is also applicable to the sublime. And in the present inquiry, we comprehend all those perceptions which have been denominated pleasures of imagination, and reduced by Mr Addison to the three general classes of beauty, novelty, and grandeur. Next in order, we consider the principle of imitation which prevails so conspicuously in man that Aristotle in his poetics has defined man *ξῶον μιμητικώτατον*. From this principle of imitation, the fine arts derive their original, and hence all those perceptions which Mr Addison, Dr Akenside and other writers have called the secondary pleasures of imagination. The distinction of primary and secondary perceptions coincides with the distinction of absolute and relative beauty, and of absolute and relative grandeur as described by Dr Hutcheson and other moralists. The secondary and relative perceptions result not from the absolute beauty or absolute grandeur of the subject, but result from a comparison and relation of ideas. Yet when the subject is also beautiful or grand, then both nature and art conspire to please, and the pleasure is accordingly heightened as arising from more than one principle. The perceptions of wit and ridicule may also be resolved into a certain relation and comparison of ideas. True wit consists in the relation of thoughts. [24] False wit commonly consists in the expression. And mixed wit is compounded of both the true and the false, and participates of both relations. This distinction was recognized by

Quinctilian and by Longinus, and has been admitted by the modern critics. Wit consists in associations which it often belongs to the judgement to separate, and hence these talents have been considered as in some degree oppose to each other in the human understanding. With regard to ridicule it may be observed that the risible and the ridiculous are distinguishable and exite different emotions. The one exites laughter, the other exites laughter mixed with contempt. The one exites a gay and social emotion, the other superadds contempt from an impropriety in the object. The engines of wit and ridicule tho' liable to abuse are, when well directed, of considerable importance. They belong, however, to the inferiour branches of eloquence. The contemplation of nature and of art excites a variety of pleasing emotions. And a sensibility to those pleasures, forms that internal power called taste. The standard of taste, as well as of truth, is erected in nature. And the sense of beauty and of the sublime imply not only a feeling but also an opinion or judgement, and supposes some quality inherent in the object which produces that feeling. Taste is an improvable faculty, and correctness and delicacy are essential to its perfection. The importance of those refined powers in the mental system, their final causes, and the rank they hold in the scale of enjoyment belong to Ethics. Meanwhile, we proceed in the order of this analysis to the immediate consideration of Moral beauty and examine into the principles of moral approbation.

[24v] Chap. III. Of the principle of moral approbation.

We now enquire into that governing faculty by which the mind distinguishes right from wrong, and perceives moral excellence and moral turpitude. Analogous to the perception of natural is the perception of moral beauty. And taste receives its highest gratification from the perception of beauty in life and manners. In consequence of this analogy, the principle of moral discernment has been called by Dr Hutcheson a reflex internal sense. With what propriety it is called a sense will afterwards appear. At present we enter not into this field of controversy. This moral principle whether distinguished by the term moral sense or any other appellation, whether distinct from every other, or whether a modification of sympathy in all the variety of its exertions is supreme in the mind and is constituted the great judge of all the motions of the will. In strict language the moral faculty is distinct from reason, but reason is subservient to its operations. It is the office of the one faculty to inform. It is the office of the other faculty to pronounce sentence. Reason is a discussing faculty. The moral faculty is intuitive, it is invested with authority and declares our duty both to God and man. The moral faculty, or conscience, as it is

commonly denominated can do no wrong. But passion or prejudice may blind reason and reason by false deductions may deceive conscience, and hence the distinction between an ill informed and a well informed conscience. But conscience well informed is always authora[i]tative and decisive. A more particular consideration of its exertions and its decisive influence [25] upon happiness and misery belong[s] to Ethics. Allied to this principle or rather a modification of it is the sense of dignity, the sense of honour, the sense of decorum, and of that propriety and grace which we have considered in the former part of this analysis. This moral principle is the natural guardian of all the motives of the will. Reward or punishment attends the observance or violation of whatever the moral faculty prescribes. From hence results a new train of motives to influence the will. And hence the distinction of primary and secondary motives resulting from the same principle of moral discernment.

Sect.II. Of Primary and Secondary Motives.

Reason is a speculative principle and directs the understanding. The moral faculty is an active principle and ought to determine the will. Its authority is paramount to every other and it may be called divine. The motives of action are either instinctive or the result of reflection and experience. The emotions of joy and of sorrow are infinitely modified according to the circumstances of their original. Those emotions may be regarded both as causes, and effects of actions. For joy implies a lively reflection on past good as well as an anticipation of the future. Sorrow too implies a lively reflection on past ill as well as an apprehension of the future. They accordingly suppose antecedent affections and aversions whence they derive their birth, yet become themselves in their turn the parents of a new train of desire. We have thus classed and enumerated various prin[25v]ciples, impulses and desires which belong to our nature and rouze the soul to action. But none of those motives are so irresistible as to constrain the will. It is the priviledge of the mind to contemplate itself, and amidst all the variety of motives to make a free election. Hence man becomes accountable for his conduct and sustains the character of a moral agent. The general tendency of habit to assist or to oppose the purposes of the will, deserves to be carefully remarked and is of supreme importance in Ethics. But prior to the decisions in ethics, we enter on the second division of Pneumatology suggested by our general plan.

Pneumatology. Part II.

Introduction.

The second part of Pneumatology is supplemenal to the former and immediately introductive to Ethics, jurisprudence, and politics. It will consist chiefly of general conclusions concerning man resulting from the preceding analysis. By induction certain laws may be collected in the moral world, in the same manner as the laws of matter and motion are collected in physics. Every theory relative to human nature must depend on the consideration of its powers and of the various relations of our being. First then we inquire into the nature of the soul and its future prospects.

Chap. I. Of the nature of the soul, and its future prospects.

The essence of mind and the essence of body are equally unknown. But the phenomena of mind justify the referring it to a class of being essentially different from body. The faculties we have surveyed are not any actual divisions in a complicated nature, but only acts and exertions of the same [26] simple indivisible being. The immateriality of mind will therefore be inferred from the analysis of its powers. With regard to continuation of existence it is observable that annihilation is altogether unknown in the order of nature. By consequence the soul of man being an indivisible substance, and therefore not liable to any dissolution of parts, is physically immortal. But the arguments for a future life are drawn from a variety of sources which will be here opened. This belief will also appear to be a dictate of natural religion; and revelation is given not to supersede but to confirm the expectations and anticipations of Nature. A question has been started concerning the constant exertion of the soul in thought. Mr Locke asserts the negative, and rather treats his opponents with derision. But this is a question of vain curiosity, nor is it possible to establish the negative any more than the affirmative with absolute certainty. Another question has been started relative to personal identity; but this is a question of barren speculation, and may be abandoned to the lovers of absurd and contentious philosophy. There is no need to philosophise concerning simple and original conceptions of the human mind. We next enquire into the rank and peculier circumstances of man in the creation of God.

Chap. II. Of the rank and situation of man

Naturalists observe that there is a regular gradation from the lowest form of existence up

to man. This series is probably continued thro'out the intellectual system: and man fills that link in the great chain of being which connects animal with intellectual nature. He has therefore been emphatically called, nexus utriusque mundi, without such a rank as man there would be a chasm in the [26v] creation of God: and this consideration ought to silence all complaints with regard to the particular lot of humanity. Man's nature evidences that he is designed to rise: for he alone seems capable of progress, and all his faculties are found susceptible of high improvement, and without culture liable to proportionable degeneracy. Hence his great attainments in language, in arts and in government; and hence the vast differencies which subsist in the character of individuals and of nations. These differencies deserve our attentive consideration: and the history of the individual is often very different from the history of the species. But the history of both is equally indispensable in the study of human nature. We therefore proceed to enquire into the diversities among the several tribes of mankind.

Chap. III. Of the different races of mankind.

As man consists of soul and body, his circumstances connect him intimately with the material world. Hence the qualities of outward objects by operating upon the animal oeconomy must in an indirect manner affect the mind. And physical causes which diversify the outward form are found in the different regions of the globe to occasion some diversity in the genius and character of mankind. Yet the independence of the human mind appears under every clime: and even soil and climate are in some measure subjected to the dominion of man. Physical causes ought to be well defined and to be distinguished from moral in all inquiries into the genius and character of nations. But in this part of the course we must again refer to the essays on the history of mankind. Naturalists from the varietys[sic] observable in outward form have distinguished mankind into six different races, the European, the Samoeid, the Tartar, the Hindoo, the Negroe, and the American. These varieties may arise from the influence of climate, or from mechanical laws. And we have endeavoured to [27] shew in the work referred to, that such varieties are consistent with a common descent and a common origin of nations. Our nature is capable of exaltation, and is also subject to degradation beyond any other being here below. The actions of man unlike those of animals suppose reflection, principle and design. And it is his distinguishing priviledge to possess moral ideas, to contemplate order in the universe, and from thence to recognize the author of his existence. These observations therefore lead to that part of our subject which relates to

our knowledge of a supreme intelligence and an all governing mind.

Pneumatology. Part III. Of the supreme mind.

On this subject we refer to out sunday course. Arguments are drawn from a variety of sources: and the arguments for the existence of a Deity derived from final causes are shewn to be irresistible and decisive. The consistence and unity of design in the system of creation evidence the unity of its author, and the Polytheism under various forms has prevailed in rude and superstitious ages, it disappears from the light of reason and philosophy. The more intelligent heathens, while they adopted or seemed to adopt the popular creed, and to acknowledge subordinate divinities, or tutelary Gods, recognized a supreme cause which controled the whole system of things. The inscription on the temple of Sais is justly celebrated as sublime; and is thus mentioned by Plutarch *ἐγω εἰμὶ πὰν τὸ γέγονος, καὶ ὄν, καὶ ἐσόμένον, καὶ τὸν ἐμὸν πέπλον οὐδείς πω θνητὸς ἀπεκάλυφεν.* The attributes of the Deity have been distinguished [27v] into natural and moral: but in general may be expressed by the terms, power, wisdom, justice and goodness. Whatever implies not a contradiction is the object of divine power; and the attributes of justice, wisdom, and goodness must infallible[y] direct the exertions of Omnipotence to the best ends. Various theories have been offered to account for the introduction of natural and moral evil into a system planned by infinite wisdom, and executed by infinite power. The condition or rank which belong to man will account for moral evil; and natural evil can be shewn to be a concomitant intimately connected with moral improvement. Man is so constituted that he is in possession of moral ideas, and must regard his maker with sentiments of love, gratitude, reverence, adoration, and obedience. Thence it follows that religion is natural to the human mind. The conduct and government of Providence, and the sanctions of the divine laws in this world suggest the idea of rewards and punishments in a future state. And revelation confirms those expectations that are laid in the religion of nature. Theology then, or the dictates of religion form a capital branch of moral science. Having therefore inquired into the faculties of the human mind, and touched on the great outlines of theology, we enter with due preparation on our course of Ethics.

[28] Ethics.

Introduction. The duty and interest of man resulting from his constitution, it was necessary that pneumatology in its various branches should precede the deductions in morals. Man being formed with various inclinations, instincts, and passions which

prompt him to action, the system of mind would be evidently defective, were there no principles designed to regulate and govern his pursuits. Such principles there are, and these intimate to man upon all occasions the rules of life. Man we have contemplated as an accountable being and a moral agent, and now we enter on the immediate province of ethics.

Chap. I. Of the standard of morals.

The idea of right and wrong is congenial with the human mind, is common to all ages and nations, and belongs to man under every form of social life. The diversity of moral judgements will be shewn to be consistent with an universal standard. The causes of this diversity can be traced in the associations of fancy, and in mistaken notions concerning the tendency of actions, or the supposed will of heaven. One people may differ from another in the detail of moral duty and in the degrees of approbation or blame that are bestowed on certain actions and characters. But benevolence in some degree is infused into every bosom, and the great outlines of morality are legible in all communities, nor is there any difference in the ultimate ends that are approb[v]ed by all. The state of nature rightly understood is not a state of war. The principles of union among [28v] men are prior to the principles of hostility. Man is by nature sociable: and all social intercourse supposes the universal obligations of morality. An intuitive principle of right and wrong is referred to in the transactions and commerce of all tribes and nations. The first institutors of government and the first legislators could no more have established a system of institutions without the original existence of natural law and moral duty, than Columbus could have discovered a new continent tho' that continent had never existed on the face of the globe. Our discernmenmt of moral distinctions is not only essential to the human constitution, but is inseparable from our conception of every higher order of intelligence. It is farther observable that the moral attributes of the author of nature are demonstrable from the order of things in the government of the universe: And by consequence the standard of morality is in every view fixed, immutable and eternal. The different theories that account for moral approbation in man will be the next subject of our philosophical enquiries.

Chap. II. Of the different theories concerning moral approbation.

Whether moral approbation be ultimately referred to reason or to sentiment is a question already determined in pneumatology. This question was first started by Lord Shafts-

burry [Shaftesbury], and Dr Hutcheson has clearly shewn, in his illustrations on the moral sense, in what respect moral distinctions arise from reason, and in what respect from immediate sense or feeling. The term moral sense has been already pronounced to be admissable [admissible or admittable], and the term conscience is perhaps of all others [29] the most unexceptionable in philosophical theory. All theories which derive moral approbation from selflove admit of an easy refutation. Mr Hobbes in his theory may be considered rather as the author of a satire upon human nature, than as in the rank of philosophers. Were it possible to believe him serious, his production called Leviathan might be considered as a monster attempting to undermine morality rather than as a philosophical production to account for its origin. The love of paradox and of system accounts for the figure which other selfish theories have made in the world. But in no point of light can the principle of selflove be regarded as the source of moral judgement: nor will the aid of sympathy, nor any refinements of the imagination avail towards the support of the selfish plan. There is indeed one theory founded on sympathy which deserves regard: it is the theory of the late ingenious Dr Smith, and it disclaims all alliance with the selfish system. This theory of moral sentiment if not full and satisfactory accounts at least very happily for a number of the appearances in human life. But this question concerning the nature of our moral faculty tho' curious in speculation is of no moment in the deductions of Ethics. The next question is more important as it enquires into the nature of that character and conduct which command the approbation of our moral faculties.

Chap. III.

Sect.I. Of the nature of virtue.

[29v] As moral approbation differs in kind from every other sentiment, the corresponding objects may be accurately defined nor ought virtue and vice to be confounded with any other species of merit or demerit. But it does not follow that all the moral virtues run into each other or are recommended to the mind intuitively as parts of the same original. The exercise of certain affections as well as the approbation which accompanies them seem to be essential to the description of virtue. The exercise of opposite affections, and were that possible, the approbation of such affections would render a being completely vitious and immoral. To certain affections it belongs to be amiable and agreeable. To other affections it belongs to be odious and disagreeable: and hence some philosophers have conceived the whole of virtue to reside with one class of affections, and the whole

of vice to reside with the opposite class. But it is also true that to approve and disapprove belong to a moral agent: and hence other philosophers derive the whole virtue from a regard to the authority of those moral judgements. Our description of virtue will serve to reconcile and to unite the different theories. And it may be observed that those theories which are the most distinguished are rather imperfect than false, and while incomplete as systems, present severally respectable views of virtue. Were it possible to trace up all the moral virtues to any one principle, that of universal benevolence [30] seems of all others most worthy to be embraced. Nor is it easy to conceive any other principle to have influenced the Deity in the acts of creation and providence. But there are other principles of action which command the immediate approbation of our moral faculties: and such a moral constitution is highly expedient for a being so imperfect as man. Consistently with the great end of morality, we recognize subordinate ends to which our feelings are immediately directed. Thus fidelity, truth, and other maxims can be shewn to be essential to the order and happiness of the system. But exclusive of this reference the above virtues are recommended by immediate feeling and sentiment. These things being premised, we proceed to consider the different aspects of human nature which have given rise to the ancient and modern systems.

Sect.II. Of ancient theories concerning virtue.

Plato, Aristotle, and Zeno coincide with regard to the prima naturae or primary objects of natural desire and aversion. They differ only in the particular composition and illustration of their respective systems. Plato considers the soul of man as somewhat like to a little state: and on that theory illustrates the nature of the cardinal virtues of Prudence, Fortitude, Temperance, and Justice. Aristotle without adopting the Platonic allusions deduces the origin of those cardinal virtues from considerations nearly similar. Plato regards virtue as a species of science, and will not admit that the clear knowledge of virtue and the practice of its dictates can be separated. But Aristotle insists constantly on action and [30v] has accordingly defined virtue to be a habit of mediocrity according to right reasoning. The philosophy of Zeno is distinguished by the sublimity of its dictates, and by the rigour of moral discipline which it exacts. It regards the approbation which attends virtue as the only principle of duty, and overlooks the merit which belongs to the actual exercise of every social and amiable affection. It recommends an entire apathy and absolute indifference with regard to events or the determinations of fortune. A regard to the rule of rectitude ought according to the Stoics to exhaust all human care, and is the

consummation of all human bliss. It inculcates resignation to Providence from the noblest considerations, and may be regarded in many respects as the most perfect system to be found in all antiquity: Yet the principles of the s[sic]toics are wound up to an extreme, and the morals of Zeno are as impracticable in their full extent, as the politics of Plato in his imaginary commonwealth. Opposed to the scheme of Zeno is that of Epicurus a philosopher who has fundamentally erred in his account of the prima naturae. Bodily pleasure according to Epicurus is the only original object of desire; and bodily pain the only original object of aversion: Yet he contends that mental pleasure and mental pain far exceed their originals and by consequence that sound judgements and right opinions are of far more importance to happiness than the actual contingencies in the life of man. The principle of selflove on which the Epicurean system is established has been already shewn to be inadequate to moral appearances. And even the life of Epicurus like the life of Mr Hobbes gives the lie to so odius a philosophy. A sect of philosophers called Eclectics flourished about the [31] end of the Augustan age. The Eclectics were afterwards known under the name of the later p[sic]latonists. They adopted not the system of any one sect, but selected from all, and reared a superstructure on the broad foundations of the Greek philosophy. This Eclectic sect seem[s] to have been the authors of that system which ultimately refers all virtue to benevolence; a system which makes a conspicuous figure among the modern theories.

Sect.III. Of the modern theories concerning virtue.

The modern theories may be distinguished into the abstract and sentimental. Dr Clarke in deriving Virtue from acting agreeably to the eternal and immutable order of things: Mr Ulestone [Wollaston?] in deriving it from a conformity to truth: and other abstract philosophers present more or less accurate descriptions of the same leading ideas which we remark in Plato and in Aristotle. The observations of those writers are often just, but their schemes are too general, and define not with precision some striking characteristics of virtue. Lord Shaftsberry[Shaftesbury] in his inquiry into virtue describes it as consisting in maintaining a proper balance among the affections. The subordination of the private to the public, of the confined to the more enlarged affections, and the vast preeminence ascribed to the latter class distinguish and adorn the writings of Shaftsberry[Shaftesbury]. The great defect in his philosophy consists in overlooking the idea of authority which gives a sanction to morality; and the idea of obligation which is applied in moral determinations, Dr Hutcheson who forms his philosophy on the model of

Shaftsberry[Shaftesbury] winds up the system of benevolence [31v] to its highest pitch; and no principle of selflove is of any account in his philosophy. Even the sentiment of approbation is not admitted in the description of virtue. Yet virtue is considered both by Hutcheson and Shaftsberry[Shaftesbury] as its own reward. The system of Hume tries all the moral virtues by the criterion of utility. But this author attempts to run into one the different modes of approbation and allows not even the circumstances of voluntary and involuntary to enter far into the estimate of personal merit. He also confounds the perception with the object and thus introduces into morals such scepticism as predominates in his philosophy of the senses. The system of utility has been adopted by Mr Paily [Paley] arch deacon of Carslisle[Carlisle] and is expounded by him with considerable ability. The leading principle in Paily[Paley]'s philosophy refers to the Divine will. But tho' the Divine will is paramount to every consideration, yet our conception of the divine will and of the moral attributes of the Deity presupposes our conception of moral rectitude as fixed immutable and eternal. The different theories antient and modern which we have examined are more or less respectable and just. But there are systems rightly called licentious which call for refutation and animadversion. The absurd tho' ingenious sophistry which prevalis in the book of maxims by the Duke de Rochefocault [Rochefoucauld], and in the Fable of the Bees by Dr Mandeville will accordingly be detected and exposed. Nor ought the system of dissimulation and deceit diffused over the posthumous works of the late Lord Chesterfield to escape the indignation and animadversion of all sound moralists. After such discussions we proceed in systematic order to form an estimate of human happiness.

[32] Chap. IV. Of happiness.

The question concerning happiness is the most interesting in philosophy. But that question is in a great measure anticipated by our inquiry into virtue. Moral sentiment however is liable to be diversified by the notions entertained of the summum bonum or the supreme felicity of man. Happiness is the universal aim, and by consequence disputes may arise when different notions are formed on that score. Man is designed for society and for action. His duty therefore consists in a series of active exertions directed to social ends. If these exertions are well governed, they will produce a series of agreeable emotions independently of the good or ill success that may attend our pursuits. A good man therefore tho' he may often be unfortunate can never be unhappy. Happiness, too, often consists more in hope than in actual enjoyment. Hope and fear therefore are of great

consideration in human life. But virtue alone can support the best hopes of our nature: and vice alone can engender well grounded fears. Virtue by the favour of heaven has everything to hope and nothing to fear: while vice has everything to fear and nothing to hope. Yet exclusive of these consequences and of the awfull futurity that awaits mankind, it can be shewn from an exact estimate of the goods and ills of life that virtue is the natural happiness, and that vice is the natural misery of every human creature. The enjoyments of man may in general be distinguished into four classes: Sensual pleasure, the pleasure of imagination and of genius, the social and sympathetic pleasures, and lastly the moral and religious. Sensual pleasures are the lowest in point of dignity, and the most transient in point of duration. It is from associations of the social and sympa[32v]thetic kind, and from the refinements of the imagination that they borrow their greatest allurements. The second class have more dignity and duration than the former, yet fall infinitely short of the social feelings. The exercise of kind affections and the reflections on conscious virtue supported by religious conviction yield a sublimity and permanency of delight to which there is no paralel in the sphere of human enjoyment. But virtue is not only its own reward, but contributes to enhance the value of every other possession. It tends to preserve health and to secure reputation; it brightens prosperity, and in advesity is our only support. Yet it would be unreasonable to expect that external advantages should be inseparably united with virtue. The gifts of fortune if proposed as an immediate reward would be destructive of all the merit of virtue. The possession of them, too, might be destructive of virtuous exertions, and in that case, might diminish instead of augmenting the sum of our enjoyments. It is then wisely ordered that external good or evil shall depend on other circumstances. And it were absurd to desire the suspension or violation of general laws. It is enough that those general laws promote the general order and harmony of the universe. Resignation to the course of things is the duty of man: and a reliance upon the Ruler of the universe forms the great support of virtue in the most trying situations of human life. Having thus contemplated virtue and happiness as inseparable in the drama of life, we next enquire into the expressions of virtue in the detail of human practice. Prior to which we touch on the metaphysical question concerning human liberty.

[33] Chap. V. Of liberty and necessity.

This question concerning liberty has occasioned a world of controversy. The doctrine of necessity leans upon a supposed analogy between impulse in the natural and motive in

the moral world. But this analogy has in reality no foundation, and by consequence every scheme is false which implies a species of necessity that confounds the physical and the moral systems. The advocates for liberty have exposed the absurdity of such opinions, while some of those advocates have given an advantage to their adversaries by an improper illustration of their own theory. The supposition of an action without a motive, that is of an effect without a cause is the absurdity objected to the patrons of liberty by the necessitarians or fatalists. Moral liberty rightly defined implies a power over the determinations of the will. And moral necessity implies the want of such a power. A sketch of the opinions of the ancients on this subject may be seen in Cicero's book de fato. Speculative men in all ages have involved themselves in much metaphysical subtilty, and the dispute has become in some respects merely verval. The motive from which we chuse to act cannot be destructive of liberty. And to act from motives not imposed upon us is the very definition of freedom. The term necessity ought therefore to be abolished, or proscribed in moral discussion, and the several opinions of philosophers in this inquiry may be considered as so many different theories or explications of human liberty. All that is in our power depends upon the will; and hence it has been well observed that the will itself must be in our power. The doctrine then of moral liberty rightly stated is perfectly admissable [admissible or admittable], and may be vindicated as conformable to the universal feelings of mankind. Freed then from this vain and embarassing speculation, we [33v] prosecute more interesting doctrines in the systematic order of the course.

Chap. VI. Of the practical rules of Morality.

Right conceptions of the origin of moral sentiment are not only of speculative importance, but may influence in some degree the maxims and the rules of life. Yet to understand his duty in the various relations of life, it is not necessary for a man to be profound in metaphysics or in pneumatology. When right moral sentiments predominate in the mind, the external expression will seldom deviate from propriety and all the virtues will be displayed in outward conduct and behaviour. The general maxims of virtue tho' liable to be warped by prejudice, by custom, and false associations can never be altogether perverted or eradicated in any country or among any people. Right and wrong in most cases are so well defined that the same system of Ethics or of sound casuistry will comprehend all ages and nations. In the rules of practice and in moral maxims, regard must be had to all the relations of our being. Hence moralists consider three classes or orders of duty; our duty to ourselves, to human society, and to the Author

of nature. The practical rules of morality are treated at large by Aristotle in his morals, and by Cicero in his offices. In a large sense justice has been shewn to comprehend in it all the virtues in their utmost perfection. But in a stricter sense, justice has a more immediate reference to the intercourse between man and man, and to the indispensable duties of social life. In this sense its dictates admit of a correct description and in the application of the maxims of justice to human life consists the science of jurisprudence.

[34] Of Jurisprudence. Introduction.

It is of importance not only to describe the great features of virtue but to enquire into the general rules that arise from virtuous sentiment. Hence casuistry becomes a branch of moral science. But scholastic casuistry like scholastic logic has been abused and the species of science cultivated under that name in dark and superstitious times deserves not the attention of an enlightened age. The attempt indeed is often vain to fix the highest species of propriety in all situations that may occur. Sound casuists have accordingly differed in the solutions they have given of some of the nicer problems. On this subject may be consulted Cicero's third book De officiis, and Dr Hutcheson and others among the moderns. Casuistry and jurisprudence tho' often confounded together are sciences perfectly distinct. Casuistry considers the rules of conduct which every good man would subscribe for himself. Jurisprudence considers those rules only, the strict observance of which may be exacted by compulsory laws.

Chap. I. Of the rules of jurisprudence.

Natural jusrisprudence considers men in a state of equality, and accordingly establishes rules for the determination of right antecedent to positive law, or any specific form of government. The general division of right is into perfect and imperfect. The last belongs to casuistry or to practical ethics: but the former belongs to Jurisprudence. For perfect rights are [deleted] such as being precise and determinate are not only guarded by the sanctions of duty, but by the sanctions of compulsory law. The division of perfect rights is into personal and real, natural and adventitious. All of which with there[their] various subdivisions will be here considered. Of adventitious rights some belong to individuals [34v] and some to corporations, communities, or states. And hence the distinction between natural persons and artificial persons. The various ways by which adventitious rights may be acquired and transferred are reducible in general to these four: Occupancy, Labour, convention, and forfeiture. The civil laws of every country may be regarded as so

many attempts more or less happy to collect the decisions of natural jurisprudence. But from the imperfection of human things, the external claims of men by civil laws will sometimes be opposed to the claims of humanity. Hence there arises a merely legal or external right which the jurisprudence of the country must admit, but which no man of honor or of sound principles would ever exercise. Of the adventitious rights which are reducible to possession, property, and command, the limitations deserve attention. And it may be shewn, that as the right of command can never extend to the persons of men, every species of slavery is a sollecism [solecism] in government, and has no foundation in the laws of nature. The right of mankind to exercise dominion over the inferiour animals has perhaps some limitations. But surely the right of mankind to exercise dominion over their fellow men and to treat them as they treat the animals can be vindicated upon no principle of public utility, nor on any principle recognized by the fundamental laws of human society.

Chap. II. Of the maintenance of the rights of man.

The 2d part of jurisprudence enquires into the manner in which the various rights of man may be maintained and vindicated prior to the institution of Government. In dubious cases arbitration is the obvious and natural way of deciding the claims of contending parties. But where a right clearly recognized is infringed or invaded, the person aggreived may assert this right by remonstrance or persuasion [35] and where all milder methods are ineffectual, recourse may be had to artifice or violence. If a man's right to his life, his person, his house, or his estate be attacked, he may repel that attack by instant violence and the aggressor may be farther punished by the community. But unless in self-defence and in those extraordinary cases, neither artifice nor violence can ever be allowable in civil society, because all differences there not amicably adjusted must be decided by an action at law before the civil magistrate. Independent nations may be considered with regard to each other as individuals are in a state of nature. And consequently many of the laws of nations may be judged by the principles of private jurisprudence. Then nations or individuals are unhappily reduced to the necessity of using either artifice or violence in the vindication of their rights, there arises a state of hostility or war. And it may be laid down as a maxim that war never can be just upon both sides. Yet during its subsistence certain rules of conduct ought to be observed inviolably by both parties. And those rules are denominated the laws of war. On this subject we refer particularly to the treatise of Grotius de jure belli et pacis. The Roman jurisprudence is the great fountain of the

jurisprudence of modern Europe. And hence the Roman law is called emphatically the civil law. The Romans considered these three states or conditions of men: status libertatis, status civilitatis, et status familiae. And the civilians or the writers on the Roman law have deduced the personal rights of men from those several conditions. The second part of the corpus juris or the Roman code has for its object not personal but real rights, as jus dominii, jus hereditatis, jus servitutis, et jus pignoris. Suitable to this division of personal and real rights is the corresponding distinction of personal and real actions at law, for the defence or the recovery of these rights. But it is not our province to descend into the details of the Roman law or those of any other country. Civil jurisprudence is a [35v] branch of politics. Yet the consideration of the status familiae which may subsist antecendently to civil institutions or the arrangements of government, forms a branch of the general science of jurisprudence which is denominated family jusrisprudence or œconomics.

Chap. III. Œconomics or family jurisprudence.

The application of jusrisprudence to a family is usually called œconomics, wherein are considered the relations and subordinations of domestic life. The domestic state being founded on the relation of marriage, the nature, design and propriety of the union, and the moral obligations which belong to it become the subjects of enquiry. It is of importance in every society and in every nation to asertain the parents of the rising generation and to allow full exercise to the natural affection or the *στοργή* inviolable fidelity therfore is incumbent on the parties who unite with sentiments of mutual love for the purpose of domestic happiness, and for rearing up a common progeny. It is easy to shew that certain ties of blood ought to exclude the relation of marriage, and consequently that incest in the ascending and descending lines is contrary to the intention of nature and to the most obvious views of public utility. The prohibitions in the transverse or collateral line contained in the Mosaic law are highly expedient, and therefore wisely adopted into the civil law of our own country and of other Christian states. But the prohibitions in the canon law are evidently absurd and were calculated for the aggrandizement and emolument of ecclesiastics in an ignorant and superstitious age. The near equality in the number of both sexes renders polygamy unjust. And on that ground as well as from the nature of the domestic alliance monogamy or single marriages will be fully vindicated. The perpetuity of the marriage contract will be also vindicated and the toleration of divorces by mutual consent or on slight pretences will be shewn to be highly

injurious to the interest of the family and to be subversive of the great ends of the contract. [36] On this subject we must again refer to the 1st of the essays on the history of mankind. Chastity is there shewn to be a dictate of morality, the liberty of divorce to be dangerous, a community of wives to be barbarous, and polygamy in every form to be unjust. These doctrines being instituted, œconomics proceeds to consider the reciprocal obligations of a family which may be divided into conjugal, parental, and filial obligation, besides those obligations which mutualy subsist between the children or common progeny. The right of command in parents over their children has been already illustrated as a natural right. But the patria potestas was allowed an unwarrantable latitude in the Roman law. The parental authority however, is of all others the least liable to abuse. Submission upon the part of the child is a dictate of nature, and to cherish and maintain parents in their declining years, or when their circumstances require it, is binding on children by all the laws of humanity, gratitude, natural affection, and jurisprudence. The obligations that arise in a family can never be dissolved: and all the members are bound to each other by the ties of duty and of reciprocal love. The relation of master and servant is another relation usually involved in the idea of a family. This relation is founded upon a mutual contract, and is therefore liable to be dissolved when all the conditions of the contract are performed by the contracting parties. Thus the domestic state is formed by nature and regulated by government. But the refinements of Plato on this subject tho' by no means intended to countenance licentiousness are repugnant to the interests of man and to the declared intention of Providence. From the domestic state we hasten into the political states which leads to the consideration of the peculiar engagements of civil life, the plans of which are various, and the consideration of them in their full extent and variety constitutes the science of politics.

[36v] Of Politics.

Introduction. The science of Politics may be divided into the following branches. Imo. The first branch of political science relates to the nature of the political union and to the original of states. IIdo. The second branch considers the several forms of government simple and compound, and describes the genius of a free constitution. IIItio. The third division of the science considers government with regard to its institutions, and therefore enters into the detail of political laws. IVto. The fourth division considers government with regard to its revenues, and therefore treats of public œconomy. Vto. The fifth and last division inquires into the history of the rise, progress and decline of civil govern-

ment.

Politics: Part I. Of the original of States.

The exigencies of man call him from a state of natural society into the adventitious state of artificial or political society. All government is founded on the tacit consent of the people, or on a species of convention which has been called by political writers the original compact. But it is not necessary to presume any such compact or convention in order to explain the duty of allegiance to an established government or the reciprocal duties of civil life. Some writers have represented the state of nature as a state of war, while other writers have described it as the golden age. These are opposite extremes which the phenomena of human life do not authorise. Mankind were probably at first dispersed into small tribes or families where a simple government was sufficient for all the exigencies of life. Among these tribes the parental authority and the authority annexed to superior wisdom and to years might supersede on ordinary occasions any positive rules or institutions. Yet every man became a member of society from the beginning. And a state of individuality is absolutely unknown. A state of war far from being the cause presupposes the existence of society. But a state of war might render it necessary to substitute in the room of patriarchal a more artificial mode of government. [37] Government therefore in its earliest stage may be pronounced to be either patriarchal or military. The distinctions of natural talents introduce corresponding distinctions in society, untill at last there arises something like a regular constitution which having the sanction of time is afterwards insisted on, or appealed to when differences arise. But it is only by slow degrees that mankind forgetting their original equality acquiesce implicitly in the authority of an existing government. Government then is founded on opinion and this opinion is strengthened and confirmed by time and by habit. Different governments may have owed their original to different causes. But as natural society is coeval with man, political society grows out of it by slow and often by insensible degrees. The duty of allegiance under every established government is an incumbent duty untill it is reformed or subverted by the collective body of the people. Though injustice and violence may have led to its formation, government may become legal by the acquiescence of ages. There is however no jus divinum of sovereigns and in cases of general tyranny and oppression, the right of resistance resides with the collective body of every people. We proceed therefore to enquire into the different forms of Government.

Part.II. Of forms of Government.

Every people in their collective capacity possess originally all the rights of government. These rights flow from the people and ultimately terminate in the same hands. The majesty of the people is therefore superior to the majesty of kings. But it is found necessary to delegate the powers of government and sovereignty is divided in various ways according to the exigencies of things, or the views of the original founders of civil society. The simple forms of government may be distinguished into democracy, aristocracy, monarchy, and despotism. The two former are called republican. A democracy supposes the sovereign power to reside in the collective body of the people, and to be exercised by themselves or by their representatives. But the idea of representation did not enter into the plans of the ancient republics. And representation is a modern improvement which adds to the perfection [37v] of which democracy is susceptible. Aristocracy supposes the sovereign power to reside in a select number or order of nobility. And this form may either be hereditary or elective. Monarchy consists in having a single person at the head of many subordinate orders while the authority of the person or monarch is defined by law. Despotism supposes the sovereign power to be exercised by one person and to be maintained by force without law or limitation. The principle most consonant to the genius of each of those forms of government has been traced by Montesquieu in his spirit of laws. Thus the principle of Democracy is virtue, or a sense of equality and justice. The principle of aristocracy is moderation, that of monarchy honour, and that of despotism fear. Despotism is an open denial of all the rights of men. It degrades human nature and admits of no apology even from the wretchedness and corruption of mankind. Every free government admits of such a distribution of power as tends to the security of the most valuable rights of men, and must be conducted by general and equal laws. A representative senate may be considered as the foundation on which the superstructure of every free government must be erected. We therfore hasten to consider the third division of our subject which inquires into the comparative excellence of different constitutions.

Part.III. Of Political law.

Simple forms of government are less perfect than the more complex. And every wise people have formed a costitution that participates in some degree of each of the three species of government recognized by political writers. Mixed governments are either mixed republics or mixed monarchies.

[38] The power of government consist in legislation, jurisdiction, and execution. And the more perfect forms consist in the proper distribution of those functions, so that a due ballance may be maintained in the constitution. The legislative power in every state is paramount to every other. And by consequence in the partition of the legislative power will consist in an eminent degree the excellence of a free constitution. The comparative advantages of different forms of civil policy will be here insisted on. They must be adjusted in part to physical, and in part to moral causes. And relative perfection rather than absolute is to be aimed at in political theory. In general, however, a mixed and limited monarchy seems to approach the nearest to perfection while an unlimited monarchy is an absurdity in theory, and in practice fitter for savages than for a civilized people. A limited and hereditary monarchy of a mixed form is displayed in the British constitution. And the British government rises superior to any other of which there is any example in the annals of mankind. This idea of a mixed government was considered by the ancients as rather to be desired than expected; but what Cicero imagined in his treatise de Republica, and what Tacitus conceived possible only in theory is realized in the British constitution. No government however seems susceptible of absolute perfection; and such plans as are delineated in the republic of Plato, in the oceana of Harrington, and in the Utopia of Sir Thomas More are imaginary and impracticable. It is a sufficient eulogium on the British constitution that it seems to possess the virtue of a Democracy, the wisdom of Aristocracy, and the strength of Monarchy. The rising states of America have opened their career whth auspicious omens, and may possibly exhibit to the world such equal and perfect governments as are hitherto unexampled in ancient or modern annals. The liberal genius of the American states begun to appear on the continent of [38v] Europe. And France animated by the example opened her career in a senate of philosophers. But the ferment in the public mind perhaps equally excited by the lovers of anarchy and the friends of ancient despotism must subside before liberty can flourish, or the rights of man be secured on permanent foundations. Nations as well as men are liable to perish by violent or by natural death, and government is exposed to danger both from foreign eruptions, and from internal convultion. It is therefore of consequence to enquire into the resources which enable a nation to resist external violence to maintain the order of internal laws and to preserve its rank and importance among the communities of mankind. The consideration of these resouces leads to the objects of public œconomy.

Part IV. Of public œconomy.

States may be regarded with a view to their institutions and forms, or with a view to their resouces. And by consequence the science of politics comprehends two great branches[,] the one relative to political law and the other to public œconomy. The capital objects of public œconomy are population, riches, and revenue. In every country where men are well supplied with the necessaries of life, and happy in their political establishment, population is likely to flourish. Government therefore ought to beware of obstructing population by improper laws. But under a well constituted government it seems unnecessary to encourage it by remuneratory laws. Populousness in most states may be considered as a pretty sure criterion of public prosperity. National richers flow either from national advantages or from industry and art, or from the profits of trade. Money has a double function. It may be considered both as an instrument of commerce, and as a measure of value. The nominal price of commodities will depend on the quantity of money in circulation, and on the quickness with which the money circulates. But it would be most fallacious to estimate national riches in all [39] circumstances by the abundance or by the deficiency of the precious metals. Among commercial nations indeed money cannot rise in any one country beyond its proper level, unless the freedom of circulation were obstructed. In estimating the comparative riches of states, it is necessary to enquire into their industry, their skill, and their progress in the mechanical and commercial arts. For these are the circumstances by which the ballance of trade will be regulated. Public revenue consists in that proportion of the national wealth which is appropriated for the purposes of state. And the exigencies of government in every country call for such an appropriation or allote[sic]ment. The mode of raising and of ma[i]ntaining the public revenue with most ease to the people is one of the nicest and most important objects of public œconomy. This opens an immence field of speculation. And the general maxims with regard to taxation are established and illustrated in the inquiry into the wealth of nations by the late Dr Smith: a work which deserves not [to] be read only, but to be studied both in the schools of philosophy, and in the cabinets of kings. Taxes in general may be referred to these four heads, capitation, assessment, customs, and excise. The advantages and inconveniences that attend these several modes, and what articles are the fittest objects of taxation will be here illustrated. But it will be impossible to enter into any long details.

Part V. Conclusion. Of government in its various stages.

The rise, progress, and decline of the political has been considered as analogous to the condition of the natural body. And it has been maintained that tho' the term of political life may be prolonged, it verges towartds mortality from the aeras of [39v] human things. In the history of civil society these aeras may be distinguished[.] Imo. The aera from the origin of society to the full establishment of dominion. IIdo. From the establishment of dominion to the acquisition of a free government regulated by law. And IIItio. From that aera to the final dissolution of civil liberty or the entire subversion of the ancient government.

The history of the Roman government in its rise, progress and decline may be considered as a sort of epitomy of the history of mankind. Collective bodies tho' independent as states have often mutual alliances and interferences. And the adjustment of their different claims constitutes the law of nations. Often, too, nations form intimate connections for the purposes of common defence, of common interest, or of commerce. Hence arises what is called a system of states as in ancient Greece, and at present in the cantons of Swi[t]zerland, in the German empire, and in the rising states beyond the Atlantic. The European nations though independent of each other, in the general œconomy and the interior government are united frequently by commerce and by their political ties. And to presume the ballance of power ought to be an object of attention in all the cabinets of Europe. The jealousies which subsist among the several states with regard to aggrandizement and power are often conducive to the general safety and propsperity of the whole. But commerce ought to be free, and monopolies of every kind are against the general interest of the commercial world. The late commercial treaty between this country and France seemed to be the result of an enlightened policy. But that treaty cannot be revived untill anarchy has ceased in the French republic. Whether in some future period, the whole habitable globe may not be reduced [40] into such circumstances that all nations while independent in their interior governments shall form one great political and commercial system, is a curious question in political theory. But into this immense field we make no excursions, and in closing these institutes we hasten to wind up with a few observations the business of this and every former course.

FINIS.

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