

Economic Empowerment without the State: Lesson from the Nandeⁱ

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Abstract

This paper argues that the notion that a strong state is the necessary condition for development is misleading and disproved by Nande traders. The latter supply the equivalent of state institutions and provide relative prosperity in the pre-industrial and stateless context of eastern region of the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

Introduction

The association of weak states with economic regression or poor economic performance is a recurrent theme in economic development literature. Besley and Persson (2009) recently recall the link between state capacity and weak states in the following: “the absence of state capacities to raise revenue and to support markets is a key factor in explaining the persistence of weak state” (2009:1)

The present paper shows that trust driving activities of Nande traders in North Kivu region of Democratic Republic of the Congo present a counterexample to the standard doctrine of development according to which strong states are necessary and sufficient conditions for development. I will address the necessity claim as contradicted by

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Nande trading networks. The sufficient claim is also in doubt as demonstrated by the South African Black Economic Empowerment (BEE) cronyism and parasitism. But, the late is outside the scope of this article. Indeed the target of my refutation is the traditional necessity claim. I will also deal with evidence of my theoretical claim as far as the provision of education, security and economic well-being in the Nande region are concerned. How do the Nande do it? Trust is a basis of Nande organization. I will finally deal with the conceptual or definitional understanding of the new social arrangement the Nande are producing: Is it a State?

I. Development theories

Development doctrine was long centered on 'national capitalism' where state plays the central role in managing market and accumulation (Hart 2010). State plays a critical role in understanding and explaining development or the absence of it. "Developmental state" is one of the ideal types that dominate the literature on development. Development state enables a conducive environment for industrialization, it enforces stability in important macroeconomic parameters, provides public goods such as roads, power supply, security, skilled based education. For this doctrine only the state could lead an economy towards development and growth (Hart 2010, Brautigam 1997, Amsden 1989, Wade 1990, Evans 1979, Weiss 1988, Putnam 1993).

The state-centered development theory had many fates throughout the history. While in the 1970s 'national capitalism' was the main paradigm of what was still a welfare state, in the 1980s the accents moved towards an understanding of development and economic growth as a rational response to the market incentives. Growth became the illusory supply response to the structural adjustment program of economic liberalization and deregulation. The market was then the only engine of growth (Hart 2010, Brautigam 1997).

The failure of market oriented development in Africa and the 1997 Asian crisis brought back emphasis on the state but under the concept of institutional economics. In fact, by focusing on price incentives on behavior, neo-liberal approaches are based on the assumption that access to market information is perfect, as are enforcement of contracts and protection of property rights. As Brautigam puts it "The new institutional economics differs from neoclassical economics in its explicit recognition that economic production and exchange do not happen with the smoothness of the curves drawn in textbooks; rather they are characterized by frictions that standard frameworks assume away" (1997: 1072)

To the question why some countries upgrade and develop but others fail to do so, Doner (2009) evokes the question of institutional capacities to address major problems of collective actions pertaining to development activities. Contrary to the new institutional dogmatism according to which institutions emerge and evolve for pure market reasons - as a result of choices by private parties to enhance mutual welfare in response to shifts in factor price -, Doner (2009) contends that political leaders are crucial to the creation of institutional capacities. And, "the availability of institutional capacities depends on the ways in which resource claims and resource availability influence the calculus of national political elites and the concentration of political authority through which elite operate" (Doner 2009: 19).

Doner brings us back to the role of political leader - non-market institutions - in the emergence of institutional capacities adequate to respond to the questions of development. As Bates puts it, "Property rights, contract law, the power to regulate production and exchange of commodities - these and other economic institutions are created by the state" (Bates quoted by Doner 2009: 19).

Before coming back to the role of institutional capacities it is important to notice that nationalist capitalism - market-oriented paradigm of development - as well as the institutional economics rest on some assumptions. One of them is that all aspects relevant to issues of development including cultural elements, genealogies of power, complexities of local discourse and histories are differed or homogenized and assumed to be alike everywhere. The instance of dynamic entrepreneurship among the Nande could not be explained by responses to price incentive or purpose state actions. Nande trust networks manage to create a dynamic and prosperous transnational trading enterprise and fill the gap left by the failure of the market in a stateless context by relying on cultural features encouraging business and trust related networks. Nande traders emerge as important economic or even political players thanks to their quality of integration within the Nande society. Nande traders maintain their internal social legitimacy and cohesion by embedding their economic activities in the web of existing social relations. But who are the Nande?

II. Who are the Nande entrepreneurs?

The Nande commercial elite seem to defend an uncanny position regarding the DRC's power dynamic. They want the state, but they want it to be as weak as possible. On the highest hill of Kambali stands a newly built mayor's office. The largest in the country, the office, a three story rectangular building, is an imposing romanesque structure resting on a concrete platform. It is on the top of the hill oriented lengthwise, from east to west, with two main entrances, one facing north, the other south. It took three years to build – three years during which the rest of the country was being devastated by the civil war. In 2006 its exterior was freshly painted brown and tall windows and doors lining each floor were newly equipped with plate glass. Its roof is peaked and colored in deep brick red. If one stands before the southern entrance, one may gaze out upon what used to be the

country's vegetable reserve – fertile lands around Mont Ruwenzori. These lands were at the origin of Nande trading activities in the 1950s and 1960s. Beans, carrots, tomatoes, onions, and other vegetables were produced and shipped regularly to Kampala, (in Uganda) when Kisangani was racked with the violence of the Mulele rebellion in 1964 and to Kisangani, when Kampala was in the throes of Uganda's war of independence in late 1960s. Through the northern doors one sees elegant villas owned by traders who are now the new occupants of the site of the former MGL (Minerais des Grands Lacs), the colonial company in charge of the exploitation of diamonds and gold in north Kivu.

This building is one of the most distinguished mayor's offices in the whole country. It was built by the association of Nande traders from Butembo. One would think that this governmental building symbolizes the attachment of the Nande people to the large state structure. This would be a false impression. The Nande have never had good relations with the Congo's central government, and since Independence have constantly worked outside the state structure. MacGaffey explains:

“The Nande found themselves underrepresented in the national political scene and unable to participate in national decision making (...) their region was neglected by the government in all development programmes and allocation of resources. After independence, when foreign exchange was allocated by quotas, the east was passed by. However, this distance from the central government also meant that Nande were to some extent beyond its control. It gave them a certain degree of autonomy, making it easier to organize their own affairs in response to government neglect” (MacGaffey 1987: 146)

If the Nande aren't State friendly, why did they build the mayor's office?

My hypothesis is that the Nande were preempting objections against the idea of moving the capital city of North Kivu province from Goma to Butembo. In 2004, a lobbying group of Nande traders wanted the capital city of the province to move to Butembo, but the bid was rejected for lack of infrastructure in Butembo. With the capital city of the province relocated in Butembo, the Nande could achieve a complete autonomy of their region in terms of resource exploitation and cross-border trade. It would have also extended and officially recognized the social and political hegemony of the Nande "bourgeoisie," already legitimated by the Catholic Church officialdom, the figurehead mayor, and other customary figures of Nande authority, and premised upon not one but several relatively mobile forms of violence that supply the ultimate resources of coercion and, thus, hierarchical social order.

The physical infrastructure that was presumed inadequate in Butembo was then summarily supplied (even to excess). However, Butembo did not become the official capital. The major actors in this shadow capital are a group of import-export traders with different geographical origins and who constitute to top commercial hierarchy in Butembo and its hinterland. It is this group that imports the containers from East Africa, South Asia, and South East Asia. The merchandise is later divided between different market shops. This group gradually acquired respectability in the entire community and a central position in local politics.

This group qualifies as a "trust" network exactly because of high levels of internal cohesion and trust between members. Their wealth and the management method make them a special, external network compared to the norm of the community. At the same time, they remain embedded in different webs of relations in the community. Thus, they engage with other actors of civil society, especially the Catholic Church, into construction of development infrastructure such as mending roads, building schools, health

centers. Even though there remain many cases of poverty in and around Butembo, the impact of the Nande trading “bourgeoisie” has had a wide and positive impact in the community. Among the Nande the question of shifting to local mechanized production is recurrent. Traders have sent people in China, especially in Guangzhou to learn how the manufacture industry works. The current generation of traders is the second one. There is a sense of transmission of the business mentality to the next generation who has been educated in Moscow, London and New York. The biggest stumbling block is indeed the security issues. How does one protect one’s business in a stateless situation? The question of the role of conflict in constructing new forms of accumulations and the possibility of local mechanized production were at the center of research I undertook during my very recent trip in Butembo in June and July 2010.

III. Evidence of the Theoretical claim: Nande

Before moving any further, let us recall that this paper argues that the idea that African regimes can generally develop by building stronger state is at best misleading, disproved by Nande prosperity. As evidence of my theoretical claim, I will elaborate how the Nande network performs function of a state in absence of state. I’ll focus on education, security and general economic well-being.

A. Catholic University of Graben

This institution of higher education in Butembo was created ten years ago by the Roman Catholic bishop of Butembo, Monsignor Kataliko with the help of Nande traders. The Catholic University of Graben (UCG) is among the best institutions of higher education in the Congo. Despite the trouble which has characterized the Congo from 1996 to this day UCG has continue to function with its four faculties of law, civil engineering, medicine and political sciences. Most of the auditoria were built with the help of traders. To equip the university library, the bishop provided a list of 100 books to each trader to buy for the library. Each trader was proud to provide the 100 books asked

by the bishop. Many of the books come from the collaboration between UCG and the University of Grenoble in France. The university also contains a nutritional center and medical school student practice at the Matanda hospital run by the Catholic Church. Medicine for the nutritional center and Matanda hospital is imported by Nande traders. To solve the problem of personnel, the university flies professors from all over DRC and many Nande professors who live in Europe come regularly back to Butembo to teach at UCG without compensation. UCG has solved the problem of higher education in the region because before the creation of the Catholic University students have to travel to Kisangani in Oriental Province or to Kinshasa to pursue their higher education. The rector of the UCG, Abbe Malu-Malu was selected to organize the 2006 general elections in the DRC which has never had a democratic election for 40 years. The university is involved in the search for the city's electrification and traders are employing engineers from the UCG.

i. Island of peace in the middle of chaos

Located in the territory of Lubero in North Kivu Province, the population of Butembo is 90% from Nande ethnic group. Catholicism is very important among the Nande even though most traders are Baptists. Nande are mainly agriculturalists and pastoralist, but since 1980s and 1990s, they have been extremely dynamic in transnational trade (Raeymaekers 2007). Today Butembo is like a warehouse for merchandise going as far as Dubai, Taipei, Hong Kong, Jakarta, and Gouazoug (Mirembe, 2004). In August 2005, an unexpected atmosphere of peace and security existed on the axis Lubero-Beni, which includes the city of Butembo. To the north of this axis is the Ituri Region with its well documented troubles and massacresⁱⁱ. To the south are the remaining territories of North Kivu province, including Masisi, Walikali and Rutsuru. These three territories are home to many armed groups. Dissident General Nkunda Batware is based in Masisi with

2,000 armed militiamen, Rutsuru is dominated by the presence of FDLRⁱⁱⁱ and Walikali still hosts ethnic tensions between the Hunde and occupants of Rwandan origin. Amidst the troubled north Kivu region and Ituri, Butembo *really was* a safe haven. This impression of general security in Butembo was reinforced by the apparent security for commodity trading; Butembo is essentially a warehouse where hundreds of tons of merchandise are stored.

This may be surprising, given that the war in the Democratic Republic of the Congo has had devastating effects on the population. From a humanitarian point of view, the Congolese conflict has caused levels of suffering unparalleled in any recent war: as of 2006, out of a population of 58 million Congolese, up to four million have died.^{iv}

But, despite the high overall level of violence, there are stark differences between various local communities in the DRC. Some groups continue to suffer, but others, especially the Nande in northeastern Congo, managed not only to insulate themselves from violence nearby, but also to prosper in their transnational economic enterprises.

Explaining Nande-based security requires explaining some economic background. In the Nande region much of the financial resources for development have come from indigenous resources: traders who are members of the communities. (Vwakyanakazi 1982, MacGaffey 1987) According to Mbogha (1975) and MacGaffey (1987) Nande traders' successes stem from their having been marginalized^v, separated and taught a puritanical life. With the positions requiring state-credentialed education closed to them after independence, many Nande looked to commerce as their road to advancement. To this should be added an ethos that

developed particularly among Nande people during the colonial period as they strived, against considerable colonial restrictions, to cash up and have a place in a broader society. Greater proletarianization among the Nande also contributed to their seeking more upward mobility within the capitalist system.

In 1983 when the Mobutu regime liberalized the mineral exploitation in the entire country, many Nande traders acquired gold mines they exploit in artisanal way. So, to protect these mines traders employ militiamen they equip regularly with weapons, mostly AK47s. In fact Butembo maintains a sort of social cohesion thanks to the alliance between traders, who are in charge of economic production, the Catholic Church in charge of development sector and the militia responsible of the coercive power^{vi}. Militias are in fact junior partners to traders. The question of security is indeed paramount as traders have to evolve in a stateless context.

ii. **The Congo Wars**

Causes of wars: Land and Nationality

A close look at the origins of the Congo wars leads inevitably to a consideration of two phenomena: the first is the question of land ownership; second is the political manipulation of citizenship, where the citizenship of the Congolese of Rwandan origin has been switched on and off as expediency dictated (Jackson 2007). Land and citizenship are of paramount importance because traditionally both have been basis for social stratification. Historically, ethnic affiliation automatically conferred rights to the land. At the same time, the possession of land defined one's status with a community. Thus, the so-called "non-indigenous" communities were excluded from equal access to land. The Zairian land reform (in effect from the late 1960s) laid the foundation for endemic

political competition, particularly in the Kivus. Restrictions on citizenship eligibility for Congolese of Rwandan and Burundian heritage (including the Banyamulenge^{vii}) were directly related to the land question. Over more than 40 years since independence, the citizenship of these “Rwandophone” minorities has been switched on and off as expediency dictated by the political claims of so-called “autochthons” for land allocation and other vital entitlements.

iii. The land question as cause of conflict

The moment the Zairian state proclaimed that all land belonged to the state in the proclamation of the famous Bakajika law in 1973, land lost its customary identity and, paradoxically, become commodifiable. Since the land, according to the new law, belonged to the state, all customary transactions regarding land became illegal. As Vlassenroot (2003) puts it, the Bakajika law was indeed a political instrument in the hands of the rural capitalist elite because they were able to buy land from the government administration and expropriate the landless farmers. Here, we have an instance of something resembling Marx’s “primitive accumulation,” facilitated by the state but without the compensatory phase of proletarianization. Johan Pottier (2003) argues that there is a clear link between conflict in the DRC and the land question. Access to land was the reason of the first outburst of violence in the Masisi region and has remained the driving force ever since behind the Congolese conflict. Indeed, land was traditionally a common good in the sense that it was regulated by customary law based on communal territorial ownership. The 1993 land reform completely disrupted the traditional modes of social stratification of various communities in the Kivus. The wealthy in the region bought land, putting hundreds of landless farmers on the street. The latter became easy targets

for recruitment by local “strongmen” who, along with thousands of unemployed youth and children, formed the ranks of the first turmoil that erupted from the early 1990s onward. During his military campaign in 1996 toward Kinshasa, the then rebel leader, Laurent Kabila, relied upon the “*kadogo*” (the smaller ones, children) and landless farmers.

The large scale expropriation of land made possible by the Bakajika law had the effect of benefiting those of the rural capitalist class who were able to utilize connections to the public administration. Many Nande traders similarly bought property titles during this period, further shirking the land available for use by peasants and farmers. During the 1980s and the 90s, according to Raeymaekers (2007) vacant lands were extensively bought by traders with the complicity of corrupt administrators or customary chiefs. These deals were possible because of an incessant “reinterpretation” of the existing legislative conventions through bribery. The main consequence was the shift of ownership from the communal peasantry to the rural capitalists, but also a complete reconfiguration of the existing relations of production.

In 2000, Mr. Mbanga, a trader in Butembo, acquired a large portion of fertile land at Masereka through dubious practices, by corrupting the administrative authorities in Goma. Mr. Mbanga is from the same region, and he knows that people had been using this land for at least three decades. Despite the fact that he acquired the land title and is therefore the legal owner, he did not have the courage to chase people off of his land. It was only in 2006 that his elder son finally initiated action through the justice department of the province, to evict all the occupants of his land. The eviction was resisted in the beginning, but in the end, police burned villages and people were put off the land they had cultivated

for decades. During an interview with the son, who is still a student of business management in London, he told me that his father was unable to execute the eviction order because he has many roots in this community. Since the son did not grow up in the area, he could carry out the eviction order. To the question of what he thinks of the relationship that bound his family to the community which is now landless, he replied that he was not concerned about it. This eviction, carried out with the heavy hand of armed violence, has created a big tension between the evicted community and the family of this trader. As a result, many young men from this community have joined militia groups affiliated with other traders in Butembo and the surrounding area.

As Raeymarkers puts it,

“rather than contributing to a peasant uprising, the Bakajika land reform precipitated a rapid transformation of customary property right systems to the advantage of rural ‘capitalists’, who used their connections to the state and non-state institutions to secure their accumulated property and transform it into capital, eventually” (Raeymaekers 2007: 98).

Yet, as I have suggested, the land question is intimately connected to the emergence of large number of restless unemployed youth, ready to join militia groups.

The Bakajika law did not wipe away completely the customary land legislation that maintained its relevance as a signifier of ethnic belonging, however. Instead, it created a kind of “dual” system of land property. Peasants were confused and the dominant economic elites took advantage of this confusion to appropriate land from one system or the other, according to whatever suited them. In this period

originates the emergence of the class of rural entrepreneurs. In the region of Luoto, according to Tsongo (1994), three quarters of the land “liberated” by the state was then bought by local entrepreneurs.

In the Nande region, agricultural surplus produced on the acquired land was used to impel developing trade enterprises; value-added from land was invested in transport, trade and construction rather than in pastoral investment, as in Masisi or Ituri (Vlassenroot 2002, Vlassenroot and Raeymaekers 2004).

In Masisi in particular, competition over land turned into a question of citizenship because land was related to ethnic belonging and immigrants from neighboring countries like Rwanda, and to a lesser extent Burundi, were excluded from land ownership. But, with the Bakajika law that liberated land from the customary legislation to ostensibly make it state property, many immigrants, especially the Banyamulenge (the Congolese Tutsi of Rwandan heritage) managed to buy and occupy large portions of land. In the 1990s, for example, 90 percent of land in the Masisi and the Rutsuru area was occupied respectively by Banyamulenge (Vlassenroot 2003) and the Banyarwanda^{viii}.

B. Provision of Security

To understand the current security issue, it is important to understand first the ways Nande traders have created the equivalent of political institutions to defend their commerce while the Congolese state has effectively vanished and numerous armed rebel groups have contended for territorial control. The primary aim is to understand how Nande traders reacted to the political disruption characterized by the fragmentation of violence in the DRC.

i. Nande and the AFDL

The *Simba* from Manguredjipa, the *Bahandule* from the Rwenzori and *Kasindiens* from Kasindi - all Nande militia groups - were mobilized by Nande traditional chiefs to fight against Kinyarwanda speaking pastoralist groups in the Masisi area in early 1993. The purported reason for this conflict was to “defend” the Nande against the alleged expansionist ambitions of Congolese Tutsi, who were beginning to acquire land in the Nande frontier region of Lubero. These militia, also known as May May or self-defense movements, played the role of hardening the Nande *ethnic* frontier, and thus helped to draw a clear line of division between them and the AFDL rebellion (Reaymaekers 2007). Because of the strong presence of Congolese Tutsi in the AFDL, the Nande remained outside of Kabila’s campaign (Marar 1998). Beginning in February 1998, when local May May, at the instigation of Nande traders, proclaimed the autonomy of Butembo vis-à-vis the Tutsi dominated AFDL movement, Kabila sent in troops which brutally repressed the May May and burned houses in Butembo and its surroundings. Predictably, this repression escalated the situation; the Catholic Church, traders, and other members of Nande civil society in Butembo became increasingly and visibly supportive of the May May fighting against the “Tutsi” elements within the AFDL government. As a result of this tension, Nande ethnic boundaries became more and more hermetic vis-à-vis the neighboring communities, especially the Kinyarwanda speakers. As in the rest of eastern Congo, the May May (largely comprised of youth who used the wars in order to pursue social and economic gain) were thus considered “liberators”, and guardians of “tradition” against the Tutsi occupying oppressors (Jackson 2001, Raeymaekers 2007). As the conflict escalated in eastern Congo, this mythology flourished even as the Nande entrepreneurs and

their junior partners, the militias, continued to take advantage of the local peasantry.

ii. The second War

Various promises that had been made to different stakeholders in the anti-Mobutu campaign of 1996 were rapidly supplanted by the autocratic and eccentric style of government under Kabila, reminiscent of the old days of Mobutu. As Moore (2001) puts it, the neo-Mobutist dictatorship of Laurent Kabila transformed the world's most attractive mineral market into a buccaneer industry, enriching himself and his family network at the expense of the Congolese people. Thus, many Congolese were deeply dissatisfied by the pace and extent of the government's promised economic and political reforms. Further, Kabila's relations with his foreign allies – Rwandans and Ugandans – were also decisive. Because he did not have a significant base of support in the Congo, Kabila had to rely on a continued Rwandan and Ugandan military presence. He was readily portrayed as a Rwandan and Ugandan puppet. In the end, Kabila was forced to distance himself from his allies. Thus, in August 2, 1998, the Rally for Congolese Democracy (RCD), a rebel group created by the Rwandans, launched an offensive against the Kabila government with the aim of occupying Kinshasa and removing Kabila from power.

The Southern African Development Community (SADC), an organization the DRC joined in 1997, sent troops to defend the Kabila regime. Thus, Zimbabwe and Angola entered the war on August 20, 1998 and defeated the rebel forces and the Rwandan Patriotic Army (RPA) troops advancing on Kinshasa (Nest 2006). However, from their strongholds in the eastern DRC, Rwandan and Ugandan forces advanced westward toward the diamond fields of East

Kasai and South toward the copper mines of Katanga. At the same time, a new rebel movement – *Mouvement pour la Liberation du Congo (MLC)* – advanced west and south along the Congo River toward Kinshasa from its strongholds in the Equator Province. Headed by Mobutu’s son-in-law, Jean-Pierre Bemba, the MLC was a creation of the Ugandan government, and was run by wealthy private entrepreneurs and some former high-ranking figures from the Mobutu era.

Many neighboring countries joined the war on both sides. On one side, troops from Zimbabwe, Angola, Namibia, Chad, Eritrea, and Sudan came to the aid of the Kabila government’s troops. Two Burundian rebel groups fighting the Tutsi-dominated regime in Burundi also allied themselves with the Congolese government. The Nande May May, in addition to the Hutu Interhamwe and ex-FAR forces, joined the Force Democratic de Liberation du Rwanda (FDLR), which was formed by the exiled Rwandans in 2000 with the objective of overthrowing the Tutsi-dominated Rwandan government, and they also rallied to the side of the Kabila government against the Rwandan army.

On the rebel side, the main Congolese groups were the RCD and the MLC. Both groups sought a share of state power. These rebel groups were militarily and organizationally linked to Rwanda and Uganda. As Lemarchand (2001) puts it, with the RCD rebellion, the question of the Kivus seemed to return “with a vengeance” on Congo’s political scene; not in the form of any political participation by its population, but through the rapid proliferation of several armed bands with various origins and sources of support. As alliances changed hands, and yesterday’s friends became tomorrow’s enemies (Willame 1999), the war brought about a complex and highly

unpredictable climate in which the use of violence for political and economical gain expanded dramatically. Relations within rebel groups, between them and their foreign backers, were constantly fractious. In 1999, fighting broke out between the Rwandan and Ugandan armies over who should lead the RDC, resulting in the group splitting into two factions: RCD-Goma and RCD-ML (Movement of liberation).

iii. Nande Traders and the Rebellions

When the war started in August 1998, many Nande traders left Butembo in order to secure their business. Their decision to return was motivated by the invitation of the rebels. As Ndivito, the president of FEC puts it, “the combination of economic crisis and political insecurity left us little choice but to collaborate directly with the rebellion to ensure local security.” But, as we will see, Nande traders did not only cooperate with the rebel movements, but they turned out to play a vital role as creditors and clients of the rebels. Since most of the rebel movements had big financial needs, they sought to borrow money from the traders. These debts were paid back through tax exoneration and suppression of customs services for goods transported across borders. At the beginning, this practice was said to be exceptional by rebel leaders, but it ended up becoming generalized. Eventually, traders themselves started to propose pre-financing rebel movements. The traders were the big winners, as they imposed interest rates up to 50 per cent. Since the rebels could never pay back their loans, traders were simply allowed to transport their merchandise in and out of the country free of charge.

In a memorandum from the rebel movement, Congolese Rally for Democracy (RCD), dated September 22, 1998, one reads: “To meet the urgent priority of the army, the

authorities in charge of finance have asked any trader in the region an amount of \$ 900,000. This amount is an equivalent of the customs service fees of 50 containers of clothes. The money has to be given in US dollars” (Kambale Mirembe, 2004). As is evident, the strategy of the traders was to cooperate with rebel movements in order to secure their business. In a letter of July 2, 2001, the president of the Federation of Entrepreneurs of Congo in Butembo (FEC) wrote: “Despite a very difficult environment, traders from Butembo have responded positively to many solicitations from the new political power by pre-financing its activities.” (Kambale Mirembe, 2004). Thus, some Nande traders plainly took advantage of rebellions in North Kivu to increase their productivity by over-billing rebel leaders who granted them tax and customs service exoneration. Nonetheless, in general terms, insecurity had a very bad effect on trade in the region. Some traders had to discontinue their business in other regions of the country such as Kisangani, Isiro, Ituri, etc., simply to protect their lives. Similarly, clients from other parts of the country could not make the trip to Butembo. The general populace saw a severe decline in their purchasing power, due to insecurity. Moreover, uncontrolled May May groups pillaged some farms.

Despite the fact that traders in Butembo were sufficiently savvy to protect their business against the political disruption and made tremendous gains from the opportunities that war offered to them, it remains true that the environment of generalized insecurity created by the violence made it very difficult for them to carry on their business inside the country.

This, indeed, poses the general question of how business is protected in a stateless situation. Even in 2006,

state power remained really non-existent in Butembo. There is a figurehead Mayor whose role has been reduced to publicly conveying messages from the Roman Catholic bishop or from the Confederation of traders (FEC) to the general population. Everybody in Butembo knows that the real decision makers in the city are the traders and to a lesser extent, also the Roman Catholic hierarchy. Many projects in Butembo have been realised through the initiative of the Church and the traders, with very minimal involvement or intervention from the official representatives of the state. Traders could use the May militia to intimidate a foreign contractor. There indeed seems to be a viable *de facto* local state, run in this manner by the traders and the Church, with only a nominal role relegated to the representative of the official state.

According to Charles Tilly's account of the origins of the European system, coercion and capital go hand in hand. Tilly maintains that, historically, the "capitalized coercion mode," of government which involved elements of both "coercion-intensive" and "capital-intensive" modes, proved most effective in war and therefore provided a compelling model "which European states soon followed (Tilly 1992:30). In the absence of a powerful state, merchants draw protection for their merchandise and their enterprises from militias, while militias gain access to military means from merchants' support. The formation and continued existence of a state implies a constant process of separating off certain aspects of social relations and defining them as "political", and hence, as separate from the "economic" (Holloway 1994). Civil wars tend to involve a blurring of these reified divisions.

C. Economic well-being in a State without State

When I arrived in Butembo, my goal was to observe the Nande's trading networks and their Dubai and Hong Kong connexions. I was interested not only in the Nande's trading networks and economic success but also the interconnection between their prosperity, their relative security, and the effectiveness of their strategies at insulating themselves from violence nearby. I retained a certain measure of optimism about the presumably innocuous character of what might be called the Nande "model" or strategy, which could conceivably be generalized to the rest of the country or to other African contexts. After almost ten months in Butembo trying to figure out how Nande society is being reconfigured and reconstructed in this context of violence and transnational trade relations, I came to recognize that there is indeed a *de facto* local state run by the traders, in concert with the Catholic Church officialdom. After a long period of participant observation, moreover, I concluded that there has been a profound complicity of Nande commercial success and regional prosperity with the surrounding civil war and the perpetuation of violence. Indeed, some Nande traders were direct beneficiaries and also direct financiers of various militias and also entangled with the so-called autochthonist movement, not only against the Rwandan invaders but also the Congolese "Rwandans", as described by Stephen Jackson (2004). Thus, it seems that the real third leg of the triumvirate is plainly not the weak central state officials but rather the organized violence and coercive capacity of the militias. It is known in Butembo that if you want to reach the rebel leaders, you must borrow the bishop's car, which they easily recognize. In fact, the bulk of the local militias' membership is comprised of former choir members, altar boys, and scouts. The Catholic Church has an indubitable persuasive power over the militias.

Traders, especially members of the G8, are each owners of gold mines in the region (especially at Mangurugipa, 60 miles north of Butembo). They acquired them in the 1980s when the Mobutu regime

liberalized the mining sector in Zaire. To protect these mines against rivals or other contenders, traders have contracted militias as permanent private security forces often led by members of their own extended families. They provide weapons for them in exchange for security services. During the war, as we have seen, militias were used to protect the region against a probable invasion by Rwandan forces or Kinyarwanda-speaking rebels. The militias exuded a sense of relative independence vis-a-vis their bosses during that period. Lots of cows belonging to traders were slaughtered for food, and some farms were decimated by the same militias whose groups has indeed been rather complex. But, as I have already indicated, these relations are significantly based on kinship and ethnic solidarity. Militia were sometimes used to intimidate competitors or other people whom the traders considered dangerous for their business. A South African contractor who helped the traders to build the hydro-electric dam, for instance, was kidnapped by the militias after he strongly disagreed with the terms of negotiation that the traders were proposing.

In fact, many of the decisive contemporary features of global capital accumulation converge in this apparently remote geographical borderland, where ruthless plunder and genocidal civil war are the complements to spectacularly prosperous networks of transnational trade.

i. Question of energy

Paradoxically, this is also the major obstacle to expand, industrialize and increase the local value added. Security is indeed the major obstacle to industrialization as insisted one of the interviewers in Butembo. In the context of "cold war" or something in between war and peace, it is very difficult to think of a long term investment a mechanized production requires. No serious business person would open an important factory or a firm in this paradoxical context of "neither war nor peace" (Raeymaekers 2004). Transnational

trade boom seems to be the highest forms of capital accumulation that this situation could allow.

If security is the major obstacle, the immediate obstacle to any effort of industrialization for the time being is the lack of energy. The problem of electric power is paramount because no mechanization of production is possible without an important production of electricity.

ii. The problem of energy

The case of electrification of Butembo is even more interesting. The corporation of traders wanted to electrify Butembo. A French firm estimated the construction of the dam and the distribution of electricity in the city at 8 million US dollars. Traders considered the price to be too high. Then, John De Bruyn, a South African engineer, offered to do the job at half of the price proposed by the French company. The traders granted the contract to Clakson Power, Mr. De Bruyn's company. The contract was of 3 million US dollars. Traders had to finance at the level of 10% and the project would finance itself with the commercialization of electricity. After many months of work, the electrical dam was constructed, and SENOKI (Societe d'Electricite du Nord Kivu) was put in charge of the distribution of the electric power in Butembo. Unfortunately, Clakson Power was able to generate only a very few kilowatts per month. It was a complete fiasco because the company was able to distribute electricity only once a month, and this, according to local engineers, was only experimental.

I attended a meeting of SENOKI consumers in October 2005. It turned out that the meeting was attended by many local intellectuals who chastised traders for not having consulted with them at the inception of the project. Some

even went so far as to rejoice about the failure of the hydro-electric project. If one reads between the lines, one sees that these indictments underscore the struggle between the two sorts of elite in Butembo, the commercial elite and intellectual elite. The latter are blatantly disregarded by the former in matters of general interests, such as building an airport, mending roads or constructing an electrical dam. The commercial elite, most of them uneducated, are accustomed to doing things according to their own prerogatives and by their own protocols. It is only when the third group, which is the Catholic Church (the religious elite), intervenes that there is any coordination of activities, such as constructing the university auditoriums for students of the Catholic University of Graben or giving donations for the construction of the University of Great Lakes, the Protestant university.

According to an interviewer SENOKI contract was not well understood by the Nande traders. Thirty six months after the contract was signed nothing concrete was seen. At that point the contract should have been cancelled. But, M. Bruyn's strategy was to deal directly with traders rather than with the company's board. According to some educated elites, traders had a complex of a white man. That is the reason why they couldn't conceal the contract.

In other words, one key dimension of the power struggle between elites in Butembo is defined by the antagonisms between an intellectual elite, who are generally leading a miserable life because the government does not function properly and cannot pay them, and an uneducated commercial elite, whose businesses are flourishing and who are in the position of imposing order on the conduct of municipal affairs on their own terms. The traders, whose influence has tremendously increased over the last ten years

with the disintegration of the Congo, are indeed the new power brokers, and they show it sometimes by bullying or marginalizing non-commercial elites, with the exception of the officials at the Catholic Church. The question of energy unifies all the groups, traders and non-traders, educated and non-educated. Today Butembo is electrified by small generators of 5 KVA imported from Japan. However, there are a small dozen of small hydro-electrical dams in Butembo and its hinterland: Katwa, Mutshanga, Luwoto, UCG, Butuwe, Maseka, Lukanga, and Kyondo. These micro hydro-electrical centrals produce a maximum of 35 KVA each. This is very far from 400 KVA a productive firm would required according engineer Murembe. However, traders, the catholic hierarchy, and interested people are thinking of ways of producing electricity for the city of Butembo. Three possibilities were being seriously contemplated:

a. Semuliki

The possibility of building a hydro-electric dam on Semuliki river which could provide electricity to the whole region. A dam in Semuliki River would be the ideal solution to produce the needed power for mechanized production in Butembo and its hinterland. However the major obstacle is that Semuliki River is part of the rivers which feed the Nile. And Egypt and Sudan who use 87% of the Nile flow have the legal right on this lion's share of Nile River water and all the rivers falling into the Nile. Despite demands from other countries who share the Nile Basin – Ethiopia, Tanzania, Uganda, Kenya, DRC, Rwanda, and Burundi – Egypt and to a less extent Sudan are refusing to relinquish a drop of their legal right the lion's share of Nile river water. Egypt has repeatedly cited its "historical" right on the river which provides the country of 80 million people with 90% of its water needs (African News, New Vision 11 June 2010). Egypt

is hanging on the agreement signed in 1959 with Sudan - following Sudan's independence in 1956 - which allocated 55.5 billion cubic meters of the Nile to Egypt, and 18.5 billion to Sudan, a combined total of 87% of the Nile flow. Furthermore, Egypt claims that its water needs are expected to exceed its supply by 2017 (Egyptian government report 2009).

It seemed that it is out of question to build a dam on Semuliki because the Egypt would put its veto power it was given by a 1929 colonial era treaty with Britain. Egypt is exerting efforts with leaders of the upstream countries including the DRC to persuade it not to put any obstacle to the flow of Nile water. Unless the DRC government negotiates with Egyptian authority, it will be difficult to build a hydro-electric dam on Semuliki river to electrify Beni and Butembo.

b. Kasindi

The second possibility of the electrification of Butembo is to connect the cities of Beni and Butembo with the power from Uganda. The Kasindi border city of Uganda and DRC receive electricity from Uganda, It would be possible to connect Beni and Butembo. Electricity from Uganda to Beni and Butembo sounds realistic but poses a political problem of dependency toward a neighbouring country, namely Uganda. Moreover, Uganda and the DRC had a contentious at the International court about the destruction following Ugandan and Rwandan confrontations in Kisangani in 2003 and 2004. Uganda was condemned at The Hague to a fine of 4 billion US dollar as compensation to the DRC for the destruction of the city of Kisangani. Uganda has accepted to pay the fine to the DRC. Uganda is proposing to supply the electricity to the DRC cities of Beni and Butembo in exchange for the fine of the 4

billion US dollar; fine The Hague had condemned Uganda to pay to the DRC.

The Congo has refused that Uganda should pay its fine by providing electricity to the city of Beni and Butembo. The Congolese government would prefer Uganda to honour his fine of 4 billion US dollar first and it will negotiate separately the supply of power to the two cities of Beni and Butembo. This possibility is excluded for the time being.

c. SENOKI

The third possibility is to revive SENOKI by a multinational or a national company. In fact SENOKI is ready to keep only 10% of its action if there is a company which accepts step in. The new company could build on the pre-existing electricity cables network installed by SENOKI. Some interviewers think that an individual trader could buy the licence of producing electricity from SENOKI. Kamungele, the wealthiest trader in Butembo thought about it once, but he lacks the courage to realize his project. For the Bishop of Butembo, reviving SENOKI is the most realistic solution to the problem of electricity in Butembo. The New ambassador of the Czech Republic in DRC has promised to send experts to study the possibility of producing electricity for city dwellers from SENOKI dam. During the last elections of 2006, president Kabila offered a generator to produce electricity for the city, but it consumes too much gasoline and it was just abandoned. In fact, some traders who import mini generator from Japan worked on the failure of the president's gift. If SENOKI remains one of the most realistic possibilities of providing electricity in Butembo in the near future, there is also many small rivers in and around Butembo where hydro-electric dams could be built. There are for example half dozen of

rivers which could potentially offer electricity to Butembo: Kisalala, Ivuwa, Kakova, Kyondo, Taliha, Visiki, and Kainan.

The lack of electricity is the major stumbling block to the industrialization of Butembo which could lead to a mechanized production of some items imported from Dubai, Gouazhoug or Jakarta. When the Nande will solve their energy problem, they would be able to generate enough revenue and improve further the standard of economic well-being, education and security in the region. But, how do the Nande has gone so far in such a chaotic situation?

IV. How do the Nande do it? The Power of Trust and Diplomacy

As I stated earlier, Nande traders qualify as trust Network. And according to Charles Tilly (2004) a trust is a property of interpersonal relations in which people take the risk of each other's failure or betrayal. Trust networks organized around kinship, long-distance trade, or workers' mutual aid rarely faces the threat of death or dispossession.

The question is then, how members of a trust network maintain cohesion, control and trust when their members spread out into a world rich with other opportunities and commitment? The limited cases of isolated communes and religious communities are easy to understand because their very insulation from the world facilitates continuous monitoring, mutual aid, reciprocity, trust and barriers to exit. But geographically dispersed trust networks somehow managed to produce similar effects as isolated communities. Maintaining boundaries between "us" and "them" clearly plays an important part in trust networks' continued operation (Tilly 2004c, 2005). Nande traders constitute a trust network. They offer support and connections for those who are inside the network in their

transnational trading activities. Nande trust network is made of transnational “informal” economic entrepreneurs who supply the equivalent of state institutions in the absence of central regulatory framework. Through their transnational contact, Nande traders were able to avoid two attempts of invasions; one from the South and the other from the north.

The invasion by the Rwandan backed rebel group led by the dissident general of the Congolese army, Nkunda Batware, took place in June 2004. According to local explanation, this invasion by the Rwandan backed rebels was allowed by the Bush administration. The later was informed by the Rwandan government that Nande traders were trading uranium with member of Al-Qaida networks.

Rwandans were aware that by claiming ‘uranium’ and ‘Al-Qaida’ it was enough to attract the Bush administration attention. So, Rwandans were allowed to use its proxy to invade Butembo. Since the Nande militia could not stop Nkunda’s progression to Butembo. Nande traders decided to send the Catholic bishop Melchisedec Sikulu to the Vatican in Rome to explain that there is no uranium in Butembo. The Vatican accordingly sent a representative to the state department to explain that Nande trade gold and not uranium. The State Department sent an emissary to Butembo who had a meeting with traders, the bishop. Convinced that Butembo had no uranium and Nande never traded with Al-Qaida, the US envoy sent a report to Washington and the rebel progression was halted immediately.

The second attempt by the rebel to invade Butembo came from the northern region of Bafwasende and was led by Jean Pierre Bemba. M. Bemba initiated the operation “Effacer le tableau” (clean the blackboard). This operation was meant to come from Bafwasende and move downward to Butembo and clean up along the way all resistance. Many pygmies were killed during the operation “effacer le tableau.” Nande militia could not resist and stop the Mbemba’s troop

progression. Once again Nande resorted to their bishop who mobilized all the international media including France International Radio (RFI), BBC and the Voice of America (VOA) and explained to the entire world that Bemba soldiers were not only killing pygmies, but they were also eating them in a kind of anthropophagic rites^{ix}. The news was so sensational that Bemba had to stop his progression and even the ICC (International Criminal Court) sent an investigator to what was happening.

My first observation was that there was indeed a *de facto* local state run by the Catholic Church, traders and very weak state representatives. However, after many months of observation, I found out that the real third piece of the trilogy was not the weak central state officials but rather the organized violence and coercion of the militias.

Herald, it is instructive to recall Holloway's distinction between the (territorial, usually national) "state" and the social relation of "the political," which is not necessarily orchestrated through a state as such but does certainly require one or another deployment of organized coercion/violence.

In this case, there seems to be a very clear social and political hegemony of the Nande "bourgeoisie," legitimated through the Church officialdom, the figurehead mayor, and perhaps other customary figures of Nande authority, premised upon not one but several relatively mobile formations of violence that supply the ultimate resources of coercion and thus social order. Outside of its central sphere of control, there is greater or lesser chaos and varying degrees of a reign of terror by the respective militias which even seem to act as *de facto* territorial states in their imposition of "taxes" and the collection of tariffs and customs duties through border policing practices, but the capitalists clearly seem to rely upon the availability of the militias' violence to secure their own ends, as needed, while

sustaining an uneasy kind of mutual dependency. As long as the traders don't try to impose themselves (their rule or "law") too much on the militias' spheres of brutal extraction in the peripheries of the Nande center, and as long as the militias steer clear of that center and do not disrupt the Nande capitalists' prosperous sphere of control and stability, then there is a definite if somewhat elusive correspondence between the traders social and economic power, expressed as virtual political rule, and the militia's various reigns of terror in a kind of multiplicity of somewhat overlapping and intersecting spaces. Seen economically, the militias then look like junior partners to the trader capitalists who ultimately have real production (not merely trade) as their base of accumulation, and the only economic resource the militias have is the sheer piracy of their arms. It is much more sustaining and lucrative for them as well as the traders to maintain this compact. There is a kind of intersection of this kind of predatory violence with what has come to be known as Marx's notion of "primitive accumulation". All the features of global capital accumulation seem to converge in this remote geographical area, and relations of productions are reproduced and changed.

V. Conceptual/Definitional claim: Is it a State?

The research site shows that the state is never the unique and exclusive form of social relations, which are "always undetermined, agonistic, and unresolved." These "relations of struggle" entail a "full panoply of contests over objectification and fetishization of human productive powers as alien forces of domination" for which "the state tends... to be the hegemonic manifestation (De Genova 2007: 442; Holloway 1994). The Nande region is one of the many places where the state is continually both experienced and undone through the illegibility of its own practices, documents, and words. Unlike in the rationalized world of Weberian abstractions, the DRC state, as seen from its margins, is inscrutable, incoherent, unpredictable, and unreliable. But to characterize these

features as “failure” is merely to retain and recapitulate a great many statist fantasies.

In the tradition of political science, the state is taken as a basic, and largely unquestioned, category. Categories such as authority, rights or sovereignty are generally discussed in the tradition of political theory, but the state, as a category, is simply assumed. The theoretical challenges defined in this study are precisely to dissolve the state as a category in the Kantian sense^x; it entails understanding the state not as a thing in itself, but as a social form, a form of social relations (Holloway 1994). By defining the state as a social phenomenon, as a form of social relations, i.e. relations between people, the study recognizes the fluidity, the unpredictability and the instability of this category. Indeed, these relations have solidified certain forms that appear to have acquired their own autonomy, their own dynamic. By taking these forms (state, money, kinship or ethnicity) as given, some academic disciplines have indeed contributed to their apparent rigidity. The state, then, appears rigid, and the classic Weberian conception of the state treats that semblance of rigidity as a given and positive fact^{xi}. As the present study will show, after first displaying how the debate on the state has evolved within African scholarship, the notion that African states have failed or collapsed is part of the same movement to reify and fetishize the colonially imposed Weberian model of statehood.

In Africa, the majority of the population lives from socio-economic activities of the so-called “informal economy”. During the colonial and post-colonial period, Nande people who felt marginalized from the central government (Macgaffey 1987), resorted to these activities to claim their social rights and to construct an alternative to the existing political and social project. Nande’s informal or parallel economic activities are deployed in local, regional and transnational markets. If international exchange is concerned with transactions between nation-states, then transnational trade goes

beyond state systems. Nande trade is organized in networks and some of its practices are “informal^{xii}”. Their trading activities are deployed in local, regional and transnational markets. Nande traders never qualified their activity as being “illegal”. They argue that “legality” or “illegality” conjure the false impression of a state functioning “normally”. The Zairian state failed its people, they reason, so the notion of “illegality” no longer applied because there was and still is no working state. For some traders, as long as value was being returned to the region, there was no reason to worry about ‘illegality’ in a corrupted and predatory government (Marysse). A. Mbembe (1992) points out, illegal networks are not only strategies for survival but also a space of resistance against the violence generated by the failure of the postcolonial modes of accumulation, state dictatorship and its distorted episteme of “leadership”. Indeed, “illegality”, as De Genova puts it, makes sense only within the framework of a nation-state which produces laws that legalize or illegalize particular practices (2002). As categories, illegality, informality or even “criminality” are *forms* of social relations in the course of being objectified, and subject to the dynamics of historical struggle over their composition, decomposition and recomposition (Holloway 1995, De Genova 2002, 2004, Kwansingan s.d.). For some traders, likewise, it seems that new forms of social relations generated by new political and historical contexts constitute their particular space of “informality” or “illegality”. It is indeed within these grey zones of “legality” and “illegality” that Nande trading activities reshape and re-invent the “state”.

Conclusion

Nande traders are operating in the absence of a central state. They have, however, created their own version of a functional regional state. Nande traders have decided, for example, to fix and maintain the roads leading in and out of Butembo. Each trader has 40 miles of road to mend. They do organize tollgates where cars paid according

to their weight. Traders build bridges sometimes in agreement with the mayor. Traders pay militaries, feed them, house them and drive them. The federation of traders has its own court where disputes are resolved. Many disputes concerning succession, land ownership are resolved in traders' court rather than the state court. Traders have distributed food, clothes and medicine to refugees from the trouble region of Ituri. Schools and health care centers are run by churches with donations from traders. In the absence of DRC government and in the presence of competing rebel groups for the control of the coercive power, Nande trading networks have managed to protect a self-sustaining and prosperous transnational enterprise. Like Italian and Dutch merchants in the 17th century, Nande traders have created their own access to defensive means in the presence of marauders, such as state predators and rebels.

This study has examined the relationship between economic development and the existence of formal and centralized state. Indeed, development problems in the DRC are paramount, but one of the lessons the Nande case study teaches us is that amid the concern in Africa over strong or weak or fragile 'state,' economic empowerment may not be strong in so-called strong states or weak in weak states. The Nande traders' example of economic governance outside the framework of the state is not simply the black market economy that runs against or alongside the neo-liberal order (Reno 1995), but also the value-system of elite distinction as well as a functional economy that may provide a shadow governance, and even government.

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ⁱ The title is indeed similar to Peter Little's *Somalia: Economy without state* (2003). But the concept of economic empowerment goes beyond the concept of economy to include, as we will see, the provision of education, security and economic well being.

ⁱⁱ Human Rights Watch report 2005, and MONUC report on human rights abuse in Ituri, 2005.

ⁱⁱⁱ FDLR standing for *Force Democratique pour la Liberation du Rwanda* is a political organization representing Rwandan Hutu refugees in eastern Congo. It was created in 2000 in opposition to the Kagame regime and included many Rwandan refugees who had been present on Congolese territory since 1994. Propaganda of the current Rwandan government wants people to believe that FDLR is formed of "ex-FAR/Interahamwes" suggesting that it is a criminal group of "genocidaires" (Auteserre, 2006) Actually, FDLR is an inclusive

term regardless of affiliation to armed groups, innocent as well as guilty of the 1994 genocide.

^{iv} See www.theIRC.org and Auteserre, S. unpublished doctoral thesis, on “local violence, international indifference, 2006).

^v The theory of marginalization has been disputed by some (see Raeymaekers, 2007) because Nande people were in the Mobutu government in prominent positions. Pierre Pay Pay was the governor of the Central Bank, and another Nande was the governor of North Kivu. But the marginalization hypothesis is demonstrated by some documents such the letter of Bishop Kataliko in 1971 titled “Aide-toi, le ciel t’aidera” where he called for self empowerment to develop the region. Another important document is a letter of a group of Nande politicians to the Kabila government in 1998 where they complained that even though the Nande made up 60% of the population of North Kivu Province, they were always underrepresented in the government of former president Kasa-Vubu and Mobutu. See Kasinia et al. 1998. and Willame 1999: 152.

^{vi} At the Baptist mission of Katwa, on the outskirts of Butembo, Christians were separated from other members of the Nande community. They were in the parish with missionaries trying to live according to the Gospel’s recommendations (see Jack Nelson 1982).

^{vii} The term Banyamulenge refers to Congolese of Tutsi descents who live in a mountain called Mulenge.

^{viii} Literally people of Rwanda. Indeed the nomenclature in this region is politicized, fluid and difficult: some scholars refer to the same collective population as Banyarwanda, other call them the Rwandophone or the Kinyarwanda speakers. In South Kivu they are referred to as Banyamulenge or Congolese Tutsi to distinguish them from Congolese Hutu. Banyarwanda is a generic term used to refer to both Congolese Hutu and Tutsi of Rwandan heritage.

^{ix} For more details on the accusation of cannibalism see Johan Pottier (2007).

^x From a Hegelian perspective, Kantian categories are hard, rigid, absolutely separated from one another (Kant I. [1781-1787], *Critique of Pure Reason*, translated by Werner S. Pluhar; introduction by Patricia Kitcher; Indianapolis/Cambridge: Hachett Publishing Compagny, Inc., 1996; p.132: Categories.

^{xi} This appearance of rigidity, stability, and fixity is what Marx would characterize as fetishization, or in DeGenova's gloss, reification.

^{xii} MacGaffey refers to the 'real economy' to signify that this is in fact what people live on. For William Johnson (2003), it is the "real market" to be introduced to the theory of international exchange. In contrast, working on Chad Basin, in Roitman (1990) sees in these activities as an extension of state regulatory mechanisms.